

AN INQUIRY
INTO
THE PRINCIPLES
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
MOST CONDUCTIVE TO
HUMAN HAPPINESS.

BY
WILLIAM THOMPSON,
AUTHOR OF "LABOUR REWARDED," "AN APPEAL OF WOMEN," &c. &c.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE THIRD EDITION.

SINCE the publication of the last edition of this work, now nearly twenty years ago, a great advance has been made in the public mind of Europe and America on the subject-matters treated by the author.

Noticing first the question of religious associations as affecting wealth and happiness, which is discussed in the course of this "Inquiry," it is to be observed that there has been in foreign countries a great diminution of the power of the priesthood, and a corresponding elasticity of the peoples in their application to industrial pursuits. Especially has this been the case in Belgium and Italy, and more recently in Austria and Spain. At home there is a constant tendency to abolish religious distinctions before the law, and to make the support of religious associations voluntary. Practical proofs of this are to be found in the admission of Jews to the legislature, and Roman Catholics to the highest offices in the service of the Crown; in the abolition of religious tests before appointment to public offices; in the passage through Parliament last session of an Act for abolishing the compulsory imposition of church rates; and lastly—and in effect the greatest—in the impending disestablishment and disendowment of the Protestant Church in Ireland, the cessation of the *Regium Donum* and the annual grant to the Roman Catholic College of Maynooth.*

* The writer of this article, influenced by the work of his friend, which he now edits, very early induced his native town, Birmingham, to take a bold and decided step in advance on the question

Turning to matters more immediately pertaining to the subject of the "Inquiry," it may be noted that within the last few years the production of wealth by slave-labour has been abolished in the United States of North America; serfdom

of church rates. On the 6th August, 1832, he proposed in the parish church of St. Martin, as an amendment on a motion for a church rate, the following resolutions, viz.:—

1. "That every religious association ought to depend on the voluntary contributions of its members for support; that it is unjust in principle, vexatious and oppressive in practice, and, moreover, utterly repugnant to the genius of Christianity, to tax men for the support of a religion they do not approve.
2. "That what is called the Established Church of England is partially supported by the forced contributions of men who dissent either from its doctrine or its discipline; and that, therefore, for the reasons given in the foregoing resolution, this meeting feels it incumbent upon it to resist by every legal and peaceful means so outrageous a violation of every principle of religion and justice."

The draft of these resolutions was submitted the night before the meeting to an assembly of the most advanced liberals, but so little chance did there seem of their being entertained by the parishioners at large, that none could be found to undertake the task of seconding them. At the meeting on the morrow, however, when proposed, they were so well received that no difficulty was felt on the subject. They were seconded by George Edmonds, an old radical reformer, who subsequently became first Clerk of the Peace for the Borough of Birmingham. After an animated discussion the resolutions were carried by a very large majority of the parishioners assembled. A petition to Parliament was also adopted, embodying the resolutions, and praying for the abolition of compulsory church rates. This was forwarded to Mr. Joseph Hume for presentation, and it may be here mentioned as an historic fact, that this was the last petition presented to the old unreformed House of Commons, just previously to its being summoned to the bar of the House of Lords to hear its final doom. Since this year, 1832, the parishioners of Birmingham have, in accordance with the resolutions then passed, consistently and steadily refused to grant a church rate; and after several severe conflicts in subsequent years—one of which, in consequence of the bitterness and rage of the pro-rate party, entailed on the writer the loss of much time and money and the risk of personal liberty itself—the attempt to raise a rate was finally given up. So that since 1831 Birmingham has been exempt from this exaction, whilst it has taken *thirty-six years* to obtain the exemption from the legislature for the country at large.

has ceased throughout the Russian dominions ; and slavery has been relaxed in countries under the rule of the Sultan.

The principles of free trade—that is, voluntary exchanges freed from all the trammels of bounties and prohibitions, encouragements and restraints—have been greatly extended in our own country, and have been, in a greater or less degree, adopted by many other countries, where previously what is called the “protective system” prevailed almost exclusively.

The two most notable instances of this movement in Europe are, first, France, the large relaxation of whose tariff may be said to have been mainly brought about by one of our own countrymen, the late Mr. Cobden ; and secondly, Russia, in which country the Government—as is not infrequent under a despotism—is in advance of the people, and has, after much inquiry and discussion, and in spite of not a little opposition from its own manufacturers and traders, recently considerably ameliorated its tariff, by which an average reduction of 41 per cent. has been effected on eighty-eight classes of goods imported into that country.

Again, the necessity for a universal and unsectarian system of education and technical instruction as a means of increasing wealth and enjoyment is felt by a much larger number of the educated and ruling classes, but is being especially pressed into the front by those advanced thinkers of all classes who see in it the means of more rapidly introducing and securing the permanence of more just laws in the production and distribution of wealth.

But perhaps the greatest advance of all has been made in the agitation of the relative rights of Capital and Labour, and in the sound practical attempts which are making to bring about a really harmonious action between them. Until a recent period capitalists and labourers have been arrayed against each other like two hostile camps, and “strikes” and “lock-outs,” with all their bitter accompaniments, have been almost exclusively resorted to in cases of dispute. These means have had the effect rather of starving the one party or the other into compliance, than of settling their differences on any just and lasting basis. It is consolatory to know, however, that one means of avoiding these internecine wars has been afforded by the recent passing of a measure

known as "Lord St. Leonards' Act," permitting the establishment of Courts of Arbitration and Conciliation, which may entertain any question relating to wages or other matters, that may by mutual agreement be referred to them for settlement from time to time by the employers and operatives.

So long as wealth shall continue to be produced under the present competitive system—that is, so long as, in the words of our author, "two hostile masses of interest are suffered to exist in society, the owners of labour on one side, and the owners of the *means* of labouring on the other," so long will vexatious disputes arise; and therefore any and all means aiding a peaceful and conciliatory settlement are to be encouraged. And it is pleasing to know that an increasing desire for their adoption is evinced by both employers and employed, and that "Lord St. Leonards' Act," in districts where it has been put in force, has been found to work most satisfactorily.

But if it be important to adopt the best means which can be devised for amicably settling disputes when they arise, of how much greater importance must it be to adopt a method by which, in the production of wealth, the causes which lead to these disputes shall be reduced to a minimum—that is, a state of things in which the interest of the capitalist and labourer, if not in perfect unison, shall no longer remain in an antagonistic position as at present. Of such a method we have most gratifying examples in what are called "Partnerships of Industry," which are now coming gradually into vogue. Among these may be named the "limited" firms of John Crossley and Co., carpet manufacturers, of Halifax; Henry Briggs, Son, and Co., of the Whitwood Collieries, Wakefield; Greening and Co., of the Victoria Iron Works, Manchester; the Drinkfield Iron Company, near Darlington; the Cobden Cotton Mills, at Sabden; the Agricultural and Horticultural Association, Manchester; the Agricultural Society, on the estate of Mr. Gurdon, at Assington, in Suffolk, and a similar one on the estate of Mr. W. Lawson, at Blennerhasset, in Cumberland. In all these establishments the labourers are, to a greater or less extent, partners, and receive portions of the net profits, varying according to the more or less advanced knowledge of these improved principles of distribution

possessed by the parties concerned, and varying also according to the peculiar nature of the several industries pursued.

This greatly improved arrangement, when compared with that exclusively selfish one which now obtains, and which it is intended to supersede, will itself be replaced, it is to be hoped ere long, by that more perfect system discussed in this volume, in which the world's wealth shall be created, exchanged, and enjoyed by co-operative capitalist-labourers—that is, by men and women who shall in their own persons possess the knowledge how to produce all kinds of useful wealth, and also the means—the capital—wherewith to make that knowledge available for the mutual good of themselves and their fellows. And until this be done, to use the language of our author, “perhaps as much as nine-tenths of attainable human productions will never be brought into existence, and ninety-nine hundred parts of attainable human happiness will be sacrificed.”

That this best of all possible arrangements for conducting human affairs—viz., mutual co-operation in the production, and voluntary equality in the distribution of wealth and the means of enjoyment, united to a rational and universal system of training and education from birth, all which are discussed by a master-mind in this volume—is the goal to which the present isolated, though so far useful, attempts on the part of the industrial classes is tending, seems to the writer as certain as anything human and in the future can be certain. Very many intermediate steps have of course to be taken, numerous difficulties to be overcome, and many prejudices to be combated and lived down. The signs of the times, however, are healthy and full of encouragement. Modern inventions, the steam-boat and the railway, cheap publications and international postal arrangements, have placed facilities in the way of the toiling millions which never before were known in the world's history, and of which the more advanced among them are now availing themselves for their common benefit. Hence the international working-men's congresses held recently in Switzerland and Belgium, at which were calmly discussed questions of the gravest interest to men of every country, class, creed, and colour. The late deputation, too, from a body of working men in London to the minister of

the United States of North America, inquiring if the laws of his country would permit them to possess and cultivate land *in common*, is not without its significance. Other signs also are there on both sides the Atlantic incident on the proceedings of bodies of working men, and in the numerous individual inquirers of other classes who are passing to and fro over the more civilised portions of the globe for the especial and benevolent purpose of learning what is doing by the workers in various countries to improve their condition, and with the view of bringing about more concerted action. All these are matters with which ministers of state and those who assume to govern the affairs of men, if they are wise, will make themselves familiar, or they will be left behind in the race, and their functions must of necessity be assumed by others.

I conclude, using the words of Thompson, by saying, "Men must ultimately see and pursue their interest when plainly laid before them. A more important and more extensive change in human society" [than that set forth in this volume] "was never contemplated by the mind of man."

. . . For surely a scheme for the production and distribution of wealth, combining all the benefits of all the opposite modes of human exertion hitherto practised, and for the attainment in the highest degree of all other human enjoyments, a scheme so wise and so beneficent, and withal so gentle even to those who must be its opponents, creating and not destroying, raising all and depressing none—in real happiness depressing none—the progress of human knowledge never heretofore enabled human being to disclose."

• WILLIAM PARE.

CHATFIELD HOUSE, PUTNEY,

January, 1869.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

UPWARDS of a quarter of a century has elapsed, since the first edition of this work was published, and it may be said to have then fallen still-born from the press. At that time men's minds were not prepared for its advanced teachings. It was, and still is, avowedly, no part of the object of the class of writers called "Political Economists" to institute "an inquiry into the principles of the distribution of wealth *most conducive to human happiness*."* Their conceptions have been by no means so rational, so extended, or so dignified. The accumulation of wealth, or capital, and especially in large masses, has been their *primary* object. Happiness, with them, has been only *secondary*. They have contented themselves with developing the laws by which the production and distribution of wealth has been, or is, at present regulated;—that is to say, the laws by which the empire of *force* and *fraud* has been, or is, maintained; for only under one or other of

* Mr. Senior, formerly Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford, says, "It is not with *happiness*, but with *wealth*, that I am concerned, as a Political Economist; and I am not only justified in omitting, but am perhaps bound to omit, all considerations which have no influence on wealth."

these influences, or both united, have men ever yet been permitted to produce, exchange, and consume, the necessities, comforts, and luxuries of life. Occasionally, it is true, the Economists have ventured to advocate improvements in the mode of conducting the industrial affairs of society, by the removal of some impediments to what they call "the free development of wealth." Such have been the abolition of monopolies, bounties, prohibitions, and restraints, whether directly instituted, or incident upon the enactment of certain fiscal laws. But these boasted improvements are as dust in the balance, so long as the production and distribution of wealth is conducted upon the false and vicious principle of "individual competition,"—of isolation, and antagonism. So long as this master evil—this very essence of barbarism—shall remain, it is in vain to expect any material improvement in the condition of mankind. What are its results to-day, in those countries deemed most civilised? For the masses—incessant life-consuming toil; and, in return, an insufficient supply of even the commonest necessities of life, the most stolid ignorance, and forced criminality. When thrown out of employment, during the oft-recurring periods of agricultural or commercial depression, their only choice is between the workhouse, the gaol, and the grave.*

For the middle classes the system imposes unremitting activity, coupled with feverish anxiety, and too frequently

* The Hon. and Rev. Sydney Godolphin Osborne, in a letter to the *Times* newspaper of the 2nd of June, 1848, says:—"The labourers have so long been kept in a state of ignorance and of low animal apathy to all social comfort, or industrial independence, that it requires strong and patient efforts to rouse them to travel from home to seek

a desperate struggle to maintain "respectable" appearances with the most straitened means. With this as a foundation, what can be expected of their intellectual and moral natures? These are woefully repressed. All generous or noble feeling is sacrificed to a low, cunning, selfish spirit, engendered by the higgings of competition,—the constant endeavour to buy cheap and sell dear.

Among the upper classes,—those who most abound in wealth,—the effects of the present system are found developed in a constant feeling of insecurity—a constant dread

fair treatment, rather than stay where they are bound by the law of settlement to live, in crowded communities in which vice is fostered by circumstances they cannot avoid, and their labour value depressed by causes against which they have no power to contend.

* * * * *

"Sad and lengthened experience has convinced me that the producer of bread by the sweat of his brow, for his body's sake, and his soul's sake, can be placed in no worse position than he is at home—in merry England (!), Christian England (?), England, the nurse of industry, the very hot-bed of philanthropy (!). Late, very late personal experience,—knowledge acquired far and near from those in whom I can put trust,—facts of which I am cognizant, from sources which defy contradiction—all prove to me that in hundreds of our villages the social condition of man is below that of any country of which I have ever read; that vice is increasing with a speed, and of a character which would justly call down any, the most awful judgment upon us; that the labourer is defrauded of his hire, oppressed, and ill-treated in a way that is a shame upon our national character.

* * * * *

"If the government can be persuaded to make bold and liberal efforts to assist families disposed to go to Australia, I can point its attention to *more* than one spot, where the so doing would be the greatest boon to the respectable and would-be industrious labourer; it would not only give him hope in this world, but it would enable him to remove his family from scenes which, *I am ready to prove*, exceed in vice any of which we have record in history, sacred or profane."

of violent changes in government, and consequent loss of power and influence, if not of property. There is also, on the part of the aristocracy of birth and station, a morbid feeling of jealousy towards the aristocracy of mere wealth—the millionaires of the middle classes.

Such are the results of the present system upon the three great classes into which “Society” is usually divided. To call it “*Society*,” indeed, is a solecism, for instead of its being an union of many for one general interest, it is a grotesque assemblage seeking to take advantage of each others’ ignorance and helplessness. It is not a wise and scientific association, but a rude unskilful agglomeration;—not a number of atoms brought together as by strong chemical affinities, and forming a regular and harmonious body, but a number of repulsive particles held together as by mechanical force, and forming an amorphous and discordant body;—in fine, in the nervous language of a popular writer of the day, it is not order, but “anarchy, —plus a street constable.”

But why should such a condition be endured? Shall it be said that, with all our knowledge and experience, a rational system of society, in which the interests and happiness of all shall be carefully combined, is yet unattainable? Is there any lack of means—supposing them properly organised—to produce a superabundance of wealth—that is, the necessities, comforts, and luxuries of life—for *all*, with ample leisure for the highest cultivation of the intellectual faculties and moral qualities, and the acquisition of the most refined habits and tastes? No one who has any pretensions to knowledge on this subject, will deny that, whatever might have been the case in

times past, the civilised nations of the world are now in a condition—with the vast aids which modern art and science have placed at their disposal—amply to satisfy all the rational wants of their respective populations, in the way of physical wealth. And this, too, without that incessant toil and anxiety, and those other disagreeable associations, incident to the production of the present inefficient supply;—in fact, with only that amount of exertion, and under those agreeable associations, which are required to develop and preserve, in full health and vigour, the physical, mental, and moral powers of man. The increase in these means, during the last half century, has been so enormous, as almost to surpass belief; and never, perhaps, was the mind of man so fertile in invention and improvement as at present. The great leading complaint of our times is, not that we cannot create sufficient wealth, but that, when created, it cannot (owing to our viciously artificial condition) be disposed of advantageously for the capitalist; and so the producers are dismissed from employment, and suffered to starve or steal, or to emigrate to the Antipodes, rather than that rational arrangements should be made to enable them to produce, and consume, and exchange their surplus productions for their own benefit. And, in its ignorance, society is expending much more in the maintenance and punishment of its paupers and criminals, than would suffice to put in operation a system which, within a short period, would, gradually, but most certainly, not only banish pauperism and crime, — by annihilating the causes of both, — but place *all* classes in a far better condition than has yet been enjoyed by *any*.

We repeat that no one, having thoroughly investigated this subject, will deny that we have the power, were it properly organised, to produce an abundance of physical wealth, under circumstances which would afford ample leisure and opportunity for the entire population to be trained to superior habits and manners, to acquire the most useful and agreeable knowledge, and to cultivate and enjoy the most refined tastes;—in short, to become highly intelligent, virtuous, and happy.

But let no one imagine that so desirable a condition can be attained, except by a complete revolution in the principles and practices of society; to be effected, however, in peace and order, and with the entire concurrence of all parties concerned; for violence is utterly opposed to the spirit of the new system, by which, in future, it is proposed to carry on the affairs of life.

The Social Reformer,—strong in his conviction of the everlasting, saving truth, that the character of man, in all countries and climes, and under all conditions, is, at every period of his life, the result of his original organisation, and of the influence of external circumstances (mostly from under his control), acting upon that organisation,—has the most unbounded charity for the convictions, feelings, and (necessary) conduct of all men; and his constant and unceasing endeavour therefore is, peacefully to withdraw all those circumstances which are known to produce evil, and to replace them by those only which are known to produce good to the human race. He discards all force and delusion, for these will not serve his holy cause. Clothed in the panoply of truth, he goes forth to do battle with error, relying on the powers of moral suasion and kindness

alone, as the only agents capable of effecting a revolution so glorious and so God-like.*

It is hoped that the able work which these few sentences are intended to introduce, may assist in hastening so desirable a change, which, though to be effective for the happiness of all, must be *universal*, yet may it be *gradual*,—commencing, too, with that portion of the population which in all countries most requires it—the able-bodied poor.

Happily, the students of social science—the great “Captains of Industry”—are daily increasing in numbers and earnestness. The Editor of this volume, knowing how instrumental was the work, on its first appearance, in the formation, in his own mind, of what he feels to be right convictions on the great subjects of which it treats, is desirous that others should be similarly advantaged; and with a view as much as possible of shortening their labour, he has in this edition reduced the work to about two-thirds its original bulk, without, he trusts, materially impairing its usefulness.

* “Accustomed to regard all the affairs of men as a process, they (the Social Reformers) never hurry, and they never pause. Theirs is not a twilight of political knowledge which gives just light enough to place one foot before the other; as they advance the scene still opens upon them, and they press right onward with a vast and varied landscape of existence around them. Calmness and energy mark all their actions. Convinced that vice originates not in the man, but in the surrounding circumstances—not in the heart, but in the understanding—they are hopeless concerning no one. To correct a vice, or generate a virtuous conduct, they pollute not their hands with the scourge of coercion: but, by endeavouring to alter the circumstances, would remove, or by strengthening the intellect, disarm the temptation.”—COLERIDGE.

Detached portions of the work will, doubtless, be viewed with satisfaction by various sections of economists, as furnishing powerful arguments in favour of their several isolated theories. Thus our Author's bold exposition of the evils of slavery, and the marked inferiority of its results in the production of wealth, and diffusion of human happiness, when contrasted with the operations of free labour, will attract the favourable notice of the champions of the Anti-slavery cause; whilst the masterly manner in which (Chapter I., Section 12) he exhibits the superiority of the system of "Voluntary exchanges" freed from all the trammels of bounties and prohibitions, encouragements and restraints, of all and every kind, will find ready acceptance with the "Free Trader." The advocates of a system of universal and unsectarian education, also, will fully appreciate the admirable reasoning in Chapter IV.,—"On the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge as one of the means of increasing production and enjoyment, and securing the permanence of the natural laws of distribution;"—and more especially the fourth section of that chapter, which treats of Education, strictly so called, previous to manhood.

As isolated portions, no doubt these are excellent. We wish, however, to impress the reader with that which to us seems the chief merit of the work as a whole, and which may be briefly stated thus:—

First, In laying down clearly, and logically, the great fundamental principles which must be observed in the production and distribution of wealth, in order to attain the largest sum of human happiness.

Secondly, In showing to what extent the carrying out these principles, and the accomplishment of this result, is possible under the system of individual competition, and where, even under its freest and best form, it must fail, from the evils inherent in the very system itself.

Thirdly, In showing the immense superiority,—not only as respects wealth, but every other source of happiness,—of the system of mutual co-operation in the production, and voluntary equality in the distribution of wealth and the means of enjoyment, over that of any other system of society hitherto practised.

Fourthly, In showing that as long as the accumulated capital of society remains in one set of hands, and the productive powers of creating wealth remain in another, this accumulated capital will, while the nature of man continues as at present, be made use of to counteract the natural laws of distribution, and to deprive the producers of the use of that which their labour has produced; and that, therefore, the great object of wisdom and benevolence, with respect to the distribution of wealth, should be, to make every member of society a capitalist-labourer, and a contributor to the joint stock of happiness; and with this view to devise arrangements by which this great object may be effected with the least possible inconvenience, not only to the holders of the capital already accumulated, but even to the idlers who are now a mere burden on productive labour, and of little benefit to themselves.

In the language of the Author himself:—

“Whatever the supposed inconvenience of this mighty change, 'tis as nothing compared with its benefits. Political changes are useful, in as far only as their obvious tendency is to bring about this great change, which the unnecessarily degraded mass of mankind,—without knowledge, without comfort, without mutual kindness,—demand of the hand of justice, and which the real interests of those who esteem themselves *privileged* classes, almost equally demand.”

One word, in conclusion, as to the author himself. Mr. Thompson, by birth an Irishman, was a man of generous sympathies, expanded mind, and extremely studious habits. A large portion of his life was devoted to the study of political, moral, and social philosophy, during several years of which he was a student of, and residing with, the celebrated Jeremy Bentham. Besides the present work, ~~which~~ which was written about the year 1822,—Mr. Thompson was the author of many other productions of a kindred character, the chief of which have been published under the following titles:—

“An appeal of one half of the human race; Women, against the pretensions of the other half, Men, to retain them in political, and thence in civil and domestic slavery”; in reply to a paragraph of Mr. Mills’s celebrated ‘Article on Government.’ London: Longman and Co. 1825.”

“Labour Rewarded. The Claims of Labour and Capital conciliated: or, how to secure to Labour the

whole products of its exertions. . London: Hunt and Clarke. 1827."

"Practical Directions for the speedy and economical establishment of Communities, on the principles of Mutual Co-operation, United Possessions, and Equality of Exertions, and of the means of enjoyment. London: Strange. 1830."

As a proof of the sincerity and earnestness with which the author held his opinions, and the benevolence which actuated him, it may be stated that, in the year 1830, he made a will, leaving the great bulk of his property, consisting of freehold estates in the county of Cork, in the hands of trustees,—of whom the writer was one,—for the purpose of still further promulgating the principles which he had so long and so ably advocated, and of aiding the humbler classes in any practical operations founded thereon.

At the time when this will was made, the most violent prejudice existed in the public mind as to the dissection of dead bodies, and, except by stealth, none but the bodies of executed criminals could be obtained for the use of our anatomical schools. Mr. Thompson, feeling this to be a great public evil, inserted the following clause in his will:—

"To aid in conquering the foolish, but frequently most mischievous prejudice, respecting the benevolent—but to the operators, most unpleasant and sometimes dangerous—process of examining dead bodies, incapable of feeling, for the benefit of the living; I will that my body be publicly examined by a lecturer on anatomy, on condition of his returning the bones, in the form of a skeleton, natural or artificial, to be preserved in the Museum of Human and Comparative Anatomy,—as my books, &c., are to be preserved in the Library of the first Co-operative Community in Britain or Ireland."

Mr. Thompson died of inflammation of the chest, at his residence, Clounkeen, Roscarbery, County of Cork, on the 28th March, 1833. For twenty years previously, he had not partaken of any animal food or intoxicating drinks; his abstinence, as he informed the writer, being mainly induced by a careful consideration of his own bodily requirements in these respects, and because it enabled him the better to pursue his mental and literary labours. His illness was but of short duration. He had a clear perception, however, of his approaching dissolution, and a few days before his death he took advantage of this knowledge, and wrote to several of his friends on matters connected with the great subject which had so long occupied his mind. His directions as to the dissection of his body were complied with, not, however, without considerable opposition, amounting to almost actual violence, on the part of the ignorant peasantry of the neighbourhood. But the trustees have not been enabled to carry out any other directions of the will. Some relatives of the deceased having contested the disposition of the property, it was brought within the jurisdiction of that most dilatory and expensive of courts—the Irish Chancery, where it still remains.

CLONTARF, Co. DUBLIN,
August, 1850.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

THOSE who have observed, reflected, or written on political economy, and the various branches of knowledge connected with it, may be ranged in two classes, the intellectual and the mechanical. Of later days, and in this country, conspicuous amongst the intellectual speculators or philosophers stands Mr. Godwin, the author of "Political Justice." Equally eminent amongst the mechanical reasoners, particularly in his earlier productions, is Mr. Malthus, whose treatise on the "Principles of Population" is become almost the text-book of a politico-economical sect.

The *intellectual* speculators, informed by their own feelings of the gentle, ever-springing, and all-sufficient pleasures of sympathy and intellectual culture, their animal wants being all comfortably supplied and therefore exciting little of their attention, little studious perhaps of the physical laws of nature, of the physical constitution of man and the beings that surround him, conscious of their own power of restraining and regulating what they regard as the grosser propensities of our nature, proclaim man as capable of attaining happiness by his mental powers alone, *almost* independent of material subordinate agency. To such a superiority have they elevated the thinking part of the human organisation, as to suppose that man may hereafter, by the perfect use of it, *will* his own health independent of the material agents usually employed to

promote it. They have thought that the mind may command mechanical operations, such as ploughing or navigation, without the intervention of intermediate physical means. How these mysterious processes, these wonders of volition, were by possibility to be carried on, consistent with any established analogy of things, could not of course be explained.

Whatever advances mankind may make in the arts of social happiness, they must be indebted to an enlarged and minute acquaintance with the surrounding universe of things and of themselves, and to the wise use and distribution and regulation of them. The intellectual speculators on political economy, however, wishing to make man *all thought*, affect to disdain *labour* as mechanical and grovelling, unaware of the paramount principle of *utility*, by which alone the worth or worthlessness of everything must be estimated. What is thought, but motion produced and *felt* in the brain? what is labour, but motion communicated to, and in co-operation with, the ever-active energies of nature? And by what standard is the superiority of either species of motion to be estimated, but by their relative tendency to produce human happiness?

If the class that I have termed intellectual speculators, leave material things and physical agencies too much out of their calculation, those whom I have termed *mechanical* speculators adopt the opposite extreme. With them, intellectual power and sympathy form no part of the creature man; he is altogether a mechanical agent, like the plough, or the loom, or the horses, with whose motions he co-operates; and he is to be urged to labour by the same rude means that operate on other animals. Those who call themselves pure political economists, and profess to have no other object but wealth in contemplation, belong, more or less, to this class. By them the sublime

notions of intelligence, benevolence, or mutual co-operation and perfectibility, are held in derision. Their sole object is, so to arrange, as that the machines—whether living, as cows, men, or horses, and propelled by food and air, or inanimate, and propelled by steam or water—should produce in the greatest abundance all articles of food, clothing, shelter, and elegance, or caprice; and that, on the other hand, means should be devised that an abundance of consumers should be found to use the articles produced, so that every year a continual demand should be kept up for these or similar articles. By what means, or by whom the articles were produced, whether by camels, horses, men, slaves or not slaves, whether by hard labour or easy labour, by healthful or life-consuming exertion, signified not; except in as far as the wear and tear of the dead or living machinery might enhance the price and lessen the production. By what means, or by whom these articles were consumed, whether by the mass of the producers, to diffuse gladness through a smiling population, or by a few living in palaces, surrounded by unenjoyed waste and sickly appetites, signified not. The problem with them has been, how to raise the greatest produce and to ensure the greatest consumption or efficient demand. No considerations but such as related immediately to wealth or exchangeable value, were admitted into the reasonings of these severe economists. Amongst these mechanical reasoners there are shades of opinion as well as amongst the intellectual speculators; and they occasionally adopt more or less of their adversaries' views.

Is it to be wondered at, that neither the one nor the other of these two classes of reasoners on political economy and human happiness, called here the intellectual and the mechanical, have arrived at truth? that no consistent and useful system of human labour and the most wise and

wholesome distribution of its products, has yet been devised between them? that while each of them have discovered on their own side a good deal of truth, their chief felicity has consisted in developing the errors of their opponents? How should it be otherwise? Man is *not* a mere machine like a steam-engine or spinning-jenny, nor an uncalculating animal like the horse or the ox whose labour he employs. Nor is man a mere intellectual agent, without properties in common with both the inanimate and the living things around him. Man is a complicated being. Like the timber or the wool on which he operates, he is liable to the impulses of external things. Appropriate agents produce chemical and mechanical changes on his structure, both within and without, just as on other masses of matter. The overwhelming force of the current or the tempest equally shatters and sweeps away him and all inanimate obstacles, whether the shed which he has reared for his protection or the plank to which he clings for succour, in proportion to the mass and powers of resistance of each. Certain living powers, the result of organisation, developing themselves in nervous and muscular motions, enable man to increase but a little his power of resistance. Like all other animals, man exists but on the condition of keeping up the eternal excitement of air and food; like the best organised of them, he is liable to various sources of enjoyment and of pain, by means of the terminations of different species of nerves in what are termed organs of sense on different parts of the body: like them, he is liable to certain impulses arising from internal secretions, entirely independent of his volition, and thence to certain propensities, desires, or wants, inseparable from his actual organisation. But unlike condensed or aerial particles of inanimate matter, unlike any known vital organisation but his own, not only

is he liable in a super-eminent degree to the feelings arising from the observation of all things around him and their relation to himself, not only to the feelings of memory perpetuating these original feelings of observation, but also to those of comparison and reasoning. Hence he is enabled to look in upon his own structure, to look forward into futurity, to calculate the effects of his actions, and thence to be guided by *distant* as well as immediate motives. By proper training, he is enabled to add to the pleasures of the senses and of internal excitement, the pleasant feelings of intellectual cultivation; and by the wise *regulation* of his appetites and passions, he not only increases indefinitely their pleasures, but avoids the evils to which want of foresight would lead them, and contracts a sympathy and inclination to benevolent co-operation with his fellow-creatures.

Can we reason then on any matters, in which the labour, voluntary or forced, of such a creature as this, is the chief ingredient, as we could respecting sheep or the wool separated from their bodies, or respecting the powers of air, water, steam, and machinery? Or can we justly reason on any matters in which such a creature as this is chiefly concerned, as if he were *all* composed of intellect and benevolence, as if he ~~were~~ were uninfluenced by the chemical and mechanical laws of nature operating within and around him, as if he could shake off the feelings and impulses co-existent with the several stages of his organisation, as if he were gifted with a mysterious power of producing changes within and around him, by mere volition, without the intervention of the usual ascertained natural agents or causes? like the power ascribed to the great spirit or mind of nature, in the poetical creation of all things?

I conceive, then, that in order to make the noble dis-

coveries of political economy—and magnificent they are when viewed in their proper connexion—useful to *social science*, the application of which becomes the art of social happiness, it is necessary always to keep in view, the complicated nature of man, the instrument to operate with, and the creature to be operated upon. Without a constant reference to it, the regulating principle of *utility* is sacrificed, and the grand object of political economy, the indefinite increase of the accumulations of wealth, or of its yearly products, become worthless objects, consigning to the wretchedness of unrequited toil three-fourths or nine-tenths of the human race, that the remaining smaller portion may pine in indolence midst unenjoyed profusion. It is not the mere possession of wealth, but the *right distribution* of it, that is important to a community. It is with communities as with individuals. Men cannot be happy without the physical means of enjoyment, which in all civilised societies consist chiefly of objects of wealth; but, with a comparatively small portion of these objects, men may be happier than they have ever been seen to be; while, though surrounded with them to superfluity, they may still be miserable. 'Tis not the *multitude*, but the *use* and the *distribution* of the objects of wealth, with which society is chiefly interested. Hence the necessity of considering wealth, not only in its effects on industry and reproduction, but also in its moral and political effects, in every way that it can influence human happiness.

Moralists have been, for the most part, ignorant of physical science and of the truths of political economy; theologians affect to disdain all other knowledge but their own peculiar and profitable dreams; political-economists profess to direct their sole attention to the production and accumulation of wealth, regardless of its distribution further than as it may influence re-production and accu-

mulation, leaving to moralists, politicians, and statesmen, its effect on happiness, and drawing a broad line of distinction between their solid material speculations and the airy philosophy of the mind. Nay, more; the chemist and the mechanic, the manufacturer, and the merchant, have, till lately, affected to disdain the speculations of political economists, as mere theories, inapplicable to the realities of their respective operations.

What is to be inferred? Not that we condemn the division of knowledge any more than the division of labour; but that we would have it limited to the improvement of its own particular branch, and not have it applied to the immense concern of social happiness without regard being had to all those other equally important data on which a just application must depend. *Social science*, the science of morals, including legislation as one of its most important sub-divisions, requires not only a knowledge of what is technically called morals, and political economy, but of the outlines of all that is known, with a capacity for following up any particular branch that may be, on particular occasions, conducive to the general end. None of these speculators have confined themselves to their own peculiar province, but have adventured, without appropriate knowledge, on the direct application of their isolated speculations to social science. A few illustrious exceptions might be named, one of whom has done more for moral science than Bacon did for physical science; for whereas Bacon did no more than point out the new and secure road to physical discovery, *he* has not only pointed out the right road to moral investigations, but has made such progress in it as no man ever before conceived, much less accomplished. Following in the road which he has demonstrated, our object is to apply to social science the ascertained truths of political economy, making these

and all other branches of knowledge subservient to that just *distribution* of wealth which tends most to human happiness.

In every nation, and in almost every age, of the world, the blessings of equal comforts to all, and the enormous evils of great inequality of wealth, have been dimly seen and recognised; and vain and ignorant efforts have been made to establish a just distribution. Force is the instrument employed by ignorance to accomplish everything, even justice itself; to establish equality, therefore, was force employed. But no sooner was force made use of, than *security* fled, and with security production, and consequently the means of happiness. Here, therefore, is the cruel dilemma in which mankind have been placed. Here is the important *problem* of moral science to be solved, "*how to reconcile equality with security; how to reconcile just distribution with continued production.*" This problem it is the object of the following pages to develop, to trace its consequences, and to point out those just and gentle means by which the *natural laws* of distribution may be everywhere introduced, and by which security, impartially applied to all, and not exclusively and hypocritically applied to a few, may become the firmest guarantee, instead of being the eternal opponent, of rational and healthful equality; as it is the only sure basis of the continued reproduction and accumulation of wealth.

This momentous problem has not been yet fully solved. Mere political economy has not attempted to solve it. To the minds of a few enlightened men, the first principles necessary for its solution may be familiar; but none of them has yet undertaken the task of bringing to a point the scattered rays of knowledge on this subject, applying them all to the *distribution* of wealth. To diffuse, and by diffusing to direct to *practical use*, the knowledge acquired

on this branch of social science, to lead forth from the calm closets of philosophical inquirers, where they have delighted and elevated the minds of a *few*, into the world of life and action, those important truths, which it behoves *all mankind* to know and to practice, to assist in wiping out the stain from science, noticed thirty years ago by Condorcet, but still adhering, that though she had done much for the *glory* of mankind, she had done nothing or little for their *happiness*, is to me an object of the most anxious desire.

Who can throw his glance over the affairs of the civilised portion of mankind, and not rejoice? * Who can behold the proofs, everywhere and every day exhibited, of the diffusion of real knowledge, and not rejoice? Who can behold all the civilised nations of mankind, either in the very act of calmly new-modelling their social institutions, according to their respective degrees of knowledge, or on the point of undertaking the bounteous, the magnificent, the inevitable operation, and not rejoice? Who is there that sees not, that whatever may be the absolute quantity of knowledge or of the articles of wealth in a community, it is not their abundance, but their right use and distribution, that constitute the happiness of that community? Is not this, therefore, peculiarly the time to investigate with uncompromising steadiness the natural laws of distribution, to ascertain how far legislatures and individuals may usefully co-operate with these tendencies of things, that new organisations of society may reject those perennial sources of vice and misery which ancient ignorance engendered?

But if the aspect of the great commonwealth of civilised nations, and the interest which we of these countries have

* Written in 1822.

in the general progress of events, be not sufficient to awaken our attention to a matter momentous like the present; there is an aspect of things nearer home, in our very bosoms, which challenges our attention this moment to the *distribution* of wealth. How comes it, that a nation abounding more than any other in the rude materials of wealth, in machinery, dwellings, and food, in intelligent and industrious producers, with all the apparent means of happiness, with all the outward semblances of happiness exhibited by a small and rich portion of the community, should still pine in privation? How comes it that the fruits of the labour of the industrious, after years of incessant and successful exertion, are mysteriously—and without imputation of fault to them, without any convulsion of nature—swept away? It is not for want of physical knowledge: it is not for want of abundant materials of wealth to make all comfortable: it is not for want of the capacity or inclination to abundant reproduction. To what, then, is this strange anomaly in human affairs to be attributed—this misery in the midst of all the means of happiness? That savage tribes, ignorant of the means of production, disinclined to labour, should be overtaken by want, were a matter of no surprise; but that where art and nature had run, as it were, a race of emulation in the prodigality of their gifts to intelligent and industrious millions, that these millions should be disabled from enjoying these products of their own creation—this is the mystery, this the astounding spectacle. To what but to a *vicious distribution of wealth* can this extraordinary phenomenon be attributed? What so natural as the cry of injustice, under such circumstances? What so natural and so usual as the imploring of the interference of the strong arm of power, to remedy such injustice? What so necessary as to ascertain the *causes* of this vicious distribution? whether they

are of a temporary or of a deep-rooted and permanent nature? whether present appearances are anything more than the full development, the maximum, of the evils inherent in long-established errors and radically vicious institutions, now brought to the crisis of their injurious operation? whether there are in art or nature any means to be found, excluding the use of force, which would make impossible the recurrence of similar calamity, and substitute a universally benevolent, self-regulating, and self-preserving distribution for the present, engendering the evils notoriously experienced? Can any inquiry be more called for, not with a view to mere topical, temporary, remedies, but to radical cure?

The tendency of the existing arrangement of things as to wealth, is to enrich a few at the expense of the mass of the producers; to make the poverty of the poor more hopeless, to throw back the middle classes upon the poor, that a few may be enabled, not only to accumulate in perniciously large masses, the real national—which is only the aggregate of individual—capital, but also, by means of such accumulations, to command the products of the yearly labour of the community. Who is not alarmed at the every-day increasing tendency to poverty on the part of the many, to the ostentation of excessive wealth on the part of the few? Who sees not the gradual undermining of the nation's resources, the sickening of the very spirit of industry on the part of her producers, if this progress cannot, by a recurrence to first principles, or otherwise, be arrested? Is it not time to inquire whether, by the laws of nature and society, we are doomed to submit to actual and anticipated evils, such as these, under the peril of enduring still greater, if we rashly attempt to remove them? All moral and political wisdom should tend mainly to this, the just distribution of the physical means of hap-

pineness: for how senseless would it be to send codes of laws and maxims of morals to the savages of New Zealand for the regulation of their passions, if matters were not so adjusted, as that—if not by gift—at least by the exercise of their faculties, these savages might be put in the way to procure not only the means of existence, but of comfort in life! 'Tis in the use and distribution of these that all their good or bad qualities, their vices or virtues, must be chiefly developed. Skill and persevering industry are necessary to produce the objects of wealth, the means of enjoyment. Truth or falsehood are used to facilitate their acquisition by exchange or otherwise. Honesty is displayed in respecting the acquisitions of others: violence and cruelty in ravishing them from their producers; prudence and temperance in so regulating their use, as to secure all the immediate pleasures they are capable of producing, without the drawback of those contingent remote evils which would follow a blind obedience to instinctive feelings; and beneficence in yielding to the grateful emotions of sympathy under the guidance of wisdom, and making wealth tributary to the happiness of others. In this way is the most important portion of our virtues and vices so indissolubly connected with the distribution of wealth, that to speak of morals and legislation with an affected contempt of such matters, is to grasp at a shadow and to leave a substance—is to add hypocritical or ignorant insult to the miseries of communities.

Should we find that that mode of distribution which political economy requires, militates against political utility, while general morality is silent, we must weigh the claims of wealth and politics and carefully adjudge the balance. Should we find the increase of wealth and supposed political utility calling for one mode of distribution, and universal morality prescribing another, we must, con-

sistently with our principles of promoting the greatest happiness of the whole, compel both wealth and politics to bend to that distribution which ensures the greatest virtue, the greatest happiness. But should we be so fortunate as to find that that species of distribution of wealth which tends most to its production and accumulation, tends also to political utility more than any other possible distribution of it, and affords the grateful aspect of the widest diffusion of moral habits, while it is, at the same time, so simple as to require no cumbrous legal machinery, almost no machinery at all, for its support; we shall unite all impartial voices in approbation of a mode of distribution so recommended. Such, and attended with so many concurring benefits, is, it is believed, the mode of distribution, the description of which follows.

Three modes of human labour are discussed and contrasted in the following pages:—first, labour by force, or compulsion, direct or indirect; second, labour by unrestricted individual competition; third, labour by mutual co-operation. The last of these modes of human labour, that by mutual co-operation, is shown to be as superior in production and happiness to the second, or that by individual competition, as the second is superior to the first, or labour by force or compulsion. ♦

The immediate incident that gave rise to the inquiry pursued through the following pages, is as follows:—In one of the literary societies established in the city of Cork for the *diffusion* of knowledge, a gentleman, celebrated for his skill in the controversies of political economy, thought proper to descant on the blessings of the *inequality* of wealth, as now established; on the dependence, and consequent gratitude which the poor should feel to the rich; on the too-great freedom and too-great equality of wealth of the United States of America; with similar

topics. Astonished at such notions, and particularly from such a man, the writer not only repelled them at the time, but determined to enter into the subject, and to lay it before the society in the shape of an essay, for future and more enlarged discussion. As the essay proceeded, the importance and extent of the subject seemed to increase; and the confused and erroneous notions prevailing almost everywhere, in print and conversation, redoubled the zeal for its completion, to whatever extent the interests of truth might require. Thus has the proposed essay extended to the present inquiry.

ON THE

DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.

CHAPTER I.

INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURAL PRINCIPLES, RULES, OR LAWS,
ON WHICH ALL JUST DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH OUGHT TO BE
FOUNDED; DEDUCED FROM OUR ORGANISATION, AND THE CIRCUM-
STANCES, PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL, WHICH SURROUND US.

UTILITY, calculating all effects, good and evil, immediate and remote, or the pursuit of the greatest possible sum of human happiness, is the leading principle constantly kept in view, and to which all others are but subsidiary, in this inquiry. In Bentham's "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," and the first chapters of the celebrated "Traité de Legislation," this principle, recognised by Helvetius, Priestley, Paley, and others, is developed and established for ever, to the exclusion of all other pretended tests of morals.

No subject is more interesting, or if rightly treated more useful, than the *Distribution of Wealth*; because on its just and wise distribution will be found to depend, not only, directly, the physical comforts of every community, but, consequentially, in a very great degree, the quantum of morality, of the pleasures of sympathy, prudence, and benevolence, as well as of intellectual enjoyment, within its reach.

The distribution to be here inquired into, is that which

will promote the *greatest possible quantity* of human happiness, or the *greatest happiness of the greatest number*. It will be seen that this greatest number is never a mere majority, but nine out of ten, or ninety out of a hundred, of the whole community. In fact, the real happiness of *the whole*, even of the apparently sacrificed minority, will be found to coincide with the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The greatest possible quantity of human happiness, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the happiness of the community, and the happiness of the whole, will therefore be found, in almost all cases, to imply the same, and may, for the most part, be indifferently used.'

The propositions on which the natural laws of distribution are founded, appear to me so plain, as to ensure assent as soon as they are understood, and the consequences flowing from them are the most universally extensive in their application, and most intimately connected with human happiness. They should be therefore freely canvassed; for, if true, they should be always kept in mind, to direct our reasonings on moral and political subjects: if false, the sooner their errors are pointed out the better, that they may not be injuriously applied in practice.

It will be asked, "What is meant by the words, *natural* principles, natural rules, or natural laws, of distribution, to be here inquired into?"

By natural laws of distribution enlightened political economists do mean, or ought to mean, those general rules or first principles, on which all distribution of wealth ought to be founded, in order to produce the greatest aggregate mass of happiness to the society, great or small, producing it. The most appropriate meaning, perhaps, which can be given to the word, *natural*, in conjunction with the words, laws, rules, or principles, of distribution, is simply such as require no factitious aid, which demand the removal or the non-imposition of restraint, instead of new machinery for their support.

The laws here spoken of have never been written or promulgated, still less enforced ; they exist only in the discussions of the inquirers after truth, and if admitted by rational men after the most severe scrutiny that can be applied to them, will become the rules of action and the guides of real written law as to the distribution of wealth.

The propositions to be proved in this chapter are the following ; placed here consecutively, that the reader may bear their connexion in mind :—

SECTION 1.—Wealth is produced by labour ; no other ingredient but labour makes any object of desire an object of wealth. Labour is the sole universal measure, as well as the characteristic distinction of wealth.

SECTION 2.—The object to be aimed at in the distribution of wealth, as in its production by labour, is to confer thereby the greatest possible quantity of happiness, *i. e.* of pleasures, whether of the senses or of a moral or intellectual nature, on the society producing it.

SECTION 3.—All members of society (cases of mal-conformation excepted) being similarly constituted in their physical organisation, are capable, by similar treatment, of enjoying equal portions of happiness.

SECTION 4.—The happiness of the greater number is to be preferred to the happiness of the lesser number : otherwise, the object in view, the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, would be sacrificed.

SECTION 5.—Those means of enjoyment or happiness which come under the name of wealth, being produced by the application of labour, guided by knowledge, to the materials afforded by nature, sufficient stimulus, in the way of *motive*, must be afforded to put the necessary labour guided by knowledge into motion, to produce this wealth.

SECTION 6.—The strongest stimulus to production

(and that which is necessary to the greatest production) that the nature of things will permit, is, "security" in the *entire use* of the products of labour to those who produce them.

SECTION 7.—All *voluntary* exchanges of articles of wealth, implying a preference, on both sides, of the thing received to the thing given, tend to the increase of happiness from wealth, and thence to increase the motives to its production.

SECTION 8.—The *forced abstraction* of the products of labour, the objects of wealth and means of happiness, from any individual, will cause more loss of happiness to him than increase of happiness to the person acquiring.

SECTION 9.—The forced abstraction of *small portions* of wealth from any given number of individuals, will lessen the whole quantity of happiness more than it can be increased by the additional pleasures conferred on any one or more individuals enjoying these united small forced masses.

SECTION 10.—Therefore, the produce of no man's labour, nor the labour itself, nor any part of them, should be taken from the labourer, without an equivalent *by him* deemed satisfactory.

SECTION 11.—The materials of wealth should be so distributed as to accomplish the double object of promoting the utmost possible equality of enjoyment and the utmost possible production; that is to say, to promote the utmost possible equality of distribution "consistent with *security*," the degree of development of every useful human energy, physical and intellectual, and of course of the production of wealth, depending on the degree of security enjoyed.

SECTION 12.—To accomplish this just distribution, no *encouragements*, or *restraints*, partaking of the nature of wealth, whether of a positive or negative kind, on the direction given to labour, or on the

free interchange of the products of labour, should be instituted or upheld.

SECTION 13.—That inequality in the distribution of wealth, and that alone, which arises from securing to every man the free use of his labour and its products, and the voluntary exchanges thence ensuing, should be upheld; because without that extent of inequality, there would be no security,—without security, no production,—without production, no wealth to distribute.

SECTION 14.—All other species of inequality of distribution, being not only unnecessary, but injurious to the excitement of production, should be repressed; because they unnecessarily detract from the benefits of equality, and thus lessen the sum total of happiness, the object aimed at in the distribution of wealth.

SECTION 15.—General inference from the above premises, “Natural Laws of Distribution,” or General Rules, the observance of which is necessary in order to attain the greatest happiness derivable from wealth:—

First, All labour ought to be free and *voluntary*, as to its direction and continuance.

Second, All the products of labour ought to be secured to the producers of them.

Third, All exchanges of these products ought to be free and *voluntary*.

SECTION 1.

WEALTH IS PRODUCED BY LABOUR: NO OTHER INGREDIENT BUT LABOUR MAKES ANY OBJECT OF DESIRE AN OBJECT OF WEALTH. LABOUR IS THE SOLE UNIVERSAL MEASURE, AS WELL AS THE CHARACTERISTIC DISTINCTION, OF WEALTH.

The word, *wealth*, signifies “that portion of the physical materials or means of enjoyment which is afforded by

the labour and knowledge of man turning to use the animate or inanimate materials or productions of nature ;" or, more concisely,—wealth is "any object of desire produced by labour."

Value in exchange is not necessary, though it almost always attaches, to the idea of wealth ; for small communities have been rich and happy by labour in common, without any exchanges. Would not woollen cloth be wealth though every man made his own coat? Without value in exchange, an article, ever so much an object of desire to him that owns it, and produced by ever so much of his labour, can have no marketable value ; it will not in a market be exposed for sale to those who have no desire for it : but that does not make it the less an object of wealth to him who desired it because it was useful, and who wisely employed himself in its fabrication for his own use.

Without labour there is no wealth. Labour is its distinguishing attribute. The agency of nature constitutes nothing an object of wealth. Labour is the *sole* parent of wealth.

National wealth is nothing more than the aggregate of the individual masses of the matter of wealth.

Land, air, heat, light, the electric fluid, men, horses, water, *as such*, are equally unentitled to the appellation of wealth. They may be objects of desire, of happiness ; but, till touched by the transforming hand of labour, they are not wealth. Of these, air, heat, light, the electric fluid, and frequently water, though objects of desire and utility, even of necessity, not only to health, but to the continuance of life, are not objects of wealth. Why so? Because it requires no *labour* to produce them, to gather them together for use, to enjoy them. They exist in such quantities, and are used and enjoyed with so little exertion, some of them requiring—as air, light, and heat—a positive exertion for the exclusion of their operation upon us, that no sort of labour is necessary to gratify our desires for them. Drovers of horses or horned cattle abounding in

regions thinly peopled, are not objects of wealth any more than the air or light. There are more of them than are wanting for use: no human exertion has produced them: whoever will employ the labour necessary to appropriate any of them, becomes their owner; and the mere labour of acquisition makes that an object of *wealth* which before was merely an object of possible desire. Thus, as articles commonly esteemed objects of wealth, lose that quality under circumstances in which no labour is requisite for their production; so do other articles, not esteemed objects of wealth, gain that quality when under circumstances making labour necessary for their enjoyment. By day, the light of the sun, the most useful and grateful of all light, is not an object of wealth. But let the earth continue its revolution and avert from the sun its lately illumined portion, and let light be still desirable for human convenience, and it will become immediately an article of wealth under the name of the substances from which it is in scanty portions extracted. The value of candles, oil, gas, &c., is only the value of the light extracted from them; and as science improves and the modes of extracting are increased and facilitated, the value of light diminishes with the smaller quantities of labour necessary for its extraction. Till directed by labour, under the guidance of knowledge, the powers of nature, in point of useful production of articles denominated wealth, are beneath estimation. Let the labour of any community cease but for one year, and how many of that community would be preserved in life, by the *materials or energies of nature*, to tell the perilous experiment to the succeeding year? Not only the comforts but the very *existence* of all nations depend on the eternal operation of labour. While the mouth consumes, the industrious arm is reproducing.

Wealth is limited to the *physical* means or materials of enjoyment. There are moral and intellectual, as well as physical, pleasures. With these sources of happiness we are not now concerned, as they are not directly comprehended

in the meaning attached to the word, wealth. There are also numerous *physical* means of happiness which come not under the definition of wealth. Light, by its varieties of colours, gives pleasure to the eye, water to the taste, the sexes to each other; yet are neither of these means of happiness denoted by the term wealth, because they are the gift of nature alone, without any addition made thereto by the labour or skill of man.

The mere utility of a thing carried to any extent and superadded to its mere existence, or what we call its production by the hand of nature, constitutes nothing an object of wealth till labour in some shape becomes identified with it: then it becomes *wealth*.

What is wealth also in one country is not wealth in another. Thus ice in equatorial civilised regions is an article of wealth and luxury; while approaching the poles, it becomes the bane of existence. In parched sandy countries, a well of water is a source of wealth; while the land is the property of no one, not being worth the trouble of appropriation. Labour was not necessary to make the well, nature, we shall suppose, having produced it; nor is the labour of drawing out the water to be alone estimated. But the existence of the well in that spot *saves the labour* that would be otherwise necessary to bring water there from its nearest supply; and the value of the well is to be measured by the quantity of labour thus saved.

Men and women, at different times and places, have been converted into mere objects of wealth; compelled by brute force, without any equivalent, to administer to the pleasures of their owners. The two circumstances necessary to constitute wealth being, "objects of desire" and "procured by labour," or effort, apply to human beings, like any other substances, such as iron or sheep, when tyrannically converted into objects of wealth. Not only is an expense of labour, of force or effort, necessary, in the first instance, to make human beings slaves, and thus objects of wealth, but also to retain them in slavery.

As to violence exerted to constrain, say the person of a woman to submit involuntarily to man's inclinations; wherever this violence is permitted, women become property, to people harems, as men do to cultivate the soil or to work in domestic thralldom.

It would be little better than impertinence, in an inquiry addressed to a civilised community, formally to except human beings from becoming objects of desire and of appropriation to each other: nor would it be necessary; for, wherever these most pernicious desires have existed, so as to lead to appropriation, property has followed, and they have been constituted matters of wealth, like any other materials, animate or inanimate. Wherever the *power* of appropriation has accompanied the fatal *desire*, the appropriation, and the sometimes illegal, but always unjust, conversion into property or wealth, has followed of course.

Numerous are the objections that may be made, from partial views of particular objects, to this simple explanation of what constitutes an object of wealth. It may suffice to notice a few of the most conspicuous. Of all the physical objects of desire to man, few are more attractive than the possession of a rich and well-cultivated piece of land, yielding every year teeming harvests of grain and fruits, or sending forth from its bosom useful minerals. Is this land, or all its products, objects of wealth? First, Are this land and all its products *objects of desire*? Circumstances evidently may exist under which neither the land nor any of its products, internal or external, may be objects of desire in the way of appropriation; as where rude hunters occupy it, as half a century ago was the case with all the fruitful lands and immense *materials*, or things capable of being converted into wealth, in the territories of the United States, west of the Alleghany mountains. Though abounding in all the physical materials of happiness, they were not therefore objects of wealth, because not objects of desire. But when the scene changed, and civilised men turned their eyes and

footsteps towards them, desiring to convert them to the means of happiness; were they then converted into objects of wealth? They were simply in the way of becoming so; but they were not yet so converted. Labour was wanting to be superadded to mere desire, and in proportion as labour was bestowed upon them, they were transformed from mere objects of desire into objects of wealth. The first settler cleared the timber and erected a shed, and affixed the value of his labour to that part of the soil on which it had been expended, and to those contiguous spots rendered by it more convenient for use. A second settler, paying for the labour under the name of the land, still added to its value by expending more labour upon it, in clearing a larger space, cultivating useful crops, and improving the sheds, and perhaps rearing and domesticating some animals. A third settler pays an increased value for all these products of labour under the name of the soil to which they are attached, introduces stock and machines, all produced by labour, and leaving the former erections for subordinate or temporary purposes, erects houses and makes fences suited for permanence and convenience. Thus is a piece of rich land which was a few years ago an object of no value, now converted into an object of wealth. What has nature done towards this conversion? Nothing. What has man, what has man's labour done? Everything. All that we call the work of nature, the mere existence of the land and its capabilities, were in as palpable existence before the land was converted into wealth as after it. Nay, by repeated culture the capabilities of the best land are frequently impaired or exhausted. But all this time, the minerals lying on the surface of the land, or arranged in its interior, though capable of the most extended use, have not been regarded, have not been esteemed articles of wealth. • Whence comes this new phenomenon? In general, because none of these articles have been all this time objects of desire, and therefore no labour has been expended upon them. Some

of them, such as coal, have not been objects of desire, because other articles procured with *less labour*, such as wood, necessarily cleared away to fit the ground for cultivation, have been used instead of them. Others, such as iron, from want of the skill and machinery necessary to convert them to useful purposes on so limited a scale, have been disregarded, inasmuch as *less labour* applied to the soil would procure articles sufficient to get them, or rather things fabricated from them *in exchange*. But let an increase be made in population, let the number of those requiring such articles be such as to afford constant employment to the machinery and skill of a few, let the timber be cut down and exhausted; then will the neglected iron-stone and the coal become objects of desire; then will labour be bestowed upon them, and they will become objects of wealth. A new value will be given to the land; not because nature has done anything to increase the capabilities of useful application of the objects of which the land consisted, but because circumstances have led to the formation of desires for their appropriation, and in consequence of such desires, labour has been bestowed upon them.

If it be objected that these lands are bought—before any labour has been expended upon them—of the United States Government, it may be observed, that the moderate price paid is but a very small remuneration for three benefits which the comparatively weak individual occupant derives from the powerful community from whom he purchases; by which he is saved a hundredfold in risk and labour in the cultivation, in the enjoyment of his land:—1st, Immediate peaceable possession; 2nd, Guarantee by the national force from savage attack or fellow-citizens' annoyance, permitting the whole of the cultivator's exertions to be directed to improvement, none of it being abstracted for defence; 3rd, *Security of title* in future enjoyment or transfers, the original appropriation becoming a public act registered and authenticated; thus saving

litigation resolvable into loss of wealth or useless expenditure of labour, with its accompanying vexation and consequential evils to an interminable extent.

Nor does the fertility or barrenness of the soil require any modification to be made in the definition given.

Suppose a trading colony settled on a confined barren spot, as the British on the island of Malta, for the mere purposes of commerce: What will determine the value of the few barren spots of ground in their neighbourhood? The quantity of labour that has been expended upon them. What determined that quantity of labour? The quantity that it has been necessary, or that it would be necessary, to expend upon them in order to afford for sale whatever articles the climate and convenience permitted, on the same terms that articles equally good could be imported from the cheapest accessible market. If more money were demanded for a vineyard, an orange-grove, or a corn-field, than this mass of labour, with the necessary profits of capital, as they are called, and superintendence, would amount to, it could not be given without loss; because the productions of the spot would not repay the interest of the capital deposited, with the yearly expenses of culture necessary to meet the rival foreign article. The value, again, of the articles brought from abroad would depend on the quantity of labour there necessary to produce them.

In such way would the value of a piece of land be determined for agricultural purposes on such an island. In what way would it be determined for building or for pleasure-ground? The value of building-ground depends on the quantity of labour in carriage and otherwise which the situation would save, and in the probability of quicker sale or letting it would afford; all which are resolvable into the saving of labour. The price of pleasure-grounds depends on the competition of the desires of the rich. To these, when wealth is viciously divided, and when great ignorance is joined to great wealth, it is hard to assign a limit. The loss of other enjoyments, which the acquisition

of a spot so over-valued by caprice beyond its agricultural or building value, would entail on its acquirer, is almost the only check to this competition. Still, however, in all cases, the two ingredients of desire and labour are necessary to constitute an article of wealth. If nature have limited the supply of the article so that labour cannot furnish the demands of desire, the artificial value of caprice commences; but whereas, in ordinary cases, the value of an article of wealth extends to the smallest quantity of labour that could produce it, here the value of caprice cannot extend even as far. Scarcely any amount of labour, not such as any individual fortune could purchase, could create a new river, for instance, and form sites upon it, or continue exploring the earth till new diamonds or similar baubles, equal in size to the largest known, were discovered. Even this surplus artificial value, therefore, comes within our rule; for not only can it never *exceed* the amount of labour necessary to produce similar articles, but it seldom reaches that amount. The amount of labour expended or saved on objects of desire, is therefore in all cases the utmost limit of their value, and that which constitutes them articles of wealth.

Though the proposition heading this section asserts that labour is the *sole* measure of the value of an article of wealth, it does not assert that this *sole* measure is in all cases an *accurate* measure. As an article must be an object of desire to be an article of wealth, and as these desires and preferences are apt to vary with circumstances both physical and moral, particularly with the quantum of knowledge (of science and art) of the means of converting to use the materials and energies of nature, it is evidently impossible that the absolute quantity of labour can be any accurate index to these. Superfluous trinkets without use are sought after by the savage and the courtier. Under representative self-government, they would be equally disregarded as things conferring merit, and reduced to their commercial value, to the value of real use. Uninformed

nations may disregard the sea-weed and the siliceous sand on their shores ; by the union of which, by means of heat, into one substance, light and warmth might be enjoyed in their dwellings ; and should other substances supply the place of these, in cheaper substitutes, they would, if not wanted for other purposes, be equally disregarded by civilised nations. What is asserted is, that in any given state of society, with any given desires, at any particular time, labour, employed with ordinary judgment on objects of desire, is the sole measure of their values ; and under such circumstances, an accurate measure.

There is no one article of desire, usually esteemed an article of wealth, which has not been, and which is not, in many places, denied that title. There are tribes, by whom neither corn, nor cottons, nor woollens, nor gold, nor rice, nor silver, would be esteemed articles of value, or wealth ; but there are no tribes, there are no human beings, with whom human labour is not esteemed an article of value. Ignorant or enlightened, poor or rich, depraved or beneficent, labour is everywhere, to all men, an article of value ; it is everywhere the price paid for the continuance of existence as well as for the means of enjoyment. It is the only universal commodity. Nowhere without human labour or effort can objects of desire be obtained in such quantity or state of preparation as to support life.

Enough, it is hoped, has been said to prove, that “wealth is produced by labour ; that labour is the sole ingredient by which an article of desire is converted into an article of wealth ; and that labour is the sole universal, though still not an accurate, measure, of the value of wealth.”

From what has been said follows also the truth of these propositions :—

First, The mere desirableness of, or desire for, any physical, or other, object, does not constitute it an object of wealth.

Second, Nor does its rarity, nor its beauty, nor the pleasure, ever so pure, intense, or permanent, that

may be afforded by it, nor even its necessity for existence, constitute it an object of wealth.

Third, Nor, of course, does its *utility*, or its subserviency to any or all of the above, or to any other, uses, constitute it an object of wealth.

Fourth, Labour alone, added to the desire for physical things, constitutes them objects of wealth.

There are also two circumstances to be noticed, which when combined exclude physical things, though objects of desire, from having labour bestowed upon them so as to be constituted articles of wealth, viz.—

First, The exhaustless supply of some physical objects of desire.

Second, Their existence in a state fit for use.

Such are the light of the sun, the air, sometimes water, atmospheric heat, &c.

Having a clear idea of what wealth is, we shall be able to understand each other when we speak of its distribution. Let us proceed, then, to our next section.

SECTION 2.

THE OBJECT TO BE AIMED AT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, AS IN ITS PRODUCTION BY LABOUR, IS TO CONFER THEREBY THE GREATEST POSSIBLE QUANTITY OF HAPPINESS (*i. e.* OF PLEASURES, WHETHER OF THE SENSES, OR OF A MORAL OR INTELLECTUAL NATURE) ON THE SOCIETY PRODUCING IT.

Our organisation has made us *sentient* beings, that is to say, capable of experiencing pleasure and pain from various sources. The only rational motive to exertion of any sort, whether to acquire wealth or for any other purpose, is to increase the means of happiness, or to remove or lessen causes of annoyance, immediate or in prospect. To add to happiness, therefore, wealth is produced. If nature produced spontaneously an abundance of food and all other comforts for the use of man, as she does of air for his respiration, no effort would be made to produce or appropriate them, no *distribution* would be thought of: every

one would take and consume as his wants demanded. With the sole view of adding to happiness, wealth, which nature does not give, is produced by labour; and the greater the happiness produced, the more satisfactory must be the effort. If we are delighted with one portion of happiness as arising from our wealth—be it enjoyed by whom it may—we must be more delighted with two portions, and with three still more than with two; and so on with any increase, to any extent of the number of portions. And as wealth can only be produced with a view to being made the means of comfort or enjoyment by its use or consumption, and as it must be distributed in order to be consumed, that distribution must be the best which gives the greatest number of portions of enjoyment, which gives the greatest possible quantity of happiness to those, the society or community, that produce it. The community producing the wealth will not send the fruits of their labour to add to the happiness of a neighbouring community, because that community possesses equal facilities for the production, because there is no reason to suppose a greater capacity for happiness amongst other communities, and because such gratuitous supply would annihilate the motives to production in the idle community receiving, as well as in the giving, unrequited, community.

The organisation of man is so constituted as to enable him to enjoy an extent of happiness indefinitely greater than that of such an animal as an oyster, or any number of oysters, or perhaps even of any number of horses; therefore is his comfort to be preferred indefinitely to the comfort of such inferior animals, whenever their happiness is incompatible with his. If, now, any one human being could demonstrate that his organisation so excelled that of his fellow-men as to enable him to experience indefinitely greater happiness than the rest of his species, his claim, like that of man above the oyster, ought to be allowed, and wealth and all other means of happiness ought to be applied to him, as by such application they would be the

most productive. Even such a state of things would not violate our present rule. The greatest quantity of happiness, wherever it may be found to alight, must be pursued.

The only reason that can be given for the *production* of wealth at all, is, that it adds to the means of happiness : the only reason that it should be *distributed* in one way more than another, is, that it tends more to produce, to add to the stock of happiness, the object of its production, by one mode of distribution than by another. Consistently with this principle, if the slavery of nine out of ten and the superlative happiness of the tenth increased the sum total of happiness, *that* distribution of slavery should be pursued. All that is asked by this first principle, is, that the greatest quantity of agreeable sensations, both in intensity and duration, should be the object aimed at in the distribution of wealth. To deny it, would be to affirm that pain is to be preferred to pleasure, that no sensations are preferable to agreeable ones, that no feeling, which is tantamount to non-existence, is to be preferred to feeling or existence. Happiness in the abstract, and the greatest possible quantity of it, being then our first object, let us proceed to ascertain what mode of distribution will ensure the most of it. Our next proposition is,

SECTION 3.

ALL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY (CASES OF MAL-CONFORMATION EXCEPTED) BEING SIMILARLY CONSTITUTED IN THEIR PHYSICAL ORGANISATION, ARE CAPABLE, BY SIMILAR TREATMENT, OF ENJOYING EQUAL PORTIONS OF HAPPINESS.

Within a few months after birth, the *senses* of men are developed to nearly as great perfection as they attain through life. Edacate them or not, sounds, odours, colours, flavours, and external contact, will operate upon them ; and no particular accidents occurring, they are equal in point of development, or capacity for use and enjoyment, to all men. Far different is it with the organisation on

which our mental feelings depend. Neglect *them*, they are little superior to those of the ape; cultivate them to the extent of what is now known, and they much excel what poets feigned of the mind or morals of the old immortal gods. Instead, then, of supposing in the cerebral organisation anything more intractable, or anything *less* liable to change than in the senses, the fact is directly the reverse. Instead of a greater tendency to inequality in the organisation on which the feeling of thought depends, the original inequalities of that organisation are *more* liable to be rectified and improved by education or circumstances, than those of the organisation of the senses. But these general facts admitted, it will perhaps be said, that "as there are peculiarities of constitution, called idiosyncrasies, tending to particular vital actions and appetites, to be operated upon by particular medicines, so there are peculiar *tastes* of the senses and of the mind." This is true, but it does not weaken our general position; for, not to mention that many of these peculiarities, particularly the moral and intellectual, are clearly the result of circumstances or education, yet are these inequalities so trifling as not to affect, on the whole, the aggregate of pleasures of any particular sense, not to say the aggregate of all the pleasures of sense of any individual, and still less the aggregate of all his pleasures, sensual, intellectual, and moral. But were even this the case—which it clearly is not—were the capacity for the aggregate sum of pleasures lessened by these peculiarities; what mode, what measure, have we to ascertain where or by *whom* this superior aggregate of pleasures, arising from such peculiarities, is enjoyed?

To us, therefore, such inequalities of capabilities of enjoyment *do not exist*, because they are by us inappreciable: they cannot enter into our moral and political calculations; for they can no more than the galvanic fluid be seized and measured. The fact of their inequality is one thing, the possibility of measuring the degrees of this

inequality, so as to make them serve as the basis of distribution, is another. 'Tis in vain that we say that different degrees of susceptibility to happiness exist, if we cannot demonstrate *where they are*, and in what *proportions*; without this they can be of no practical use. But let us advance another step in the argument. Suppose that these capabilities, or susceptibilities, of enjoyment were, in the sum total of pleasures, different in different individuals,—suppose, moreover, that we had discovered a mode of measuring them; another difficulty, of a practical nature, and insurmountable, occurs. Who are to be the *measurers* of these susceptibilities? the rich or the poor, the young or the old, the studious or the illiterate? Are we to institute a court, and to impanel a jury, in the case of every individual; or, if this be too troublesome, are we to use a judge without jury, and label every man's neck, to say nothing of the women, with tickets of susceptibility of one to one hundred, supposing these numbers to comprise the extreme lengths of the chain? Behold! no sooner are our labels attached, no sooner is this delicate operation performed of valuing susceptibilities, than changes begin to take place, and the most accurate valuation becomes deranged. Accidents, diseases, the progress of years, mental or moral improvement or deterioration, all these causes are in unceasing activity; so that the table of susceptibilities of one year will be quite inapplicable the succeeding year, or perhaps the succeeding month. We must dismiss, then, as altogether unworthy of consideration, the notion of influencing the distribution of wealth by speculations as to the capacities for enjoyment of different individuals. Whether, under similar treatment, with like incidents and diseases, similar *moral or mental qualities* would be developed, is not now the question: 'tis merely whether similar treatment, operating on healthy organisation, will produce equal capabilities as to the aggregate of *enjoyment*, though it will also, perhaps, be found that in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred similar treatment will

produce similar intellectual and moral qualities also. As to our immediate subject indeed, the distribution of wealth, even so much is not required. 'T is not the susceptibility to every species of enjoyment which is demanded for our main argument, but simply to those particular enjoyments arising from the use of the objects of wealth. That "all sane members of society, similarly treated, are capable of similar degrees of enjoyment from equal portions of wealth," will now, I trust, be admitted, though the larger proposition as to an equal capacity for all species of enjoyment—which appears to be equally incontrovertible—should be denied; always keeping in mind the impossibility of acting on these inequalities, even if they were proved to exist. In the application of punishment, indeed, the susceptibilities to pain may usefully be taken into account in order to render those punishments *equal*, opportunity being afforded in such cases of inquiring into individual circumstances.

Let it be always recollected that our reasonings apply to the *capabilities* of all human beings as formed by nature, and modified by external circumstances. If an *actual state* of degradation of a great portion of any community, and a consequent incapacity of physical enjoyment, could be exhibited, it would not weaken our argument, until it could be shown that the portion of the community so degraded, had been subjected to *similar treatment* with the more fortunate members of the same community.

SECTION 4.

THE HAPPINESS OF THE GREATER NUMBER IS TO BE PREFERRED TO THE HAPPINESS OF THE LESSER NUMBER; OTHERWISE THE OBJECT IN VIEW, THE PRODUCTION OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE QUANTITY OF HAPPINESS, WOULD BE SACRIFICED.

This proposition necessarily follows the preceding; for if all sane persons are, by similar treatment, capable

of equal portions of enjoyment, to say, that the happiness of two of these equals is to be preferred to one, is no more than saying that two or any other number are more than one. Happiness being the object, the sum total would be lessened by the abstraction of any portion of it. Why, then, the necessity of stating a self-evident proposition? Because, though sometimes admitted in theory as to smaller associations, it has been most flagrantly and lamentably neglected *in practice*, not only as applied to society at large, but even in its application to these minor associations. To enumerate the practices that prevail in violation of this principle, would be to enumerate almost every case of privilege and exemption. It must be observed again, that though this, like the other propositions, is expressed in general terms as applicable to every species of happiness, to happiness derived from all other sources as well as from wealth, because they are thought to be universally true; yet is our general argument concerned with no more than this, that *that* portion of the happiness of the greater number, which *is derived from wealth*, is to be preferred to that portion of the happiness of the smaller number which is derived from the same source. The *direct* operation of wealth is chiefly to afford the means of more extensive pleasures of the senses: it is only indirectly that it operates to increase our moral and intellectual pleasures; and when unequally distributed, and in very large masses, it tends, as will be proved, to eradicate almost entirely these higher moral and intellectual pleasures.

“Should not the happiness of the intelligent and the moral,” some will, perhaps, weakly ask, “be preferred, in the distribution of wealth, to the happiness of the ignorant and vicious?” * First, it was dissimilarity of treatment alone that made the one enlightened and the other ignorant, the one moral and the other vicious. None so ready to proclaim this truth as the intelligent and the moral. Ask them from what sources their happiness is derived;

ask them how much of it proceeds directly from mere wealth, and you will be astonished at the scantiness of the proportion of their enjoyments arising from that source, beyond the supply of the average comforts of life. Will *they* wish, will they demand that the physical enjoyments of others should be deliberately sacrificed to theirs? that the distribution of wealth should be directed out of its natural channel of free labour and voluntary exchanges, to favour them? Will *they* desire, by any artificial regulations, to obtain the fruit of other men's labour without their consent, and for which there is no equivalent given?

Far from the intelligent, far from the moral, would be such a wish. The happiness of the wise and good could not be promoted by such means; they require the forced sacrifice of no man's happiness, of the happiness of no portion of their fellow-creatures, to promote theirs. Such injustice would but mar their happiness instead of increasing it. They respect the happiness of all other men equally with their own. But suppose the case were the reverse; suppose that the wise and moral did, in this unwise and immoral way, require the sacrifice of the happiness of others, of the greater number, to theirs, how should we find out who were the moral and the wise? By the forming of such wishes? Who would not then put in his claim for morality and wisdom? Every individual would assert his exclusive claim. To avoid this confusion, we give—to whom?—the power of deciding who are to be the favoured virtuous and wise. If to those in power, whose legislative measures regulate the distribution of wealth, will they prefer the interest of the wise and good to their own exclusive interest? Or will they not find out at once that they are the wise and good; that to themselves and their friends, as the wisest and the best, the preference should be given; if the happiness of a smaller is to be preferred to the happiness of a larger number?

Let us turn to which side we may, it will be impossible to find any rational ground for preferring the happiness of

the smaller number as derived from wealth, or indeed from any other source, to the happiness of the larger number. The happiness of the greatest number must therefore be always kept in view by the moralist and legislator, without any regard to morals, manners, intellectual or other qualities. In fact, our argument does not encumber itself with the supposition of the actual existence of any inequalities of character or circumstances. We take mankind as actually constituted by nature, and as capable, by similar treatment, of being fashioned by circumstances; and under these data, we ask what is best to be done in the way of the distribution of wealth? A future stage in the inquiry will lead us to an investigation of the best mode of introducing our natural arrangement into a society labouring under the evils of forced and artificial arrangements for distributing wealth.

The happiness of the greater number is therefore to be preferred to the happiness of the lesser number, in whatever arrangements may be made respecting the distribution of wealth. We may now pass on to the next, our fifth proposition; which endeavours to show that,

SECTION 5.

THOSE MEANS OF ENJOYMENT, OR HAPPINESS, WHICH COME UNDER THE NAME OF WEALTH, BEING PRODUCED BY THE APPLICATION OF LABOUR AND KNOWLEDGE TO THE MATERIALS AFFORDED BY NATURE, SUFFICIENT STIMULUS IN THE WAY OF MOTIVE MUST BE AFFORDED TO PUT THE NECESSARY LABOUR GUIDED BY KNOWLEDGE INTO MOTION TO PRODUCE THIS WEALTH.

For every voluntary human exertion, an adequate motive must be afforded; and the longer continued and more painful the exertion; the more remote, the slighter, and more doubtful, the advantage to be derived from the exertion; the more powerful must be the motive to produce the effect required. Man in his first wild uncivilised state, like the other animals surrounding him, is urged to exertion almost exclusively by the feelings of hunger, and the desire

of enjoying the pleasures of taste. Satisfied at first, like other animals, with seizing what nature throws in his way of vegetable or animal nutriment, he never learns till these fail him, to domesticate, to confine, and rear, wild animals, or to imitate the processes of nature in sowing a kernel or seed with the view of reaping the grain, or gathering the fruit to be produced by them. He is urged in all things by the pressure of want, or by the apprehension of future want; less frequently, by the desire of pleasure. The great obstacle to the development of exertion amongst mankind, not only in its earlier stages, but through all its subsequent struggles, is the want of "*security*." No sooner has the provident matured and brought forward in a state for use, for consumption, the articles of food—those being always the first objects of human foresight and industry—than they are exposed to the attacks of all around, urged by superior strength or the urgent calls of appetite. The first obstacles to the progress of industry in the acquisition of wealth are, want of adequate motives to conquer the love of ease, want of foresight, want of apprehension, want of knowledge to devise the means of producing or increasing the quantity of the articles required. When those difficulties are surmounted, when knowledge has been acquired, when motives sufficiently urgent have been developed by circumstances; there remains still a condition without which all knowledge to produce, all desire of producing, must remain eternally barren and unproductive of effectual exertion—the want of *security*. Without it, exertion, continued exertion, is impossible. Even with its most assured aid, it is often almost impossible to conquer the indolence of savage man. Frequent efforts have been made in North America by individuals and governments, on a confined and on an extensive scale, on whole tribes and on a few selected from the mass of uncivilised men, to induce them to change their habits of indolence for industrious habits; but almost uniformly without success. Whether it is possible, by other means of persuasion and

new combinations of industrious exertion, to overcome these difficulties, is a question which it is not necessary here to discuss.

It must be observed, however, that as it is the impulse of want, of necessity, which prompts the exertions of the savage, in his wild state, even to support his existence; so is it the same impulse of want, of necessity, aided by habits acquired in early life, which prompts the exertions of the productive labourers of civilised communities. The savage must hunt for his animal or vegetable repast, or starve; the civilised labourer must ply his tools, and pursue his industry, or he must starve also. If the uncivilised man is asked to adopt the slow producing labours of civilisation, he has always an alternative, the old hazardous chase, or the new persevering and slowly but certainly-rewarded toil. But to the civilised labourer, no such alternative is presented. To him no wilds of nature are open to allure him to liberty and risk, to exertion and repose. He must persevere in industry, or perish; necessity compels him to labour in order to live. Annihilate the neighbouring woodlands or immeasured plains of the savage, and he too, like the civilised labourer, must work or starve. But, from want of acquired habits of industry, his exertions will be grudged, and will be limited to the rudest supply of physical wants. Knowledge, motives to labour from seeing the good effects it produces around him, secure enjoyment of what his labour produces, all these favourable circumstances are insufficient to make the savage industrious. Yet the civilised man is industrious under apparently similar circumstances; similar, certainly, as far as mere wealth is concerned. We must look, then, beyond mere wealth into the intellectual constitution of man. In what do these two supposed sets of labourers, the civilised and uncivilised, now differ? In the different *habits* which each of them has acquired in early life. The wants and circumstances of the savage, have impressed upon him the habit of occasional violent exer-

tion, of long rest, of freedom from restraint, and have in a great measure absolved him from the necessity of so regulating his conduct as to avoid the ill-will and ill-offices of those around him; with social morality, springing out of the relations of men to and dependencies upon each other, he is little acquainted. Circumstances of a very different nature surrounding from his birth the civilised man, he acquires the habit of gentle and continued labour, of short repose, of skill in handling certain tools, of using and therefore wanting certain small gratifications, and of shaping his conduct to the restraints of established laws, established customs, or established force, and consulting the passions and interests of those around him. Such being the difference of character, of inclination, of the two individuals or classes of men, the savage and the civilised, when both are newly-placed, as we have described, under exactly similar external circumstances, let us further inquire how these different habits have been generated, and how they must be altered or amended. Habits are generated by false or true associations, by false or true views of interest. Habit is the constant repetition of the same act or series of actions; but for doing the first act or for repeating it there must be some reason, some inducement, some motive, dread of pain or desire of pleasure. In savage life the motive to exertion is urgent, is direct, the immediate necessity, by direct means, of appropriating food from the common storehouse of nature. The call is seldom made, but when made cannot be resisted. Hunger and thirst provided for, the call for labour ceases, and indolence reigns. There is no reason to fear but that the habit of yielding to this energetic call will always remain in full force in the mind of the savage. The reason of the habit is true, energetic, and always present. The drilling, the habit of the civilised man, will lead *him* to be operated upon by motives more distant than those necessary to impel the savage to action. Habit will not, however, supersede the necessity of adequate stimulus, in the

shape of rational motive to exertion in the production of wealth; it will merely facilitate the development of motives, which without the acquired habit of industry would produce no effect whatever. Industrious habits render men accessible to the motives for production. Without these habits of activity, men are not accessible to any motives but those of immediate wants. The habit of exertion, therefore, however developed, whether mechanically, rationally, or from a union of both reason and authority, will produce nothing without motive. Motives of interest are the vital air to those whose industrious habits are formed: a constant supply of these is eternally necessary to keep up the production of wealth, to diffuse its vivifying effects through society. A review of the state or progress of all nations, whether industrious or indolent, will prove that industry has everywhere prevailed exactly in proportion to the motives held out in the form of rewards of industry, enjoying the product of its labour.

In many parts of the world, at this moment, force has been substituted for voluntary motive, and the dread of pain, compulsion, have been made to produce the stunted imitations of healthful voluntary exertion. In an economical point of view, this labour has been proved to be the most expensive; in a moral point of view, it abstracts from the mass of human happiness. If there be any truth in the principles here laid down, no proof of the comparative cheapness of production by compulsory labour, no proof of the impossibility of procuring any desired portion of wealth without such labour, would suffice for a moment to justify its introduction or continuance. The simple question of justice to be asked is—"Is the sum total of human happiness, including that of the slaves as well as of their masters, lessened or increased by substituting compulsory for voluntary labour?" To ask such a question is absurd; because if compulsory labour produced more happiness, there would be no need of using compulsion—it would become voluntary.

All motives arising from terror being then excluded, and man being to be operated upon as a voluntary agent, sufficient stimulus must be applied, in the shape of *voluntary motive*, to induce him to continue the exercise of those habits of industry, which in civilised life he must more or less have formed. Where is this sufficient stimulus to be found? Our next proposition undertakes to solve this question.

SECTION 6.

THE STRONGEST STIMULUS TO PRODUCTION (AND THAT WHICH IS NECESSARY TO THE GREATEST PRODUCTION) THAT THE NATURE OF THINGS WILL PERMIT, IS "SECURITY" IN THE *entire use* OF THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR, TO THOSE WHO PRODUCE THEM.

We have already seen, that no extent of knowledge on the part of the productive labourers, no profusion of motives tempting them to exertion, not even the acquisition of industrious habits, will induce them to persevere in the continued production of wealth, if they are not by some means protected, whether by their own strength or by co-operation, in the *use* of what their labour has produced. To continue voluntary labour, uncompelled, for the benefit of others, would be a proof of insanity; and has in fact, on a national scale, never occurred. It is a moral impossibility. In order to *continue* voluntary production at all—for it may be begun without reflection or by the way of experiment—the producer must derive the expected benefit from the thing produced. But this general principle admitted in words, has been pertinaciously opposed in practice. The constant effort of what has been called society, has been to deceive and induce, to terrify and compel, the productive labourer to work for the *smallest possible portion* of the produce of his own labour. The object of those who instituted and maintained such a state of things, was altogether different from the simple object

which is here put forward as the only just end of legislation, of morals, or of the association of men,—*the production of the greatest possible quantity of human happiness.* Such men, possessing mostly the wealth and the ruling powers of society, have uniformly established their subordinate objects as ultimate ends of pursuit; such as the support and continuance of their order, the continuance of the system of rule, whatever it might be, which they had introduced; the continuance, at all events, and increase of their own superiority in wealth, power, and happiness. Now, to promote different objects, different means must be used. It were childish to expect results from a set of measures favourable to *one* object, which were instituted with a view to *opposite* results; except by way of ignorance or accident no such consequence can follow. The only candid way of reasoning on the first principles of economy and legislation is, to avow explicitly our ultimate object. The ultimate object of political economy has been to increase the absolute mass of accumulated wealth in society, leaving it to moralists and politicians to divide the yearly produce and the permanent accumulation, in whatever proportions their mysterious wisdom might think fit; satisfied with the achievement of increasing the wealth (the productive powers of the labour) of society, and confident that comfort and happiness must, somehow or other, or somewhere or other, be the necessary consequence of increased and increasing wealth. The rich and the powerful, with eye intent on the direction of this wealth, when produced to their own use, were altogether soothed and pleased with speculations developing the easiest means of multiplying all the objects that could minister to their delights; and they fancied themselves, from their adventitious command over these means of enjoyment, the dispensers of food, clothing, and habitation to the productive classes. “Enough must be left with the labourers,” say the rich, “to make them *work*.” All beyond this was so much lost to themselves; nay, worse, tended to make the working classes discon-

tented, insolent. With such ultimate objects in view, the absolute quantity of wealth to be produced was only a secondary object, and held no importance, except as ministerial to the most abundant supply of their own means of enjoyment. It is necessary, then, candidly and explicitly to avow, that we hold all such objects as the *mere* production and accumulation of wealth, to be childish; all such preferences of the happiness of one class of human beings over that of another, to be absurd, cruel, unjust; that no regulation, no institution, ought to stand in the way of, ought to be one moment substituted for, our principle of the greatest happiness; that we accept of no parley, no compromise with any other interest; that our principle must reign uncontrolled, and suffer no divided empire. The question, then, comes simply to this:—

The object being to promote the greatest sum of happiness to the productive classes—for even the increase of wealth, if it were not accompanied with an increase of happiness, would cease to be an object of rational desire—will these productive classes be more happy (all other circumstances, climate, institutions, morals, manners, &c. being equal) in the use of a *part* or of the *whole* of what their labour has produced?

Suppose a thousand individuals, healthy, willing to work, with acquired habits of industry in different departments, associated together for mutual support on the system of mutual co-operation and economy by all the aids of science, applied by art to useful purposes. Suppose them without tools, without a supply of clothes or food, till their labour could be made productive, without land to till, without materials to work upon.

Behold them provided with nothing but habits of industry and skill. What shall we say? Can mere industry and skill surmount these giant bars to happiness, to existence? How shall we stimulate this helpless colony into exertion sufficiently energetic to conquer so many obstacles,

and to raise themselves into the enjoyment of the comforts of existence? By giving them security in *the entire use*, the free disposal of whatever their labour can procure, shall we accomplish this desirable object? or by giving them *anything less* than the entire? Assuredly the question is preposterous. Assuredly the difficulty is, how without removing some of these obstacles, how without some additional encouragement, to put the labour of such a colony into productive motion. The difficulty assuredly is, how without compulsion—the compulsion of want superseding that of force—to make such a colony labour at all, further than necessary to existence; the prospect of acquired comfort out of the produce of labour being so remote.

To accommodate matters to this striving colony, the owner of the land comes forward and says that he will not insist on an equivalent in labour for the *purchase* of his land; but he will be satisfied with disposing of the *yearly use* of his land, getting in return every year so much labour, measured by its products, so much of the increase of the soil, as may be deemed an equivalent. The colony then undertakes to give the produce, every year, of a portion of its labour applied to the soil, in the way of *rent* for the use of the soil and its productive powers. The owners of the rude materials for manufactures make a similar claim on the labour of the colony, for the use of the materials with which to work up the clothing and other comforts of the colony; the productive labourers yielding a portion of the value of the articles they make to the suppliers of the materials, which portion constitutes their *profit*. Sometimes even the owner of the tools to work with, if they be very complicated and costly in their structure, or require permanent fixtures or buildings, make a similar demand on the unprovided labourers; and even those that possess the food that the labourers must consume until the produce of this labour is in a state for consumption or exchange, demand a profit, a portion of the return of the labour,

for their aid, with repayment of the whole of the food advanced.

Will any one ask, Why should the labourer be burdened with payment of a part of his labour for the entire cost or the use of the tools, clothes, food, materials, or land, with or upon which he works? Why not give him the *whole absolute produce* of his labour without any of these deductions? Because other people who have appropriated this land, these materials, by labour or voluntary exchanges, who have made these tools or clothes, who have co-operated with nature in the production of this food, require the same stimulus to continue their productive industry; require the same "security," in the entire use of what their labour has produced, that is demanded for the unprovided labourer. We must not rob one producer to encourage another. Security in the entire use must be administered impartially to all. By violating the security of another, the productive labourer annihilates with his own hand his own claim to security not only in the entire use, but in any use of what his labour has created. *No exchanges but such as are voluntary, no possessions but such as industry has acquired*, are reconcileable with impartial security. As to the *amount* of compensation claimed by capitalists, that will be considered hereafter.

Now, with all these deductions to be made from the produce of the labour of the colony, will its productive labour yield such a surplus as to afford more than sufficient stimulus to set the colony to work for the sake of such a remuneration? Even under such terms, the pressure of extreme want—for they must work or starve—it may be said, will *compel* them to work. Yes, truly. But is this the strongest stimulus, the highest reward that the nature of things will permit? Is this giving to productive labourers the *entire use* of the whole of the produce of their labour? Can political economy devise no further expedient, no additional encouragement to cheer, to reward the labours of such men? In the way of wealth, and on a scale of

such extent as to produce anything like national utility, political economy can do no more than this; and this is giving the labourer security in the entire use of the produce of his labour.

But, be it always recollected, this is exactly the situation of every unprovided labourer in every civilised community.

Still it will be objected, "May not *bounties* be given; may not rewards, honorary or otherwise, be held out; may not contributions, subscriptions, be raised, to buy for, and present to, the colony, that which they must otherwise hire. None of these things will be done on a large scale, because capitalists will not risk their capital without being assured of the ordinary profit. And for the payment of this profit, not to speak of the risk of their capitals, they will hardly be satisfied with the guarantee of such a community. It is evident that *voluntary transfers* could never be expected on a large scale. To *force* wealth, obtained by productive labour and voluntary exchange, from those who have produced it, in order to encourage others to productive labour and voluntary exchange, is evidently undoing with the one hand what the other is aiming to accomplish. As to bounties or honours, in a case of tremendous exigency like this, they would not be thought of. They may *mis-direct* labour; the question here is to *produce* it.

But may we not try whether the drilling of superstition through the associations of early education, will not lead the labourer to work as a matter of duty for less than the entire use, and whether these associations would not be a more energetic and productive principle of action? The whole history of the exertions of human industry has belied this hope. If superstition could stunt the growth of the faculties as directed to one subject or one line of thought or exertion alone, without weakening the faculties themselves; if men could be kept children in *one* matter, and that the most important of their lives, without being

spiritless, uninventive, and unproductive in *every other* matter then might such a scheme succeed. But such is not the constitution of our nature. Gross deception destroys that curiosity, that elasticity of mind, which is requisite for vigorous exertion. The unfailing effect of such schemes has been to render men stupid or ferocious, but always passive, slaves, producing almost nothing for their own comfort or that of their masters.

If superstition, or *false* or *pretended* knowledge, can give no new stimulus, no stimulus at all, but is an absolute drawback on industry, *real* knowledge will wonderfully strengthen and accelerate its efforts, and produce the full development of human capabilities. But knowledge can never act as a *substitute* for the stimulus of the entire use of the products of labour. On the contrary, it would make this entire use the first condition of productive industry; but with this condition, it would indefinitely increase its powers.

But, in addition to the obstructions to the development of industry, which nature or the progress of cultivation throws in the way of the savage, or the civilised, man, or of the American settler, there are other obstructions of an appalling nature, and to an indefinite extent, which have been foolishly, or wantonly, or cruelly thrown in the way of the productive labourer. Those who have no visible or tangible equivalent in the way of the exchange of wealth to bestow, have seized on parts of the produce of his labour. His consent has not been asked to sanction the transfer. No equivalent, by the labourer deemed satisfactory, whether of a physical or intellectual nature, has been afforded him. Under no circumstances in the world has labour on a grand scale been so free and secure in the entire use of its products as in the United States of America; and nowhere has it been so productive. In proportion as the reward of productive labour has departed from this maximum, so have the efforts of industry been relaxed; till at length, at their extreme point of apathy,

from want of voluntary stimulus, brutal force has been used to extort, by means of terror, a reluctant produce from the arms of wretchedness. All history proclaims this truth; and it might be illustrated from thousands of pages. The same reason that would justify the *taking away* one portion of the produce of labour *without the labourer's consent*—which is the golden and universal check that we are in search of—would justify the taking away any other portion; till in the end, no stimulus being left, no possible exertion, no production but in obedience to physical want or compulsion would ensue.

It is hoped, then, that all difficulties have been removed, in the way of admitting that “the strongest stimulus to production that the nature of things will permit, is *security* in the *entire use* of the products of labour to those who produce them.”

How far the claims of capitalists injuriously abstract from this entire use, will be inquired into hereafter.

SECTION 7.

ALL *voluntary* EXCHANGES OF THE ARTICLES OF WEALTH, IMPLYING A PREFERENCE, ON BOTH SIDES, OF THE THING RECEIVED TO THE THING GIVEN, TEND TO THE INCREASE OF HAPPINESS FROM WEALTH, AND THENCE TO INCREASE THE MOTIVES TO ITS PRODUCTION.

Without exchanges there can be no industry, no continued production of wealth. Labour without exchanges would be nearly as useless as exchanges without labour, as no one man can produce all the articles necessary to his own well-being. Suppose again a colony of 1,000 labourers or 1,000 individuals, including the usual proportion of women and children. The whole of these must not only be fed, but clad, and provided with dwellings, furniture, and other conveniences. By what process shall all these numerous wants be supplied? Shall every individual endeavour to supply all his wants himself, make his own tools,

build his own house, till the ground for his own food, search out the materials for his own clothing and furniture, and manufacture them himself? But if every *man* should provide all his own wants, why should not every *woman* provide also hers? Why should not she also, till, build, manufacture clothes, food, tools, &c. for her own use? Because, not having as much strength as man, and a great portion of the time of her most vigorous years being devoted to the rearing of successive children, not only would she not have *time* to accomplish *all* these objects, but what she attempted would be inefficiently performed. *Convenience* would require that the woman should occupy herself with that species of labour, useful to herself and her companion, and their offspring, in which her peculiar organisation, and thence resulting powers, would be the most productive. This reason is so very striking, that none but the most brutal and stupid of savages have been uninfluenced by it. In a few cases in savage life, the men have made the women carry burdens, work in the fields, as well as mind the house; rewarding them with compulsion and blows, making them complete slaves; as amongst some tribes in North America. The *object* of these savages, however, was not to increase production, but to gratify their own love of ease, of idleness, and domination. *Our* object being different, different means must be used to attain it. Now, the very same convenience with respect to the increase of production, and thence of enjoyment, which would lead the man and the woman of one hut into different species of labour, would lead different men of the same community into different modes of production, or rather into the production of different articles. If all were to work at all trades, all would have to learn all trades. Evidently as much skill could not be learned in all trades as in one or a few. Here is, then, a *loss of skill* by the effort of every man to produce every article of his wants for himself. Then comes a second inconvenience of *loss of time* in turning from one operation to another; not

only the time lost of putting up one set of tools and materials and getting out another, of locomotion from place to place, but the chance of abstraction of mind or interruption from without, during the passage from one employment to another. But this is not at all; one man may live in the neighbourhood of water or wood, and thence may find it more easy to catch the fish or make the tools, the materials for which are at hand. Again, some operations require the strength of many, others such expedition as only many hands can supply, both in agricultural and manufacturing operations. If such operations are undertaken by solitary individuals, it must be at a great disadvantage, one labourer unassisted not producing perhaps the one hundredth part, instead of the fifth part of what five co-operating could produce. Moreover, some men are of weakly constitutions from defect of organisation, disease, or accident, or may have acquired a particular delight and skill in a particular line of labour. The weak or the skilful may produce double the value of useful things in that line of labour for which they are adapted. Their time, therefore, would be comparatively lost in any other occupations. Another obstacle superior to all these together comes in the way. There is scarcely a spot on the globe capable of feeding the smallest community, say ours of 1,000 individuals, that contains within its own bounds all the rude materials of clothes, tools, &c. necessary for the comfortable existence of its population. If, then, all members of every community, or of any colony, made themselves, individually, all articles to supply their respective wants; all their productions would be wretchedly deficient in quality and in quantity, and many of the most useful articles for production or consumption must be entirely dispensed with. Still other evils assail the scheme of solitary unaided exertion. Can the *independent* supplier of his own wants predict exactly the capacity of his stomach, or his family's stomach, or even the number of that family for the year? If he could, can he also fore-

tell the produce of the soil and the accidents of the seasons? Is he sure, therefore, that his best-regulated exertions will procure him exactly enough of food to supply his yearly wants? and that no useless surplus will be produced? Will the leather for shoes, thongs, and other uses, always require a whole hide, neither more nor less; the chairs or table always require a whole tree, neither more nor less; the coat require exactly a whole fleece? and so on of all other rude materials. If there be a deficiency or superfluity of food, clothing, or other manufactured articles, what is to be done with this superfluity? how is this deficiency to be supplied? Is the superfluity to be turned to no account, to be an absolute loss? Is the deficiency to be submitted to with its train of privations, famine, sickness, and perhaps death? Where is the remedy to be found? In *voluntary exchanges*: so simple, so efficacious. Without the use of exchanges, the application of labour to the appropriation or modelling for use the productions of nature, would be comparatively barren and inoperative in increasing wealth, and the pleasures derivable from it. Exchanges, therefore, are as necessary to useful, to enlarged, production, as labour is.

We have in truth presumed far beyond the nature of things, far beyond the experience of any community however small, in supposing that individual exertion for the exclusive use of its separate members, could procure for the labourers a comfortable subsistence. Co-operation of labour on some occasions, division of labour on other occasions, are necessary to ensure anything worthy the name of production. Over-production and under-production, from natural or accidental causes, where no exchanges took place, would be so frequent and so discouraging, that all stimulus to labour, so uncertain and unsatisfactory in its results, would be taken away. No skill in anything could be acquired, no one object of necessity or convenience could be good in its kind. The herculean effort to produce *everything* by solitary effort, would be relinquished by the

individual or the individual family, as soon as undertaken ; and nothing but what the necessity of existence demanded, would be ultimately produced.

Not only, then, in order to make labour productive to any extent, but in order to set the human arm to work at all, in order to raise man from the most degraded state of savage wretchedness, the utility of exchanges must be discovered, and exchanges must be practised. Take away the faculty of exchanging, and you annihilate the motives to labour. Give life to the principle of exchanges, and no solitary exertion of labour is lost. What is useless to the individual producer, or even to those around him, brought into the common stock, will find some person with whom it is an object of desire, and who will give for it some equivalent in exchange.

We are thus led to the *moral* effects of exchanges. Useful as they are in an economical point of view, indispensable as they are to the production of wealth and the physical comforts in its train, they are no less indispensable for the evolution of morality, of beneficence. Shall we picture to ourselves what man would be, what an isolated family of the human race would be, if working for itself alone, and deprived of the resources and benefits of exchanges? Nothing to give to, nothing to receive from, any other individual, no co-operation implying mutual exchanges of labour, man is an object of apprehension, of distrust to his fellow-creature. What kindly feeling can spring up in the human mind under such circumstances? Instead of benevolent feelings, those of an entirely opposite nature must, under such circumstances, be engendered. Envy and rapine on the one side ; alarm, suspicion, and hatred on the other. Such a state of things as individual labour without exchanges, would be a school of vice. But, change the scene, let the utility of mutual exchanges be once understood ; let their mutual blessings be felt in practice, and what was lately a theatre of rapine, a school of vice, becomes a nursery of social virtue. Man being, in

common with all other animals, essentially a sentient being, it is impossible that any line of action should be followed by him which did not tend in his opinion, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, to his well-being. Tell him to be virtuous, to be beneficent, to promote the happiness of his fellow-creatures; you must show him it is his *interest* to be, and do so. Tell him to be virtuous, and surround him with such circumstances as make the virtues you recommend contrary to his *apparent* interest; his conduct will unhesitatingly follow in the line of what seems to him his interest, and all exhortations in opposition thereto, will be unheeded and inoperative. Improve his powers of comparing and judging, teach him to observe the *consequences* of his own actions as well as those of others, as well as their immediate effects, teach him foresight; and then, surrounded by favourable external circumstances, all the virtues will necessarily spring up.

What does the simple introduction of *exchanges* tell to man, capable of appreciating the truth? He sees that in the numerous ways pointed out, the co-operation of his fellow-creatures with him, and of him with them, is necessary to their mutual happiness; he becomes *interested* in the success of their *joint* labours; he feels a sympathy in their exertions; his feelings are carried out of himself in this first and simplest exchange of labour. When he finds that he has produced more of any article than is necessary for the supply of his own immediate wants till new exertions can procure a new supply; when he finds another person possessing an article which he wants, but which is to his neighbour a superfluity, and when in consequence he makes an exchange, giving superfluity for superfluity, receiving an object of desire for an object of desire; here again mutual satisfaction is produced, mutual sympathy is excited, pleasure is felt at the same time, from the same cause, by both, and thus a pleasurable *association* is formed, and the discovery is made that the happiness of others is not necessarily opposed to our own, but is frequently inseparably connected with it. The more

of these mutually convenient exchanges that take place, the more man becomes dependent on man, the more his feelings become sympathetic, the more social he becomes, the more benevolent. He finds that these mutual good offices generate in his neighbour kindly dispositions, and thence, when an opportunity occurs, kindly actions. He partakes himself of a kindred disposition; and thus all traces of ferocious isolation become lost, from a perception of real and palpable interest.

Thus it appears that not only do all exchanges of the products of labour, tend to increase happiness, and thence the motives to the production of wealth, but that they are also at the basis of social virtue and of production, and without them labour itself would be inefficient to any extensive usefulness.

Would it not be trifling to ask whether these exchanges should be in all cases *voluntary or forced*, or whether forced should in any case be substituted for voluntary exchanges? What virtue is there left in these exchanges if they are not voluntary? is not this circumstance the very essence of them? Take away voluntariness from an exchange, take away from the labourer without his consent the produce of his labour, and what is the result, what is the operation but brute force and robbery? As all *voluntary* exchanges confer happiness equally on both the parties concerned, and promote production and benevolence; so do all *involuntary* exchanges annihilate industry and virtue. They are in every respect opposed to each other, the one operates on the understanding and leads captive the will; the other condescends not to reason, but forces away what it demands. When the surplus produce of a man's labour is taken from him, it may be either without any pretence of any return, of any equivalent in exchange, or it may be accompanied with such equivalent as the stronger party may deem adequate. The first of these cases was despatched in our last section, where it was shown that security in the entire use of all the products of labour was

necessary to ensure even the rude beginnings of production. Where part of the surplus products of labour are taken away contrary to the wishes of the owner, and it is pretended to give an equivalent in exchange; either that equivalent is in fact a real equivalent with which the productive labourer ought, if he knew his own interest, to be satisfied, or it is *not* a real equivalent, being in fact of no value, or of none commensurate to the thing taken. First, the equivalent given is supposed to be fully equal in real value to the thing taken, but through the obstinacy or ignorance of the producer, it does not to him appear to be a full equivalent, he is dissatisfied with it. In this case, what is wanting to be done by the person forcing the real equivalent on the productive labourer? What more simple and easy than his task? He has but to enlighten the ignorance, to explain the truth, to show his own interest to the person whom his proposed exchange would serve. Observe the difference between the continued employment of force in such real exchanges, and the employment of reason, of knowledge. Knowledge once diffused, reason once convinced, all difficulty in the way of such useful exchanges *for the future*, is removed; the operation once performed, is performed for ever. All such future exchanges enliven industry and promote mutual kindness, by affording mutual and voluntary compensations of enjoyment. But where force is once employed to compel an exchange ever so useful, it is not the *less* necessary to employ it a second time, but the *more* necessary. Ill-will is generated by the employment of force; a false and unfavourable association is formed, that of pain, with proffered exchange; prejudice is thus called forth; and indignation at presumed injustice takes away the power of reversing hasty decisions. It is therefore the more necessary to continue the employment of force, or the apprehension, the alternative of force, to compel such exchanges, than it was originally to employ it; reluctance increasing, when the reason is unconvinced, with every repetition of the violence.

Another argument equally cogent in favour of the use of knowledge and persuasion, instead of force, in effecting exchanges, is, that the persuasion, the satisfaction of the producer—for by the supposition the other party is persuaded and satisfied—is the best *test*, that the nature of things will permit, of the utility of the exchange. It is not an *unerring* test. No such tests are to be found amongst creatures whose reasoning powers are imperfect. But, compared with any other supposable test, it is the most likely to be true, nay, it is impossible to devise any other test that can serve, a moment, as a substitute for it. By this test the *two* parties interested, and with opposing interests, must be convinced; by the other only *one*: double the pleasure of satisfaction, therefore, in this case. All the cases that can be brought forward, of both of the exchanging parties being in error, such as exchanges of slaves for spirits or implements of destruction, prove nothing. For it is not pretended that the power of voluntary exchanges will give to mankind at once, or at all, perfect wisdom; it will produce, not an unerring perfection, but an infinity more of production and happiness than any other arrangement. No other arrangement can possibly be devised that will not lead directly to the domination of the crafty and the strong, to all the combined miseries of force and fraud. The simple and obvious remedy for those cases where both exchanging parties are mistaken as to their real interest, is to show them their mistakes, to give them *knowledge*. As soon as they see their mistake, they will of course correct it. This operation of showing them their interest, is not only the most certain and lasting remedy, but the speediest. After preventing these exchanges a thousand times, the disposition—the judgment remaining uninformed—is still as fully inclined as before to engage in them through any number of years; but when once the judgment is disabused, such exchanges cease of themselves. Ignorance must be *always* compelled; but knowledge *once* diffused keeps the springs of real interest in motion without any

further, without any external, aid. In the case of the exchange of slaves, however, the principle of security, of voluntary exchanges, has been altogether violated. The original vice of the acquisition of the slave mingles itself with every future operation. What slave was ever obtained by voluntary exchange? When did savage or civilised man ever *voluntarily* surrender for a little water and a bit of bread, the power of bruising or torturing their bodies or minds, and of extorting labour at the option of a master? The disposal of labour, of the smallest portion of labour, the exchange of the produce of labour, of its minutest part, must be voluntary; and yet the disposal of the whole man that includes all labour, all exchanges, all volition, may be involuntary or forced. How could our principles of free labour and voluntary exchanges, be more signally violated than in this case?

The question, then, is reduced to the voluntary exchange of two things, fairly and *voluntarily acquired*. Both parties, we shall suppose, are in error; the production of one, or the other, or of both of the articles to be exchanged, was pernicious; or the exchange was conducted on unfair principles. Under such circumstances, the probability is, that the exchanging parties only participate in the general ignorance and false associations of those around them as to such matters; and still the only remedy is the *diffusion of knowledge*. For, though it were possible—which it is not—to place an unerring director of exchanges over such a community, still the violation done to the principle of security in interfering with voluntary exchanges, would not only preponderate over the pretended good to be derived from any superiority of judgment, but would sap, and ultimately annihilate, the springs to industry, and thence to virtue and happiness.

From what has been said it appears evident, that security in voluntary exchanges is as necessary, as in the free use of labour and of its products. They are the parents of production, and not only of production but of morality and happiness. Without them man could scarcely raise

himself above the inferior animals, on whom he now so proudly looks down. No substitute can be devised for voluntary exchanges;* no superiority of force or of intellect, real or supposed, of either of the individuals concerned or of any other persons, can in any case be usefully substituted for voluntary exchanges. They are founded on the interest, and produce the satisfaction, of the parties concerned. Their operation extends through the whole structure of society, to the grand outlines of its organisation, as well as to the minute operations between man and man, and to all his social relations. They are founded on the utility of the employment, in all things, of reason and persuasion, instead of brute force; and the great extent and influence of their operation will be hereafter more fully developed. The same principles of justice, because of benevolence,—of benevolence, because of tendency to promote the greatest happiness,—that should regulate the distribution of wealth, particularly the principle of voluntary exchanges, should regulate all human intercourse, and pervade all human institutions. Wherever this prin-

* The plan of labour in common, and mutual co-operation, may be cited as a practical objection to this position. In those societies, or small associations of a few hundred to a few thousand individuals, production and happiness proceed, it may be said, without any exchanges.

Perhaps it may be more correctly said, that this system—as far, and only as far, as it is perfectly voluntary—is the perfection of voluntary exchanges and of the kindly feelings they engender. In this system, every one labours for every one, every one benefits and is benefited by every one. Though there is no exchange of individual articles from individual to individual, there is a constant and universal *exchange of benefits*. This universal system of voluntary exchanges, could only be elicited by wisdom in a very improved state of social science. It is but applying the principle of one individual exchange to the mass of all the labour of every individual. If the ultimate benefits of this general system of exchanging the whole labour of every individual for portions of the products of the labour of the rest of the community, be found more productive of happiness than the system of individual exchanges, why should it not be pursued? It is not substituting a new principle to that of exchanges, but applying it on a comprehensive and universal scale.

ciple is neglected, misery and vice follow in proportion to the extent of the violation. This will be exemplified further on, when the forcible exactions made for supporting existing establishments come under review.

SECTION 8.

THE FORCED ABSTRACTION OF THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR, THE OBJECTS OF WEALTH AND MEANS OF HAPPINESS, FROM ANY INDIVIDUAL, WILL CAUSE MORE LOSS OF HAPPINESS TO HIM THAN INCREASE OF HAPPINESS TO THE PERSON ACQUIRING.

Although few will in words deny this principle, yet does almost every one habitually *act* in flagrant violation of it, or unconcernedly witness its violation. Laws, even, and institutions are enacted and upheld in opposition to it. Its application and misapplication are universal; and so are the evils or benefits resulting from it. It is necessary, therefore, that it should be put in a clear light.

When forced abstraction is made from any individual of the products of his labour, the objects of wealth, in what does the *loss* which he has sustained consist? what are the constituent parts of the evil which he has experienced? On the other hand, what is the *gain* which the party taking has made, and what are its constituent parts? Let us review these two masses and compare them together, that we may see where the balance of evil lies.

First, as to the mere articles themselves, which are taken from the one and seized by the other, they are evidently, in most cases, the same in the hands of both parties; what the one immediately loses the other gains, as a pound of flax, a bushel of corn. The one loses the corn or the flax; the other gains it: no loss or waste of the materials is *necessarily* attendant on the transfer, though it may most frequently occur. It is our object to reduce things to their simplest elements; therefore let us suppose that what is lost by the one, is gained, without defalcation, by

the other. A bushel of corn will go as far in feeding, and a pound of flax towards the clothing, of one individual—size and appetite being equal—as of another.

The article, then, itself not being affected by the transfer, the gain of matter capable of usefulness being as great in the one case as the loss in the other, we must look out for other sources of difference in the two cases ; and we shall find them in the *immediate feelings*, the state of mind, of the two parties concerned, and in the *future consequences* resulting to each of them from the operation.

The man who forcibly takes the corn, consumes and digests it like the producer: his taste and hunger are gratified notwithstanding his robbery. But what are the *associated feelings* which arise in his mind, from the laws of his organisation, while the animal consumption is going on? An ox might consume corn forced from another ox, just as if it had not been so obtained; but no human animal, ever so rude, is without those powers of mind which produce feelings necessarily associated with such enjoyments. The man of force consumes, but, while he consumes, he cannot help knowing that he has excited the ill-will of him whom he has plundered; he knows that he is liable to his ill-offices, that if opportunity occurred the plundered article would be taken back by the producer, the owner. He has, moreover, a feeling of his own injustice, and sometimes a feeling of regret, of pity, towards those whom he has wronged. He knows that he would not like that another person should take away from him what he had with much labour produced; and though he yields to the temptation of enjoyment, and seizes what he can from another, the feeling of the injustice must occasionally intrude, and, so far, lessen his satisfaction. Should he be above all fear from insecurity, should he be beyond all remorse for injustice, he will perhaps be the more accessible to pity for the miseries caused by his plunder. Or, under a last supposition—which is a very rare one, and almost impossible—he may be without fear, remorse, or

pity; and if so, what will be his capacity for enjoyment? That of the hyæna. The mere animal feeling of the moment, without foresight or sympathy, without any of the pleasures of judgment or benevolence to increase his animal gratifications, or to fill up their intervals with lighter but more frequently-renewed pleasures. In fact, however, such a human creature could hardly exist; for if he had sagacity enough to make his force available to cope with the combined sagacity and strength of his neighbour, and to prevail in his seizures, he must have sagacity enough to perceive *some* at least of the effects of his conduct. If he had no more sagacity than the hyæna, his attacks would be repelled with equal facility. But still, were such a human creature possible, what immediate pleasure would the corn give him? The sole pleasures of taste and hunger: after these, mere insensibility; no pleasures of association, or of communicating enjoyment to others; whereas in the case of the producer, the corn supports his existence to make it the vehicle not only of the pleasures of taste and hunger, but of all the other gentler pleasures incident to the sagacity requisite for industrious labour. Still, perhaps, it will be objected, that we have omitted in our enumeration the greatest pleasure of all felt by the seizer of another's labour, the pleasure of success—of successful rapine or injustice to be sure, but still of success.

But whether in savage, half-civilised, or civilised communities, the mere pleasure of success in plunder, could never, of itself and unattended with the gratification of want, be of much effect; for, not to speak of its being counterbalanced by apprehension, it is met by a much greater pleasure, that of successful industry, on the part of the producer.

Now, to oppose to these pleasures of the plunderer, of him who forcibly abstracts the products of labour, the means of wealth and happiness, from the producer of them, what immediate pleasures has the man of industry

to bring forward? He physically consumes just like him who took away his wealth; but what are the feelings necessarily associated in his mind with the physical enjoyment? The pleasures of successful industry, not of the effort of an hour or a day, but of a long-continued course of effort, all directed to one object and all brought to the wished-for result; the pleasure of skill, of perseverance, of success. These accumulated pleasures are brought, as it were, to a focus at the time of enjoyment; they have filled up all the moments of production, and now memory brings them forward to heighten the enjoyment. These are all included in the pleasure of employment, of having some *fixed purpose in life*, which fills up all the voids of existence, and keeps out the pressure of weariness and disgust. He knows, moreover, that *his* success is attended with the sympathy and good opinion of all the peaceable and industrious members of the community. All these soothing associations which the man of force is without, are superadded, in the case of the industrious, to the mere pleasure of success; so that in this respect alone the success of industry is infinitely more pleasurable than the success of force.

But let all these considerations be forgotten, let the pleasure of the success of the one be supposed to be equal in intensity and extent to that of the other, the main point of distinction between their mental feelings, their associated pleasures, must be still dwelt upon.

A sense of injustice, of remorse, of fear, must trouble the enjoyment of the one; while a sense of justice, of peace, and of requited effort must enhance the pleasure of the other. The one is insecure in his enjoyment, fearing loss on every side; the other, injuring no one, is undisturbed by the dread of privation: the one naturally resorts to secrecy, silence, and fraud to protect him; the other needs not the aid of such treacherous allies.

Dismissing, then, the *immediate feelings* of the industrious, and the seizer by force, let us proceed to the second

head of comparison, and point out the *future consequences*, as to the production of wealth or other desirable objects, of permitting the products of industry to remain for use in the hands of the producer, or permitting any part of them to be forcibly abstracted from him for the use of another.

What are the consequences to the labourer? what are the consequences to him who takes by force the produce of another's labour? In both cases the extinction of the motives that lead to productive labour, and of course the discontinuance of that labour itself, where it has been previously active; or its early and immediate withering, where it is only showing its first efforts; or its utter disregard from the chance of acquiring the means of enjoyment without labour.

The productive labourer has toiled, and the fruit of his labour is taken from him. Why should he work again? His sole object in labouring was to procure for himself some object of utility; that is to say, of remote or of immediate gratification. At the moment that his labour, guided by foresight, had produced the object which was to constitute his reward, that reward is forcibly abstracted from his grasp, and he finds that he has laboured in vain. What is the consequence? The springs of his industry are relaxed; he can no longer securely rely on procuring by means of labour those comforts or enjoyments, the prospect of which supported him in his toil. The first time that the produce of his labour is taken from him, he is alarmed, and has less reliance on industry as a means of procuring enjoyment; the next time, he is still more alarmed, and his reliance is still further weakened; till, by degrees, from the frequent repetition of such forcible seizures, his inclination to industry is rooted out, from his experience of the utter unproductiveness of his toils. What now is the amount of this evil, the loss of the spirit of industry to the industrious man? Is it the loss merely of the article or of the one or two or five or ten articles, the produce of his

labour, which had been forcibly abstracted from him? By no means. These losses, grievous as they are, are nothing to the real and absolute future losses of the productive labourer. He loses with his industrious habits, all those comforts, renewed through his life, which perseverance in industrious pursuits would, with security, have given him. Were the pleasure, then, of the spoiler ten times as great in the enjoyment of the articles abstracted as that of the productive labourer in the enjoyment of the same article, and were twelve spoliations requisite to banish the spirit of industry; still, from the discontinuance of the production of these articles on the part of the industrious, his monthly, weekly, or daily enjoyment of them would through his whole life be lost. Here, then, is a balance of evil: as the pleasures of a life of enjoyment, in any particular line, derived from any particular article, are to the pleasures of a few hours' enjoyment derived from the same article; so are the pleasures of the industrious to those of the plunderer. Such is the superiority of the good effects of protecting from forced abstraction the products of labour. Mark, too, every instance of success on the part of him who forcibly seizes, renders *less probable* his future supply by discouraging production; while every enjoyment, every instance of success in productive labour, confirms the habits of the industrious, gives a new stimulus to his exertions, and renders *more probable* his future supply.

But it may be said that it is an extreme and improbable case to suppose the forced abstraction of the *whole* of the produce of the labour of the industrious, that in fact it is but a part, but what he can spare, over and above his necessities, that he generally loses, and that this *partial* abstraction will not materially affect his industry. In the first place, every abstraction operates injuriously as far as it goes; the *alarm* excited by the abstraction of a part extends to every atom left, and makes the whole insecure; and if the whole have not been abstracted, 'tis most pro-

bable that the want of opportunity or of power, not of inclination, saved the remainder. The explanation, however, lies deeper. So urgent are the motives to gratify hunger and to support life, that no attacks on the products of labour can exterminate that portion of exertion which is requisite to allay such imperious wants. But for mere existence, without comfort, what is requisite? The casual labour of the savage, of the wretched husbandman of Syria or Egypt, as described by Volney in his admirable *Travels*, fearful lest he should over-supply his wants and feed his plunderer. Were there no produce of industry left from the frequency of rapine, so strong are the cravings of appetite that men would, like rats, on the failure of food, kill each other for the chance of surviving. 'Tis allowed, therefore, that the forced abstraction of the products of labour will not annihilate the desire of existing, or rather of shunning the miseries of want. But is this industry? are such the hopes, the rewards, of productive labour? Destroy production to this extent, and population and happiness will decrease where they now exist, till busy towns and valleys become as the abode of the savage; and under such circumstances the uncivilised will never assume the comforts of industry. Are not these effects dreadful enough? but must the race of man absolutely cease to exist? The relaxation of industry, however, will do no more: it will do no more than bring men down to this level. Industry, therefore, consists not in the production of what is merely necessary for the support of the lowest animal existence, but in supplying as many additional sources of physical enjoyment as possible, superadded to these mere means of existence. The cravings of want alone are sufficient to urge every animal to provide for its gratification; but the cravings of want will do no more, and nothing less energetic than these cravings is sufficient to make head against the abasement caused by the forcible abstraction of any part of the products of labour. Until labour becomes voluntary and

excited by motives of less urgency than the necessities of existence, it is not called industry. Everything that comes under the name of industry, or of *voluntary* labour with the view of *increasing* our enjoyments, is evidently incompatible with the forcing away from the labourer that article, greater or less, which he had produced with the sole view of enjoying it.

But we may advance a step further. We have seen that without *voluntary exchanges* industry could not exist, and that industry implies co-operation and society. The force committed on the one, is therefore known to all around him. In whatever way force *has* been employed to take from him, it *may* be employed to take away from them the products of their industry. Distrust and apathy increase and diffuse themselves through the whole community, till that relaxation of industry which has occurred to one becomes general, from the very same cause, through all the productive labourers of the community. From a relaxation of industry, comes a diminution of production: from a diminished production, comes a diminished consumption, a diminished enjoyment. Thus the loss of the happiness of numbers without limit, of the whole community, is the result of the *insecurity* arising from the forced abstraction of wealth, on partial occasions, from a few individuals. It is not, then, by the pleasures of a life of industrious enjoyment as felt by *one* individual, as contrasted with the temporary pleasures of plunder, that we are to estimate the evils of forcible abstraction, but by the loss of the pleasures of industrious enjoyment through the lives of the whole of an industrious community, and the loss of the pleasures of the moral habits thence resulting to them all.

Such are the inevitable effects of violating the principle of security, in the forcible abstraction from the productive labourer of the product of his toil. It signifies not by what name the spoiler may be called, whether his act be deemed expert, brave, and meritorious, as amongst the wandering Arabs, whether it be deemed illegal as in the

flagrant cases of robbery amongst what are called civilised nations, or whether the abstraction be sanctioned by law; in every case, the sole question to be asked is, "*Is the abstraction voluntary, or is it forced?*" If the abstraction be forced, no form or ceremony of law or superstition can alter its nature or effects. On the voluntariness of the exchange all its merit depends. Take away this ingredient; let the produce of labour be taken without equivalent satisfactory to the owner, and all the evils mentioned to individuals and to society result from it; restore this ingredient, satisfy him from whom the article is taken, and the forcible abstraction becomes a voluntary exchange, the most useful and beneficent of social operations. Is any abstraction of the products of labour just? The sufficient and only answer ought to be, "*Is it voluntary?*"

SECTION 9.

THE FORCED ABSTRACTIONS OF SMALL PORTIONS OF WEALTH FROM ANY GIVEN NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS, WILL LESSEN THE WHOLE QUANTITY OF HAPPINESS MORE THAN IT CAN BE INCREASED BY THE ADDITIONAL PLEASURES CONFERRED ON ANY ONE OR MORE INDIVIDUALS ENJOYING THOSE UNITED SMALL FORCED MASSES.

We have already seen that the happiness gained to the spoiler by the forced abstraction of the matter of wealth, the product of industry, is as nothing compared with the happiness lost in consequence of the same operation. To diminish the evil to the sufferer, an expedient has been put forth and very generally acted upon,—the expedient of dividing the shares of loss into as many and as small lots as possible, so that they may ultimately become almost imperceptible and afford no contrast of privation to the glare of enjoyment exhibited by the one, or small number, who use the things seized. In this case, the enjoyment of those who forcibly take, remains a fixed quantity: the object is not to increase their enjoyment, but to lessen the pressure on those who are forced to

contribute. Our inquiry is, therefore, does it produce this effect?

Where the forced abstraction of wealth, the product of industry, is made in one heap from one, the loss of the absolute material is certainly to that one, just a thousand times as great as it would be if shared amongst one thousand in lots of one each. Here, in the absolute material, there is neither loss nor gain: the same amount is raised in both cases. We must look, therefore, for any differences, for any points of comparison, beyond the thing seized to the *feelings* produced by the seizure in the minds of those who suffer the loss. It is not said that every poor industrious man losing a shilling is as much distressed thereby as the wealthier from whom 1,000 shillings are taken, and who has more left after the 1,000 are removed, than the poor after losing the one. Suppose that the loser of the one suffers but the tenth part as much—and this is surely an ample concession—as the loser of the thousand, the loss on the whole will be as 100 to one. There will be in this case one hundred times the loss of happiness by diffusing the loss divided into small portions, that there would be by abstracting it at once from one individual; because, though every individual of the poorer thousand suffers but the tenth part of him who loses the whole in a mass, yet as there are 1,000 of these smaller sufferers for one of the larger, these 1,000 tenths added together will make 100 whole parts, each equal to the suffering of him from whom the whole was taken in one mass. If it be alleged that the feelings of the poor, from whom these numerous smaller portions are necessarily taken, are reconciled by the *habit* of privation and suffering to the loss, it may be equally alleged that the feelings of the rich who make the abstractions are equally blunted by habit to enjoyment. Habit, operating equally in both ways, at both ends of the scale, diminishing equally enjoyment and suffering, must therefore be left out of the question.

No doubt there are powerful motives, altogether independent of the greater or smaller portion of suffering produced by division or concentration, which urge those who forcibly abstract, to prefer the system of diffusion and subdividing the shares of loss. When the seizure is from a great number in small lots, the *injustice* of the operation seems to be forgotten in its *equality*. An equal distribution of injustice is apt to be regarded as a species of justice, the *principle* of the measure being forgotten in the consideration of its *mode of operation*; whereas nothing is more evident than that the mode of operating the most iniquitous measure may be impartial and just. By confusing these two positions, such an advantage is taken as to divert the mind from the nature of the abstraction itself, from its effects on individual or social happiness; and the illusion is assisted by the small quantity in each case demanded.

Those very reasons, however, which make it prudent or wise on the part of the spoliator to subdivide and diffuse the loss in every case amongst as many as possible, are those which would render this very diffusion undesirable to the community. It is the interest of the community that the real effects of every seizure should be known; that no operation, by which delusion might be practised, and rapine, shrouding itself under the guise of equality to ensure the better chance of success, should be permitted. When an injustice is committed, it is the interest of the community that it should be seen, felt, known, and duly appreciated. When *any* act is done, whether just or not, it is the interest of all that its *real* effects should be known. Therefore, whatever mode of forcible seizure exhibits the nature of the operation in its *truest* colours, is most useful to the community, were even the balance of immediate suffering in favour of concealment, which it has been shown not to be.

Having shown that the division of the forced loss into many shares, does not lessen, but in most cases increases,

the sum total of suffering, instead of annihilating it, as in the language of political quackery, it remains now to prove, that this waste of happiness caused by the diffusion, is more than equal to the gain of happiness experienced by those amongst whom the matters abstracted are divided.

It makes no difference to the question, whether the articles abstracted are divided amongst one or many. Dividing amongst many is only a repetition of a similar operation; and the evil depends in every case on the absolute quantity of wealth taken by each as compared with the number and situation of those who are compelled to suffer the loss; the greater in each case the gain, the lesser the *comparative* happiness derived from it. Of 1,000 portions of the matter of wealth, the first 100, suppose, are necessary to repel hunger and thirst, and support life. The use of this first portion is as life to death: the value is the greatest of all human values, including the capacity for all other enjoyments, for which nature or education may have adapted the individual. What is the effect on the same individual of the application of a second mass, say of a second 100 of these portions of wealth? Nothing ecstatic, no change as from life to death; simply the addition of some of the most obvious comforts of life demanded by real convenience. The effect of these second 100 in intensity of enjoyment, is so infinitely beneath that produced by the first 100, as to be incapable of any comparison. We proceed, however, and to this second we add a third 100, and ask what is the effect of this third equal supply? Does it produce an equal portion of happiness with either of the two former? With the first, it admits of no comparison; with the second, of very little: the first was existence, life or death; the second, *real* comforts; this third, what? *imaginary* comforts, such as the opinions and customs around us render desirable. These are acquired by the third hundred; but they are unaccompanied with the craving recommendations of want, or even of real comforts, and are recommended

by public opinion alone and doubtful utility. The recommendation of public opinion, observe, was not wanting to the two first portions, while the effect of the third 100 depends on it alone; its effect in producing happiness is therefore proportionally weak, and is much less than the second, but not so much less than the second as the second was less than the first. To the three lots of 100 portions each, of the matter of wealth, we add a fourth lot of the same kind. The individual is already supplied in wants, in real comforts, in comforts of opinion the most approaching to utility: how shall he apply this additional, this fourth portion? He necessarily looks out for those lighter sources of enjoyment, which hold the *second* rank in the opinion and customs of those around him. This process of seeking out lesser gratifications is unavoidable; for, with the previous 100 the choice was open, and those enjoyments esteemed the most desirable would naturally be selected first. This fourth addition, therefore, gives a still less absolute increase to happiness than the third, but the difference between its effect and that of the third is less apparent. We now give a fifth addition of the means of enjoyment in another hundred portions of the objects of wealth. How shall this fifth mass be applied? Wants, comforts, real and unreal, secondary conveniences, are already supplied. A search must be instituted for conveniences of a still more doubtful nature; and fancy and caprice begin their empire. The fifth addition is still less productive of absolute increase of happiness than the fourth; and if, in order to add to enjoyment, we make another addition of another hundred portions of the articles of wealth, we shall find that this sixth mass is still less operative than the fifth. Utility having been long ago gratified, caprice begins now to display itself in the mere changes of *form* or *quality* of the articles used, or in the acquisition of the objects of mere pomp and exhibition. An addition still decreasing is made to happiness by this sixth 100; and if we add a seventh, the effect on happiness

will be proportionally less ; till the mere habit and pleasure of accumulation becomes almost the sole influential motive to the acquisition. Every hundred added is less and less productive of absolute increase of happiness to the possessor : but the difference of effect of each addition is less and less as we recede from the first portion and the first addition ; till at length an addition equal in amount to that which allayed hunger and secured existence and its capacities of enjoyment, becomes a matter of mere indifference.

We have now seen what are the additional pleasures conferred on those who enjoy the united small forced masses of wealth, abstracted from numerous contributors. If the enjoyment of the first portion which the rapacious receives, suppose, from the first of the 1,000 contributors, is considerable, that, from the last of the 1,000 portions, will be scarcely perceived. Now, it mostly happens that the person receiving these 1,000 portions, is not in the same circumstances, is not in equal want, with those who contribute the 1,000 portions ; and, therefore, even the first portion, on him, will produce a very trifling effect in the way of pleasure, compared to the pain of the loss. And, while the pleasure of the gain is, as we see, diminishing with every portion added, the pain of the loss remains the same to each forced contributor, be they ever so extensive. The pleasures from every new portion are always diminishing till they become imperceptible, while the pains of loss are the same throughout, and never decrease. Here are already fearful odds against him who forcibly abstracts the products of others' labour. But all this goes on the supposition of the first portion (if given to one in circumstances similar to those of the contributors) producing an effect in happiness gained by the enjoyer equal to that lost by the producer. The fallacy of this position was demonstrated in the last section, in which it was shown that the evils of the loss (though abstracted by the rapacious most in need) of the industrious producer, were as almost

infinity to one, when compared with the pleasures of the gain to the despoiler; the pleasures of the gain being as nothing in the comparison. The steps of our argument, then, are as follows, and are all facts of universal notoriety:—

First, the *evil* of the loss and *its consequences* to the productive labourer exceed in a degree very great, though not capable of being put down in numbers, the advantages of the gain to the rapacious, *though both were in equal want, and though one portion only of wealth were taken from one producer.*

But, second, those who forcibly seize are almost never in equal want with the producers: whence a second aggravation of the evils of the loss.

Third, those who forcibly seize, take more than one portion from one producer; they take other equal portions from other producers; the evil of the loss of each portion succeeding the first, remaining the same, while the pleasure of the gain is diminishing to infinity; whence a third aggravation of the evil of the loss.

Fourth, we shall see hereafter that, from causes inherent in the physical and intellectual constitution of man, and in the objects and circumstances surrounding him, the *capacity for enjoyment decreases* with the acquisitions of excessive wealth (that wealth only being here called excessive which is procured by any other means than those of free industry and voluntary exchanges); whence a fourth aggravation of the evil of the loss.

It appears, then, that our position is entirely established. The lightening of the pressure of forced abstraction, by means of division and diffusion, is a mere delusion. Where the desire with the power of forcible abstraction exists, the process is diffused as the producers increase, and the largest quantity that can with prudence be withdrawn from each and every one of them, is the only limit to the demand. The principle of security, in its branch of voluntary transfer, once violated, there is no other limit to oppression than the caprice of the rapacious,

whether the spoliation is supported by laws or decrees, or by them marked out for punishment.

SECTION 10.

THE PRODUCE OF NO MAN'S LABOUR, NOR THE LABOUR ITSELF, NOR ANY PART OF THEM, SHOULD BE TAKEN FROM THE LABOURER, WITHOUT AN EQUIVALENT *by him* DEEMED SATISFACTORY. THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES ADMITS OF NO EXCEPTION.

The general fact as to the evils of compulsion is conceded; but in particular cases it is still contended that "labour or its products may be abstracted when a real equivalent is given, although the producer may not be able, from ignorance, to appreciate the value of the equivalent. It may not be always possible to satisfy the selfish ignorance of the producer or labourer, though one hundred times a real equivalent were offered him in exchange for his labour, or for the article of wealth it had produced." In such case we say *universally*, Let no exchange be made. The benefit of the equivalent, though real to the enlightened, will be altogether swallowed up and lost in the evil of the compulsion.

We wish to obtain from the industrious a portion of his labour, or an article of wealth the product of his labour. There are two modes of proceeding to accomplish this desire; *compulsion*, or the offer of such an equivalent as shall lead the possessor to a *voluntary* transfer. In all ordinary cases we suppose it conceded that compulsion would be most pernicious. What are the extraordinary cases in which compulsion might be permitted? It will be said, Where the equivalent is really sufficient, and where the ignorance of one of the parties is such as to preclude him from seeing its real value.

It is desired to make an exchange. How is this desire known? by the expression of the wish of *one* of the parties only? That cannot be; for to make an exchange, the concurrence of at least two is necessary. Without two

desires there can be no exchange. One desire may lead to rapine. But the second party comes forward and consents to an exchange, provided an *unreasonable* equivalent is obtained. Who is to ascertain the unreasonableness? This insuperable difficulty we pass by, and admit the claim to be really unreasonable. Shall the unwilling be *compelled* to take a reasonable equivalent? The evils of forcible abstraction have been pointed out. Until the possessor or labourer is satisfied, the abstraction is forcible, *for so much* as to him; and the usual evils of force will follow. What are the benefits, in this case, to counterbalance these evils? The allowed superior real value of the equivalent forced upon him. Involuntariness will deprive it of all its value, and turn its blessings into poison. Now, it is clear that if there be in the nature of things any mode by which the use of the really superior equivalent can be transferred to the unreasonable bargainer without incurring the evils of force,—of forcible abstraction,—that mode should be pursued. That mode does exist, and consists simply in *enlightening the mind* of the unreasonable. The unreasonable has intellectual capacity equal to that of him who kindly wishes him to take a superior equivalent, or he has not. If the capacity be equal, the benefit of the exchange—which is supposed to be a real benefit—can be surely demonstrated to him. If his capacity be inferior, the advantage of superiority of intellect is supposed to be on the side of reason; and in such case is not persuasion certain? Why is it not, then, universally employed? To save the *trouble of showing the truth* to those who, by the supposition, are in possession of it, and of superior intelligence too, to explain and demonstrate it. What possible reason is there why all the evils of force should be suffered in order to save trouble, the trouble of persuasion, to those who are in possession of the truth? What is this trouble? what is the amount of it? where are to be found the constituents of this evil, of this trouble of persuasion? Is persuasion unamiable or

uninstructive? Is persuasion, by unfolding the truth, and showing the real qualities and relation of things, and the real consequences, immediate and remote, of actions, less instructive to him who persuades, than to him to whom the persuasion is addressed? 'Tis impossible to say to which of the parties it is most useful. To the ignorant it gives knowledge and happiness, by teaching him his real interest, and inspires him with the pleasurable feeling of gratitude for the benefits received. To the intelligent it affords an opportunity of exercising and improving his talents, leads him to gentleness and benevolence, and supersedes the inclination to violence and injustice. Thus does this pretended trouble, this scarecrow, turn out, on examination, to be a real benefit, a benefit which wisdom would invent, if nature had not prescribed it. So triumphant, on an accurate analysis, are found the benefits of reason, of persuasion, of gentleness, so fatal the effects of compulsion and violence, that even the very evils, falsely said to flow from an undeviating adherence to justice, are found to be blessings.

Behold the benefit, the inappreciable benefit, of the *universality* of the principle of voluntary exchanges—of exchanges deemed satisfactory equally by both parties! It operates as a simple and all-sufficient *check* to arrest force, fraud, or injustice, in any shape, under the guise of exchange; it necessitates the exercise of intellect and benevolence; and there is not in the nature of things any other check to be substituted for it. On the principle of voluntary exchanges, is the equivalent offered by either of the parties unsatisfactory to the other, though really useful to him? What stronger motive can be conceived for the exercise of the mental powers of the party wishing the exchange? In order to succeed in his object, to get the equivalent desired, he must persuade; in order to persuade, he must cultivate his own reasoning powers—he must study the disposition, the mind, of him whom he wishes to convince; he will show the uses to which the equivalent

may be applied; he will communicate knowledge, in order to excite a counter-desire to his own to get the exchange effected. He will also study the *feelings* of him whom he wishes to persuade; he will neither do nor say anything revolting or offensive—he will seek to soothe and to please him, and will thus learn the habit of conciliation and kindness; and what interest first prompted, habit will confirm. Exchanges, leading man out of himself, thus become the parent of benevolence, as well as of intellectual culture. The utility of the check to injustice from the universality of the voluntariness of exchanges, proceeds as much from its extreme *simplicity* as from its universal application. Who so ignorant, so devoid of understanding, as not to know, without the possibility of error, when the industrious is satisfied with the equivalent offered him for his labour or its produce? Who can effect a mistake on this head? Without voluntariness, the equivalent is not delivered. Where force is excluded till both parties are satisfied, there is no act done. 'Tis the plainest of human transactions. How much unlike the opposing system of compulsion, forcing a real equivalent! Where is here the check? Where is here the simplicity? Check, there is none: for the unsatisfied party, being ignorant, is mute; or, if complaining, is not listened to. The *will*, the unrestrained will of *one* of the interested parties, is the rule; and that will must be influenced by the varying speculations of his mind, as to the fitness of the exchange for those on whom in every case it is proposed to force it. And with a volition secured from the control of any other motives than those arising from its own views of its own isolated and exclusive interest, what mortal ever continued to judge rightly—to act with justice! What less than omniscience can penetrate the fitness that is to square with the circumstances of others, to know their varying feelings and wants? What mortal could undertake, what mortal could conceive, a task so complex, so inscrutable! If voluntariness, or mutual satisfaction, be the extreme point of simplicity, compulsion

is surely its opposite, the extreme point of complexity and confusion.

Here nature, supported by the clearest deductions of reason, presents to our hands a check to all injustice in matters of wealth, so clear, so simple, so effectual, that nothing can be wished beyond it. Why, then, search for arbitrary and artificial checks to restrain the operation of that fraud and force which we voluntarily permit, when we sanction any departure from the strict rule of justice, the mutual and complete satisfaction of both of the parties making exchanges? No other check can be devised; for, if it be said that the progress of reason, and consequently of morality, will ultimately show the *one* party—judging for both—the *real* comprehensive interest of both, in opposition to the supposed immediate interest of the one, what should prevent the dissenting party from being equally accessible to the influence of reason, and the acquisition of morality? Nay, by the supposition, the dissenting party will be *more* liable to the influence of reason; for the exchange being really for his benefit, and the other party anxious to unfold the truth, the real operation of the exchange, is it not certain that such a real interest must be soon understood? Whereas, in the case of the party exclusively wishing for such exchange, there is a constant temptation of immediate interest to misjudge in his own favour, the *power* being vested in his own hands of deciding for the interest of both himself and another. Where the equivalent is a real one, and ought to be mutually satisfactory, there is no place for the influence of reason on the mind of him who is already satisfied; but the constant probability, nay certainty, is, that the principle of compulsion once established, the influence of reason on the mind so circumstanced, under no necessity of cultivating it, would be gradually diminishing instead of increasing, till it would be finally proscribed as a useless labour, and force under the guidance of caprice would be omnipotent.

One strange error still remains opposed to the very simple proposition at the head of this section of our argument. A notion is very prevalent that the *products* of labour, and *labour itself*, are very dissimilar in their nature, and entitled to very different portions of regard. Articles of wealth, and the wealthy, are universally looked upon with complacency, while those who have accumulated nothing, who have mere capacity to labour, are regarded with indifference, with aversion. Wealth and poverty, that is to say, wealth, and the producers of wealth, are contradistinguished from each other, are regarded as at irreconcilable hostility. To protect wealth to its *possessors*, every expedient is devised; to protect that productive energy which called wealth into being, is deemed superfluous; nay, everywhere, even, are systematic combinations made to control the free exercise of labour. Many, therefore, who freely admit, nay who maintain, that no atom of any article of wealth, the product of labour, should, under any pretext, be taken from its possessor without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory, have as fiercely maintained that labour, the productive spring of wealth, might be abstracted from its possessor, without a satisfactory equivalent.

It is presumed that no one who has proceeded thus far in these pages, could be influenced for a moment by the sophistry of such pretended distinctions. Shall we respect the mere unconscious, inanimate matter which labour has produced, and shall we not more respect the persevering hand guided by the intelligent mind that produced it? Take away from the costliest article, silk, purple, or gold, the labour employed in their production, and what are they worth? Of no human use, as articles of wealth, are the unwrought materials. If it required no labour to appropriate them, though ever so useful, like the air or the water, they would be of no exchangeable value. 'Tis labour that makes them what they are. Labour is that ingredient which turns the otherwise useless materials scattered abroad

by nature, into the means of happiness to man. It is labour alone that gives them their value and currency as articles of wealth. Without it, if they were ever so useful—and there is no article of wealth more useful than the light which enables us to distinguish every article around us—they would not be noticed as articles of wealth. These articles are respected by the judicious, only in as far as they embody and represent skill and labour, and as they tend, in the use, to promote human happiness. When we value an article of wealth, it is in fact the labour concentrated in its fabrication and in the finding or rearing of its natural material, that we estimate. What more absurd, therefore, than to pretend to respect wealth produced by labour, and to disdain the labour that produced it? 'Tis admiring "Milton's *Paradise Lost*," and at the same time affecting to despise the intellect that imagined it.

Again—for what reason is it that the free disposal of the *products* of labour must be respected, for which we should not also respect the free disposal of *labour itself*? Reproduction, morality, and happiness, require equally that labour and its products should be shielded from all force or involuntary exchange. Take away what labour *has* produced, or anticipate and seize on, as it were beforehand, what labour is *about* to produce; where is the difference in the operation? where the difference in the pernicious effects? If any, the difference would be in favour of seizing the products after production rather than anticipating them, because the relaxation of the producing industry is avoided where the products already exist, and the effect of discouragement would be only against *future* productions. But where the labour is compelled, the product itself to be seized upon is raised and completed with diminished energy. We deprecate the forcible seizure of an article of wealth, not for any evil, any ill effect, to be produced on the article itself, on the inanimate object, but for the evil to be produced on the intelligent agent, on the mind of the producer. The article itself is not necessarily injured, is equally capa-

ble of use whether transferred voluntarily or involuntarily ; but the alarm, the sense of insecurity, the discouragement of future production, the disinclination to labour which is defrauded of its reward, are produced equally by compelling labour, or seizing, or giving an unsatisfactory equivalent for its products. The injurious effects on the *mind* of the industrious, limiting future production and producing other *moral*, as well as these economical, evils—which are the only points to be regarded—are the same whether labour or its products are attacked ; and the products of labour can in no case be considered but as the representatives of labour itself. The dead material is nothing, the active mind and hand are the sole objects, in our present point of view, of philosophical and moral regard. Under what pretext could I demand that the labour of any human being should be forcibly directed to my benefit, that could not be equally pleaded by that person in demand of the unrequited benefit of my labour ? Further on, it will be pointed out how very inconsiderable are the effects on production and happiness, of the wealth absolutely accumulated in any society, compared with the powers of future production of that same society.

The universality of the principle of the freedom and voluntariness of exchanges being established, it will be incumbent on those who plead in any case for a departure from the rule, to demonstrate *particular* benefits from the departure in that case, preponderant over the general benefits of the rule.

SECTION 11.

THE MATERIALS OF WEALTH, THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR, SHOULD BE SO DISTRIBUTED, AS TO ACCOMPLISH THE DOUBLE OBJECT OF PROMOTING THE UTMOST POSSIBLE *equality* OF ENJOYMENT AND THE UTMOST POSSIBLE *production* ; THAT IS TO SAY, SO AS TO PROMOTE THE UTMOST POSSIBLE EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY : SECURITY ALONE CALLING FORTH THE COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF EVERY USEFUL HUMAN ENERGY, PHYSICAL AND INTELLECTUAL.

As it has been attempted, it is hoped successfully, to demonstrate, that all well organised human beings are capable,

by similar treatment, of enjoying equal portions of happiness, particularly of that species of happiness which arises from the use of articles of wealth, and that of course the happiness of the greatest number of such similarly constituted beings must be constantly preferred to the happiness of any smaller number, when found—which under wise arrangements would scarcely ever be the case—incompatible with each other; it would seem to follow that it should be our object to promote equally the happiness of all without any distinction of persons, and that *equality of happiness* should be the object aimed at. For if they be all equally capable of enjoyment, why give more to one than another? If this system of absolute equality were consistent with production, it ought to be universally adhered to. Successive portions of wealth diminish in their power of producing happiness when added to the same individual's share; but when divided amongst many individuals, the productive power of each portion is wonderfully increased, though the glitter of the effect may not be so apparent. The demand of justice would seem then to be, that the mass of wealth of the society should be divided in *equal portions* amongst its members.

This argument would be irresistible were not *labour* necessary for the production, for the existence, of wealth. This circumstance introduces a limitation to equality; which limitation, however, must be guarded within the strictest limits of its proper end. *Wherever equality does not lessen production* it should be the sole object pursued. Wherever it decreases really useful production (that which is attended with preponderant good to the producers), it saps its own existence, and should cease. Let us illustrate this limit, which nature seems to have placed in the way of the wide wish of beneficence, the impartial hand of justice.

Suppose any article, now an article of wealth because an object of desire, and requiring labour for its production, such as wheat, or sugar, or hats, were produced, by the

mechanism of nature or by any other means, independent of human effort; suppose it to be produced, not like air or daylight, superabundant for the wants of all, but in such quantities as would give a *limited supply* to each individual in the community. Suppose that the supply increased regularly with the increase of population, without any exertion from any part of that population, but never to that extent to give an abundance to all that wanted. Water and air and light are useful articles, as useful, or more useful, than either wheat or sugar or hats; but though they are not, for the most part, in any way dependent on human co-operation for their supply, they exist in such excess as not to afford the means of our present illustration. Suppose, then, such a quantity of hats, always increasing with the increase of population, produced yearly without human effort, as, if equally divided, to afford one hat or two hats to every individual in the community for his yearly consumption. What distribution of these hats will produce in the consumption the greatest possible quantity of happiness? Shall we give three or four, or ten or twenty hats every year to some individuals, and leave others without any hat to wear, exposed to the changes of the weather, the moisture, cold, and the fervours of the summer's sun? The owner of the additional number—exchanges being out of the question—could derive no benefit from his superfluity, but the gratification of the childish vanity of the constant newness of the article he wore, say a new hat every month. If the enjoyer of the twelve hats in the year were of a well-regulated intellect and acquainted with the pleasures of sympathy, he would feel infinitely more pain or discomfort in the contemplation of the evils suffered by those whose share of hats he used, and of course left unprovided, than he could feel pleasure of vanity from the use of the additional unnecessary hats. But, be this as it may, let all the gratification which ignorant selfishness can picture to itself as arising from such a cause, be felt by the possessor

of the many hats, what is the amount of the additional good gained to him, in comparison to the good lost (or evils endured) by those compelled to forego the use of those hats? There are no limits to the consequential evils that may arise to the health, independent of the daily disreputableness and discomfort, of those who are compelled to do without hats. The question, therefore, will admit but of one answer. An *entire equality* should be preserved in the distribution of such articles, as every departure therefrom trenches immediately upon happiness, adding nothing to the gainer in comparison to what it takes away from him from whom the article is withheld. Strict equality is the invariable rule of justice and benevolence. Were a mere article of luxury procured in any limited quantity without human effort, the effect would be the same,—diminution of happiness would always arise from inequality of distribution. When a luxury becomes multiplied and many shares are given to one person, it *soon ceases to be to him a luxury*, it becomes a mere necessary,—not a necessary of nature, but of pure convention, and with thirty times the quantity he frequently, from sated appetites, enjoys less than the consumer of the one, to whom that share is a luxury. Therefore, in all cases, whether of luxuries or necessities, wherever labour has not been used in the production, equality must be observed in the distribution in order to produce the largest sum total of happiness.

But, *in all those cases* in which wealth is the article to be distributed, *labour* is necessary for its production:—labour in searching for, labour in capturing or tending, labour in separating, labour in fashioning and preparing, as applied to pearls, jewels, and other precious stones, to domestic or wild animals, to extracting ores, saccharine or other juices, to the fabricating of all manufactures. In some shape labour must be applied to an article of use or mere desire, in order to constitute it an article of wealth; and without labour there is no wealth. In the mere effort

of seizing and appropriating what had before been seized and appropriated by no one, as in taking water from a common well, it is the application of labour alone that turns that into property which before belonged to no one. Labour, therefore, as before proved, is the universal parent of wealth.

Having found out this ingredient which separates those objects of desire and utility, which are called wealth, from all other objects of use or desire to which the term wealth is not applied; let us suppose another case to be put abreast of the preceding case of wheat, sugar, hats, obtained without labour.

We now suppose an equal quantity of wheat, sugar, hats, to be produced every year that were obtained spontaneously before. The same quantity of all these articles is every year at the disposal of the community; but the yearly labour of one-half, or some other portion, of the community has been employed in producing them, in seeking for their materials, extracting and fashioning them. Shall we in the distribution of these articles follow the same rule of equality and impartiality that we advocated before? Will an equal distribution of these articles, obtained by means of labour, tend to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness, as it would have done in the case of those same articles when obtained yearly without any labour of any individual?

Every one sees that a new law of distribution must here be introduced. Every one sees that the blessings of equality cannot in this case be obtained without injury, without producing unpleasant feelings and emotions, to those whose exclusive labour has been employed in the production of the articles in question. The industrious whose time has been occupied, whose mental and corporeal powers have been respectively on the stretch, to produce these articles with the view of adding to their own comforts, stand forth and claim as their own, as *their property*, what their labour alone has made what it is, distin-

guishable from the unappropriated and unwrought articles around them. To take from them what their arm guided by their mind has produced, is like taking from them a part of themselves. It represents and exhibits in a palpable form their superiority to the unthinking, the improvident, the indolent. The motive to their exertion was the *use* of the articles to be produced; and the free use implies the power of free disposal. Is it useful to encourage this claim of right, this notion of exclusive property, on things appropriated and formed by labour? Without the acknowledgment of this right, it would be evidently folly to produce them at all. *Without it they would cease to be produced.* As soon, therefore, as a new supply of articles springs up that are produced by labour, a new law of distribution, or a modification of the old law of equality, as applied to articles *not* produced by labour, must be devised. The one set of articles will be produced to all eternity, though no labour be exerted in producing them; the other exist by labour, and derive all their value, as articles of wealth, from the labour bestowed upon them. This new law, rule, or suggestion of wisdom, therefore, is, as before established, "Secure to the producer the free use of whatever his labour has produced." Here, then, is a new rule of action, apparently antagonizing with the former rule of equality, counteracting it in all cases where labour is employed in producing an article of usefulness, real or supposed.

What shall we do, then? shall we renounce the blessings of equality as ideal, and not applicable to that real state of things attendant on human associations? By no means. First, the rule of equality must always be followed where no labour is employed in the production. Second, *Whenever a departure is made* (which ought scarcely ever, *if ever*, to occur) from the principle of "securing to every one the free use of his labour and its products," that departure should always be *in favour of equality*; not to increase the necessary and unavoidable evils of inequality.

Wisdom and justice, then, looking forward to enjoyment, and to production as the necessary means of enjoyment, admit, in its fullest extent, the claim of the industrious to the exclusive use of the produce of their industry. Is this admission a hardship on the rest of the society who have not produced, from want of foresight, from want of skill, from want of strength, from want of activity? Must the rule of equality and all its increase of enjoyment be given up in favour of the producer, and must the non-producers be left destitute while the producers have an excess?

The producers have an excess—that is to say, have more than their own immediate gratification demands. *Absolute equality* in the distribution of articles produced by labour—that is to say, of articles of wealth (meaning always labour by competition, the ordinary mode of labour of all societies), is impracticable, or if practicable would, under the system of individual competition, be unwise. As absolute equality in such articles is out of the question, the next object of wisdom and benevolence is to make as *near an approach as possible* to equality, as near as is consistent with the greatest production.

The producers have an excess. What is to be done with this excess? The improvident, the non-producers want. How are they to obtain? Here a third principle, that of “voluntary exchange,” presents itself, which reconciles all the apparent contrarieties of equality and security. This principle, steadily pursued, leads to the utmost practicable equality, is a branch of security, necessitates the greatest production of the objects of wealth, and thus ensures the greatest mass of happiness.

The non-producers want. They want, because they have been unemployed while the industrious were producing an excess beyond their own immediate wants. If not absolutely idle, they have been comparatively unindustrious, because the producers have found the means to exist, as well as the non-producers, while their skill and

labour were perfecting for use some unappropriated materials. The non-producers want; but they have nothing to give in exchange, nothing in the shape of wealth. What is wealth but labour concentrated in an article of desire? The non-producer has not *now* this; but, as long as he has labour and faculties, he has the means of producing it, he has that which alone gives it its value, which makes it what it is; the fountain of wealth, of property, is within him. The non-producer has two modes, apparently different, but in reality the same, of procuring from the productive labourer the excess of his industry. He may either put his labour under the direction of the producer, the owner of the article he wants, until he gives him an equivalent in labour; or he may apply his labour himself to the searching for, or preparation of, some article which the owner may deem a satisfactory equivalent.

The only rational object of the production of wealth, as of all other human effort, being the increase of happiness to those, of whatever number, who produce it, equality of distribution tending the most efficiently to this end, except in as far as limited by equal and impartial security, and the freedom of voluntary exchanges (implied in security) leading directly to the utmost possible equality consistent with reproduction by individual competition; what other conceivable means can there be of educing the greatest sum of happiness from wealth which it is capable of producing, than by maximising the blessings of equality and security? So far from being irreconcilable with each other, it is only by an undeviating adherence to (real) equal security that any approach can be made to equality. What has been hitherto worshipped under the false name of security, has been the security of a few at the expense of the plunder, the degradation of the many, particularly of the whole mass of the operative, the real, producers of wealth. This spurious unequal security is as much opposed to equality of wealth, as equal security is friendly

to it. Security as to wealth implies the free disposal of labour, the entire use of its products, and the faculty of voluntary exchanges. The maintenance of this real and equal security tending to the greatest production, leads also to the utmost possible equality. These two objects of pursuit, therefore, so far coinciding as that the greatest quantity of the one will lead to the greatest quantity of the other, what so simple as the rule of action?—promote in everything the greatest possible security, and you promote the greatest production and the greatest equality. In as far as you depart from equal security, you lessen equality; in as far as you interfere to promote inequality, you lessen security.

Can there, then, be any question as to the propriety of *so distributing* these articles of wealth as to produce this two-fold result? Is there any other secondary and subordinate principle of distribution to be kept in view (the first and paramount principle being always the production of happiness) superior to this, or to be in any way regarded in comparison with it?

The false principles that have guided mankind, the injurious objects they have had in view in the distribution of property, are almost without number. In one end only do they seem to have all met—in the promotion of the supposed interest of those in power and possession. To maintain equality and security, equality as far as reconcilable with security, was never contemplated by them. Sometimes, from a confused view of the benefits of equality, they have endeavoured to establish and maintain it in an absolute manner; but this was only done at the expense of making slaves of half the community, the productive labourers, as in Sparta, and in a less flagrant degree in the other states of Greece, or of eternal commotions and speedy relinquishment of an impracticable undertaking, as in the early ages of Rome, or the first institutions of Christian communities. Veering between equality and security, not knowing how to reconcile the

opposing claims of these mortal adversaries, one or the other gained the ascendant, as the pressure of the evil from its opponent happened at the time to be most severely felt ; and, for want of knowledge, the best men have advocated and forwarded the most atrocious injustice. This happened even in Republican governments, where the good of the greatest number was the presumed object in view. But, under all other systems and institutions, where such an object as the happiness of the greater number was, not only not an object of contemplation, but was systematically disregarded, and where the acquisition, the increase, and the perpetuating of wealth and power, to those possessing them, or either of them, was the declared object of pursuit ; where the interest of the greater number was at times incidentally pursued, as the interest of horses is pursued, to make their work more profitable to their masters ; there ignorance and violence usurped, and vested, sometimes in one, sometimes in a few, sometimes in many, the wealth of the community ; and short-sighted and rapacious views almost always impoverished, and always made vicious and miserable, the whole of that community. Under all systems of rule, the *principle* of “voluntary exchanges” has been almost equally violated ; *in practice*, the violation has not been carried so far in some as in others. But the principle has been, everywhere disregarded ; and, with the sacrifice of the principle of voluntary exchanges, has been necessarily sacrificed the principles and the blessings of *equality* and of *security* ; the only mode of deriving the greatest happiness from each of these being, as has been shown, by means of entire voluntary exchanges. The English system of government is the most complete example of the coalition of different particular interests, combining for mutual advantage to promote each other’s views ; the general interest—that of by far the greater number of unclassed persons, of *productive labourers*, being altogether overlooked, except in as far as, by the physical or mental laws of nature, the inte-

rest of the producers happens to be identified with that of some of the governing classes. As a priest; as a lawyer; as a lord; as a member of some corporations, each varying from the other in caprice of charter and by-laws; as the holder of certain tenures in a county, regulated by no one principle of intelligence, probity, or even pecuniary value; as one of the army or navy; as a collector or consumer of the public revenue; in any of these capacities, an individual's interest may be attended to in a direct manner, as forming part of the larger interest of which he constitutes a part. In an *indirect* way also, if a man has wealth enough, he can buy of a borough owner or patron, for one or many years, the power of voting in the making of laws for the community; or if he be very rich, he can almost command a senseless addition to his name, which promises him and his descendants *for ever* the faculty of co-operating in the making of laws. As a *man*, born in the country, ever so wise and intelligent, his interest is in no way recognised by the English system, which is founded on the union of the more prominent particular interests—not on a regard to the rights and happiness of sentient and rational beings. Here, also, as elsewhere, the rights and happiness of one-half the human species, *women*, are not only not considered, but altogether denied; the pernicious consequences arising out of which antisocial and preposterous state of things, on the interest and happiness of society at large, require only to be seriously examined, to become obvious to all. Yet was this system of political institutions, with all its evils and absurdities, the best—that is to say, the least productive of evil, of any which circumstances had generated amongst extensive communities, till the establishment of the representative and elective system in the government of the United States of America. *There* was the only sound principle of just social institutions first solemnly proclaimed and acted upon. “No representation, no taxation,” elsewhere unmeaning words, are there the undeviating rule of action; except in the iniquitous case of

slaves in many of the states, and in the degradation of women, there as amongst all mankind.

What is now the inference as to our argument from this apparent digression? Can any one for a moment hesitate to admit that in all those communities the principle of "voluntary exchanges," and of course of equality and security, have in fact been,—and, to ensure their very existence, must have been,—systematically violated? What principle have they uniformly and necessarily substituted? The application of *force*. *Force*, more or less disguised, has been the support of them all, in utter contempt of the principle of returning to the productive labourer an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory.

Now, there is in fact no intermediate principle between the principle of "voluntary exchanges" by means of equivalents satisfactory to each of the exchanging parties, and the empire of "brute force." The *degree* of force employed, and the *direction* in which it is exerted, may vary; but the *principle* is the same, whether the robber or the ruler seizes on any portion of wealth, the product of labour, without giving an equivalent satisfactory to the producer. No intermediate principle between these two can be even conceived. Half-voluntariness is involuntariness for the portion wanting to make the satisfaction complete; and for that balance compulsion is the only alternative.

All social institutions have hitherto been merely *fortuitous experiments* during the infancy, and of course ignorance, of human affairs, in social science. But reason has now entered the interesting field, and will mould the vast materials, discordantly scattered around, to utility, to human use and comfort.

With respect to the distribution of wealth, there remains no other mode than the sublime simplicity of justice, "secure to every man the free disposal of the entire products of his labour." Nothing more is wanting for man to perform in the way of distribution, the hand of nature will do the rest.

SECTION 12.

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS JUST DISTRIBUTION, *no encouragements, no restraints* PARTAKING OF THE NATURE OF WEALTH, WHETHER OF A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE KIND, ON THE DIRECTION GIVEN TO LABOUR, OR ON THE FREE INTERCHANGE OF THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR, SHOULD BE PERMITTED.

It is impossible that any encouragements or restraints partaking of the nature of wealth, should be given without violating the principle of security, and in most cases also aggravating the unavoidable evils of inequality. These encouragements or restraints of social science are denominated in the language of commerce, *bounties, protections, apprenticeships, guilds, corporations, monopolies*, as applying to those whom they favour; while as applying to those excluded, to the great mass and majority of the individual members of all societies, they are denominated *prohibitions, contraband, &c.*, engendering the utmost cruelty of punishment to uphold the pernicious privileges which they confer. No privilege less than universal (which is no privilege at all, but a *common right* founded on *utility*) can be conferred on any individual or number of individuals, except at the expense of the rest of the community. The more flagrantly unjust the advantages are to the favoured, the greater is, of course, the reluctance of the unfavoured, the rest of the community, to submit to them; the more probable their efforts to contravene them. But in proportion to the strength of the motives, and thence of the probable efforts to contravene, must be the extent and intensity of the means, by terror and violence, to repress. Hence, the more unjust the privilege, the more atrocious must be the means effectually to uphold it. These considerations, which apply to every branch of social regulation, are alone sufficient to condemn any attempt to interfere with the free circulation of labour and the free disposal of its products.

Wherever the new mode of direction proposed to be given to labour is in reality more productive, more useful,

than the old mode, nothing more is necessary than the beneficent operation, which has been almost universally neglected, of showing those concerned, by the diffusion of knowledge, that it is their *interest* to adopt it. But, as if to demonstrate the conscious selfishness of all *forced* monopolies, as all privileges and monopolies must be—for the dread of unprotected monopolies in a community of free labour is worse than a bugbear—monopolists and their favourers have uniformly endeavoured to *conceal* all their schemes, all their knowledge, all their means of rendering labour more productive, and of acquiring increased profit. The history of all monopolies and monopolists will prove these facts. As they are founded on exclusion, they are supported by the repression of knowledge and exertion. They are inconsistent with the diffusion of knowledge, which it is the duty of every friend to society to effect, in order to render labour, to whatever useful object directed, more productive. The moral effects, therefore, of privileges, guarding to a few the exclusive right to direct their labour in a particular channel—even supposing that the wealth of the community was for the moment increased thereby—are such as universally to condemn them.

Fortunately, however, the moral and economical effects of privileges and exclusions point the same way. Neither at their first establishment, nor at any subsequent period of their existence, do they tend to increase, but to diminish, the aggregate of the mass of national wealth. Their real object never has been to increase the sum total of the products of labour, but to add to the profits of the favoured individuals, necessarily at the expense of the rest of the community. The *pretext* sometimes put forward to palliate their injustice, has indeed been, that they brought into existence a mass of wealth which would not otherwise have existed. But a few observations will demonstrate the futility of this pretext.

A community, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, are in the habit, every year, of pro-

ducing a certain quantity of articles for food, clothing, habitation, and for other sources, real or supposed, of happiness. It is thought by some person that the community would add very much to its happiness by producing, in addition to all these, some other article which it had not been in the habit of producing. It is evident that the mere wish of one or of the whole community, to acquire a new article (if no improvement of skill or machinery takes place), can simply direct a portion of their energies to its production, leaving an equal quantity of the old employment. The new article produced is obviously apparent, and strikes the eye of every one; while the diminution of the old is not, on a large scale, perceived. This new article is one with which the community have been before acquainted, or of which they know nothing. If the community know nothing of it, 'tis impossible they should have any desire to enjoy, or, of course, to produce it. What is then to be done? Simply to make them acquainted with its uses by description, by affording them information on the subject—in a word, by *knowledge*. By using the article, and exhibiting its uses, this knowledge would of course be more expeditiously and impressively conveyed. This done, or the community already acquainted with its benefits, what remains to induce its production? The desire to enjoy it—that is to say, the *demand*, being excited, what is to prevent its production? Most probably, the want is still the want of knowing how to produce it—the want of *knowledge*. But, perhaps, the productive labourers are already fully occupied in producing what they deem of superior importance to the new article. Here an effectual bar is opposed to the introduction, till accumulation of capital, the products of labour, or improvements in machinery, or additional skill, rendering labour more productive, sets free a portion of labour for the production of the new article. Perhaps their climate or their soil is not adapted to its production. Perhaps they have not the acquired skill of hand, or

of muscle, requisite to its production. In all these cases, is it equally desirable to introduce the cultivation or manufacture of the article? and what must be done to introduce it when desired? Where all the productive power of the community is already employed in raising articles deemed of superior utility, the introduction of the new article, though in itself an object of desire, would evidently displace the production of articles affording superior enjoyment. Where it might be advantageously substituted, there, certainly, it would be wise to introduce it, the soil and climate permitting. But, where the soil and climate oppose, it never can be usefully introduced, from the great waste of labour in forcing, or in ineffectually endeavouring to force, its production. Where the soil and climate oppose, and where there is a superfluity of the old articles formerly produced by the community, the obvious expedient is to "make an *exchange*," provided also the the articles in excess are objects of desire to the foreign producers of the new article. But, it may be said, where there are no obstacles of soil or climate, why not produce it at home, and thus acquire the double advantage of producing the articles to be exchanged, and the new articles to be got in exchange for them? This is an impossibility, a mere mistake. *Both* of these articles, the exchanging and the exchanged, could not be at the same time produced at home. Suppose the article wanted was woollens, the article to be raised and sent for it, linen. Before the new article was desired, there was linen enough produced to supply the community; why, therefore, waste labour in producing more, if not for a useful exchange? But the new article is to be raised at home, and no exchange is to take place. Therefore, that labour which, in case of exchange, would have gone to produce the equivalent, linens, is now directed to produce immediately, at home, the new article desired, woollens. If the new article be produced at home, an equivalent of articles to procure it in exchange will not be wanting, and, therefore, will not

be produced. Whether the new article is obtained at home or in exchange, the quantity of productive labour necessary for the enjoyment of it is the same. In the one case we devote, say, every five men and women out of a hundred, to the production of woollen; in the other case we devote them to the production of linen, over and above what we want for our own consumption, to be given in exchange for the woollen. The one is a *direct*, the other an *indirect*, operation to effect (at the same expense) the same object—a supply of the new article of desire, woollens. There is no advantage gained in producing the woollens at home, though there be no hindrance of soil or climate, provided, as was laid down, the community was previously fully and usefully employed. In all such cases, then, no encouragement is wanting, because the object to be promoted by it would not be desirable.

The most plausible ground, however, taken by the friends of *encouragements* in the way of wealth, rests on the following statement. In a thriving intelligent country, they admit that all such measures are unwise; but, in a country favoured by nature with navigable waters, with fertility of soils, salubrity of climate, minerals within the earth's bosom, a teeming population, unemployed, and turning to no account the materials of happiness within and around them—for such a population, under such circumstances, they demand encouragements to *call forth their industry*.

Alas! alas! such a state of things is a demonstration that the principles of security and equality have been grossly violated—such a state of things is a demonstration that the products of labour have been torn from the productive labourer without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory; that voluntary exchanges have been disregarded; that *discouragements* and *obstructions* innumerable have been thrown in the way of industry; that physical and moral knowledge has been shut out from the minds of the community; and that sophistry and falsehood have been impressed upon them. Before a hand is raised or a

foolish thought turned to afford *encouragements*, *invitations*, to the exertions of such a community, remove from them the mountains of obstructions under which they are buried. Whistle to an imprisoned bird to break the meshes of an iron cage, and fly through to the pecking of a morsel of sugar on the outside of it—till then, cease to insult a community so circumstanced, so bowed down, *so robbed*, with offers of *encouragements* to industry. They want none of such encouragements—they ask no more than to cease to *discourage* them. Encourage them! with what? from whence should such encouragements come? *From the produce of their own industry.* There is no other produce from which such encouragement, in the shape of wealth, can come to a whole community, or to a portion of the whole community, except from the remaining portion. Will you draw down, by your prayers, from heaven, wealth ready made to shower *encouragements* on the way of the industry of a people? Encourage them with their own? No. But cease extracting it from them. Unloose the chains from the hands of the productive labourer. Rob him of no portion, not an atom, of his labour, without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory.

But, if the refinements of exaction are still to be persevered in; if, backed by terror, and ultimately rendered operative by force, almost the whole produce of labour is taken from the producer, and scarcely enough left him to support a miserable existence; if the labourer be paid in *forced* wages, regulated at the caprice of those whose interests are opposed to his, after *forced* tithes and *forced* taxes of all sorts have been levied upon him; if the principle of "*security*," guaranteeing to the producer the *entire use* of the products of his labour—proved to be essential to the most complete development and continuance of successful industry—be thus systematically and pertinaciously trampled under foot, how absurd to talk of *encouragements*! If to remove absolute and galling *restraints*—if to cease to practise devastating violations of the principle of security

—be *encouragement*, in such a sense let encouragement be afforded, until every exchange is voluntary, and till neither labour nor its products are demanded, without an equivalent deemed satisfactory by the producer. Many of those things—of those regulations which have been called encouragements, such as bounties and drawbacks, are, in truth, nothing more than the removal, partial or complete, of previous forcible restraints thrown in the way of industry. A drawback, as its name imports, is nothing but the return, under particular circumstances, of a part or the whole amount of the duty, the forced levy, made on the production, carriage, or transit, of certain articles, or, in other words, a forcible seizure of a portion of the products of labour. These, therefore, are no *superadded* encouragements, and do not come under the meaning of our term; they do but partially remove certain universal obstructions to free labour. Hereafter will be pointed out the only mode by which any species of impost can be reconciled with the principle of *security*, which requires free labour and voluntary exchanges. As levied hitherto, they have been plain and direct inroads on security and all its blessings. Hitherto, the meaning of the word security, and all the advantages in its train, have been reserved exclusively for the rich; it is time that the real producers of wealth, the active and skilful labourers, should partake of its benefits, that strict justice, that perfect equality, should be observed in affording “security” to both rich and poor, that the same word should no longer have one meaning for the smaller and influential portion of society, and another, diametrically opposite, for the vast majority.

What shall be said, then, to *bounties*?—to premiums or rewards absolutely given, over and above the natural returns of labour, still further to remunerate, and to urge to renewed exertion, the productive labourer? Here is exhibited not only a disposition to leave untouched in the hands of the producer all the products of his labour, but to *increase those products*. This language, and the measures

to which it would lead, on a large scale, are perfect absurdity and impossibility. It has been shown that there is no other fund in nature for the repayment and satisfaction of labour than what itself produces. *A nation's labour must repay itself.*

But a particular subordinate branch of industry, some influential person thinks, is strangely neglected, and would add much to the comfort of the community if established. First, this influential person may be wrong; next, if he be right, and know better than the rest of the community, why not impart his knowledge to them? by means of which, some amongst them would adopt and introduce this particularly useful branch of industry.

By what mode of operation is it expected that a species of industry, a direction of labour, which is now avowedly so far from being productive as to require a premium to enable it to exist, will, by the continued application of that premium, become so productive as to be worthy of pursuit, and able to support itself, like other trades, without the premium? The bounty, by giving a factitious profit to the trade, draws many into it from other trades, leads them to acquire the new habits and skill peculiar to it, leads them to construct those edifices, to procure those tools and machines, which are necessary for the successful pursuit of the new line of industry. Do any of these operations, this new direction of labour, this accumulation of the products of labour, under the name of capital, in the new line, tend to make it more productive than the old? If the actual machinery, or processes of the new direction, be improved after the bounty, so might the old have been improved without the bounty. It is an effectual demand operating on intelligence that would improve the old as well as the new. To ascertain the effect of the bounty, and of the bounty alone, we must suppose that processes and machinery on both sides, the new and the old, remain as when the bounty began. How, then, can the bounty make that profitable in the end, which, previously to the

bounty, and without the bounty, was unprofitable? "It will call the public attention to the new occupation, and will lead to the acquisition of habits of skill amongst the workmen." But, in a state of free labour and voluntary exchanges, does not interest keep intelligence always on the stretch for improvement, and eternally excite the artisans to increased skill? Or, if affairs be complicated, do not bounties increase the complication, confuse the judgment, and deter from free speculation, by the upholding of artificial and arbitrary regulations? "By the bounty an article is produced for the society, the value of which they could not know till they experienced its utility; but, after this experience, they will continue to use it." A rare and modest price, truly, to be paid for an experiment, which, after all, may turn out undesirable as probably as useful! Individual interest, and the communication of information in the particular line, is surely the proper and the sufficient expedient—an expedient risking no possible evil, but operating entirely in good. How, then, can bounties alter the nature of things? how can they make that profitable which was previously unprofitable, or make that *ultimately* profitable which is not *immediately* so? It is evident that a bounty can produce no such effects. Its whole useful effect is limited to its supposed instrumentality in making people acquainted with their interest in the use of new articles; and its first step to produce this accurate knowledge of facts, is to distort the features of the case! Individual exertion, the removal of restraint, and the diffusion of knowledge, are the only unobjectionable means of accomplishing such objects.

Now comes the explanation of the mode by which the bounty is supposed *ultimately* to cause the new article to be produced at a lower price than at the beginning. By means of the bounty, a great deal of labour in the shape of capital will have been accumulated in the new employment, supported all the time by the bounty. If any part of the bounty be withdrawn, the buildings and machinery

cannot follow the new direction of the bounty. If the new direction of industry be abandoned, or in part relinquished, on the withdrawing of the whole or of any part of the bounty, the buildings and materials are probably useless, or of little value for any other purpose; and the loss of time and want of knowledge for other pursuits, keep the followers of the new pursuit still engaged in it. It does not follow, therefore, that, though the new trade may support itself when the bounty is withdrawn, it is as productive as other hardy trades which the circumstances of the country demanded without the aid of bounties. Where the trade will ultimately support itself, to the bounty it is perhaps indebted for more or less of its capital. But this accumulation of capital would not ultimately support it long, if a losing trade—a losing trade will swallow up any amount of capital. If, therefore, it ultimately succeeds without the bounty, the circumstances of the society must have changed during the continuance of the bounty, from other causes entirely unconnected with it, and the trade would, without any aid—restraints being supposed out of the way—have sprung up of itself. The more frequent result is, that when the bounties supporting particular trades are withdrawn, those trades languish and die, notwithstanding the temptation to continue them, from the great losses attending the breaking up of establishments, and, of course, the inclination to continue them at reduced profits. When, at the end of a great number of years, during which the bounty has been constantly applied, we perceive a particular branch of industry fully developed, and supporting itself on its own resources, we are apt to look on all this industry as the child of the bounty. 'Tis true that, without the bounty, if the circumstances of the community did not require it, *that particular direction* of industry would not have been produced; but, in another direction—all other circumstances, soil, climate, intelligence, capital, &c. being the same—a greater portion of industry would have been

developed. In every case in which a bounty has so apparently succeeded, it has done no more than prematurely to force, at a greater or less expense of the wealth of the community, a particular branch of industry, which, in a short period, without any of the evils of bounties, would have vigorously burst into existence, and have spread its roots firm in the wants or the wishes of the people. Where the new direction of labour becomes ultimately profitable, it is owing to circumstances entirely unconnected with the bounty.

The mere fact of giving a bounty, shows that industry is deemed desirable by those who give it; that public attention, or at least the attention of many who think the most, is directed that way. The bounty could not have caused this original attention; it is only a means of accomplishing its purpose. The establishment of the bounty excites in others, and diffuses this attention; which object might be better accomplished in a way quite unexceptionable. As the bounty and the interest, and frequently the improvement, co-exist, the one is deemed the cause and the other the effect, without any nice discrimination, any laborious analysis. The discrimination of causes is the great difficulty of moral and economical science.

It will not be inferred from any observations here made, that the absurd notion is maintained, that the productive labourers of a country, whether as direct labourers, machinery-makers, or capitalists, are always able to judge of the most useful mode of directing their own productive powers; or that, in point of fact, their powers are always necessarily employed in the way most tending to increase their individual wealth, or the aggregate of that of the community. This would be to assert that knowledge and wisdom are at the point of perfection, in every successive and varying state of society. At this present period more knowledge is acquired than at any preceding period; yet there are, every day, changes, improvements made; preceding errors are every day rectified. Productive labourers,

therefore, are no more infallible, have no more arrived at the end of knowledge, than those who kindly or presumptuously think for them. Their efforts are frequently directed by fortuitous combinations to labours of caprice, sometimes of mischief and vice,—of caprice, when directed (if voluntarily directed) to such purposes as raising pyramids for the dead, or palaces for the corruption of the living; to mischief and vice, when producing articles injurious to health and abridging the period of life, such as intoxicating liquors in larger quantities than are necessary for medical use, such as supporting and pampering an idle priesthood or army, to prostrate the understanding or the undrilled physical force of a community. But, in all these cases of erroneous application of a part, and sometimes by far the greater part, of the productive powers of a community, it will invariably be found that one or the other, most frequently both, of two circumstances occur. The principle of *security* has been egregiously violated towards the labourers; by *force*, their labour or its products have been abstracted or misdirected; or, they have been deficient in *knowledge* to see their true interests. For either of these evils what is the remedy? Not surely bounties, in the proper meaning of that term; but *removal of restraint and diffusion of knowledge*.

Though bounties are given, still knowledge must be diffused to attain the ultimate object; but the existence of bounties makes the diffusion of knowledge more difficult. The evil effect of bounties, as to knowledge, does not even rest here; not only do they supersede the necessity of information as to the utility of the new mode of industry; not only do they render it more difficult to acquire that accurate knowledge; but they tend to repress all useful inquiry, and to lay prostrate human reason, rendering man a mere mechanical creature.

There is another injurious effect of all bounties, in whatever state of social regulation, simple or complicated, they may have been afforded—an evil which is greater as the

bounty is more injudicious. Those who engage in any new line of industry, supported by a bounty, require a *larger profit*, to compensate for the *uncertainty* of the continuance of the bounty, and of course of the trade, than those engaged in free occupations self-supported. The consumers pay, of course, this increased profit, whether in a higher price or in an increased bounty.

“These considerations,” it may still perhaps be urged, “do not apply to that artificial aspect which society actually exhibits, encumbered with imposts, bounties, restraints, and every species of complication.”

To every degree of complication, however, and to every stage of society, these principles, it is conceived, do apply. Where security is every day violated,—the security of the poor man, of productive labourers, of an immense majority of every community,—it is wished to give a bounty to a particular branch of industry. If this be not done by removing some restraint, by ceasing the practice of some particular violation of security, how is it to be done? By adding additional restraints, by practising new violations of security, in addition to those already inflicted? To obtain the amount of the bounty, new plunder is committed, and less of the products of their labour are left to all the industrious but the new order to be favoured at their expense. It makes what was before bad, still worse; what was before oppressive, still more oppressive. If any given amount can be spared in the shape of bounty, surely the same amount can be spared in the remission of some restraint—the removal of some obstacle to the free development of industry.

If it appear that the operation of bounties is, in so many ways, to mar the blessings of equality and security, what shall we say of monopolies, of corporation-guilds, of forced apprenticeships, and such like contrivances, whose tendencies are frequently to counteract and nullify each other, and whose endless regulations have filled with vexation and perplexity almost every path of human industry?

It would lead us too far to enter into but a very limited discussion of such matters ; though a right understanding and explanation of them would illustrate and confirm all our previous principles. It is hoped that those principles, with the observations made on bounties, will be sufficient to guide to the true nature of such expedients.

The interference of law, or the public force of the community, is essential to constitute a monopoly. Where all labour is free, and all exchanges voluntary, there can be no monopoly : such operations are excluded from our present consideration. Monopolies are of various kinds ; sometimes they permit a few individuals to exercise exclusively a particular line of industry—as the making of snuff, tobacco, porcelain, &c. ; sometimes they permit any one, or every one, of a whole community to engage in a particular trade, but exclude foreign countries, or colonial settlements or dependencies, of the same community, as refining sugar for the consumption of the community ; sometimes they limit to a particular set of men the export of certain or of all articles to other countries ; and sometimes the import of some or all articles from those countries, such as the East India Company as formerly and as newly regulated ; sometimes they confine to particular colonial settlements the faculty of supplying the community with certain articles, such as sugar, rum, &c., from the East or West India colonies of all European powers, each community admitting exclusively for its own supply the products of its own colonies ; sometimes they establish a mutual and reciprocal monopoly in the supply of certain articles, such as the old (Methuen) treaty between England and Portugal, for the mutual preference of the wines of Portugal in England, and the woollens of England in Portugal.

Monopolies are more degrading and revolting than bounties, inasmuch as bounties seem to operate entirely in the way of reward, in the way of encouragement and over-payment ; they are of an exhilarating nature, and wear the appearance of generosity ; their pernicious effects

are disguised and confounded with other circumstances and causes; bounties frequently invite *all* who may think proper to direct their industry, with the addition of the bounty, in the way they point out. But monopolies wear, throughout and from the commencement, the harsh features of restraint and punishment; they openly and avowedly favour the few at the expense of the many, under the same pretext that has been made use of to justify bounties, that, though injurious for the present, they will ultimately establish a useful branch of trade which would not otherwise have existed.

Monopolies seem to be liable to all the objections that have been urged against bounties, but one; and to be liable to most of them in a much stronger manner than bounties are. They are liable to additional objections which do not press against bounties. The objection to which they are not liable is, that while a direct tax, or a portion of the public revenue, raised by direct taxation, is applied to the payment of bounties, there is no *necessary* call on the public funds for anything in the way of pecuniary aid in the establishment of monopolies. Monopolies act by taking away the rights of others; bounties, by pretending to superadd factitious rewards to industry, forgetting the only source, the product, the reward, of the successful industry of the rest of the community from whence such rewards can be abstracted. The evils produced, in a greater or less degree, by both bounties and monopolies, may, perhaps, be collected under the following heads:—

1. They violate the principle of *security*.
2. They violate the principle of *equality*.

These two evils, clearly established, are quite sufficient to condemn such expedients as bounties or monopolies; for, if the productions of the whole society be lessened by the violation of security, and the aggregate happiness lessened by any inequality not necessary to security, any subordinate effects, were they

all in good, arising from them, could be only partial drawbacks from the paramount mischiefs of insecurity and inequality. But bounties and monopolies agree also in producing the following additional evils. Or, perhaps, it may be more correctly said, that the following evils are but illustrations of the violations of equality or security; into one or the other of which they may be all ultimately resolved.

3. They are both liable to enormous abuses of misapplication and consequent loss of national wealth, from the necessary imperfection of knowledge of facts and judgment, on the part of their favourers—supposing them to be always well disposed.
4. They are both founded on the admission, that the direction of industry which they favour is less profitable than the average of other modes of employment.
5. They both require larger profits to compensate for the uncertainty of the continuance of their privileges.
6. They are both liable to be more wastefully carried on than other unsupported directions of industry; and they produce fraud and favouritism in the working of their necessarily complex machinery.
7. They both tend to raise the prices of other commodities, by artificially withdrawing the labour and capital usually employed in them.
8. They both remarkably discourage the acquisition and diffusion of physical and economical knowledge.
9. Both expedients, bounties and monopolies, are quite *superfluous*, though unaccompanied with any of the preceding evils; because appropriate means are at hand to accomplish all the good expected from them without any of the evil.

The evils incident to monopolies, over and above those which they share in common with bounties, may be classed as under :—

1. Monopolies require punishments, mostly cruel and sanguinary, for their support.

2. They generate atrocious avarice and injustice in the favoured traders, from the abuse of the power entrusted to them to support the monopoly.
3. They have in fact, in almost every instance, turned out ruinous as trading speculations, and have degenerated into theatres of corruption and plunder on the part of the agents, at the expense of the trading company of the community at home, and of the foreigners over whom their power has extended.

A few words, after what has been already said, will show that monopolies are justly chargeable with all the evils here attributed to them.

First, as to those evils of which they partake in common with bounties. They violate the principle of *security* as flagrantly as bounties do, but not exactly in the same *visible* way. They do not attack security by levying forced contributions as bounties do, by taking from the thriving the products of their industry, to lavish them on a species of industry which cannot support itself. But they violate security by arresting the arm of the labourer, the skill of the artisan, the adventurous energy of the carrier, from using their productive powers in that direction which may be the most useful to them. Monopolies do not wait until the products are made; they anticipate them—they strangle them in the birth. Monopolies act by exclusion; they exclude all but the favoured few from employing their labour, or exchanging the products of that labour in a particular line; they *restrain* the right to free labour and voluntary exchanges in all the rest of the community. Suppose that a labouring artisan has produced a hat or pair of shoes, for his own use, or to procure some article of desire by its exchange. This article, or its equivalent, or part of its equivalent, in money, is forcibly taken from the producer to raise the fund for the payment of bounties. But, in the case of monopolies (as, say, of hat-making), the artisan is restrained from making the shoes or the hat. Where is, then, the difference, as to use and enjoyment,

between taking away an article when made, or preventing it from being made? If the article be taken when made, and the robbery stop there, it may be made again; but, in the case of the prohibition, the power itself of producing is arrested, is annihilated. The attack on security is, therefore, the more flagrant when immediately directed on labour itself, on the power of production, the characteristic constituent of every article of wealth.

Monopolies are also chargeable, as well as bounties, with violating the principle of *equality*. The equality here advocated is not *absolute, forced*, equality; but the utmost possible degree of equality compatible with security, with free labour and voluntary exchanges. Bounties violate equality by taking from the industrious a part of their earnings, and giving them to a favoured few, enriching them at the expense of the community, instead of protecting all under the ægis of free competition. Monopolies more flagrantly violate equality, by interdicting a supposed means of useful exertion, and, therefore, of happiness, to all, but some privileged individuals. The wealth they produce is necessarily the most partial possible, the least diffused, the least depending on individual exertion and skill; and, therefore, for these and other reasons, the least productive of happiness. We have seen that the more any given mass of wealth is diffused—provided that each portion of it remains in such quantity as to be appreciable in its capacity of exciting enjoyment, and provided the minute labour of the division does not overbalance the minute enjoyment—the more happiness it produces. The paramount claims of security, in order to ensure production and existence to mankind, form the only justifiable limit to the universal agency of this benignant principle. Security being provided for, equality is the universal law of justice. By it, the utility of every institution must be tried. What shall we say, then, to an institution like that of monopolies, which first violates the principle of security, and then entirely tramples on the principle of equality—

by taking from or restraining the many, the poor, the weak, and giving to the few, the rich, the strong? Had it respected security, its attacks on equality might have been palliated. Were it really necessary to uphold security, its attacks on equality would be justified. But instead of any such justification or palliation, it prostrates equally the two principles of security and equality—the most essential to human happiness.

These two evil tendencies, to violate security and to violate equality—attendant equally on monopolies and bounties—are sufficient, as before observed, to banish their use for the pretended purpose of increasing the production of wealth, or of happiness, by its distribution. Still, however, by glancing over some of the minor evils produced by them, we shall be the more fully and permanently convinced, not only how utterly unnecessary such contrivances are for the most just distribution of wealth, but how completely they are incompatible with such just distribution.

“Trades carried on by bounties and monopolies require larger profits to compensate for the uncertainty of their continuance.” Mr. Mill says, in his “Elements of Political Economy,” chapter on Bounties, that the person engaging in a protected trade gets no more profit than the profit of capital in other trades, *competition* bringing down his profits thereto. Competition produces no *absolute* equality of profits or of wages of labour in society; but a *relative* equality, all circumstances of risk, skill, unpleasantness of the occupation, &c., considered. No man will or does engage in a dirty, dishonourable, or hazardous trade, without the expectation of higher profits or wages than if employed in ordinary occupations almost free from risk, demanding no peculiar skill, and almost certain as to their continuance. To the lowest that will repay these inconveniences, competition will bring down the wages or profits of protected as well as of other trades. But for this addition attending the encouragement or restraint, the society

pays ; while, by those concerned in the protected lines, the addition is not felt as a real increase of just remuneration. 'Tis so much lost, and a real loss to the community ; a loss created by the act of protection. It is true, that monopolies, though causing higher prices to the community for the articles they deal in, have very seldom afforded the ordinary profits of trade to their members. This arises from another vice which swallows up and supersedes the present ; the unfaithfulness of their ministers and agents, deliberately preferring their own private interest, as servants, to the general interest of the trading monopoly. If the public pay a higher price for the article afforded by the monopoly, it is quite immaterial to that public into whose pockets that higher price goes.

Another of the mischiefs arising from monopolies as well as bounties, is, that "they are liable to be more wastefully carried on than other unsupported directions of industry, and they produce fraud and favouritism in the working of their necessarily complex machinery." The exercise of care and economy depend, other things being equal, like the exercise of other qualities, on the degree of interest engaged in producing them. In private pecuniary affairs this vigilance, this prevention of waste, is at its highest ; for be the character what it may, whether indolent or active, it will be *most* vigilant when engaged in personal concerns, provided they are such as to be deemed in themselves important. A trade supported by bounties may be conducted by individual vigilance, and is therefore little liable to this abuse ; but the mischief is almost inseparable from monopolies. Where but the hundredth or the thousandth part of the mischief will fall personally on the agent who relaxes in vigilance, or commits, or suffers to be committed, waste, the same anxiety and the same exertion cannot be expected to prevent waste, that would naturally be expected where the whole of the evils arising from neglect must fall on the negligent. It will not be said that moral principle, in large concerns, will supply the

place of individual interest. The whole history of man proves that when these two principles are placed, whether fortuitously or from a fatal system, in opposition to each other, moral principle will yield to immediate private interest. Besides, the great end and object of all monopolies being to make profits, that paramount object is apt to get possession of all minds to the exclusion of every other, and principle never pleads so weakly as when opposed to gain in such a concern. Under a system whose governing principle was mutual co-operation and benevolence, it is possible that social motives might be so identified with personal, as to become the rule of action; but here, where private gain is the sole moving spring, to relinquish an opportunity of promoting it, is looked upon rather as stupidity than morality, and the *admissible* modes of seeking private interest at the expense of the concern, become so enlarged and varied from sympathy of mutual interests amongst the servant, or master-conductors, that the words fair and honourable, change their nature, and become applied to any profitable neglect, or other mode of gain, that can be practised with impunity. Bounties are notoriously liable to frauds on the part of the claimants, notwithstanding the frequently complicated machinery to prevent them, the very subordinate agents of prevention becoming parties in the fraud: while favoritism in the dispensing of posts and places in monopolies is so constant, that the chance of the influence to obtain or procure one of them often becomes the sole motive of adhesion to the concern.

It is another of the mischiefs arising from these expedients, that "both bounties and monopolies remarkably discourage the acquisition and diffusion of physical and economical knowledge." Their tendency is to discourage *all* freedom of thought and calculation on the part of the community: physical and politico-economical knowledge coming more immediately in contact with these instruments, are more particularly operated upon by them. Bounties

and monopolies imply a judgment formed, a dictation practised on the community, as to the direction in which their industry should be employed. There is no appeal made to the understanding of the people, no exposition, no explanation, given, no concurrence solicited, no examination permitted. The *will* of those who have the power, and whose interest may or may not be involved in the operations, determines that such a direction of industry shall be pursued, and levies money or lays restraints to carry it into effect. To question this supreme will, is an insult to its omniscience, if not an attack on its authority. All discussion, all activity of mind, being useless, or being even judged presumptuous, ceases. Of what avail to question operations which are clothed with the arm of power? Submission and prostration of the understanding to the absolute wisdom of the legislators of trade and commerce, are sought for by such legislators with an avidity always proportioned to their want of comprehension of mind, and exactly in the inverse ratio of their merits. Of what use to the industrious and intelligent to weigh, to calculate, to experiment on the most useful modes of directing their productive powers in the creation of wealth, when they find everything arbitrarily regulated for them? Restraints and encouragements taken out of the hand of nature, and lavished at the caprice of the legislator? Of *what use* can intellectual exertion, under such circumstances, directed to such objects, be? Of what use, but to excite the ill-will of those who have the sovereign direction?

Physical knowledge, that which consists in an examination of all natural productions, inanimate, vegetable, and animal, with the view of applying them to use, guiding, or co-operating with the productive forces and energies of nature; that species of knowledge which is the basis of all industry, is peculiarly discouraged by artificial regulations and encouragements. As long as the field of enterprise is open, every useful quality of bodies, every physical energy of nature, is eagerly sought after, that it may be applied to

use by the discoverer. But, under the system of bounty and restraint, the laws of nature are compelled to give way ; industry is forced and artificial, and the productive powers of nature are restrained as well as the energies of man.

The last of the objections stated as applying equally to bounties and monopolies is, that "they are both *superfluous*, though unaccompanied with any of the preceding evils, because appropriate means are at hand to accomplish all the good expected from them without any of the evil."

On this part of the subject a capital error has frequently prevailed. The useful tendency of encouragements and restraints, and the whole artificial system of corporations, apprenticeships, &c., have been held to be demonstrated by the fact of the great improvement which took place in every part of Europe, where, by means of such contrivances, the old horrid system of feudal idleness, superstition, and rapine, was replaced by industry and independence. One observation, it is hoped, will set this objection to rest. The whole feudal system was nothing but a mass of the usurpations of force, an all-pervading violation, in gross and in detail, of the principles of security and equality. Succeeding, therefore, to such a system, and compared with it, the establishment of corporations and of privileges to the associated, was, in fact, to an immense extent, the *removal of feudal restraints*, the asserting, in opposition to feudal barbarism, the principles of security and equality ; and all the good effects of such establishments arose from their conforming to the principles we have laid down, bating the evils which their ignorant violation of these principles produced, and still generates in a new state of things, in which the monster of feudality is almost conquered. The restraints which these establishments impose, as compared to the rule of justice, of security and equality, are most mischievous, and ought to cease. The restraints which they impose,

compared with that utter insecurity and usurping rule of force, that characterised feudal times, is as vexatious mischief compared to utter desolation. The reason of these anti-feudal establishments not producing pure good, was the restraints which they still retained or invented. In no state of society could such encouragements or restraints be wise; but to expect that absolute wisdom, as to the regulation of industry, would have sprung up at once amidst feudal proscription of intellect, is no more rational than to expect that the steamship would have sprung forth as soon as the first boat of wickerwork and skins was launched on the waves. The steamship, set afloat by improvements in mechanics and chemistry, is worthy the improved knowledge of the age; while, to our shame, the corporations and restrictions of barbarous ages, the wickerwork and skins of political economy, are still our *ne-plus-ultra* of wisdom in *active*, whatever it may be in *theoretical*, social science. It is plain, then, that the origin of even the restrictive and partially protecting system itself, is an argument against its continuance, and in favour of our principles.

In a country desolated by a system of brutal force about equal in atrocity with the feudal system, in Egypt, Syria, or in almost any other part of the Turkish despotism, where the every-day principle and practice of what is called government, is a systematic violation of security, where ignorant rapacity snatches from the hand of the producer the fruits of his labour, till all industry is extinguished, and the scanty exertion of despondency scarcely remains sufficient to perpetuate by reproduction the means of existence; in such countries, even the restrictive and protecting system would be a comparative blessing. Had Bonaparte remained in Asia, and established there free industry, instead of returning to desolate Europe, mankind would have been indebted to him, in proportion to the restraints which he would there have removed from the development of human thought and action. Even the

ordinary European restrictive system would be there comparative liberty, and would operate as partial security did on the feudal system ; but it would be absurd to conclude from thence that it was the restrictive and not the anti-restrictive part of that system that produced the good effect.

Having thus dismissed those evils, in which restraints and encouragements, monopolies and bounties, for the most part agree, it remains that we notice the mischiefs almost peculiar to monopolies.

The evil or mischief first noticed is, that “monopolies require punishments, mostly cruel and sanguinary, for their support.” Without punishments, law-making and restraints are useless—every law must have its sanction (in cases of civil law, restitution is the sanction) ; and those laws which are the most useful to monopolies, giving them the greatest exclusive privileges, are exactly those which require the most terrible sanctions, as violating most flagrantly the common rights and sympathies of mankind. Hence the necessity for exemplary punishments, in direct ratio to the injustice of the monopoly. That all monopolies—the Dutch, the Spanish, the English, in Europe, America, and Asia—have been enforced by punishments frequently the most atrocious, is a matter of history ; and the necessity of such punishments to support such establishments is quite natural and palpable. When the law inflicts punishment for what is really an immoral—that is to say, a pernicious action, as for stealing, fraud, burning, or murder—although the punishment may be severe and sanguinary, and tend to brutify and harden the people, still the real evil of the crime—the insecurity and alarm arising from its prevalence if unrestrained, operate so strongly on the peaceable and the industrious, as to counterbalance the horror produced by the punishment, and to weaken the sympathy for the tormented criminal. But, in the case of cruel punishments, or of any punishments, inflicted in support of monopolies, where is the

equivalent for the violence done to human feelings? for the acute sympathy with the sufferer? for the association of cruelty and injustice with law in general, and the consequent hatred of all law? The act for which the punishment is inflicted is a strictly moral, a meritorious act, that of directing labour where it will be most productive; the crime is imaginary, and of the law's creation. All notions of justice are reversed, the intellectual faculty of the community is bewildered, morality has no basis on which to found its judgments; and if the terror of punishment succeed—which it never has done where the temptation was strong and the profit of contravening high—it can only be at the expense of the degradation of the activity and the intelligence of the community.

A second evil imputed particularly to monopolies, is, that “they generate atrocious avarice and injustice in the favoured traders, from the abuse of the power intrusted to them to support the monopoly.” History concurs here also with the tendencies of things in proving this additional mischief. The atrocities of the agents of the great Dutch monopolies both in the East and West India Islands and on the Main, of the English in the East Indies, and of the Spaniards in supporting their eternal restrictions in America, must be familiar to every one who has read the history of these companies, or of the nations to which they belong. To produce a famine, or an approach to a famine, that a speculator might enrich himself by means of those advanced prices which would produce disease and the lingering death of his fellow-creatures, is but a specimen of the expedients resorted to by avarice when entrusted with power without accountability. Where monopolies are established at home, whether in favour of the executive government, or of individuals, so much cruelty of this kind is not practised, the government watching over the monopolists under its eye and jealous of their assumption of power; or, if itself practising the monopoly, having still more important objects and cares to distract its attention from the mere pur-

suit of avarice. 'Tis in case of foreign monopolies, where a so-called civilised nation entrusts to a company of its trading citizens the pretended right—which the parent society never possessed and could not confer—of *sovereignty*, of ruling, of restraining, whether by laws or through momentary despotic will, the labour, property, and person of the inhabitants, with the sole view of making subservient to avarice, that sovereignty over tribes or nations discovered by navigation, that the iniquity of the system has most glaringly displayed itself.

A third evil imputed particularly to monopolies, is, that “they have, in fact, in almost every instance, turned out *ruinous* as trading speculations, and have degenerated into theatres of corruption and plunder of the agents, at the expense of the trade, of the community at home, and of the foreigners over whom their power has extended.” These facts alone, the ascertained and historical result of almost all monopolies, supported by power (for without *force* there can be no monopoly, all voluntary exchanges being not only innocent but salutary), are sufficient to banish such expedients for ever from all enlightened legislation. The experiment has been tried over and over again, on the most extensive scale, by nation after nation, in almost every trading portion of the globe, and the question has been decided against monopolies as expedients to ensure mercantile gain. Experience has as satisfactorily shown, that they are instruments of the waste and ruin of capital compared with trade carried on by the activity and economy of private enterprise, as that the power of windmills is excelled by the immense and regular energy of steam. All great monopolies, ending with the English East India Company, have become insolvent. Notwithstanding its mercantile losses, this company still exists, partly by means of what is called revenue, taken by force from the unfortunate inhabitants of Hindostan, to help to balance its losses partly by the contracting of a debt, which it will never be able to pay. To levy revenue for such a purpose, so

foreign from at least the usual *ostensible pretext* of applying it to the support of the public institutions, for dispensing justice, morality, education, &c., through the community who pay it, has been reserved for the impudence of a trading company. Legally plundering the people with whom they trade, to make up for the balance of losses, caused by every species of waste and abuse!! Why, then, does this Company continue to exist? Private sinister interest and political considerations support it. Its original mere mercantile object is now entirely lost in these new views and interests. It is continued, first, for the sinister interests of the servants, military, civil, and mercantile, of the Company; next, to prevent the Government at home, as now constituted, from making a still worse use of what is called the patronage, or at all events to keep this patronage in the hands of the Company's Directors. In *no hands*, however, neither in those of the Company nor the Government, should such patronage be placed.

Thus it is that these monopolies are attended with evils incalculable. To the friends and connexions of those who have influence in the direction, and to their interest alone, the interest of providing for them by making their fortunes in India, where they themselves become the governors and agents of the governors, without any interference of the inhabitants of the country in their own affairs; to the sordid interest of these agents, destined to bring in succession the spoils of Asia to Europe—spoils exacted either by open plunder or by a grinding taxation—is the right to security, equality, and political liberty, of nearly a hundred millions of rational creatures deliberately sacrificed; because they were, perhaps, *almost* as wretched before we visited them! And when these men, so enriched by foreign plunder, come home,; their wealth, effeminacy, and oriental habits of oppression and contempt for the rights and feelings of their fellow-creatures, make them admirable tools in diffusing servility and corruption at home, as if to avenge

on British freedom and happiness the untold miseries and degradation of the East. Yes, this is indeed a moral retribution; not the capricious sporting of imaginary beings with the destinies of human creatures, but the unerring operation of the laws of our physical and mental organisation, necessitating a course of vicious action to those whose habits have been formed by the practice of corruption, cruelty, and oppression.

But to return. There is another mode, a branch of the system of monopoly, of encouraging a home trade at the expense of all foreign competition, by laying duties, not for the sake of revenue, but for the mere sake of protection, on all rival foreign goods. Its importance may justify a short separate consideration.

First, We are no more permitted, by the principle of *utility*, to invade the security—the right to free labour and voluntary exchanges—of foreign communities, than of that in which we live; because it will lead to retaliation and reprisals, by which our own industry will be, in return, equally shackled by them, and to effects of their ill-will in whatever other way they may have an opportunity of showing it; so that, striking at their rights, is indirectly attacking our own.

Second, Such mercantile duties on foreign productions raise the price, while they deteriorate the quality of the articles protected, on all the home consumers—they raise the price, because, if the home goods could be made at home as cheap as the foreign, protection by duty or otherwise would be superfluous; and they deteriorate the quality, because they prevent the full effect of foreign, added to home competition.

Third, They give no additional profit to the home manufacturers (risk of discontinuance, &c., considered), competition amongst themselves soon bringing that down to the level of profit of *similar* occupations—whatever more they get is only a premium injuriously taken from

the rest of the community, to compensate for their risk, ignorance, &c., in the new undertaking.

Fourth, As affecting the national capital, the aggregate of that of individuals, as a whole, they lessen it and its total produce, by diverting a part of it out of its former *more* profitable employment, whatever that might have been, into the new employment, the natural profit of which would not support it without removing competition by the duty.

Fifth, If the protecting duty be high, it leads to all the miseries, vices, contempt of law and justice, which *ought* to be the same, waste of property, &c., of smuggling, and to the expenses, punishments, and vexatious restrictions, necessary to enforce a collection of the duty. If, on the contrary, the duty be low, so as to render smuggling not worth the risk, the protection is, in that very same proportion, inefficient and uncalled for.

After the lengthened investigation which we have given to the oft-reprobated, but still widely practised, systems of interference with free labour and voluntary exchanges, by pecuniary encouragement or penal restraint, it will not be necessary to dwell on the minor expedients of petty corporations, varying in every city and town, and violating in a hundred ways the principles of free industry. They all invade, in a greater or less degree, the sacred principle of *security* (with us no hypocritical principle, favouring the rich alone), but sacred to the protection of the labour of the poor, as well as of the products of labour possessed by the rich—impartial to all. Such laws also invade the sister principle of equality—which should never be departed from but in obedience to security—because they forcibly take from the poor, to increase the store or the enjoyments of the rich. For their minor evils, arising from their peculiar objects and circumstances, they must be left to the discernment of the reader.

Having now proved that neither pecuniary reward nor the exertion of force, that neither encouragements nor

restraints, are wanting, but are, on the contrary, extremely prejudicial to the production of wealth by labour, let us proceed to the next proposition.

SECTION 13.

That INEQUALITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, AND *that alone*, WHICH ARISES FROM SECURING TO EVERY MAN THE FREE USE OF HIS LABOUR, AND ITS PRODUCTS, AND THE VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES THENCE ENSUING, SHOULD BE UPHOLD; BECAUSE, WITHOUT THAT EXTENT OF INEQUALITY, THERE WOULD BE NO *security*, WITHOUT SECURITY NO PRODUCTION, WITHOUT PRODUCTION NO WEALTH TO DISTRIBUTE.

Were food and all other objects of wealth supplied to man, like light, air, and in most places water, in such quantities as to be abundant for all, without the necessity of any human effort for their production; and were it proposed, *in order to make them produce more happiness*, to limit their consumption by the greater number of individuals of the community, that the remainder might have more than they could consume; who is there that would not exclaim against the absurdity of such a proposal? Or, were they only in such quantity, but still unconnected with human exertion, as to afford but a limited supply to all, enough for mere necessary use but not for superfluity; would not the person, in this case also, be deemed irrational who should propose to increase the sum total of the happiness of the community, by any inequality of distribution, taking from some what was merely necessary, in order to load others with satiety? The absurdity and the mischief, in the latter case, would be the greatest; for those who had at best but merely necessities, would suffer more pain in being deprived of them to add to the superfluities of others, than those who previously possessed abundance. Suppose a third case, that a given supply, any how obtained, but without the intervention of human exertion, that would give but a treat to all, were every year, every month, or every day, acquired by a community; the enjoyment of any individual using at the same time 500, 1,000, or any

other number of those portions, would scarcely, from the laws of our organisation, double the enjoyment of any one of those from whom one of the single shares was taken or withheld. This, it is hoped, has been already made evident in Sections 8 and 9, and will be further proved when we inquire into the effects of *excessive* inequality of wealth on the happiness of a community.

In all cases, then, whether of a large or small supply, where human effort has not been concerned in the production, equality of distribution is the rule of justice. Let the reader pause, reflect, and speculate, and assign, if he can, any other justification, amongst beings similarly constituted, capable of equal degrees of happiness, of a departure from the law of equality in distribution, than the necessity of human exertion for the production. There can be no other justification of a departure from equality of distribution. Its blessings are so transcendently great, so productive of immensely increased agreeable sensations, peace, and benevolence, that never but when justified by the necessity of continued production should they be departed from. To this superior *necessity*, and to this alone, must they yield; and to this necessity must they be strictly limited.

What is the circumstance which distinguishes the objects of wealth as means of enjoyment, from other means of enjoyment which come not under the name of wealth? The necessity of *labour* for their production. In nothing but in being the creatures of human labour, do they differ from other sources of enjoyment. Without labour they could not exist. Without security—which means the exclusive possession by every man of all the advantages of his labour—labour would not be called forth. Therefore, in the distribution of such articles where labour is employed, called articles of wealth, and in these alone, equality must be limited by security, because in no other case are equality and production incompatible with each other. What is the reason of this? that equality is not,

wherever attainable, to be desired? is it that equality itself is not founded in justice and productive of happiness? Far from it. But because its paramount blessings cannot be obtained, when applied to one particular class of objects of desire, those which are produced by labour, called objects of wealth, without destroying the source, the supply of such objects. Were it possible to ensure a reproduction by labour of the articles equally consumed, all the advantages of equality would be as fully derivable from the equal distribution of objects of wealth, as of any other objects of desire, or materials of happiness whatever.

A celebrated practical as well as philosophical inquirer, conceives that he has demonstrated *experimentally* that reproduction and equality are *not* incompatible even when applied to objects of wealth, produced as they all are, by labour. He conceives that he has proved that other motives, besides *individual* necessity and the love of the factitious pleasures of superiority of wealth, can be found, and made to operate with sufficient energy, to ensure a constant reproduction of abundant wealth, for the equal use of the whole community. As *almost* all falsehood and violence, and as *all* stealing proceeds from inequality of distribution of wealth; *he* would certainly be no mean benefactor to his species, who could demonstrate the practicability of thoroughly eradicating, by removing the causes of, these the most numerous by far of human miseries and vices. The mischiefs arising from the misregulation of our appetites, passions, and desires, and from the want of knowledge and loss of the pleasures of intellectual culture, would be the only ones to which the attention of society would be then anxiously directed: and the whole attention being concentrated on these, the prospects of indefinite improvement would be captivating indeed. In a separate chapter those views will be investigated, which are by no means regarded as visionary speculations, but as some of the most important problems of social science that were ever submitted to the consideration of mankind.

In the course of our argument in this inquiry, we have, however, all along reasoned on the supposition of labour by *individual competition*, and taken it for granted, that the reproduction of wealth and security were incompatible with equality of wealth. By no scheme or combination affecting a whole community, have these discordant principles been ever yet in human practice reconciled. But to assert that they could not, as moral wisdom improved, be found reconcilable, would be as presumptuous reasoning from ignorance, in morals, as to assert, in physics—(and not many years ago the writer heard the assertion made by an experienced naval officer, who now owns a steam-vessel and practises what he pronounced impracticable)—that it would be impossible to apply steam navigation to the ocean or to strong river currents. No part of our argument is built even on the practicability of reconciling these two hitherto rival principles of security and equality; or rather of reproduction and equality: for although equality might leave every one secure in the possession of his equal share by taking away the motives to plunder, it would remain still, under such circumstances, to *supply motives to production*. This is the real difficulty. Conceding, therefore, so much on the one hand, we must strictly guard, on the other, against the abuses and false inferences that may be drawn from this concession. Wherever inequality is not called for by the clear necessity of security, not of that false security which is partially applied to soothe the imaginary alarms of the rich, protecting mere possession however acquired, while it overlooks violence applied to the very means of existence of the poor; but of that equal and just security which is alike to all; *equality* is to be pursued as the means of the greatest happiness derivable from distribution. Quite opposite to this has been the current philosophy, in order to uphold the enormous practices everywhere in operation, and outraging equally the principles of security and equality. There is scarcely a violation of

the principle of security, for which the maintenance of that principle has not served as a pretext. The word, security, once laid hold of by the lovers of exclusive privileges and possessions, and but partially understood or wilfully misrepresented, has been reserved for the protection of the rich and powerful alone, to guard their possessions, however acquired, though at the expense not only of equality, but of the security of the rest of the community, and has been by the rich used as a cover for every oppression—nay, as a justification of the most atrocious cruelty, the worst species of vice. To justify that transcendent enormity, the slave-trade, including in itself all the complicated evils combined arising from the violation of the principle of security, the name of that same principle of security has been as unblushingly as absurdly profaned. Allowing for a moment that our demonstration of the sole original right to *property*, as founded on free labour and voluntary exchanges, is erroneous; allowing that it would tend to the happiness of a community that property should be acquired by its members by force or fraud, and that such acquisitions should be eternally by force or fraud maintained; still the simple question of *security* comes to this. There are *two* human beings, the slave and the owner, equally concerned in the maintenance of this principle of security. If the slave were a house or an ox, or any such species of property, and *not a sentient being like the owner*, the principle of security would then apply to the owner alone; but wherever man and labour are concerned, the principle of security will apply. To the owner the principle of security says, “Your property, that is to say, the free use and direction of your labour and all your faculties (not interfering with similar rights in others), and the right of voluntary exchanges for the products of that labour; and also, as an item of this your property, your expectation of so much happiness from *the use* of the living machine (provided it was acquired by free labour or voluntary exchange), shall

be awarded to you." But to the slave the same principle of security says, "*Your* property, that is to say, the free use and direction of your labour and all your faculties (not interfering with similar rights in others), and the right of voluntary exchanges for the products of that labour, shall be awarded to *you*." How can justice in this case reconcile security with security? the security of the master with the security of the slave? It is impossible. But in such and a thousand similar cases, where two moral duties interfere with each other, and it is impossible to perform them both, what is the conduct which necessity, in compliance with the principle of the greatest good, requires? *That the lesser duty should be sacrificed to the greater*: making always such compensation, where practicable, to the party suffering, as will not be attended with other preponderant mischief.

Having thus shown, in so flagrant a case, the mischiefs practised and justified under the pretext of doing homage to the principle of security, it will be easy to detect its abuse in all other cases. Equality of enjoyment, arising from equality of distribution, is never to be sacrificed, but when a real, not an imaginary, security, demands it as necessary to reproduction. For what purpose should any, the smallest portion of inequality not necessary for production be maintained? To maintain the happiness of those who profit by the inequality? But you thereby destroy a much greater portion of happiness of those at whose expense the inequality is acquired. There is no other reason than the necessity of supplying motives to production for any portion of inequality of distribution.

How far an approach to the blessings of equality may be carried, when all obstacles of force and fraud to the entire development of free labour and voluntary exchanges shall have been removed, and when knowledge shall be equally afforded to all members of a community, it would be hazardous to predict. That it would approach, however, very nearly to a system of mutual co-operation by common

labour, there can be no doubt. And as every approach to this state consistent with the greatest production, is always to be kept in view, hence arises the peculiar duty of those who seek the greatest happiness of the community in which they live, to oppose every institution, regulation, and effort, tending to add to those unavoidable evils of inequality which security requires. If equality and security, or production, can be reconciled by the diffusion of knowledge; or, in other words, if motives equally or more efficient than those arising from personal gain, can be put into operation to ensure an equally large production, no doubt *social* motives ought to be preferred to *selfish*. This phenomenon, however, remains to be exhibited in practice, as well as proved by theory: and as all its operations must be eminently and essentially *voluntary*; as all force and fraud must be equally excluded from its establishment and continuance; the system here advocated, of free labour and voluntary exchanges, will quietly lead to the adoption of everything useful in it.

It may be said that we are conceding the very basis of our argument, when we admit, for a moment, the *possibility* of reconciling security or production with equality of distribution. True, as far as concerns the system of labour by *individual competition*, the ordinary system of human labour, and the only one yet spoken of, security is not reconcilable with equality of distribution. We have been hitherto contrasting the system of free labour by individual competition with the employment of force, compulsion, or restraint of any kind. Of production by mutual co-operation resting on individual security, or *voluntary* equality in the distribution and enjoyment of the products of united labour, a succeeding chapter will treat at length.

SECTION 14.

ALL OTHER SPECIES OF INEQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION, BEING NOT ONLY UNNECESSARY BUT INJURIOUS TO THE EXCITEMENT OF PRODUCTION, SHOULD BE REPRESSED (ABSTAINED FROM); BECAUSE THEY UNNECESSARILY DETRACT FROM THE BENEFITS OF EQUALITY, AND THUS LESSEN THE SUM TOTAL OF HAPPINESS, THE OBJECT AIMED AT BY THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.

Many of those who support the last proposition, but for reasons different from those which we have given, and in our opinion on false reasons, would reject altogether the present. Having proved the advantages of inequality, the *necessity* even of a considerable portion of it, for the very existence of every community, labouring by individual effort, enjoying themselves the larger shares, the prizes, in this unequal distribution, they are apt to regard inequality as a positive blessing, instead of a necessary evil to be endured only as far as that necessity demands. Hence the countenance which political economy has been supposed to give, which its misapplication has certainly given, to the support of almost every usurpation on the equal rights of men. Inequality once proved a blessing, the more this blessing was diffused the better, the greater masses of this blessing the influential few could appropriate to themselves, the better. Nothing further remained than by an equal misapplication of the principle of *security*, to uphold for ever these supposed blessings of the greatest possible inequality; and thus enlist science in the maintenance of every existing system of force and fraud. No wonder that such reasoners should assert the necessity, not only of that species of inequality which was necessary to production, but of every possible degree of it, in the extravagant contemplation of which they could find any sickly delight. Was a voice heard in favour of the outraged rights of the suffering many of any community, on the ground of the inequality of wealth? "It proceeds from an ignorance of political economy," was the

reply. "Such complaints would lead to equality and rapine: security, the security of the rich, requires the very evils ignorantly complained of."

Is this reproof merited? is it true? does it not fall back on the heads of those who use it? It is hoped that those who have gone thus far in this inquiry are persuaded that political economy, rightly understood, and humanity, are much more intimately allied than the supporters of the inequality of rights and of happiness would fain admit; it is hoped that, seeing clearly the reason for the permission of inequality—its necessity for security and reproduction—they see also the limits to which it ought to be confined; that all further extension of inequality impairs production and lessens security, as much as its extension *so far* increases the one and strengthens the other; that when further extended, it always violates instead of supporting the principle of security,—violates, in numerous and vital points, the security of the many, to maintain, on trivial or imaginary points, the security of the few. We would ask, what *is* that species of inequality which should be maintained over and above what is necessary for equal security and reproduction? That such inequality is destructive of happiness has been already seen, and will be shown more fully in the next chapter, on the effects of the *excessive inequality* of wealth. If not for happiness, for the greatest happiness of the whole community, for what purpose should such inequality be maintained? Because a community would not otherwise possess works of splendour and magnificence? If such works were not found by the community to contribute to its happiness, they ought not to be produced or maintained. If they were esteemed by the community to contribute to its happiness, common labour and exertion would provide them for public use. *That* splendour and that magnificence which are founded on the depression of the many, and afford gratification to a few, are to be deprecated; because such gratification is vicious, arising

from the contrast of the grandeur of the few with the destitution of those around them, and from the envy and influence to which such grandeur gives birth. Where objects of beauty, taste, and magnificence, can be procured for public use, without preponderant evil in the cost of production, there can be no question of their desirableness as tending to increase happiness; but no forced inequality of wealth can ever be instituted for this purpose without lessening the sum total of the happiness of the community.

As to the second question, whether the rich derive such an increase of happiness from splendid things, as more than to counterbalance the evils of forced inequality, there is surely no one to maintain the affirmative. The real pleasure derived to the rich from such things is not the pleasure of skill, proportion, &c., for with that, ownership has nothing to do; and by too frequent repetition, such pleasure ceases: but it is the mere pleasure of vanity, of the influence over the opinions and actions of others, which such magnificence affords. When this pleasure also becomes the daily and hourly enjoyment of life, it, too, palls on the appetite, and degenerates into a mere *want*, begetting anger, disdain, hatred, and all the malevolent passions when its usual gratification is withheld. This is an evil inevitably incident to all factitious sources of distinction, and reduces their balance of pretended enjoyment to almost nothing. To the community, there is a great balance of pain in the display of matters of mere private magnificence, considered only as things to be looked at; envy and awe entirely superseding all pleasurable feelings of sympathy.

Another phantom that has been put forward to justify a greater degree of inequality of wealth than is necessary for free labour and voluntary exchanges (which have been proved to be necessary to the greatest production of wealth and the greatest quantity of happiness derivable from wealth), is, that without this forced inequality it would be

impossible for certain institutions, certain privileged bodies, certain modes of faith, certain systems of physics or morality, to maintain themselves in a community. That it would be impossible, without such or similar forcible means, to preserve many such institutions and systems in existence, is at once explicitly conceded. But, with this concession, the short and simple reply is, Such institutions and systems ought no longer to exist, regard being had, where possible without preponderant mischief, to the feelings and happiness of the immediate occupants.

For what purpose are institutions, and systems, and orders of men supported, or rather for what purpose alone ought they to be supported, amongst a community of rational beings? For their own exclusive and individual benefit, forgetting or deliberately sacrificing the happiness of the rest of the community? Public morality now renounces so monstrous an avowal; and the supporters of all systems and institutions are now driven to show, as well as they can, the *utility*, the tendency of what they advocate to promote the happiness of the community. Now, in what way can any of these things tend to promote a nation's happiness, that would render necessary for that purpose the sacrifice of personal security and of the greatest happiness derivable from wealth? Take these away, the enjoyment of security and of the objects of wealth, and for what other purpose, for the production of what other species of happiness to the community, could these institutions, or castes, or systems, be made useful? Are all the other sources of our enjoyment put together—if it were possible to disconnect them, and if they could separately exist or be enjoyed—to be at all compared with the enjoyments derived from wealth, from labour? Let the pleasures of security and wealth be maintained, and all other sources of enjoyment will take care of themselves, either as having an existence without any voluntary effort on our part, or as arising out of the just distribution of wealth. The pleasures of sympathy and love, of the

healthful working of our animal economy, and the grateful supply of air, of knowledge, of the regulation of our propensities, all come under this description. What is the pretended good for which we are to sacrifice the pleasures of equality limited only by equal security? Is it to obtain the favour of heaven? to enjoy happiness hereafter? And is it by violating security, by forcibly taking from one to lavish on another, that we are to obtain the favour of Heaven? The empire of force and forced inequality, would be indeed necessary to support such impotent absurdities. Whatever mode of the distribution of wealth tends to the most happiness, must be most pleasing to a benevolent being. Heaven, therefore, can never be interested in forced inequality, though those that abuse its name for their own selfish purposes, may.

Is it to uphold a particular system of government, or any branch of any system of government, that forced inequality,—that inequality not called for by security, must be upheld? What is the object of all just government? What but to promote by just laws, ninety-nine out of a hundred of which are directly or indirectly concerned with wealth, the greatest happiness of the whole community, or, where that is not practicable, of the greatest number of the community? But this very object is the end aimed at by our distribution. No government, no institution or branch of any government, no caste, should be upheld by society which contravenes this just distribution; because, by so doing, it contravenes the only useful, and, therefore, the only just, object of its existence. The more ancient any institution is, that contravenes this object, that has stood in the way of this distribution, the more of human misery it must have caused, or of happiness it must have prevented, and the sooner it ceases to exist—those subject to it persuaded of its evil tendency and wishing its removal—the better.

For what other purpose, then, could it be necessary to maintain *forced inequality*, or any degree of inequality

beyond what is called for by security? Is it to uphold *truth*, to perpetuate the belief in a certain system of doctrines, of morals, of philosophy? First, of philosophy, of physical truth. Of all the benefits we derive from physical knowledge, the most important by far is the power which it ultimately gives us of turning to use, in the shape of articles of wealth, the materials and energies of nature, making human labour more available in the production of the means of enjoyment. The other uses of knowledge, the pleasure of the intellectual pursuit and the raising of the mind above superstitious fears, which are almost always founded on an ignorance of the laws (or regular course) of nature, are surely in no way dependent on excessive inequality of wealth. On the contrary, excessive inequality narrows and lessens these sources of happiness from wealth, and converts them, in the hands of a few, into mere means for upholding their exclusive objects, whatever they may chance to be. That physical truth, or real physical knowledge, cannot be discovered, demonstrated, or perpetuated without the aid of forced inequality of wealth, of inequality not demanded by security, scarcely any one will at present contend, the whole current of experience and every-day facts are so entirely opposed to such a notion. Almost all useful discoveries have been made by persons in moderate or lowly circumstances; the pressure even of want having been frequently the original impulse that launched genius on its wings. Excessive wealth almost annihilates all motives to exertion. Competence may be requisite to remove disturbing considerations; but here the influence of wealth ceases; and there is no greater foe to competence than forced inequality. Any awe or respect, that makes us admit, or believe, or rather pretend to believe, any proposition, without full conviction, grounded on satisfactory appropriate evidence, is altogether pernicious to the discovery or communication of truth, and ought to be anxiously guarded against. The evidence, and nothing but the evidence, ought to influence the mind.

Will forced inequality of wealth tend to improvements in *morals*, and ought it to be maintained for the advancement of morality? Morality, that is to say, the direction of our voluntary actions to useful, to the most useful, purposes, requires adequate *motives* to set it into action. On the just or unjust, the wise or unwise, the forcible or the voluntary distribution of wealth in a community, depend, much more than upon any other, or all other causes combined, the nature and the energy of these motives to good or evil. 'Tis the worst of folly, or the worst of insincerity, to affect to separate morality from wealth, from the consideration of those solid influential motives to good or evil conduct, which the possession or the want of the materials of happiness, supplied by wealth, affords. For what, in the ultimate resort, on almost every occasion, is the great contest between morality and immorality, between law and crime? for what, but for the possession of the objects of wealth? Wealth, at the same time, *supplies the motives* to vice and virtue, and is the *object of pursuit*, and the *instrument of reward*. Where force is excluded, and reason must win its purposes by persuasion addressed to competence, there will exist the maximum of motives for the practice of the social and personal virtues. But just such is the state of things under the natural distribution of equality limited by security. Forced inequality can never, therefore, be anything but destructive to morality.

To render our argument complete, to meet our opponents on that ground where silence might be construed into a surrender of the universality of our principle in their favour, we ask, "Should any degree of inequality not demanded by security, be maintained for the support of what are called *spiritual* doctrines, or creeds, for belief in *anything* beyond the strict severity of evidence adduced to support it?" The absurdity of any compulsion, whether in the way of wealth or otherwise, in support of any such systems, Mussulman, Jewish, or Christian, is a thousand times more flagrant than in support of the ordinary physical truths of

natural science. All knowledge or pretended knowledge is interesting to mankind, and ought to be attended to, in proportion to the extent, the certainty, and the proximity of the advantages it promises to afford. Is this, the spiritual species of study or speculation, judged important by mankind? they will naturally, from a regard to their interest, attend to it. Is it not judged by mankind to be of any leading importance to them? they will not, and *ought not* to be compelled to attend to it.

Persuasion alone is to be admitted, to exhibit to men the *importance* of spiritual doctrines. What more is necessary to demonstrate to mankind their *truth*? If such doctrines be true, *appropriate evidence* will command assent to them, as to other physical or moral truth, from all ordinarily organised beings. But over and above this, there is Divine influence, in the case of spiritual doctrines, giving tenfold efficacy to ordinary human means of persuasion. And as we have shown that it would be the extreme of folly to permit any forced inequality of property, or any other species of force, to aid in the discovery, maintenance, or diffusion, of unsupported human knowledge; so would it be incredibly more absurd to permit any such interference to aid that whose pretensions are Divine. The genuine and the loud voice of history, and of every day's experience, declares, that in proportion to the absurdity of spiritual doctrines is the demand for force to maintain them; that force is a mere succedaneum to make up for the deficiency of evidence; and that all doctrines, requiring any such aid for their support, demonstrate their own weakness, uselessness, and falsehood. Such doctrines are *weak*, because it is one of the distinguishing attributes of truth to rely fearlessly, even to presumption, on its own powers of persuading: they are *useless*, because, if their importance to human happiness could be shown, men would as willingly attend to them as to any other means of well-being: they are *false* by their own showing, inasmuch as they acknowledge themselves incompetent to operate conviction without the

extraneous, corruptive, and terrific means of wealth and force. Allow to any one man, or set of men, on the face of the earth, wealth and force, to discover, uphold, or propagate what they call truth ; and what possible reason can be given that any other man or set of men whatever, from the lama of Thibet to the African fetiche-man, should not be favoured with similar means to uphold and propagate their supernatural notions? Truth, physical, moral, or spiritual, requires, admits of, no means of persuasion but the exhibition of appropriate evidence, and the removal of, or the abstinence from, force.

SECTION 15.

WHAT PROPORTION OF THE PRODUCTS OF THEIR LABOUR OUGHT THE LABOURERS TO PAY FOR THE USE OF THE ARTICLES, CALLED CAPITAL, TO THE POSSESSORS OF THEM, CALLED CAPITALISTS?

In Section 6 it was promised that this amount of compensation, exacted by capitalists from the productive labourers, under the name of rent or profits, as claimed for the use of land or other articles, should be inquired into.

The rule of free and voluntary exchanges would appear, on a first view, to operate tremendously against the mere unprovided productive labourer, with no other possession than his capability of producing ; for all the physical materials on which, or by means of which, his productive powers can be made available, being in the hands of others with interests opposed to his, and their consent being a necessary preliminary to any exertion on his part, is he not, and must he not always remain, at the mercy of these capitalists for whatever portion of the fruits of his own labour they may think proper to leave at his disposal in compensation for his toils? Is this situation of the productive labourer irremediable? even under the shield of free labour, *entire use of its products*, and voluntary exchanges? Are there no limits to these taxes on industry, to these exactions of capitalists? Is the amount of these

exactions altogether arbitrary, or are there any natural limits to its excess?

There are two points of view under which this most important matter may be considered. First,—Are these deductions from the labourer, of the products of his labour, just? do they intend to increase production, to increase the enjoyments derived from production?

Second, useful or not,—Can they, without preponderant evil, without the employment of force which would annihilate all production, be avoided?

That every abstraction made from the labourer of the products of his labour, whether by open force, or by the indirect compulsion of want extorting a species of voluntary acquiescence, must proportionally decrease his motives to production, and consequently the amount of production, is sufficiently apparent. The effect in discouraging production is beyond dispute. It signifies not the hand, whether rich or poor, or by whatever name called, that abstracts any part of the products of labour, or prevents their acquisition; in proportion to the amount of products withheld, whether called profits, or taxes, or theft, or any other mode of loss, will be the discouragement to reproduction. The necessity of maintaining existence alone, not the cheerful desire of increasing happiness, will become the prevailing stimulus to labour, as the use of its products is withdrawn from the producer. This being so, what is the proportion of the products of labour withdrawn from the labourer by capitalists alone? and what would be the additional motives to production if these defalcations ceased to exist?

These defalcations vary in different countries, in the same country at different times, and according to the species of labour from which they are subtracted; but they appear to subtract at least one-half of the products of labour from the use of the producer, even where capital is most abundant, and the competition amongst capitalists—as far as such competition can aid the labourers—most

active. First, the labourer, say the mechanic at woollens or cottons, earning about two shillings a-day or about thirty pounds a-year, pays for his house or lodging about five pounds a-year. He has evidently no other fund out of which to pay this rent than the produce of his labour, whether deducted by the capitalist for whom he labours, or by labour paid to another. Next comes the claim of the employer who owns the buildings in which the mechanic works, the unwrought materials which he is to fabricate, and the machinery (the tools) with which he must operate, as well as the wages to be advanced until the wrought article is exchanged. The amount of this capital, fixed and circulating, may be from thirty to a hundred pounds for every labourer employed, the average profit on which may be set down at ten pounds. There can be no other source of this profit than the value added to the unwrought material by the labour guided by skill expended upon it. The materials, the buildings, the machinery, the wages, can add nothing to their own value. The additional value proceeds from labour alone. The spade may as well be called the parent of the grain, instead of the labourious arm that wields it, as any of these articles constituting capital, can be called the parents of the manufactured article. 'Twas labour that gave to all these their value as wealth, before they came into the hand of the mechanic; and by his additional labour alone can their value be still further increased. In the usual course of things, then, the productive labourer is deprived of at least half the products of his labour by the capitalist; the amount of his labour being thirty pounds, and his rent and the profits on the stock that is said to employ him, being fifteen pounds.

'Tis of no avail to say that the operative labourer does not understand the machinery by which the fruits of his labour are thus subtracted, that he regards the operation as inevitable, and takes what he can bargain for as the most that the nature of things will allow him. The owner

of the capital most frequently understands as little of these matters as the working mechanic. But the ignorance of the labourer does not increase the absolute quantum of remuneration left him after the demands of capitalists are satisfied. According to this amount of remuneration will his future exertions—the necessities of existence excepted—be. Whether withheld by the niggardliness of nature, or the justice or injustice of man, the unproductiveness of enjoyment from labour, must diminish the desire to produce and the amount of production.

“Without this capital, in the shape of machinery, materials, &c.,” it will be insisted, that “mere labour would be comparatively unproductive; and therefore it is but just that the labourer should pay for the use of that, without which, by whomsoever owned, his mere productive powers would be inefficient.”

Doubtless, the labourer must pay for the use of these, when so unfortunate as not himself to possess them; the question is, *how much* of the products of his labour ought to be subtracted for their use?

Two measures of the value of this use, here present themselves: the measure of the labourer, and the measure of the capitalist. The measure of the labourer consists in the contribution of such sums as would replace the waste and value of the capital, by the time it would be consumed, with such added compensation to the owner and superintendent of it, as would support him in equal comfort with the more actively employed productive labourers. The measure of the capitalist, on the contrary, would be the additional value produced by the same quantity of labour, in consequence of the use of the machinery or other capital; the whole of such surplus value to be enjoyed by the capitalist for his superior intelligence and skill in accumulating and advancing to the labourers his capital, or the use of it.

The difference of the amount to be paid by the labourer for the use of the capital necessary to enable him to exert his productive powers, according to these two different

measures, is immense. It is the difference between almost perfect equality, and excess both of wealth and poverty. Let it be illustrated on the calculation just made. The labourer pays five pounds a-year for his house. The house cost fifty pounds, and is calculated to last fifty or one hundred years. By the labourer's measure of the use of this article of capital, he should pay one pound or ten shillings a-year rent for the yearly loss in value, according to the time the house would be in consuming, with a trifling surplus to repay the trouble of the owner—say five shillings a-year out of each of a hundred houses, or as many as it would employ one man to superintend, amounting to twenty-five pounds a-year—to enable him to enjoy as much as any of the operative labourers. Fifteen to twenty-five shillings a-year rent, instead of one hundred shillings, would be for this item the charge on the labourer. For the use of the capital of his employer, it would be in about the same proportion, or something more, in consequence of the more perishable nature of the capital employed—that part which consists in machinery not being liable to last as long as the house. If fifty pounds be the amount of the working capital, and, if the average of its duration be thirty-five years, two pounds a-year must be paid to replace this yearly waste, and for the trouble of the capitalist—greater than that of the mere house-owner, and requiring more skill and time—say, ten shillings instead of five are to be added. Fifty shillings a-year profit instead of two hundred shillings, would be for these remaining items, the charge on the labourer. Adding the rent and profits together, the labourer would have to pay sixty-five to seventy-five shillings per annum, for the use of one hundred pounds capital, instead of the three hundred shillings, or fifteen pounds, the half of the whole amount of the products of his labour, which he now pays. Were the labourer employed in agriculture, the value of the land and stock necessary to render the powers of the agricultural labourer productive would have to be estimated, instead of

the manufacturing capital; and the charge for its use would be something less. Were the labourer the owner of his own capital, the five shillings a-year compensation to the owner of the house, and the ten shillings a-year compensation to the owner of the capital, would still be saved to him, the care necessary to preserve his own capital being rather pleasurable than painful to himself and requiring no remuneration, the real wear and tear being all the necessary expense that he must incur. Were this one hundred pounds capital the produce of his own labour, it would be of still less cost; and one-half the yearly amount of labour now paid to the capitalists, would be sufficient to replace in the labourer's hands, the several items of capital by the time they were respectively consumed.

Such being the measure of the *labourer* of the value of the use of the capital necessary to make his labour productive, what is the measure of that value as made by the capitalist? Before the invention of machinery, before the accommodation of workshops, mills, or factories, in which to labour, what was the amount of produce which the unaided powers of the labourer produced? Whatever that was, let him still enjoy, with the additional ease and comfort in the production which the superiority of the tools and the protection of the buildings afford. To the maker of the buildings or the machinery, or to him who by voluntary exchange acquired them, let all the surplus value of the manufactured article go, as a reward for, and stimulus to, his superior intelligence in the fabrication or acquisition of them; for the advance of the material on which he works, let the labourer pay in the same proportion, according to its value and the time he retains it, as without the material neither buildings nor machinery could be turned to account, and the merit of appropriation and accumulation is as great in the case of materials as of buildings or machinery. His improved dwelling-house being one of the items preserving his health and strength as well as the articles kept therein, and thus contributing

with the other capital to make his labour more productive, or to increase his healthful time for labour, let the rate of the profit of other capital determine this likewise. Or let the whole capital for which the labourer pays, rent and profit, be regarded as one common instrument to add to the productive powers of his labour; and let the several owners of this capital share between them, in proportion to its amount and perishableness, the additional value thus given to the labour of the ignorant producer. Let the labourer enjoy with more ease and comfort what he formerly enjoyed; but let all the rewards of superior intelligence be secured to those possessing it, the accumulators of capital.

What says justice, what says utility, to these rival claims? Equality pleads altogether in favour of the productive labourer. Security stands neuter, prohibiting to either party the use of compulsion. If the measure of the labourer prevails, what is the consequence? Accumulation beyond the means necessary to enable every labourer to make his labour productive, will not be urged on by such irresistible motives as now prevail; but this point attained, the desire of further accumulation would become comparatively weak, being excited by little hope of enjoyment, either in the way of vanity or comfort, beyond that possessed by operative labourers; the chief recompense for accumulation being the substitution of mental and gentle muscular exertion for more efficient, perhaps more healthful bodily labour. As to real comfort, that of the operative labourer would be so much increased, that the accumulator would not lose so much by being reduced to his level as present appearances might indicate. The richest capitalist would be but reduced to a situation intermediate in point of *wealth* between his present situation and that of the present degraded labourer. In point of real *happiness*, the situation of the labourer and capitalist would be perhaps equally improved. But in proportion as motives to accumulation beyond this point, for mere vanity and distinction, lost

their force, motives to that degree of accumulation necessary to render labour productive would be strengthened and would increase. The whole of the products of labour being ensured to the producer, the utmost energy would be employed in production, and necessarily in the acquisition and retaining of those means or instruments indispensable to render labour productive. The yearly produce, and consumption of the products of labour, to increase enjoyment, being the real object of rational effort, in comparison to the extent of which productive power, the extent of accumulation is as nothing, and accumulation being considered merely as a means to this great end, the universal desire of enjoyment and of production as the only path to lead to enjoyment, would ensure to every one the possession of the capital required for such purposes. Every year, as human labour became more productive by machinery or otherwise, the rewards of labour would be increased; houses, machinery, dress, food, would be improved, not for a few accumulators or capitalists, but for all. Capital would be increased in a tenfold ratio, though in masses almost equal, and universally diffused, because every one would be interested in its accumulation, and would be able to accumulate it as far as really useful, that is to say, as far as worth the trouble by rational men of producing it. The mass of national wealth would be immensely greater than at present, though no person might possess ten times more accumulated capital than his neighbour. All the increase of happiness proved to arise from equality of distribution, would prevail; and men would produce for the sake of the *absolute* comforts to be derived from wealth, not for the sake of mere *relative* comforts, of a comparison of their superiority with the wretchedness of their fellow-creatures.

If, on the contrary, the measure of the capitalists prevails, what is the consequence? Whetted by the stimulus of the gratification of unbounded desires, of superiority without assignable limit to the destitution around

him, the desire of accumulation supersedes with the capitalist even the love of enjoyment. To inequality of wealth there is no bound : it becomes the ruling passion : the distinction which it confers, the envy which it excites, urge men on to acquire it by any means ; talents, virtue, are sacrificed to it. Every expedient which force and cunning can use to appropriate the fruits of other men's labour, and with this view to turn the mass of mankind into ignorant contented drudges, is erected into a custom or a law. A universal and always vigilant conspiracy of capitalists, of necessity the most intelligent, exists everywhere, because founded on a universally existing interest, to cause the labourers to toil for the lowest possible, and to wrest as much as possible of the products of their labour to swell the accumulations and expenditure of capitalists. Yet such is the rage of these men for distinction, for expenditure as an instrument of distinction rather than of any direct enjoyment, that the products of the labour of thousands are swallowed up for no other end than to gratify such unsubstantial desires. What accumulated wealth there is in such a community, is gathered into the hands of a few ; and as well from its bulk as from its contrast with the surrounding poverty, it strikes every eye. The productive labourers, stript of all capital, of tools, houses, and materials to make their labour productive, toil from want, from the necessity of existence, their remuneration being kept at the lowest, compatible with the existence of industrious habits. The mass of national wealth, though its individual heaps might be a thousand times greater than under nearly equal distribution, bears no proportion to what it would be, if smaller portions of capital necessary to make labour productive, were possessed by the productive labourers, by *all*. The extremes of luxury and magnificence prevail. The evils of inequality are pushed to the utmost. The desire of accumulation reigns unbounded : production is stimulated chiefly by want.

In point of fact, neither the measure of the producer nor of the capitalist prevails ; but a measure between the two, formed out of the conflict of their opposing interests, and varied by a thousand casual circumstances in every society. The measure of the capitalist of the value of the use of his capital, pushed to its extreme, would annihilate production from its zeal to accumulate, or to appropriate, to itself the products of labour. The measure of the labourer, without the universal diffusion of knowledge and justice, could not prevail. In proportion as force and fraud have been removed in the progress of the development of wealth, the tendency has been towards the measure of the labourer ; and every expedient, legal or otherwise, employed to counteract this tendency, has resulted from selfishness or ignorance, and lessened the mass of enjoyment. The amount demanded for the use of capital depends more on the mode of its distribution than on the absolute quantity accumulated. Whatever may be the amount of the capital accumulated, whether large or small, if it all remain in the hands of the producers, the price demanded for the occasional use of any portion of it would necessarily be at the lowest, from the few persons unprovided with capital, and of course the feeble competition for the use of it. But where all the capital of the community is in the hands of men called capitalists, and scarcely any remains in the hands of the producers, there will the price of the use of it be very high, whether the absolute quantity of capital be large or small, from the multitudes, the great majority of the community unprovided with capital, and of course the immense competition to obtain the use of it. The greater the supply of capital amongst the capitalists, the lower of course will become the price of its use, the numbers of the unprovided, and the competition remaining the same. But the absolute amount of capital in the hands of the capitalists of any community, affords no guarantee to the efficient producers of wealth that the remuneration of their labour will be in-

creased, that a greater proportion of its products will be left in their hands at their own disposal. Under systems of insecurity, capitalists will not find or deem it their interest to permit their capital so to increase as to reduce materially its profits or the cost of its use. When accumulating to this point, the desire of enjoyment shows itself in increased luxury of expenditure. In foreign wars, by means of loans, capital is expended by political power: it is utterly consumed and annihilated; and in return its owners acquire, under the guarantee of political power, a claim on the products of the annual labour of the working community: whereas, had this capital been applied to the maintenance of productive labour, instead of being consumed in loans, and thus taken out of the market of competition; instead of entailing a burden on productive labour, it would bring down the profits of stock, and thus tend to throw more of the products of labour into the hands of the producers. The burden without equivalent, the interest on the loan, would be altogether saved to the industrious community, and for their labour, capitalists would besides be compelled to pay them more liberally—no new expedient being devised to check this natural tendency of things.

Our second question with respect to the deductions from the products of labour taken by capitalists for the use of the articles constituting their capital, was—"useful or not, can these deductions be avoided without the production of preponderant evil in the employment of force?" If the simple removal of restraints, and the consequent diffusion of knowledge, be not sufficient to abate these deductions, they ought not by any other means to be abated: for no other means than those of force remaining, the employment of such an instrument would annihilate production. All institutions and expedients contravening the rules of distribution here laid down being removed, the producers being permitted to follow their real interests, and the acquisition as well as the enlargement of knowledge

being facilitated to all, those deductions would soon be reduced to the lowest compatible with reproduction, and the producer would gradually recover the entire use of the products of his labour, or the nearest approach to it which the ultimate and extended interests of all producers would permit. The different modes of production and distribution, by which producers, as rational beings, under the shield of equal security, as specified under the name of the natural laws of distribution, might accomplish this object of enjoying the whole of the products of their own labour, will be pointed out. Enough at present to get a glance at the mighty evils spread over the producers, wherever the capital necessary to make their labour productive is accumulated in any other hands than their own.

SECTION 16.

GENERAL INFERENCES FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES. STATEMENT OF THE "NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION," OR GENERAL RULES OR PRINCIPLES, THE OBSERVANCE OF WHICH IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE GREATEST HAPPINESS DERIVABLE FROM WEALTH.

If we have entered with great earnestness and minute detail into the proof of the propositions at the head of the several sections of this chapter, it has been with the view of establishing a few simple, intelligible, and most important rules, to serve as first principles in the distribution of wealth. As we have hitherto proved directly their truth, that is to say, their accordance with the organisation and circumstances of man, and their tendency to promote the greatest happiness to be derived from wealth; so shall we, frankly and unhesitatingly, follow in subsequent chapters wherever truth may further lead us, in the development of all the other consequences interesting to mankind, that appear to flow from an undeviating adherence to these simple rules. These are what may be called the *natural laws of distribution*. The observance of these rules or laws will lead, without effort, to the enjoyment of the greatest portion of the benefits of equality that can be

had without preponderant evil, *i. e.*, without violating security, and with security curtailing and ultimately annihilating production itself. Every person exercising them is of course bound to respect the same rights in every other member of the community. The grand secret demonstrated is, that it is the *interest* of all communities to substitute reason and voluntariness, for force, in the distribution of wealth, as well as in all their other concerns; that in the distribution of wealth, as in every other department of morals, the duty and the interest of individuals coincide, mingle with, and form the aggregate of national happiness.

In the preceding sections what have we proved? First, It is evident that if we wish to extract from wealth the greatest happiness it is capable of affording those who produce it, we shall be of opinion that "all labour ought to be free and voluntary, as to its direction and continuance."

All labour should be "free" from external compulsion as to its direction and continuance. On all unappropriated articles labour ought to be free, because, no appropriation having been made, no rival claim can be set up; no consent is to be asked. On appropriated articles labour is to be free from all external compulsion, the consent of the appropriator having been obtained.

All labour should be "voluntary" as to its direction and continuance; that is to say, not only should no external compulsion restrain its action on any unappropriated or conceded appropriated article; but even to direct it to any of these, no motives but those capable of moving the *will*, through the reason, the affections, or both, should be employed. Man can only be induced to act through the will, or by force: there is no alternative. Delusion is still voluntariness, and knowledge is its appropriate cure. For the lengthened proof of this first rule or law of distribution, the reader is referred to the five first sections.

What is the second rule that the preceding facts and inferences have proved? "All the products of labour," it has been shown, "ought to be secured to the producers of them."

The object being to promote happiness, and, of course, the greatest quantity of happiness; and this quantity depending, other things being equal, on the quantity of articles of wealth produced to promote that happiness; that quantum of use of the products of labour ought to be enjoyed by the labourer, which will call forth this greatest happiness and greatest production.

Under the present system of things, the producer is, as to *happiness*, at the very lowest point of the scale at which he can be kept, consistently with the continuance of his efforts. As to *production*, the expedients of insecurity restrict the acquisition of skill, and the use of capital (the materials of production) to so few, and render such numbers utterly useless to production, that with one-half the labour which is now extracted from the misery of a few, four times, or, perhaps, ten times the quantity of production, on the whole, would be obtained from the active energies of an equally-informed and skilful community, all enjoying the whole of the products of their individual exertions. The accumulation of the general capital of the community—for a few accidental exceptions, to a small amount, would cause no perceptible derangement—in any other hands than those of the real operative labourers, necessarily arrests the progress of all industry, but that which will leave the usual remuneration of capital which the time and circumstances afford, to the holders of the capital. Though millions might be made happy by employment on the existing capital,—land, food, houses, machines,—of any community, if rendered skilful and permitted to use them at a profit, say one-fourth, or any proportion, less than that which a very few skilful labourers of the same community could be *made* by limiting, by direct and indirect means, their enjoyments to nothing, to yield to the holders of the capital; yet as long as that force-supported organisation of things continues, by which one set of men possess the productive powers alone, and another possess the physical means of putting those productive

powers into operation, so long will the latter, the capitalists, use the means in their power to render the labour and the happiness of all labourers subservient to their greatest interests ;—so long will the happiness of the whole human race be sacrificed, if necessary in the estimation of capitalists, to produce an additional quarter per cent. profit. The labourers in their place would do the same, being all equally the creatures of the circumstances surrounding them. As long as two hostile masses of interest are suffered to exist in society, the owners of labour on one side, and the owners of the *means* of labouring on the other, as long as this unnatural distribution is forcibly maintained—for without force, wielded by ignorance, it could not be maintained—so long will, perhaps, as much as nine-tenths of attainable human productions never be brought into existence, and so long will ninety-nine hundred parts of attainable human happiness be sacrificed. To obviate these evils, by excluding force altogether from the distribution of wealth, it is necessary to observe our second rule, “All the products of labour should be secured to the producers of them.”

For the lengthened illustration and proof of this second rule of equal security in respect to property or wealth, see Sections 6, 8, 9, and 10.

There is still another rule to be deduced from the preceding sections, making with the two former what we call the “natural laws of distribution,” or principles of security respecting property or wealth. “All exchanges of the products of wealth ought to be free and voluntary.” In Sections 7, 11, and following, this proposition is proved.

As in the first rule, principle, or law, respecting the direction and continuance of labour, so in this respecting exchanges of the products of labour, the word “free,” as well as “voluntary,” is made use of. Exchanges must be free as referring to external constraint, and must be voluntary as respects the intelligent agent. Were the word “free” not made use of, it might perhaps be said, “All

the exchanges that are permitted, ought to be voluntary ; but there are many exchanges which it would be unwise to permit." To obviate, therefore, the possibility of misunderstanding the meaning, the second word is introduced ; though the first alone, in its fair signification, might be sufficient to convey the whole intended meaning. In Section 12, this rule of exchanges has been developed.

Our lengthened discussions, it will be seen, have had for their sole object to remove all regulations and interferences with labour and its products depending on force ; and to substitute knowledge and persuasion for them in all matters relating to wealth, by means of intelligible and simple first principles or rules of action, the observance of which, constituting what is called *security* as to property, would lead of itself, without effort, to the utmost possible, nearly approaching to a perfect, equality of distribution of wealth, and thus to the greatest happiness derivable from it.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE EVILS ACTUALLY PRODUCED BY FORCED INEQUALITY OF WEALTH.

It is one thing, to have shown the *benefits* that are necessarily attendant on a distribution of wealth, such as the natural course of things, under the shelter of impartial justice between man and man, aided by the constant advancement and diffusion of knowledge, would produce. To exhibit the *evils* of a contrary course, of an attempt at forcing wealth into certain hands, or of maintaining it in those hands by partial regulations—and without such forced and partial regulations it can never be so maintained—will carry our main argument to the highest point of what we may call moral demonstration. All the evils arising from excessive inequality of wealth, from that inequality which is effected either by direct force or by unequal laws, may perhaps be usefully referred to one or other of the following heads:—

I. Of its moral evils.

1. Excessive inequality of wealth, that is to say, all inequality over and above that which is necessary to support the natural laws of distribution—free labour—entire use of its products—and voluntary exchange—diminishes the sum total of human enjoyment, by subtracting from the masses of happiness of the greater number.

2. It does *not add* to the happiness, on the balance of its effects, of those few who possess the larger shares.

3. It engenders *positive vices* in those having the larger shares, in the excessively rich.

4. It excites the admiration and the imitation, and in this way diffuses the practice, of those vices of the rich in the rest of the community, or produces in them other vices

arising out of their relative situation in respect to the excessively rich.

II. Of its economical evils.

1. Its yearly income is consumed by *unproductive* labourers, and is therefore so much *annual loss* of the productions of the national industry.

2. It encourages such arts and trades, in the exchange of its income, previous to consumption, as are the most insecure and unequal in their remuneration, and therefore the least tending to national welfare.

III. Of its political evils.

It necessarily leads to the usurpation of the powers of legislation, as well as of the executive and judicial authority, by those unqualified by education to exercise them aright, and with interests hostile to the general or national interest.

SECTION I.

OF THE MORAL EVILS PRODUCED BY FORCED INEQUALITY OF WEALTH.

Who will deny that excessive inequality must diminish the sum total of human enjoyment, by subtracting from the masses of happiness of the greater number, in as far as that happiness consists in the pleasures dependent on the possession of wealth? If any number of heaps of any article be exposed, and a little be taken from each, nothing is more clear than that each individual heap will be lessened. Just so it is with happiness: we cannot measure directly the sensations and other feelings that constitute happiness itself; but we can measure the physical means, the instruments by which these pleasurable feelings are excited. These means being lessened in each, the aggregate of individual, which alone constitutes the general, happiness, is diminished. Were the riches of the rich anything more than the annual or other periodical products of the labour of the rest of the community—*then*, and in this imaginary state of things, it might so happen that the

wealth of the excessively rich might exist without a deduction, exactly correspondent in extent, from the portions of the rest of the community. It follows, then, that excessive inequality, being attainable only by deductions from the products of the individual labours of the whole of the rest of the community, must lessen the sum total of the enjoyments derived from the wealth of that community. To justify this inequality, caused by force or unequal laws, it would be necessary to show that the additional happiness enjoyed by those having excessive wealth is so great, as *more* than to counterbalance the individual deductions from the happiness of those who have produced the wealth, the society at large. But so very far is this from being the case, as already shown in the 8th and 9th sections of the last chapter, that we shall find, that

The second evil arising from that inequality of wealth—which can only be produced by violence or unequal laws, and which renders exertion unnecessary for the continuance of the possession of wealth—called here, *excessive inequality*, is, that *it does not add to the happiness even of those few possessing the larger shares*. This result arises from several facts always recurring, in the way of antecedents and consequents, called “laws of nature,” observed in the play of our physical organisation. Inequality of wealth, acquired in any other way than by means of the voluntary exchanges of successful industry, or the free gift of wealth so acquired, is, on an immense probability of chances, attended with this effect, that as it renders exertion *unnecessary*, so it renders it *unpractised*. Exertion, implying an effort attended with some degree of discomfort before its ultimate object can be produced, requires to be stimulated by some adequate *motive*; and the excessively rich, as a body, being without motives to exertion, are condemned to inaction and listlessness: they know not how to pass away, or (very energetically speaking) to *kill* their time; they feel the void, the wearisomeness of existence; for them has been formed the word *ennui*, to denote

the wretchedness of a continual want of sensations, physical or mental—

“ The veriest pang the wretched find,
Is rapture to the dreary void,
The leafless desert of the mind,
The waste of feelings unemploy’d.”

Hope has no brightening prospects for them ; desire no wish, by exertion, to be accomplished. What are the expedients to which they are necessarily driven, in order to fly from this vacuity of thought and feeling ? To renew and repeat eternally the pleasures of the senses ? To enjoy an eternal banquet of tastes, of sounds, of forms, and colours, of odours, and of all the varieties of feeling ? Alas ! nature interposes and baffles the schemes of contentment, not to say of happiness, from such continual excitements. It is a *fact* always recurring, and what we call a *law* of nature, that the nerve excited beyond a certain time, or a certain degree, loses the power of enjoyment, till relieved by rest and abstinence. Nay, this law of our nature, this fact of our organisation, goes even further. Not only are rest and abstinence required to recover the capacity for a renewal of sensual pleasures ; but if we presume to push these pleasures to excess, if we go a step beyond the point of gratification, by way of forcing nature to more intense or lengthened enjoyment, she indignantly repels us from her bosom, and lassitude, and disgust, and loathing, infallibly succeed, and even the capacity for enjoying future sensual pleasures is more or less impaired ; not to speak of remote constitutional effects in predisposing to disease, and lessening the duration of life. Supposing that wisdom or prudence avoids these latter evils, how are the unoccupied rich to fill up the dreaded daily void spaces of their existence ? In sauntering, trifling, gossiping, in worthless pursuits, or in pernicious pursuits, say the experience of all ages and nations, and the very nature of our organisation. Happy are they amongst them, who can make to themselves an interest in vying with their grooms or coachmen in the care of hunting dogs, or the fashionable mode of brandishing

their whips, and guiding their brown or grey horses. If extravagance of foolish expenditure do not accompany these pastimes, time is at all events *killed* by them, and the dreaded feeling of the vacuity of life is removed. After the idlers and the foolishly busy, come the *perniciously* busy, professed sensualists, intriguers, gamblers, &c. Those who require stronger excitements to keep awake the feeling of existence, are of this class; and numerous, and to be pitied they are, their pursuits being justly denominated *vices*, from the miseries which they entail on themselves and others.

We may conclude, then, that the excessively rich is not as happy as the moderately rich; because, in sensual pleasures, nature will not permit him to go beyond what the moderately rich has the means to gratify; because he has no uniform aim or object of exertion in life which the moderately rich and the occupied possess, to maintain their station or to advance it; and because long leisure hours are occupied with silly or pernicious pursuits, while the few hours of leisure—after exertion—of the employed, are turned to pleasure, though the walk, the air, the sun, the skies, may be their sole invigorating causes of delight.

But we have undertaken to show that not only is excessive wealth unable to make the excessively rich happier than the moderately rich, but “*it engenders positive vices in the possessors of these excessive shares of wealth.*” The vices produced by excessive wealth, under the name of the vices of luxury, have been, in almost all countries and ages, the themes calling forth the reprobation of moralists. Stealing, lying about the ordinary concerns of life, stinginess, at least towards their equals, are not the vices of the excessively rich; but sensual excesses, a disregard of all the personal virtues of prudence, an irreclaimable selfishness arising from an over-estimate of their own importance, and of the superior value of their own happiness, want of fortitude to bear the ordinary evils and casualties of life—these are the vices inseparable, in a great majority of cases,

from the possession of excessive wealth. That sensual excesses are vicious, merely, like all other vices, because they tend to misery, no one, I believe, will dispute: that those who have the means, without effort, of indulging, as it is called, in these excesses, will be more apt to yield to them than those who are not so well provided with the means of enjoyment (or if provided by means of exertion, giving a substitute and a habit of other pursuits), cannot be disputed. Amongst the poor the necessities of their existence, amongst the middle classes the defect of sufficient means, limit, respectively, the possibility or the probability of sensual excess; while amongst the excessively rich there is no restraint to the headlong gratification of appetite, but enlarged views of distant evils; which enlarged views, on the one hand, are in no way confined to the rich; while, on the other hand, they have the least aptitude to be influenced by them. As to the restraining motive of public opinion, the influence of religion, of the laws, these are, not to say equally operative on the rest of society as on the rich, but much *more operative*. There remain, then, greater means of gratification with the rich, and, therefore, other things being at least equal, greater excesses and abuse of sensual pleasures.

The tendency of excessive wealth to produce improvidence, cannot be doubted; and though the want of prudence is not so great a vice, as not being attended with so great evils, to the very rich, as to the moderately rich, not to speak of the poor, to whom it would be perdition; yet it is necessarily incidental to excessive wealth; and vicious, in as far as it tends to induce misery to themselves, or indirectly, to others. The sensual excesses and the improvidence of excessive wealth, are necessarily accompanied with a *want of fortitude* in bearing the casualties of life. To excel in anything, exercise and habit are necessary: the whole range of human ingenuity is employed to remove every source of pain and disquiet from the very rich; to avoid every *appearance* of pain or discomfort is the study of their

lives; and in the education of their infants this principle of warding off immediate physical evil is entirely followed out. What is the consequence? As they are not permitted ever to run the risk of experiencing physical evil, they cannot acquire the habit of enduring it with fortitude. Fortitude, like the strength of a particular muscle, must be acquired by exercise, by early habit. When the excessively rich suffer ever so slight a pain, physical or mental, every one around, not to speak of paid servants and expectants, sympathises, or seems to sympathise, with him: when the poor man suffers, sympathy is regarded as an act of benevolence, not of expected good manners. The constant operation of this unequal sympathy must inevitably produce in the minds, not only of the excessively rich themselves, but of the bulk of mankind—their enviers and admirers—an over-estimate of the importance of their happiness, as compared with that of the rest of their fellow-creatures.

Our next position is, that “*excessive wealth excites the admiration and the imitation, and in this way diffuses the the practice of the vices of the rich, amongst the rest of the community; or produces in them other vices arising out of their relative situation to the excessively rich.*” On this point, nothing is more obvious than the universal operation of the most common principle of our nature—that of association. The wealth, as the means of happiness, of the excessively rich, is admired or envied by all; the manners and character connected with the abundance of these good things, always strike the mind in conjunction with them, and the approbation excited by wealth, naturally spreads itself over its adjuncts. Can those qualities not be delightful which are joined with such delightful things? Now, does it tend to the happiness of society—*i. e.*, of the individuals who compose society—that such qualities as sensuality, imprudence, pusillanimity, and selfishness, should be viewed through a fallacious medium, and palliated, and excused, and followed, rather than reprobated

and shunned? Can it tend to the happiness of society that its wealth, the produce of its industry, should be so distributed as to raise such qualities as these in the public estimation, by ensuring their practice on the part of the most influential of its members? From the false glare through which these qualities are viewed, there are many even who regard them rather as amiable weaknesses—as mere venial faults, than as vices, the more dangerous, because *treacherously* pernicious.

Besides the imitation of these injurious qualities practised by the rich themselves, it is a curious infelicity attending the existence of excessive wealth, that it generates other vices in the rest of the community, not dependent on imitation, and of which the example is not necessarily set by the rich themselves. An *over-anxious pursuit of wealth*—as the one thing needful to obtain not only physical pleasures, its more appropriate object, but as the means of power and reputation, to the exclusion of all other means, such as those of genius or virtue, constituting personal merit—is eagerly instituted by all, and becomes the moving spring of society. “Get wealth, if possible, honestly; but at all events get wealth,” becomes an established maxim. Consequent on the over-anxious pursuit of wealth, are the *servility* and *corruption* to which excessive wealth gives rise throughout the community in which it exists. Wealth becomes the only medium of influence; and for wealth everything is sold. Truth, honour, the affections, the person which should be the prize of excited regard and love, political rights of immense but remote utility, nothing in life so sacred as not to find its price in money. Hence a universal rushing into every vice and crime, attended with the hope of impunity, that promises to attract this universal good. Where excessive wealth does not exist; men have not the means to bribe their fellows to the meanesses, or the cruelties, of iniquity; for so distasteful is vice—so much does it excite the reaction of the injured, and the oppro-

brium and ill-offices of society, that it will not be practised without such an equivalent as excessive want, ungoverned passions, or excessive wealth, have to bestow. As the mass of the community become easy in their circumstances, the influence of excessive wealth is reduced; and it is forced to direct itself to less revolting modes of control. But these enormous masses have a constant tendency to prevent or retard this ease of circumstances; and their influence is not thereby eradicated, but directed to other objects, and rendered on the whole less pernicious: it endeavours to accomplish by corruption, by the equivalents of wealth, what, in a less advanced state of society, would be effected by the force of the servile hireling. A David, in modern times, could not, for a small bribe, procure the murder of the husband of her whose beauty excited his desire, but would expend thousands in purchasing the courtly acquiescence and utter blindness of the husband; and thus, through all society, would wealth operate in *buying* vice. So universal, so notorious, so inevitable, is this effect of excessive wealth, that nothing is more common than for the haughty corrupters themselves, to affect or to feel contempt for the tools and creatures of their own systems and temptations, and to justify the use of such means from the absence of all those moral qualities which their very employment had eradicated; or rather ~~which~~, under the existence of such a state of things, could never have been excited.

SECTION 2.

OF THE ECONOMICAL EVILS OF FORCED INEQUALITY OF WEALTH.

Of this class of evils, the most palpable, but the most misunderstood, or most strangely misrepresented, is, that *the yearly income of excessive wealth is consumed by unproductive labourers, and is, therefore, so much annual loss of the productions of the national industry.*

Why is one species of labour called productive and another unproductive? Because the one species of labourer

produces a visible and tangible article of the matter of wealth, in lieu of, and to replace, that portion of wealth which he received by way of equivalent for his labour; while the other produces nothing visible or tangible, gives no article of wealth back in exchange. Two men get two shillings each, for their day's labour: the one produces at the end of the day a tangible and useful basket, the source of future economy and comfort, and which will procure in exchange any other equivalent object of desire; the other produces for his two shillings, bows and grimaces and obsequious answers from time to time, which, when the motions are over and the day is past, would, if put up to auction, hardly find a purchaser, as there would be nothing but the remembrance of them to give as an equivalent; the two shillings, or their worth in meat, drink, or clothing, have been in this latter case consumed without return, and society is so much the poorer; but in the case of the maker of the basket, production has been going on at an equal pace with consumption, and the wealth of society is not by such consumption diminished, but in general increased, as something more is generally produced to be accumulated under the name of capital. In the same way, by everything consumed by the rich themselves and by every one of their dependants, of those amongst whom they divide their wealth, without a tangible equivalent of the matter of wealth produced by their labour during the consumption, the wealth of the society is daily decreased to the whole amount of such consumption. What then? do not the excessively rich feed the productive labourers? could they, the productive labourers, live, and produce, and consume, and enjoy, if there were none such? They could indeed; and it is they alone who feed, and clothe, and pamper, the rich. Who ever heard that the excessively rich ever gave his wealth to the productive labourer, without exacting a return, an equivalent fully equal in value to the portion of wealth he gave in exchange? If the excessively rich give to the productive labourer of corn, or

hats, five shillings, for a bushel of corn to the one, or five shillings for a covering for the head to the other; would not the same producer of hats, or of corn, be equally benefited if the *excessively poor* had made a similar exchange with him? Is the money, the medium of exchange or the representative of value, or the article of value given itself in exchange, more valuable because it has come out of the hands of a rich man, or a rich man's domestic, than if it had come out of the hands of the poor? Is gold given in exchange more heavy, or corn more nourishing, because they have passed through the hands of idleness? In neither case is the seller obliged to the excessively poor, or to the excessively rich, for the exchange, any more than they are obliged to him; every voluntary exchange implying a preference of the thing received, *on both sides*, to the thing given. But every article of wealth consumed, whether of food, clothes, furniture, &c., without the production of an equivalent, of an equal mass of wealth, is so much, in an economical point of view, lost to the community. The consumption of the productive labourer never decreases the wealth of society, because he never consumes but on the condition of reproduction. Not so with the unproductive; every atom of wealth consumed by him is so much deducted from the general stock.

It is clear that the expenditure of excessive wealth, indeed of all income consumed by unproductive labourers, is annually lost to society; no return, in the shape of wealth, being afforded by it. So much sophistry has been employed on this head by the luxurious and the timid, seeking to establish a fancied unreal merit for the possessors of excessive wealth, and thence a sympathy in its support, that numerous objections to this simple truth might be stated and exposed. Real utility is the only basis on which any particular distribution of wealth, or any other human institution, will henceforth depend. It is wise, therefore, rejecting all fallacious supports, to seize and rely on those which are true and good. These, as far

as the distribution of wealth is concerned, it is our object to point out and illustrate. Happy, were it a frequent question amongst the rich, "In what way do I benefit society, what equivalent do I afford it for the excess of the matter of wealth consumed by me, without reproduction, over and above what productive labourers consume? If I give no return in the way of reproduction, let me in some other way contribute to the public good."

If, then, any man wishes to know whether he is a productive labourer, or a mere consumer, in the great field of national wealth, let him simply ask himself, "whether he produces anything of exchangeable value, during the day, the month, the year, of his consumption, to the full amount at least of what he has consumed?" If he have produced nothing directly himself, has he, by the making of tools, machines, &c., set productive labourers to work; or has he, by any contrivances, by acting as carrier or agent between the producers and consumers, or *by any other means*, enabled them, by concentrating their attention, to produce more than they would otherwise have done? If he have not been, directly or indirectly, instrumental to the reproduction of as much, or more, than he has consumed of the *tangible matter* of wealth, he is not only useless, but pernicious to society—as far as the increase, nay the preservation, of the national wealth, is concerned. What *moral* equivalents the excessively rich give to society for their enormous consumption, we have already seen.

We have now to show that "*excessive wealth encourages such arts and trades, in the exchange of its income previous to consumption, as are the most insecure and unequal in their remuneration, and, therefore, the least tending to the national welfare.*" A luxurious man has not the capacity of increasing the size of his stomach, or the dimensions of limbs and trunk, so as to elaborate a greater quantity of food, or to demand a greater extent of clothing, than the poor or the moderately rich. What does he, then? As he cannot increase in quantity, he will

excel in *quality* ; at all events, he will use something *different* from other people, and *more costly*, in order to distinguish himself from them in some way requiring less labour than moral or intellectual superiority. In those countries where there are no manufactures or commerce—where there is no comfort in the way of food, no neatness of dress, amongst the community—where not only the productive labourers have been unable to accumulate capital, but where there are even no middle class with capital (the produce of labour to facilitate its future progress)—where there is no intellectual culture, no knowledge, no public opinion ;—there, as in all the East, and, until lately, in the despotisms of Europe, the rich expended in sumptuous clothing, in the childish ornaments of uncommonly glittering gems, and such optical splendours attached to their persons, vast portions of their wealth. But, in countries where capital and comfort have, in spite of folly and rapine under the name of government, increased amongst the community ; where the middle orders, under the name of plebeians, &c., have acquired the means of purchasing feathers and precious stones, and similar gew-gaws, to vie with the excessively rich in the ornament of their persons ; there, the rage for the pomp of dress amongst the excessively rich becomes weakened. Why so ? Because it no longer serves the purpose for which it was originally used ; it no longer *distinguishes* the wearer ; it no longer points him out to the gaze of the vulgar as an envied mortal, clad, and beautified with clothing, beyond other men. 'Tis curious to see the mean and brutal contrivances to which, by the aid of legislation, and under the cloak of morality, the rich have had recourse, when they found themselves in danger of being out-vied in finery of dress by the productive classes, by the industrious. They have been constantly in the habit of inflicting *sumptuary punishments*, through the instrumentality of what have been called “sumptuary laws,” on all those not belonging to them—

selves, or, to use a conventional phrase, not of *their rank*, or *caste*, who should imitate the finery of their dress ; thus forcibly monopolising to themselves the distinctions of apparel. Where such efforts have not been made—where no *law* has prohibited the competition, the rich (as in these countries) have fairly given up the competition of the distinctions of dress, and have resorted to other means of showing their superiority of wealth. Numerous horses and chariots, costly equipages, rich liveries, and constant *change* of exquisite materials for their own persons, become the means of distinction to the rich. These cannot be so easily imitated ; a mock coach and horses cannot be made like a mock diamond, nor can ordinary or rational men overtake the velocities of fashionable changes of attire. In the article of food, also, 'tis what is costly and exquisite, but at all events what is *uncommon*—what serves to distinguish, and, in their opinion, to raise, them above the rest of the community, that they use. Their furniture, also, everything about them, is liable, from the same principle, the desire of making their wealth the means of distinction, to the changes of taste or caprice ; for, if Grecian models were universal, the excessively rich would spurn them. Variety, even under the guidance of caprice, must be their idol ; for, what is the main object of their lives but to excite, to keep up, by artificial means, those emotions for which the satiety of excessive wealth has precluded the usual excitements ? The changes and the variety of external things are amongst the most effectual means, in their power, of accomplishing this object. In all their pleasures, then, variety, novelty, rarity, will be a main ingredient. What effect will this state of things produce on the species and character of the artisans, with whom the rich exchange a portion of their income previous to consumption ?

It will not call into being any productive labourers who would not otherwise have existed ; it will create nothing. What will it do, then ? It will simply give a *new direction* to the labour of a given number of the productive classes ;

it will divert them from the production of ordinary and substantial things for every-day use, to the production of those which are costly, rare, and liable to the changes of fashion. Were there none, or but little, of excessive wealth, there would be no demand for what had not real utility or permanent beauty, according to the best notions prevalent at the time; mere novelty and caprice could not be indulged in at the expense of real comforts. But where all *real* wants and comforts are supplied to saturation, without personal exertion, *unreal* wants *must* be excited, or there will be no mode of employing the superfluity of wealth; it would otherwise lie idle, or be given to productive labourers in exchange for useful works for the public good. Very seldom is the latter alternative of getting rid of superfluous wealth resorted to, and still more seldom the former. It is employed, then, in what are called elegancies, luxuries—partaking more or less of caprice. The *ordinary* wants and comforts of society remain through ages nearly the same; the food, and clothing, and form and mode of constructing dwellings, change but slowly; they depend on physical circumstances of climate, natural productions, degree of intercourse with foreign nations,—all modified by the knowledge of the age. All these circumstances change but very slowly. The nature and form of the productions to which they give rise, partake, of course, of their steadiness of character. *Wants* remaining the same, it takes a generation to change the fashion of an article; and, during this slow revolution of demand, the productive labourers have time to accommodate themselves to the change.

But there exists, in the very nature of things, a constant source of caprice in the demand for all those extra articles of luxury called for by excessive wealth. If they were necessary or conducive to any palpable comfort, nature, or our organisation, would constantly indicate the articles to be procured, and the demand would be, and for such articles is, constant. But, where all wants are already gratified, and nothing left even for the adaptations of convenience,

mere chance or caprice, that is to say, *inappreciable motives*, must guide the choice. The effect is, that, one year, the productive labourers whose industry produces what are called Cashmere shawls, another year those who dive for pearls, another year or another period those who dig or search for diamonds, are called into active industry; and, if the caprice causing the activity of the demand be intense, their reward is very liberal; for these freaks of demand must be supplied at once, or they are apt to turn their longings towards other and more speedily attainable frivolities. The urgency of the caprice enhances the demand for the peculiar species of labour, for the article in request; and this naturally induces many to leave other lines of industry, and engage in the more liberally paid, new branch. At length, however, the sickly ardour of fashion relaxes—the bauble, become old or familiar, ceases to please, and the trade in the superfluity, so lately active, is now comparatively at a stand. On the fixed and moveable capital employed during the great demand, there must be more or less of loss in transferring it to other employment. Such trades are a species of lottery—a gambling concern. High prices attended the fever of the demand; the producers were well paid, enjoyed much, probably foolishly, intemperately, from the irregularity of the supply, and from want of previous habits of arranging expenditure to such liberal payment. Sudden demand beget habits of imprudence and dissipation; sudden ceasing of the demand throws many into absolute want, or reduces the payment of the wages of all down to, or below, the price of ordinary labour, or produces at the same time both these effects, each in a minor degree. Privation of customary enjoyment, misery to a less or greater extent, are caused by these changes—want always, on a number of persons, begets vice. If sudden over-payment beget excess and intemperance, sudden lowering of wages engenders falsehood, theft, cruelty. The savings of high wages are not reserved for the wants of a future reduction; but the remembrance of them em-

bitters actual privation, and engenders a feeling of injustice. The inclination, the ability to work, remain as before ; but employment, without any fault of the labourers, is taken away from them. How have they deserved this ? To repair the injustice, they will prey on the produce of the industry of others. Unoccupied, with disposable energies liable to any direction, they yield to any impulse, to which projects engendered by themselves or others, of a political, fanatical, or any other description, may give rise. Idleness, voluntary or forced, of the rich or of the poor, is the fruitful parent of misery and vice.

It is plain, then, that not only is the ultimate consumption of the yearly income of excessive wealth, an annual loss to the community of a portion of the products of labour, most of which would be converted by a wiser distribution into an eternal accumulation of capital ; but even that species of industry which it peculiarly encourages, in its exchanges previous to consumption, is, of all species of trade and labour, the least conducive to the public good.

SECTION 3.

OF THE POLITICAL EVILS OF FORCED INEQUALITY OF WEALTH.

Under this head we shall point out but the following overwhelming evil.

Excessive wealth necessarily leads to the usurpation of the powers of legislation, as well as of the executive and judicial authority, by those unqualified by education to exercise them aright, and with interests hostile to the general, or national, interest.

The object to be aimed at in legislation, to which every political, as well as economical, regulation should tend, is to promote the greatest happiness of the community, *i. e.*, of the greatest number of the community. Now, is there not *one essential* requisite to be possessed by any persons undertaking to make regulations having this object in

view, without which neither knowledge nor activity is of any avail, but rather become the means of mischief? Is it not an essential requisite that the makers of these regulations should have a sympathy, a fellow-feeling, an identity of interest, with the community, that is to say, with the greater number of the community, for which the regulations are formed? Or, if it be impossible that they should have this identity of interest, or at all events this lively sympathy, is it not necessary that they should be under the real and *bonâ fide* control of those whose interests they represent, of the produce of whose labour, and of all of whose rights they exercise the disposal? Or rather, in order to accomplish this undertaking—supposing always the undertakers to be possessed of such appropriate knowledge as the age allows—is it not necessary for the security of the community that this *double* guarantee should be imposed? that *sympathy* and *accountability* should both of them be required from those entrusted with the solemn charge of making laws, and exercising the judicial and executive powers?

If this be so, if these be plain political truths, how shall we find them to apply to the excessively rich? Have *they* a sympathy, a fellow-feeling, an identity, or, even in any obvious respect, a community of interest with the community, *with the greater number* of the community? First, as to their wealth (in as far always as not obtained by free labour or voluntary exchange, or not requiring active industry for its preservation), it stands in direct contrast to the poverty of the greater number of the community, even to the moderate means of the active members of society possessing capital. Their wealth, acquired for the most part by original spoliation and perpetuated by injurious laws, not acquired by industry, by free competition and voluntary exchanges, is a constant source of pride to them, and of envy to those who do not possess it. The excessively rich, as a class, like all other classes in every community, must obey the influence of the

peculiar circumstances in which they are placed, must acquire the inclinations and the characters, good or bad, springing out of the state of things surrounding them from their birth. Having always possessed wealth without labour, they look upon it as their right, and their family's right, always to possess it on the same terms. Not only do they look down on the productive labourers of the community as beings below them, but they affect a marked superiority over those who purchase wealth by means of accumulations produced by successful industry and voluntary exchanges. All history, and the state of things at present in every country of the globe, prove this invariable disposition of excessive wealth appropriated to particular classes. To uphold, to perpetuate, and to increase, their wealth and influence, their wealth, as the chief means of their distinction, is their ruling object, at the expense of whoever may be affected by it. How is this to be accomplished? By labour, by industry? Those they despise. By a shorter mode; by seizing on political power, and upholding a system of things, varying with the circumstances of different countries, and calculated to *keep down* the rest of the community, they endeavour to *perpetuate* their own superiority of wealth from the participation of that unceasing envy with which they are surrounded.

In point of wealth, there is evidently a contrariety of feeling and interest between the excessively rich and the rest of the community. How stands the case with respect to those other features in the characters of both, in which wealth is not directly concerned? Are the habits and the pursuits of the excessively rich, so much in accordance with the habits and pursuits of the rest of the community, as to generate a sympathy and regard for each other's happiness in spite of the tendency of the inequality of wealth? No; but they tend to aggravate tenfold this inequality. Mark the difference of the moral and intellectual qualities, of the habits, of the manners, the whole character, of the rich and the poor, of the very rich and the industrious, of the pro-

ductive, and the immensely over-fed unproductive classes. In all, they are unlike to each other ; in their virtues, in their vices, in their pleasures, in their pains, in their occupations, in their amusements. Do they ever associate together—the very rich with the poor? For what purpose should they associate? The pursuits and the conduct of the rich man, if followed one day by the poor, would involve him in ruin for life ; while, to the rich, it is but a day's pastime. The niggardly parsimony which, to the rich, is a matter of contempt, is necessary for the poor man's existence ; and yet the generosity that the poor practice towards each other, *in comparison to their means*, is such as should make most rich men blush ; though, the actual sum given being small, the rich affect to despise it, and think they are more generous because they give, numerically, more. How can the very rich exchange thoughts or feelings with the poor? Were all the wisdom and benevolence that poetry ever blended together stamped on the character of the poor, what attractions could they possess for the rich, unaccompanied with those *manners*, mostly conventional, with which excessive wealth associates all claim to respect? The influence of *manners* amongst the excessively rich, is all-commanding ; and this influence must necessarily continue : for hazardous, energetic, and doubtful pursuits, being out of their course of life, their time being unoccupied, and demanding light amusements to fill it up, *substance* being banished from their occupations, *form* and *manner* must be substituted for them.

The same circumstances operate between the rich and the middle classes, but in an inferior degree. Friendly intercourse and association between the active industrious classes and the excessively rich, there is none, until by means, of whatever description, the thriving amass such wealth as to be admitted into the superior class. Then, with an imitation of the manners of the great, and of their lavish expenditure, a ticket of admission is easily procured, deficiency of merit or intellect being no bar to the union.

The active classes have not *time* to associate with the idle. The unoccupied rich are without understanding, without interest, in those occupations of the active, which engross their leading thoughts and desires. Occasional intercourse in matters of business, in the exchange of wealth, in which the class of the rich always affect the character of givers and obligers, takes place between them ; but the intercourse of friends, the intercourse of equals, never, or most rarely, occurs. The tone of mind of the two classes is quite opposed to each other ; the one serious and active, the other gay, or wearing the face of gaiety, and enjoying ; the one accumulates, the other expends and consumes. As similarity of pursuits, of character, and manners, is requisite, at least to a certain extent, to beget sympathy and mutual regard between different individuals and different classes ; and as a marked contrast of pursuits, of character, and manners, exists between the industrious and the class of unoccupied rich, so is it impossible that there should be much sympathy between them. The industrious classes have more knowledge and better manners than the poor or the working classes. But still, the unoccupied rich look on the industrious as at an immeasurable distance from *them*. With the mere poor, they will not risk the contamination of their breath ; with the middle classes, they will condescend to speak ; but as to inferiors—their tone, their manner, everything betrays their consciousness of the superiority of wealth. Where are, then, to be found the sympathies of the very rich ? of those who have nothing else to do but to find food for pleasurable sensations and emotions ? Have they no sympathies to exercise ? they, to whose unoccupied time such a new stock of never-ending gentle pleasures must be particularly valuable ? On whom, then, are they expended ? The sympathies of the very rich are called forth and expended on those whom they regard as their *equals*, and on them alone. It could not, it cannot be otherwise ; we are not blaming the rich for these tendencies of their situation ;

we are merely investigating facts, and tracing them to the circumstances by which they are produced. With the excessively rich, the excessively rich sympathise ; all their pursuits, their pleasures, their virtues, their vices, their manners, their peculiar system of rules of honour, as substitutes for the diffusive morality of utility ; all these produce amongst them an *esprit-de-corps*, which makes them regard each other as the most important class, as those for whose particular happiness society is, and ought to be, constituted. With each other's pleasures and pursuits they are interested. These constitute the world to them.

Such being the inevitable tendency of excessive wealth, when made the patrimony of any class, to narrow the range of human sympathy to the comparatively few of the same class or situation in life, what is the consequence ? how does it affect our argument ? Is it peculiar to the excessively rich, that their hopes and fears are excited and engaged for what is interesting to those in similar circumstances with themselves ? By no means. There is not a class or corporation in society to which the same rule will not apply. The poor, the middle classes, the higher order, the priests, the lawyers, all contract sympathies with each other, to the exclusion, more or less, of the rest of society ; and the measure of this exclusion depends on the number of points of contact remaining between them and the community at large. Those who are entirely independent of all others, have the fewest points of contact with them.

It has been shown that the object of the distribution of wealth, of all wise legislation respecting it, ought to be to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Who sympathise the most with the greatest number ? The poor certainly, the productive classes ; for their own pursuits, manners, and amusements, must touch them most. If, therefore, the poor had knowledge, the best knowledge of their age, as to the *best means* of promoting their own happiness,—to them, as sympathising with by far the greater number, ought the formation of regulations for the

general good to be entrusted. To the class of excessively rich, as sympathising with but a very few, they ought last of all to be entrusted. But there is another quality besides an identity of interest, or mutual sympathy, which is necessary, which is indispensable, for the formation of useful regulations; it is *knowledge*. Very seldom have the poor, the great majority of the productive classes, knowledge; if a few of them have hitherto acquired knowledge, they have been almost universally raised above their class, and have ceased to be poor. Seldom, therefore, from this radical defect, can a poor man—in the present state of society—be a fit person for the important task of legislation. If want of knowledge precludes the poor, want of interest, of sympathy, excludes the excessively rich. Whom, therefore, ought society to choose, whom would they of necessity choose, under a natural arrangement? Those possessing the requisite knowledge, that sympathise most largely with the community. Poverty, equal to that of the majority, as denoting an identity of interest and consequent sympathy, would be the greatest recommendation, provided it were joined with adequate knowledge. Excessive wealth, as being the most opposed to identity of interest and sympathy with the mass of the community, is the most unfit to be entrusted with the making of national regulations, though *it possessed appropriate knowledge*; because its interest, as a class, would misdirect its knowledge; and the more knowing such men, the more skilful they would be in shaping and rounding systems of exclusive laws. The poor being necessarily excluded from want of knowledge, the excessively rich from want of sympathy, and misdirection of knowledge; there remain those, whose situations give rise to a fellow-feeling of interest with the greater number, to an equality of knowledge with the foremost of the age in which they live, and to a direction of that knowledge for the benefit of the greater number. These are not to be found, either amongst the very poor or the very rich of the community, but are to be selected in

the large intermediate space between the two; always bearing in mind, that want of wealth, superior to what the majority of the community enjoy, *other things (qualifications) being equal*, is a recommendation, as securing an extended sympathy, instead of a disqualification. The more of this sympathy, the less need of counter checks.

But things being so, what has been, what must ever be, the conduct of the excessively rich in every community where an arbitrary inequality of wealth is maintained by force, or by unjust, and, therefore, unwise, laws? The excessively rich, everywhere, and from their very nature, seek to possess themselves of those very important functions, for the useful exercise of which they are the most incompetent. Whence arises this phenomenon? Simply from the education of the very rich, and the circumstances surrounding them through life. The unoccupied rich are without any active pursuit; an *object* in life is wanting to them. The means of gratifying the senses, the imagination even, of sating all wants and caprices, they possess. The pleasures of *power* are still to be attained. It is one of the strongest and most unavoidable propensities of those who have been brought up in indulgence, to abhor restraint, to be uneasy under opposition, and therefore to desire *power* to remove these evils of restraint and opposition. How shall they acquire this power? First, by the direct influence of their wealth, and the hopes and fears it engenders; then, when these means are exhausted, or to make these means more effectual, they endeavour everywhere to seize on, to monopolise, the *powers of government*. Where despotism does not exist, they endeavour to get entirely into their own hands, or, in conjunction with the head of the state, or other bodies, they seize, as large a portion as they can, of the functions of legislation. Where despotism does not exist, or is modified, they share amongst themselves all the subordinate departments of government; they monopolize, either directly or indirectly, the commands of the armed force, the offices of judges, priests,

and all those executive departments which give the most power, require the least trouble, and render the largest pecuniary return. Where despotism exists, the class of the excessively rich make the best terms they can with the despot, to share his power, whether as partners, agents, or mere slaves. If their situation is such, as to give them a confidence in their strength, they make terms with the despot, and insist on what they call their *rights*; if they are weak, they gladly crawl to the despot, and affect to glory in their slavishness to him for the sake of the delegated power of making slaves to themselves of the rest of the community. Such do the histories of all nations prove the tendencies of excessive wealth to be.

This, then, is the career, the career of *power*, in opposition to the career of industry, of virtue, or of intellectual superiority, to which the situation of the rich imperiously summons them. The necessity of their condition forces on them this career in preference to every other, as well to preserve what they have, by whatever means, acquired, as to fence themselves round with new securities against the jealousies and intrusions of the mass of the community. Under the name of *rights* or *privileges*, these possessors of excessive wealth have usurped advantages over all other classes, *sometimes* to the full extent of throwing the burden of taxation, the whole cost of supporting the administration, which they alone were permitted to wield and to enjoy, on the productive classes; *always*, to the extent of securing to themselves some advantages, entirely independent of personal merit, withheld from the rest of the community.

The radical defect in the constitution of society, that which must necessarily engender every other evil, is the excessive inequality of wealth. Wherever this radical evil is permitted to exist, no free institutions, no just laws can be made, or, if made, can be long supported. Without its influence, no man would dare to assume the power of making laws to dispose of the produce of the labour, of the

actions, and of the lives of rational beings, without being authorised by them so to do, and without being accountable to them for so tremendous an exercise of power.

Till mere wealth ceases to be the prime object of pursuit, mankind will never make any essential progress in useful knowledge and beneficence. When the sanction of public opinion shall be, as it may be, directed to the acquisition of knowledge and beneficence, with the same intensity that it is now directed to the pursuit of wealth, then these will constitute personal merit, and will be, as they ought to be, the leading objects of human pursuit, the solid basis of human happiness.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION, "FREE LABOUR, ENTIRE USE OF ITS PRODUCTS, AND VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES;"—THAT IS TO SAY, OF EQUALITY LIMITED BY SECURITY.

THERE is an effect, paramount to all others, the fruitful parent of good, which will diffuse itself over the whole of society, to be expected from following the natural laws of distribution. *They exclude force*; and, with force, they exclude fraud. Reason is the only successor to force; and she becomes by means of persuasion, and expression through the public opinion, the arbiter of public affairs, as well as of the private transactions of life. Let us point out its effects in a *political, economical, and moral* view. And first as to its *political* effects.

"If abstracting wealth, or levying money, by rulers, without giving an equivalent deemed satisfactory to every one from whom the value is taken, be a violation of security, how can governments," it will be urged, "be supported? Must they ask the consent of every one from whom they levy a tax? Either they and the blessings of order must cease, or the exercise of security in this unlimited sense must be given up, and with it the natural laws of distribution."

Fortunately for mankind, security is reconcilable with legislation, taxation, and the most perfect execution of all useful laws. Nay, more, without the entire maintenance of the principle of security, without unreserved respect for the natural laws of distribution, no just legislation, no just interference with human wealth or human actions, can take place. Respect for the principle of security is the basis of all just government.

How is this to be accomplished? How is this problem to be solved?

Simply by means of the *representative system of government*. The principle of security, producing the greatest possible degree of equality and happiness, is absolutely incompatible with any other species of government. It is the touchstone of all just legislation. Real *bonâ-fide* representation of every person possessing or producing wealth, of every adult person capable of engaging in rational voluntary transactions, and of course of being influenced by the laws made. This right of security is no metaphysical right, founded on abstract principles, but necessary to evolve, at the same time, the greatest production and the most useful distribution of wealth, the chief operative means of human happiness. Will it be said that even by means of representation, we sacrifice the universality of our principle? that individual assent to every act interfering with the labour, or its products, of any individual, would on our principles be necessary to constitute just government? and that individual legislation—which is an impossibility in large communities—would be rendered necessary? We reply, Even individual legislation and immediate self-taxation would imply a previous agreement of all *to abide by the decision of the majority*, in all those cases where the desires of the majority and minority are incompatible. Without this previous understanding, no mutual action, no system of co-operation could ever exist. It is a condition necessary to all communion. Any one disapproving of this condition, cannot belong to the society; and all that such individual could claim would be, free permission to withdraw from the society, and to connect himself with any other; which permission would be so obvious and useful an individual right, that every community should sanction it. The very act, then, of voting in concert with others, necessarily implies a recognition of the principle of adopting the act of the majority for that of

the whole. Now, under the system of representation, the most extended, where millions, or tens of millions, of men co-operate together, nothing more than this admission is required to make the acts of the representatives of a community the voluntary acts of every individual in it. The majority of the united representatives carry with them the voices of the majority of their respective constituents, and the acts of this majority become the acts of all the individuals of the community. In those cases where the will and interest of the minority are not incompatible with those of the majority, they ought to be pursued and promoted, as well as those of the majority; 'tis only in those cases where they are incompatible, that either, and if either, of course the smaller, should be sacrificed. If, then, a majority of this great community, through their representatives, think proper, for any purpose, useful or not, to appropriate any part of the products of their labour; though they may act foolishly, as well as wisely, in such appropriation, they can never be charged with violating by it the principle of security. This is the only secret for reconciling security with legislation, with the complete and voluntary execution of all laws, even of those which interfere with the products of labour, instead of the continued execution of them through the terror of an armed host, supported again by violating the security of the community. This is not the occasion to enumerate all the blessings of representative government. Enough to show, that no other is reconcilable with the principle of security. All pretended right to govern without delegation from the governed, assumed by a single person, or by many, under whatever name, in as far as it presumes to interfere with the products of labour, or the direction of labour, stands in hostility to security, to the natural laws of the distribution of wealth. Representation and election alone are compatible with it.

We cannot even *conceive* any other plan than that of representation for obviating the evils of insecurity. If

any other could be devised, it would then be necessary to compare its good and evil effects with those of representation, and to give the preference to the most useful expedient. The system of *perfect equality* of property in a community, brought about by voluntary co-operation, would not obviate the necessity of representation, in order to reconcile public contributions with security; for, not to say that these communities, necessarily small—not exceeding villages in size—must have internal regulations, they must also have connexions, in the way of exchange, with neighbouring communities or individuals, and must be as much interested in all works and institutions of national utility, as any other portions of the great national community amongst whom they may live. For these purposes representation is indispensable. Common objects must be attained by a great community, either by its own immediate acts, or by the instrumentality of others. If by others, without any power to that effect by the community, security is violated; if in consequence of powers given by the community, the representative system is brought into effect. There are no half-way expedients between voluntary and involuntary; there are no automatic motions in the rationale of government.

The first grand political benefit, then, from which almost all others emanate, of an entire obedience to the natural laws of distribution, is, that they render necessary the universal establishment amongst all communities sufficiently enlightened to perceive its utility, and of course to maintain its action,—Representative Government.

Let us proceed to another political advantage of security.

A community, respecting the natural laws of distribution, and enjoying all the individual happiness resulting from the greatest possible equality of wealth consistent with security, would be as little anxious to annoy their neighbours by war, as they would be inclined to submit to the unjust seizure of their property, the fruits of their

labour, by others. Brought up in the exercise of laborious industry—accustomed to respect the acquisitions and the rights of others as they value their own—aware of the mischiefs of brutal force, and of the unfailing and bounteous results of labour guided by intelligence; what motives should lead such men to rush like a banditti on their unoffending neighbours? They know well, that while plunder necessarily lasts but for a day, industry is the only permanent resource of a community; and that their plundering expeditions must necessarily be accompanied with a dereliction of their industrious pursuits. No standing armies would be maintained, nor thought of, by such a community; nor would they be necessary. For external affairs, “let other communities manage their own concerns;” for the rest, reason and reciprocity are the only means of influence they wish for. For internal affairs, what member of the community has not health and strength, knows not the art of self-defence, feels not the blessings he enjoys, calculates not the rights by the maintenance of which these blessings were created and are upheld? And what member of such a community would not know his place, and would not hasten to co-operate—nay, would not throw himself into the breach—to repel the aggressions of violence? Such a community, enjoying abundance, but at the expense of labour, uncorrupted by forced inequality and idleness, would be a mountain of brass against foreign plunderers, and would be too happy at home to turn plunderers themselves.

Such being the beneficial effects of the principle of security, on the frame of government, on the public strength of a community, what would be its influence on penal law, and the administration of justice? The unrestrained tendency of the distribution of wealth, being so much towards equality, excessive wealth and excessive poverty being removed, almost all the temptations, all the motives, which now urge to the commission of crime, would be also removed. What would be the effect of this

abatement of motives to crime? Not only all sanguinary, all cruel punishments, educating the people in hardness of heart, would be utterly banished, but the gentlest punishments would be sufficient to make head against the remaining weakened motives to crime, and the punishment of shame would be every day more operative, and become a larger ingredient in the evil of every other punishment. This mild state of penal law would operate again on manners, and reason and useful sympathies would be constantly gaining new strength over the savage ignorant inclinations of violence. If penal laws would be more mild, they would be also more certainly and easily executed, and without the exhibition of any public force.

The next political benefit that occurs as arising from a strict observance of the natural laws of distribution, is, that,—*all the expenses of all the machinery of government, would be reduced to their lowest point ; and all the wealth thus saved every year from unproductive consumption, would be expended in rewarding the exertions and increasing the comforts of the producers, or would be devoted to works, everywhere diffused, of public utility and enjoyment.* It is evident that if all the members of a community contributed, either themselves directly, or through their representatives, what they thought necessary for the public purposes of government, they would give as little, and get as much in return, as possible. As in all other transactions, they would get the best article, the article they wanted, on the lowest terms that the actual market of appropriate talents could afford. The reason of the present wasteful and overwhelming expenses of government, is obvious. The persons who order directly or indirectly, and levy the contributions, are those who themselves consume, or oblige others by sharing with them the consumption of them. Thus a double error, or vice, is committed. Not only are they, the produce of whose labour and industry is forcibly taken, to pay the contributions, debarred from the right of settling the

amount, but the men who, of all others, should be the last permitted to exercise any such power, the consumers or distributors of the contributions, are the regulators of it. The consequence naturally—and, as long as human nature remains constituted as at present, necessarily—is, that the largest possible sums which the patience and privations of communities will permit the prudence of their rulers to abstract from the yearly products of their labour, is taken from them; and the largest possible amount of these sums is expended, not only unproductively as to any return in the shape of wealth—not only without any other possible equivalent to the community, but in a manner tending as directly as possible to destroy all the useful virtues, and to substitute the concurrent vices, of excessive wealth and poverty, with political degradation superadded. The chief use to which these enormous forced contributions are mostly applied, is to maintain a large armed force to overawe the discontents to which they give rise, as well as to afford the occasional amusement of war to the rulers. It needs surely no proof, that if the contributors awarded their own contributions, they would give as little and get as much as possible. And why should they not? Is not cheapness a universal blessing? cheapness of intellectual and physical exertion, as well as of the articles of wealth, the quality of the article bought being of course unchanged? The cheap undertakers, having less influence, and being more under control of the contributors, having no other merit but the goodness of their work to recommend them, would be driven to perform the work best.

To induce the rich or their connexions to activity, to exertion of any sort, a stimulus proportionally strong must be applied—the magnitude of it depending on the average of the expenditure and acquired habits of these rich men. As they could not be induced to work for the value of the offices according to the rate of payment for such services in private life, the payment must be raised

till worth their acceptance. Nomination being absolute amongst themselves, all competition is of course excluded. The result is, in general, that with a part—a very small part of the excessive payment, they hire appropriate talent to perform the real duty—where there is any real duty to be performed—and consume *unproductively* always, and almost always *perniciously*, the funds of which the laborious community is thus plundered. The pretence of less liability to corruption from over-payment, is a widely and mournfully ascertained falsehood. In every country, and from the known principles of human nature, the best articles are obtained where the real competition value and no more is given for them. Where the proper means to ensure integrity are neglected, the only effect of excessive payment is to render necessary higher bribes, or more of the matter of corruption in some available shape. Deliberately to pay beyond the real market value of any article, physical or intellectual, whether on the part of the community or of a private individual, might be passed by as a species of insanity merely, if the deep corruption of the motives and the deadly influence of the effects on public happiness did not call for an effectual restraint.

The next and the last beneficial political effect, that we shall notice as necessarily attendant on obedience to the natural laws of distribution, is, *that all religious associations would become voluntary*. Who is bold enough to say, that any established system of religion in Europe, that is now supported by aid of the public force, would continue to be upheld in its present state of expenditure, if that support were withdrawn, and if the voluntary consent of all, the produce of whose industry is now taken for its support, were rendered necessary for the payment?

If it be said that no religion, neither the religion of Mahomet, of Confucius, or of Jésus, could support itself without attacks on security, by the forced abstraction of wealth, to pay its priests, it is replied, that no

religion ought to exist on such terms, inasmuch as no religion can confer advantages to be at all put in comparison with the blessings of security: without them, the purest religion, the mildest, the most sublime morality, would be but vain sounds; with them, whatever was lovely and true in religion would become the unconstrained belief and practice of every happy and enlightened mind. Not only has experience proved that religion can exist, without interfering with the natural laws of distribution by violations of security, but it has increased and flourished, as during centuries in Ireland and in Greece, under, and in spite of, the forced abstraction of its own resources from its own communicants, to enrich a rival and hated priesthood, or to feed the force that enchained it. Does British policy support by forced contributions the Hindoo priests of the East, or the Fetiche system of the Negroes of the West Indies? and is there any one that fears that, in consequence of the mere not granting of that support, these two systems of religion will immediately cease? No; even with knowledge and power against them, they hold their ground: and shall not that religion which comes from God, and is supported by God, with the aid of the most improved human talents, preserve itself *without* robbery, while every vulgar superstition holds up its head *in spite* of robbery?

SECTION 2.

ECONOMICAL BENEFITS OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION.

Let us now notice a few of the most striking beneficial effects which would result, in an *economical* point of view, from upholding equal security, as dictated by the natural laws of distribution.

Perhaps the leading economical benefit is, that *production would be increased, and capital accumulated, with a rapidity, and to an extent, hitherto unknown.* The influ-

ence of security in increasing production, the means of enjoyment, and in increasing happiness, by the just distribution and increased consumption, by the whole productive community, of these added means of enjoyment, has been already shown. It remains to show, that the increased accumulations of such a community, would proceed, in an equal ratio, with their increased consumption. It is plain that if all that was produced by labour in a year, were consumed within the year, no accumulation could take place. Capital is nothing mysterious: 'tis nothing else but that portion of the products of labour which is not *immediately* consumed. For *ultimate* consumption, or what is in this case called, *use*, are all articles whatsoever, that are not immediately consumed, produced. No rational beings would produce, but with a view to consumption or enjoyment, immediate, or permanent, or remote. Ripe fruit is consumed the day it is produced and matured, shoes, and other articles of clothes, are consumed within a few months after their production, the grain of one harvest is consumed within the succeeding year, till industry directs the slumbering energies of nature to the production of a new supply. A spade, a pick-axe, a chair, a table, a loom, are consumed, or, as we say in this case, are *worn out*, in a few years, according to the use and the care bestowed on them. A house, if well built, will not be consumed or worn out in fifty years; a good painting will not be consumed or decayed in many centuries; public buildings, of a massive structure, as bridges, senate-houses, porticos, temples, may abide the consumption or use of thousands of years; while statues, the fairest works of art, seem to smile at decay, and have outlived the immortality of the immortal gods, whose representatives they are, the embodied creations of pleasing *human* qualities. Whatever is not made for use, is made in vain: of this sort, under the influence of despotism and insecurity, are the pyramids of Egypt—vain memorials of immense exertions! While the beautiful remains of the architecture of ancient

Greece, that have survived the barbarism and superstition of ages, seem to await the re-inspiring touch of freedom and security to become again the theatres, for all the citizens, for all the members of the community, of patriotic and scientific exertions, where the love of knowledge and of virtue will be associated with the magnificence of the surrounding scenes of nature and of art. An apple, then, consumed in a minute, and a statue enduring for thousands of years, are equally products of labour, and made solely for enjoyment, by means of their use. Doubtless, the more durable any article, the less comparative labour bestowed upon it, and to the greater number of men, and succeeding generations of men, it is the means of comfort,—whether by means of shelter as a building, by means of passage as a bridge, or by simple contemplation and association as a statue,—the more useful it is. If an apple could give the renewed pleasure and nourishment of eating for fifty successive days, it would be fifty times as valuable, though its *exchangeable* value would decrease. The beneficial consequence would be, that so much human labour would be set free for the production of other objects of desire.

What, then, is capital? and how is it distinguished from the other yearly, or monthly, or daily, products of labour? Sometimes the distinction arises simply from the *use* to which the products of labour may be applied, the *hands* in which they may be placed; but more commonly from the *permanence* of the article produced. All buildings, bridges, docks, cities, inclosures, laying out and reclaiming of lands, ships, machinery, pictures, statues, and other desired works of art, though as much the products of labour as the apple, are distinguished as capital simply from their permanence, though in daily use, and in the course of a more or less gradual consumption. Flour, milk, shoes, hats, meat, coats, gowns, laid in by a family for current use, are not capital, but materials for consumption; while, in the hands of the flour-factor, dairyman, or milk-vender, shoemaker, hatter, butcher, tailor, and

mantua-maker, they form, respectively, the stock or capitals of their trades. In the one case, the use was immediate consumption, *without any view to any further exchange*. In the other case, consumption by the owner is excluded, and exchange is the sole object, or, at all events, is the sole use, of the possession. Sometimes that partial use, which does not amount to the wearing out, or scarcely injuring, of the article, as the use of silver-ware, may render an article at the same time an object of use or consumption, and capital or stock, or, as it is sometimes called, capital-stock. What, then, is the most accurate idea of capital? It is—that portion of the products of labour which, whether of a permanent nature or not, is capable of being made the instrument of profit. Such seem to be the real circumstances which mark out one portion of the products of labour into capital. On such distinctions, however, have been founded the insecurity and oppression of the productive labourer—the real parent, under the guidance of knowledge, of all wealth—and the enormous usurpations over the productive powers of their fellow-creatures, of those who, under the name of capitalists, or landholders, acquired the possession of these accumulated products,—the yearly or permanent supply of the community. Hence the opposing claims of the capitalist and the labourer. The capitalist getting into his hands, under the reign of insecurity and force, the consumption of many labourers for the coming year, the tools or machinery necessary to make their labour productive, and the dwellings in which they must live, turned them to the best account, and bought labour and its future products with them as cheaply as possible. The greater the profit of capital, or the more the capitalist made the labourer pay for the advance of his food, the use of the implements or machinery, and the occupation of the dwelling, the less of course remained to the labourer, for the acquisition of any other object of desire.

The circumstances that really influence the abundance

of the objects of wealth are these—abundance of materials to work upon, abundance of tools or machines to work with, and knowledge of the mind, as well as skill of hand, to elaborate out of these the objects desired. The natural course of things should seem to be, that every productive labourer should possess his own materials, his own supply of food while working, his own tools, his own dwelling, with appropriate skill and knowledge to guide these elements of production.

Now, under the auspices of the natural laws of distribution, what would be the progress of mechanical or agricultural industry, in the very commencement of these pursuits? Occupation by improvement being the natural title to unoccupied land, any man having the means to work with, and to whom the produce of land was an object of desire, would appropriate as much land as his necessities demanded. To expend his labour in merely inclosing, with a view to future possession, a larger tract than he could cultivate, would be absurd, because, if his labour were spent on mere inclosing, he must starve; in order to live, he must render the land productive of food. The competition of others, and the mere distance of the benefit to be derived from mere inclosures, would prevent them, even if the necessity of food by cultivation did not interfere. If again he inclosed more than he wanted, what would be the price of such inclosure? Just the labour it cost, or its value, a full equivalent and no more; for, why should those who can get, by the labour of inclosing, new land, give more than the value of that labour for land already inclosed? This is clearly its natural value, so that inclosing more land than was necessary for use would not be thought of. The incloser or inclosers of the land must have been possessed of the means of existence, food, clothes, dwelling, and of the tools and seed to work with, or else they could never produce. What must be the amount of their production? A year's supply; but a supply of food, enough not only for their own use during

the year, but for procuring, by exchange, those articles of clothing, furniture, or other objects of desire, which they could not make for themselves, or which they found it more convenient (costing less labour or being cheaper) to get in exchange, would constitute this supply; land would be exchanged, that is to say, the labour laid out in land, in convenient parcels, just like any other commodity; the whole of the products of labour would go for remuneration to the producer, and for whatever he gave away, he would receive a satisfactory equivalent.

But from idleness, want of skill, or accident, some other individuals might want food, tools, &c., and, not being possessed of any equivalent fabricated by any other exertion of industry, might be compelled to sue for food to those who, by cultivation, had procured it. They would give their *labour* for the articles they wanted. Be it observed, however, these cases would be exceptions to the general rule, which is that of equality of physical powers and accidents. This small number of exceptions, again, would be kept down by two circumstances; the voluntary support and supply by the friends or family of the most of them in case of accident, and the facility of acquiring the means (tools, &c.) of independent cultivation.

If such would be the progress, as to capital, of the producers of food, agriculturists, there would be still less tendency to inequality amongst the mechanics. It very seldom takes a year, as in agriculture, of continued labour, to bring to perfection any manufactured article—more frequently a month, a week, a day. So much the less dependent on the owner of capital would the mechanic be, whom accident or folly had left without his proper stock of the means of living while at work. The acquisition of a few articles by exchange of his manufacturing labour, with economy, would soon replace the little he lost; and he, too, would soon again unite capitalist and labourer in his own person. It is not meant to say, that there would be no permanent class of labourers under the free opera-

tion of the natural laws of distribution; but that *mere* labourers, altogether destitute of capital, would be extremely few and very well remunerated, receiving the whole produce of their labour, a small compensation deducted for the loan or advance made them. In such a community would there be no capitalists, such as we now see them, engrossing the accumulated products of the labours of thousands? There would be very few such. But, in such a community, would there be no accumulation of capital? Its accumulation would be immense, and greater than under any forced or fraudulent distribution; so that there would be a profusion of capital without capitalists. How could these things be? The great body of the productive labourers would be capitalists themselves, owners of the capital (improvements, food, tools, seed), necessary for the cultivation of their small spots of land, of which they would be, of course, the entire owners; and the great body of the manufacturers would also be capitalists as well as labourers, each man owning his own little stock to enable him to work. Though the interest of such men, working for themselves, would lead them to exert all their energies to increase their enjoyments,—which they could only do by increasing their production, part of which, for their own convenience, necessarily becomes fixed or accumulated, and is called capital;—although they would accumulate *much more* capital than would be done by unequal distribution; yet, does it not follow that their *absolute* accumulation of capital should be great. That depends on the quantity of materials afforded by nature, on the knowledge possessed by the community, on the tools and machines to work with, and the skill of operation to employ all these to advantage. Whatever be the state of these things, whether deficient or flourishing, the increase of capital will, under all variations, be infinitely greater where the enjoyments and the skill of nearly the whole community are on the alert for its accumulation, than where the grandeur of a few capi-

talists only is interested to increase their display, at the expense of the comforts, and to the depression of the energies, of the rest of the community. Whatever may be the state as to knowledge, &c., the accumulation will be immeasurably greater, or where the capital is widely distributed, or where the productive labourers are capitalists, than where capital is confined to the hands of a few. Without knowledge and materials, as on the mountains of Iceland or Greenland, even security and just distribution could not do much; while insecurity would make the desolation of man equal to that of nature. So immense, under favourable circumstances of materials, skill, knowledge, &c., and under the shield of equal security maintained by giving free scope to the natural laws of distribution, is the progress of the accumulation of capital, that in one generation, along the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, in the American United States, inclosures, villages, manufactures, towns, *whole states*, have been created by labour. These constitute the wealth of a country, in whatever hands, whether in those of the few or the many, they may be placed; while the quantum of happiness depends on the distribution. The same lands, under Spanish insecurity and immense land-owners and capitalists, had slumbered unproductive for ages. These are the extremes, it is true, of the operation of the two principles; but let us ever bear in mind, that, in exact proportion as we follow the dictates of the one or the other, will the result be; both in happiness and accumulation.

“But how,” it will be asked, “could great manufactures and great enterprises of commerce be carried on without great capitalists?” It is great *capitals* that are wanted for some few undertakings, not great *capitalists*. Provided the capital is produced, it signifies not whether it comes out of one or fifty hands. Capital being every where diffused by security, a hundred or a thousand shares would be raised for any useful purpose, among shrewd and active men; and

those in whom they had the most confidence would conduct the concern as long as the conductors retained that confidence: and those conductors would esteem themselves amply recompensed by a remuneration equal or very little superior to that of their associates, in addition to the gratification of the esteem, as evinced by the trust reposed in them by these their associates and equals. If the operation were in a manufacturing establishment, the joint-stock would buy the machinery and erect the buildings; or the one or the other might be hired from those who had made them. Ordinary manufacturing establishments requiring but moderate capital would be carried on, as now, by individuals. Whether the subscribers to the joint-stock would receive their shares of yearly benefit from the concern in the shape of wages, or profits, would be quite immaterial to the community. It could only be received in the shape of increased wages where all of the contributors were employed in the manufacture. Such establishments would be an efficient check on the efforts of great capitalists—of whom very few could exist, from the eternal competition of intelligent men with small capitals—to depress injuriously the wages of labour. Where the manufacture was such that each productive labourer could finish at home a part of the fabric, he would purchase the materials, in whatever state of preparation, and sell them, when completed, either to the consumer, if the market were small, or to a factor, if the markets were remote, and it required skill to select them.

Where the establishment was one of commerce, particularly of foreign commerce, a larger capital would be required, and the concern would most frequently be conducted by individual hands, or by a few, from a peculiar knowledge of the wants and productions of remote nations which such business requires, and which industrious producers have not facilities to acquire. Where a foreign trade—which very seldom happens—could not be carried on without larger capitals than the union of a few individuals

in a mercantile house would produce, resort would be had to shares, as in the case of manufactures; and all the spare capital of the thriving producers would naturally employ itself in this way, when holding out higher inducements than the employing of the same capital in internal improvements—mines, canals, bridges, and such works—whether to facilitate universal industry and interchange, or to advance a particular branch of industry. The savings of prudent sharp-sighted men, like these industrious producers, would not be rashly adventured in foreign speculation, till everything around them, at home, was assuming the features of garden culture, and domestic comfort. The real internal happiness of the members of such a community, depending on increased production, and consumption, and freedom, and activity of interchange, would not be sacrificed to the glittering display of a forced foreign trade. No laws on the subject would be necessary; the interest and intelligence of the industrious would produce the result in the most useful manner. A working, thinking, people, would not be led astray by projects in the air, but would exercise a deliberate judgment. On the other hand, when a fair prospect of success presented itself, they would cheerfully embark, anxious to exchange the surplus productions of their community, for whatever useful articles any other nation could produce at less cost of useful labour. These voluntary associations of small capitalists would be dependent on no bounties, would demand no monopoly or exclusive protection; the meanest individual in the state might enter into active competition with them—a check necessary to their own interest, their own good management, if not called for by still higher considerations.

An admirable effect arising from these joint-associations of numerous small masses of capital,—whether in the line of manufactures or commerce,—would be, that they would act as *insurance companies*, guarantying from utter loss, and possible misery, those hardy pioneers of industry and prosperity who first essay unexplored roads. In case of

failure, even complete, which would seldom occur, the loss to each contributor would be but small and retrievable; and the splendid wealth of a great capitalist of to-day would not be followed, not only by his own destruction, but that of numbers connected with him, to-morrow.

Thus, by the operation of these numerous circumstances, is the capital of the community rapidly accumulated in masses the most favourable to enjoyment, and all pernicious inequality is prevented, simply by not imposing restraint, or, in other words, by following the natural laws of distribution.

Under the depressing competition of producers, engendered by the present system of insecurity, the employers are self-punished. Their calculation is, that whatever can be saved from the labourers will go to enrich themselves. This might be the case if man were a machine like the loom, uninfluenced by moral, and operated upon by mechanical, causes, alone. The production being, then, a given quantity, whatever the employers took, the sum total of the produce would not be lessened. But this is not the case: man is liable to more, and more subtle, agencies, than the mere machine. Suppose him to be producing abundantly—deprive him by restraint, by plunder, legal or otherwise, by grave regulation, of half the produce of his labour, and the amount of the whole produce begins immediately to decrease. The motives of enjoyment and independence, which led him to improve his skill and sharpen all his faculties, have ceased to exist; he is dissatisfied, careless, hopeless; he works no more with the usual alacrity, the produce is for another; he is jealous and envious of that other; he looks on his employer as his enemy, and grudgingly gives him extorted labour; he has no pleasure, because he has no interest, in seeing admirably finished work; as the object of the employer is to extort as much from him as possible, it becomes his fixed policy to give as little and as bad work, and to idle as much as possible. Thus is the whole quan-

tity produced, always lessened by every increase of the short-sighted avarice of the employers. Too ignorant or too selfish to see the real causes (want, in various ways, of security) of the falling off of the produce, they impute it to the awkwardness, the ignorance, the perverseness of the labourers—to that ignorance, perverseness, and awkwardness, which were their own work. Production goes on decreasing; the lower the wages, the less valuable, even compared with the wages, the work done. The productive labourers are miserable, and the employers are punished. Instead of seeing the real causes of the mischief, they exclaim against the idleness, the dishonesty, the depravity of the labourers; and force, the ready and eternal resort of ignorance, is employed, to repress the vices and keep down the demand for unmerited high wages for such men. As the employers have influence in making the laws, and the productive labourers have none, new restrictions, new penal laws, more barbarous and absurd than the preceding, are enacted; and the employers are forced to console themselves with the exercise of vexatious tyranny in lieu of their decayed profits. Meantime the producers take measures to defeat these iniquitous laws; they endeavour by a counter-force to make head against the violences instituted against them; they resort to plots and combinations of violence, to defeat the violence of power, which seeks, under the name of law, to repress their spirit, and, with their spirit, their industry, for ever. They endeavour, by unjust violence towards their own members, and sullen threats against their employers, to keep down the depressing competition of low wages. They follow the vile example, which, by *ex parte* laws of their own making, their employers give them, of issuing decrees forcibly to regulate the wages of labour. While the laws of the state and of corporations keep down labour, the laws of their little associations endeavour to support it. Regulations of the most vexatious description, and summary punishments, the most brutal, are enforced by them, to

uphold their wages. The law punishes the productive labourer who will not work for the regulated hire; the combination law punishes him who dares to work under the wages regulated by the mechanics themselves. Thus is a community converted into a theatre of war; hostile camps of the employers and labourers are everywhere formed; and that alacrity and energy which, under the influence of equal security, are expended in multiplying productions by means of increased knowledge, skill, and application, are here devoted to contrive the means of mutual annoyance and persecution, legal or not legal; and, in the mutual rage of the parties, not only capital, but lives are sacrificed; capital, the means of reproduction and enjoyment, is wantonly consumed by fanatic ignorance; and murders, in spite of the law, and by the law, are committed, to revenge the alleged injustice of the parties on each other. Such is the state to which society is reduced, under the depressing competition for low wages. When these counteracting measures of violence are not pursued by the productive labourers to counteract the legal robberies and violence of the selfish and short-sighted employers, the labourers of a community sink into listless wretchedness; and industry and prosperity are banished, with the freedom of exertion and of competition, that are necessary for their development.

It is evident, then, that the depressing competition of labourers for lowness of wages, whether it ends in the annihilation of all hope and exertion, or in the establishment of counter-combinations and mutual rancour and violence between the labourers and employers, is almost equally fatal to the hope of accumulating capital. The labourers look with an evil eye on the accumulations of the capitalist; the capitalists survey with jealousy the savings of the poor. The competition of low wages, or decreased remuneration, is as unfriendly to the accumulation of capital, as the exhilarating competition for increased remuneration, by means of increased and superior productions,

is favourable to it. An equal and uniform regard to the natural laws of distribution, "free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges," will, alone, ensure the greatest accumulation, as well as the greatest production of wealth, by upholding everywhere the exhilarating, to the exclusion of the depressing, competition for wages. So natural is the presumption in favour of the tendency of excessive wealth, to accumulate capital beyond the tendency to the same effect of the natural laws of distribution, as well from the more glaring effect of large, though thinly scattered, masses on the eye, as from the sympathy of all the aspirants to wealth, in favour of the envied holders of these large masses, that too much care cannot be taken to counteract, by exposing, so very common and so very pernicious an error.

SECTION 3.

MORAL BENEFITS OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION.

The great and paramount moral blessing, consequent on equal security, produced by the natural laws of distribution, is, *that excessive poverty and excessive wealth being removed from society, the peculiar vices of luxury and want would almost cease.* The vices of the very poor and the vices of the very rich, mutually productive of each other, and necessarily generated by the circumstances surrounding each of the classes, are the great moral sources of human misery. The middle class, those who are above want and not exposed to luxury, are comparatively, and many of them absolutely, moral, commanding their own passions, and endeavouring to diffuse happiness around them. If the middle classes are not, in most communities, as perfect as the theory of their situation would make them, the reason is, that they live in the midst of, and of course exposed to, the contaminating atmosphere and the touch of the vices of both poor and rich. The rich above, and the poor below, court their imitation of hetero-

geneous follies and vices ; and having themselves, in common with all the rich, at longer or shorter intervals, necessarily sprung from the poor, many of them have been educated, more or less, in their peculiar vices. And yet, from the mere circumstance of an approach to equality in their condition—that equality brought about and maintained by their own continued exertions—they are justly spoken of as the class that supplies the materials for whatever of commanding intellect, attractive virtue, and persevering activity, society can boast.

What was mentioned above as to *crimes*, may be repeated here as to *virtues* and *vices*. As most of the crimes that desolate society have their origin in excessive inequality of wealth, the greater part of them emanating from the continued or sudden pressure of poverty and wretchedness, so do most of the virtues and vices of men proceed from the same source. All crimes are vices ; that is to say, no actions *ought to be* declared crimes by the law, and marked out for punishment, which were not vicious antecedently to the law, which were not productive of preponderant mischief to society. And, moreover, those vices *only*, which are at the same time the *most mischievous*, and the punishment of which, would not bring after it a train of evils, preponderating even over the mischief of the vices, ought to be erected into crimes. Thus necessarily limited, we see, at once, how impotent are the mere restraints of law, to generate a virtuous community. Very few are the actions which it can regulate. By attempting too much, by its eternal restraints, it has hitherto done more to perpetuate poverty, vice, and wretchedness amongst mankind, than to produce good. Henceforward, guided by the best wisdom of the age and nation, continually improving, and, therefore, changing, like the other sciences directed to the impartial production of happiness, under the system of representation, it will become the beneficent guardian of every blessing, rather than the stern avenger of crime,—the jailer of exclusive privileges and usurpations.

How should the wretchedly poor be virtuous? Who cares about them? What character have they to lose? What hold has public opinion on their actions? What care *they* for the delicate pleasures of reputation, who are tormented by the gnawings of absolute want? How should they respect the property or rights of others, who have none of their own to beget a sympathy for those who suffer by their privation? How can they feel for others' woes, for others' passing-light complaints, who are tormented by their own substantial miseries? The mere mention of the trivial inconveniences of others, insults, and excites the indignation, instead of calling forth their complacent sympathies. Cut off from the decencies, the comforts, the necessities of life, want begets ferocity. If they turn round, they find many in the same situation with themselves, partaking of their feelings of isolation from kindly sympathies with the happy. They become a public to each other, a public of suffering, of discontent, and ignorance; they form a public opinion of their own, in contempt of the public opinion of the rich; whom, and their laws, they look upon as the result of force alone. From whom are the wretched to learn the principles, while they never see the practice, of morality? of respect for the security of others?—from their superiors? from the laws? The conduct of their superiors, the operations of the laws, have been one practical lesson towards them, of force, of restraint, of taking away, without their consent, without any equivalent, the fruits of their labour. Of what avail are words, or precepts, or commands, when opposed, when belied, by example? These can never supply *motives* to virtuous conduct. Motives arise from *things*, from *surrounding circumstances*, not from the idleness of words and empty declamation. Words are only useful to convey and impress a knowledge of these things and circumstances. If these states of things do not exist, words are mere mockery.

In all points the reverse, would be the morals of the

industrious producers of a community, who were taught from their childhood,—not by vain words, but by facts,—respect for the security and comfort of others, by the undeviating respect paid by the law, and all around them, to their own security. Enjoying the full produce of their labour, nothing being taken from them without a fair equivalent, they would respect the acquisitions of others. Their wants satisfied, they would esteem it a wrong that others should be distressed, and would feel it soothing to their injured feelings to relieve them. The temptations to theft, to fraud, and lying, being removed, these vices would not be necessary, and would not be practised. There would be no public opinion of suffering, to wage war against the public opinion of the well-fed and the powerful. Vice would find no sympathy, because it would be the interest of no one to shelter it. Kindly feelings and beneficent conduct would expand. The sphere of enjoyment, like the heat of the sun, would be multiplied a hundred-fold by the reflections from the cheerful hearts and smiling countenances of encircling happiness. Virtue would consist in blessing, and being blessed; and all voluntary, useless mortification would be spurned as insanity. But, as self-restraint is indispensable to real permanent happiness, men, intent on obtaining it, would look anxiously into all the remotest *consequences* of their actions; they would investigate the effect on happiness of every *habit* which they might form; and would acquire such dispositions of fortitude, self-command, and universal sympathy, as would render them capable, and, therefore, deserving, of happiness, in any possible state of existence. Industry, the daughter of equal security, supported by labour, and enlightened by knowledge, would be held in universal honour. *Not* to labour, *not* to contribute to the grand mass of human weal, would become a matter of shame, of reproach: not to be usefully employed, whether through the mind or the hand, in the production of satisfactory equivalents for existence, would be as discreditable

—though in some cases accumulated wealth might render such labour not necessary to existence—as it is now fashionable, to lead a life of trifling, vicious, idleness. Every active talent, every research, every speculation tending to usefulness, would be nursed into life. Knowledge of the mind would be in demand, as skill in the hand, and all other useful faculties. Ease of circumstances would enable all to afford an equivalent for the elements of knowledge by means of education. Knowledge would no longer be monopolised to support the power and wealth of a few, but would be diffused, like cheap cottons, as one of the means of happiness to all.

Equal security being incompatible with excessive wealth, activity of mind and body being in honour, the vices peculiar to wealth would almost disappear. Heartless, impotent, unenjoying sensuality, would be left without the materials for its wretched excesses. Temperance would be proved, by the most vulgar arithmetic, to be the means of adding an hundred-fold, both in intensity and duration, to all our pleasures, even moral or intellectual, as well as physical. No stupid admiration of mere glittering, useless trappings of wealth, would be seen; utility would be the touchstone of everything. The excessive and voracious pursuit of wealth, as the mere means of influencing the minds of others, without reference to its peculiar enjoyments, would be deemed a ridiculous disease; for its powers of influencing, alone, without appropriate moral or mental qualities, would be gone. Pride, caprice, and oppression, would find no congenial soil to take root, in the midst of a society of active, intelligent, and independent men. Those of the rich, not usefully employed from higher motives, would be shamed into some line of active emulation. Their leisure time would be devoted to preparing themselves for the high duties of legislators, judges, teachers, or to extending the bounds of science, or improving the processes of the arts; or, by the cheap performance of those honourable duties, requiring intellec-

tual activity alone, they would reduce to the lowest the expenses of government and instruction.

In such a state of society, what food would be left to nourish the ambitious aspirations of any lover of mere power or splendour? To obtain the approbation and admiration of their industrious and independent fellow-citizens, will be the object of the lives of those who seek public employment; for on the suffrages of such men will the nomination to public employments directly or indirectly depend. And are such a community likely to be dazzled by the display of splendid vices, by mere theatrical exhibitions of oriental baubles, without use, sparkling stones and brilliant tissues? Are such men likely to lend themselves to be made the instruments, the tools, of ambitious plotters? What motive could be held out to them? They are not starving; and the risk of punishment, or even disgrace, would a thousand times outweigh any promised hope of pay or plunder. They cannot be oppressed, while the products of their labour and the free use of their faculties are secured to them by the laws. The very basis on which the community rests, the foundation of their industry, the first principle of their morals, is voluntariness and satisfactory equivalents for everything. And amidst such men, will *force* be an instrument likely to overawe or to dazzle? Will not the very name of its employment be so odious, as to brand with the epithets of fools or madmen those who dream of wielding it in contempt of the overwhelming strength of all the community.

A view of the effects, economical, political, and moral, arising more or less directly from undeviating adherence to the natural laws of distribution, might be pursued at great length, as their operation includes and affects almost the whole of human actions and institutions. Enough perhaps to have pointed out here their most obvious and striking effects. It is not pretended they would remove vice, remove crime, remove moral misery, and thus make

human associations or communities paradises of the poets ; still less that they would remove physical evils, any more than they could banish occasional monstrous productions of organisation. But they would reduce all these evils to their lowest term ; would render uncommon and disreputable those vices which are now supported by circles of perverted interests ; would lay the basis for permanent and always advancing ameliorations ; would elevate the great mass of a community into industrious, intelligent, moral, and happy beings ; and would multiply inconceivably the chances of superior virtues and talents, to make tributary new portions of matter and energies of nature to human enjoyment, tending to raise man to a situation a thousand times perhaps more elevated beyond what he now is, than his present state in civilised life surpasses that of the wretched savages living on the raw fish of the shores of New Holland, or in New Zealand devouring each other.

One cheering circumstance, above all, attends the improvements in human affairs brought about by the just, or what we have called the natural, in opposition to the forced or factitious, distribution of wealth. Whatever advance is made must be permanent ; there can be no retrograde movements to poverty, vice, and degradation. The change being founded on the interest of the individual members of the community, not on enthusiasm, force, or terror, and the natural laws of distribution once in operation ensuring their own preservation, there can be no fear of losing the benefits gained. Hitherto, by neglecting this enduring basis of social institutions, the establishment of partial good has been but temporary. Without the natural distribution of wealth, without the greatest possible equality of wealth consistent with security, it is impossible that representative institutions should long continue. Ancient legislators, aware of this truth, but not knowing the natural means of inducing, without force and by means of equal security, that basis of equality which they wished, adopted the strange and tremendous error of

instituting *forced* equality, of founding liberty on slavery, industry on eternal violations of security, the happiness of the citizens on the subjection or degradation of all excluded from that title. Such heterogeneous elements necessarily produced eternal conflicts. The representative system, the inevitable consequence of the establishment of equal security, was unknown. So intimately connected and dependent on each other are these two great blessings,—equal security and representative or self-government,—that the establishment of the one necessarily includes that of the other: the penalty, at all events, of not adopting the one, is the loss of the other. Without equal security, representative government cannot continue; without representative government, security cannot continue. The principle of insecurity, involuntariness, and plunder, is essential to monarchy, aristocracy, and any mixture of them; pure representative government alone is compatible with security.

It is time to notice an objection which will be made to the laws of free labour and voluntary exchange; an objection, however, which, it will be seen, becomes another instance of their useful operation.

“If acquisition, by means of *free labour* and *voluntary exchanges*,” it will be said, “be the sole useful, and therefore the sole just and moral, title to the possession of the articles of wealth, or property, what is to protect the actual possessors of wealth, particularly of masses of hereditary land, in the enjoyment of their revenues? Would not such principles unhinge the rights of property?”

The consequence following from these natural laws of distribution as to the absolute nullity of *original title*, or right, on the part of the acquirers by force or fraud,—by any means but those of free labour or voluntary exchanges,—to the parcels of lands, coins, or other commodities which they or their descendants may possess, is admitted in its fullest extent; and this principle is made the basis of

all future, as it ought to have been of all past, acquisition. But such concession as to the nullity of *original right*, can decide nothing as to the expediency of upholding or interfering with the present, the actual distribution. To support property acquired without force or fraud, the *utility of the acquisition* is sufficient: no benefits to society, as has been proved, can at all come in competition with those resulting from the protection of such acquisitions, by adhering to the simple, natural rules of distribution.

But, to support property acquired by force or fraud, by robbery, on a larger or a smaller scale, by any other means than those of labour, skill, exchange for a satisfactory equivalent, or free gift, requires a longer and more intricate process. The *utility of the actual distribution* must, in such cases, be proved, in defect of the utility of the original acquisition or original right. It must be proved that all evils of insecurity arising from the original injustice of the acquisition, have ceased to exist; that such voluntary transfers have been made, such habits formed, such expectations excited, amongst the present possessors, as more than to counterbalance the extinguished evil of original injustice and of any other existing mischiefs which such possessions may cause to society. We are now speaking, not of rules to guide lawyers, but of the supreme laws of morality for the guidance of legislators. If the evils of the original injustice have ceased to exist, if no peculiar injury is caused to the structure or frame of society, or social institutions, by these masses of property more than by others, the right to the enjoyment of them ought to be equally upheld by society. But as it is impossible that enormous masses of wealth could have been got together and perpetuated by individuals without the aid of law, or of vicious institutions made and perpetuated, whether by law or custom, supporting force or fraud; it becomes the imperative duty of every community to root out of their laws and institutions whatever may have this injurious tendency, interfering with the natural laws of

distribution. For any loss arising from the simple withdrawing of protection to force or fraud, no compensation should be made, any more than for the abolition of the right of the few to assault the many; because no compensation could be given by the community without preponderant mischief, without increasing excessive wealth and its pernicious influence, and without continuing under another name the previous robbery of the community, out of whose future labour alone the compensation could come. Were the strict rules of equal justice followed, compensation should rather be made to the injured for past wrong; but as the very magnitude of the wrong would make that impossible, and as the demand would lead only to the perpetuating of malignant passions, it is more useful, and therefore more just, to forget the past, except as a guide to the future.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE ACQUISITION AND DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE, AS ONE OF THE MEANS OF INCREASING PRODUCTION AND ENJOYMENT, AND SECURING THE PERMANENCE OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION.

HITHERTO, in speaking of labour, we have always included in that term the quantity of knowledge requisite for its direction. Without this knowledge, it would be no more than brute force directed to no useful purpose. In whatever proportion knowledge is possessed, whether in whole or in part, by the productive labourer, or by him who directs his labour, it is necessary, in order to make his labour productive, that some person should possess it. In the subdivisions of occupations, and of labour itself, it becomes at times so separated from labour in complicated society, that we must consider it apart, in order to estimate its relation to the production of wealth and happiness, and to guard against the mischiefs to which even this noble instrument has been perverted.

Without a certain portion of knowledge men cannot live; at least they cannot live in larger numbers than the scanty produce of the chase, or fishing, or of wild fruits or roots, disputed with the lower animals, and spread over a boundless tract of land, can supply; and even so to continue existence, requires as much knowledge as the lower animals possess, or rather more, to make up for the deficiency of strength in man. To enable men to live in numbers, in society, they must either domesticate animals, if those fit for the purpose are near them, or must learn the art of raising and protecting, by inclosures or otherwise, the fruits of the earth. For either of these purposes *knowledge* is required, to guide labour to production. By this first acquisition of knowledge, man saves his race

from wretchedness and perhaps annihilation; and with less labour, and less painful labour, enjoys a happier existence. Food and shelter are the two great means of comfort, as well as of existence, to man. Shelter is stationary, as of huts or houses; or accompanying the person, as clothes. As man suffers pain from various circumstances and incidents, he naturally endeavours to remove them, or to obviate their effects; as he gets the experience of new means of enjoyment, he endeavours to secure, to perpetuate, or to enlarge them. Hence his observation and invention are again called into activity, to devise the most durable and agreeable modes of supplying his food and shelter. This leads to further acquisition of knowledge, of the qualities and uses of bodies, called, when acting on an extended scale or with great effect, the powers or energies of nature, as well as of the *laws* of nature. The man of knowledge and the productive labourer come to be widely divided from each other; and knowledge, instead of remaining the handmaid of labour in the hand of the labourer to increase his productive powers, to guide its distribution so as to raise to the highest its capacity of giving enjoyment, has almost everywhere arrayed itself against labour, not only concealing its treasures from the labourers, but systematically deluding and leading them astray, in order to render their muscular powers entirely mechanical and obedient. It could not be expected, while these multifarious branches of knowledge were being acquired by man, setting out from the post of mere helpless ignorance, that he should have been able to raise himself at once to the calm and lofty examination of the direction of all these means of happiness, of all the propensities of the beings like himself surrounding him, to the production of the greatest possible quantity of enjoyment for all.

In the earlier stages of society, labour and knowledge naturally accompany each other. The most intelligent becomes the most industrious, to turn his knowledge to

account. The perfection of civilisation will reunite labour and knowledge. In the course of the progress from rudeness to civilisation, it was perhaps unavoidable, it was certainly quite natural, that labour and knowledge should be widely separated; the processes of labour became more varied and complicated, and required more of nicety and skill; the progress of knowledge embraced more objects, and required more time and attention for its acquisition. In the earlier stages of society, labour and knowledge accompanied each other, because they were both simple and easily understood. In improved civilisation, under the influence of perfect security, they will again re-unite, improved and mature, to part no more, because the happiness of all demands it; and because the very progress and development of the social art has unfolded the *means*.

This intimate union between knowledge and labour, or industry, becomes the more indispensable, when we reflect on the great tendency of impartial security to produce *happiness*, both directly and indirectly, by the great abundance and equality of wealth to which it leads. Perhaps the very establishment of perfect and equal security, pre-supposes such an advance in civilisation and social science, such an ample experience of the results of past combinations, that the very same wisdom that establishes the natural laws of distribution will necessarily be able to obviate all causes counteracting their continuance.

Assuredly the community that is wise enough to establish, from a conviction of their utility, the natural laws of distribution, will also be wise enough to diffuse and perpetuate, through all its members, that knowledge, which is essential to its support. Let us see what the *means* are by which this is to be accomplished; and what are the *effects* to be expected from knowledge, on the production and distribution of wealth, and on the happiness thence resulting. We may observe as to the effects of knowledge, or the modes in which it would operate, that it is in three ways intimately connected with our subject:—

It devises the means of constantly improving the arts, rendering labour more productive in quantity, or quality, of its productions, or in both, and thus indefinitely increasing wealth as a means of enjoyment.

It indefinitely increases the enjoyment to be derived from these materials of wealth, by teaching the effects of food, air, heat, &c., on our bodies, and the mutual effects of the actions and passions of ourselves and others, on each other and ourselves, ensuring the practice of prudence, comprehending self-restraint, fortitude, and benevolence.

It keeps the blessings of equal security from the natural laws of distribution constantly under the mental contemplation of the members of the community, and thus renders any retrograde movement to insecurity, misery, and vice, impossible.

Such are the certain effects of knowledge as it relates to wealth. No one will probably contend that knowledge, diffused amongst the members of a community, living under the natural laws of distribution, would produce any other effects than these, or to the exclusion of these. We come, then, to the means by which this desirable distribution of knowledge, as well as of wealth, is to be accomplished. There are three obvious modes of diffusing knowledge, constituted as communities now are.

The first is by means of *institutions* ; which form that state of things and of action surrounding individuals, begetting their *habits*, and the information connected with them.

The second is by means of *writings*, or *discourses*, private or public, addressed to the *adult population*, or any portion thereof.

The third is by means of *education*, addressed almost exclusively to the *young*.

SECTION 2.

OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AS ONE OF THE MEANS OF DIFFUSING OR SUPPRESSING KNOWLEDGE.

Of all the means of diffusing useful knowledge, that which effects it by domestic, political, or other social institutions, when those institutions are founded on reason and truth, is the most certain in its operation, and the most permanent. As far as it goes, it is the most complete instrument, preserving itself by its own operation; but its operation has been hitherto very limited as to extent of knowledge; more frequently, indeed, it has served to corrupt, to extinguish, or to shut out knowledge from the productive and useful members of a community. Under the head of institutions are comprehended all the tactics and operations of domestic, religious, and political establishments, all the circumstances and states of things arising from these, by which men are surrounded, and in the midst of which they have been brought up and live; reading, and writing, and what is commonly called education, in its limited sense, being excluded. Let an English child be sent, at a year old, to Turkey, and a child of the same age from Egypt, or Asia Minor, to England. The young Mussulman, on being settled in an English family, mingles with all its daily household scenes. It imitates the actions, it acquires the sentiments, by degrees it joins in the occupations of those around it. Whatever knowledge is required in the practice of the arts which it is taught, it becomes possessed of; and this knowledge, thus daily learnt and practised, and combined with so many associations, becomes fixed and indelible. *Habits* of activity, of industry, of cleanliness, of truth, of temperance, of sobriety, of honesty, of mutual kindness,—or the reverse of all these,—are formed by imitation, and by the influence of the opinion, leading to the good or ill offices, of those around it. The conduct and opinions, again, of those

around it, are necessitated chiefly by the comfort or wretchedness in which they live, arising from the wise or unwise distribution of wealth. Whatever places of worship its guardians frequented, it would frequent; whatever ceremonies or forms of a religious, legal, or social nature it witnessed habitually, would operate on its mind, in common with those of its associates. The rewards and punishments, private or legal, would operate variously on its mind, as mildness or barbarity prevailed. Again, according to the different station in life in which it was brought up, it would assume a peculiarity of character, from peculiarity of situation and circumstances. As it grew up, it would share, if a man, in all the political combinations which its station, under the arbitrary regulations of society, permitted. Thus would the sentiments, the habits, and the knowledge of the Christian citizen of Britain, be acquired by the transplanted infant of Mahometanism, simply by the operation of the surrounding *institutions*, without any education of books when young, or of discourses, oral or written, when advanced to manhood.

The young Christian transported to Turkey, would, *by a similar process*, become as certainly a sincere follower of the last and greatest of the Prophets, as the young Mussulman had become the disciple of Jesus and of Christian establishments. *There is but one God*, would resound on all sides; and with this would be associated an undefined horror of those monsters who worshipped three gods, or divided or compounded the Divine nature. Thus initiated as soon as it can articulate, the young transported Christian partakes of the meals, observes the ceremonies, witnesses and joins in the daily pursuits of the family with which it lives. Its opinions are formed by those of its elders around. Whatever it sees done, it imitates; whatever is thought right to be done by others, it is by it, also, the most helpless and ignorant, thought right to be done. It mingles in the pursuits, it shares in the pleasures, it participates in the sympathies of its associates.

The young Mussulman sees what is called justice arbitrarily administered ; and always in the habit of witnessing the giving of presents to propitiate the judge, he never doubts the propriety, or inquires into the effects, of these presents, any more than the uneducated Briton does into the similar effects of law-taxes and expenses in Britain. He sees no responsibility on the part of those entrusted with power ; he contracts the notion, that irresponsibility towards those over whom it is exercised is a necessary appendage of power ; and force soon constitutes right in his mind. Responsibility and equal justice unknown, the young Mussulman feels no check to the exercise of every impetuous passion as years develop them within him ; he imitates in this respect his associates, and, with the scimitar and the turban, he puts on the ignorance, the ferocity, and the whole character of the Turk.

We may suppose a third case. Suppose a child, no matter whether Christian, Turk, or prematurely devoted to the Grand Lama, to be introduced into a community of rational beings living under the influence of equal security. He sees every person enjoying the produce of his labour ; he sees nothing taken from any person without a satisfactory equivalent. He is thus imbued, as his life lengthens year by year, with the first principles of justice ; he is taught an industrious employment ; he respects industry, he respects peaceful labour, because he sees them practised and respected on account of the benefits they produce. Every one around him practises honesty and speaks truth, because the motives to dishonesty and falsehood are removed, from the easy mode of satisfying want by means of industrious pursuits ; falsehood being merely an auxiliary vice to facilitate unjust acquisitions. The neatness, the order, the skill, practised by those around him, he sees and imitates. He partakes of all the feelings of the family, and the associates with whom he lives ; but as all force is excluded, and voluntariness is requisite in every transaction respecting the objects of wealth, so—

naturally and necessarily—is the same principle extended to every operation of the mind. Though he participates, therefore, in the feelings of others, he also learns by degrees to *judge* of them; that is to say, of their propriety, and the consequences of indulging in them. As he grows up, he is called to partake in all the institutions, political, judicial, administrative, of the community. These call forth the exercise of his faculties; and the power they give him, and his mode of exercising them, render him to himself, as well as to others, an object of respect. He feels the force, he partakes in the awarding, of *public opinion*. It becomes a new incentive to the practice of industry, and of everything deemed reputable. To whatever line of active exertion, whether intellectual, or in the way of the fine or the more useful arts, accidental circumstances or peculiar aptitude may lead him, he devotes his pleased attention, supported by the universal activity around, by the disreputableness of idleness, by the happiness of useful activity, and by the elevating approbation of an intelligent and virtuous community. Living in such a community, where the influence of mere wealth was reduced, from the equality of fortunes, to its lowest level; where public opinion became the substitute for the influence of wealth, and where talents and virtues were the essential means of attaining public approbation, who shall limit the excellence to which the pupil of such a state of things, domestic and political, may attain, in whatever pursuit he follows? Must not his life, in such a community, be as useful as happy?

Such is the mode of conveying knowledge and forming character, by means of *institutions* alone, without any regular preceptors, without any systematic instruction. As we find that errors of judgment, antipathies, and vices of conduct, formed in this way until manhood, are, for the most part, indelible through life, though opposed by the clearest demonstrations of reason and interest; the *habit* being once formed and become a part of the agent,

we must see the immense efficacy of the mere establishment of the principle of security in forming the characters, the intellectual and moral habits of a community. But would the natural laws of distribution, if once established, and if in all branches of their legislation and conduct respected by any community, be self-sufficient? adequate to their own support? Ought nothing more to be done in the way of diffusing knowledge, by such a community, beyond the establishment of the facilities and inducements for acquiring it, which such a state of things would present.

By the governing part of a community, even where security prevailed, except at the immediate requisition of their constituents, nothing more ought to be done. By the intelligent members themselves of the community a vast deal more ought to be done, and would in the present state of information be done, both in the diffusion of knowledge to the adults, and in the education, or training, of the young. The reasons are these. The free inquiry resulting from security, would always bring forth, without any interference of the government, whatever useful knowledge was possessed on any interesting subject by any member of the community, from the desire of doing good, of reputation, of swaying the public opinion, of the love of truth, and, in many cases, of pecuniary profit. The interference of mere power is always uncongenial to the interests of truth, which should stand on its own merits alone. When pretending to prop truth by its authority, the exercise of power creates a bias, a disturbance of mind, necessarily pernicious, because not produced by any additional evidence appropriate to the case. In upholding equal security, equal freedom of thought, of expression, and of action, the government does all that it can usefully do towards the enlargement of the bounds of knowledge, or its diffusion amongst adults.

Of the two great branches of human knowledge, physics and morals, the one is absolutely arrested in its

growth by government interference. On this, the moral branch, the guidance of the actions of men, every government supposes itself perfect, as in law, religion, morality, political economy, &c. They frequently persecute and punish, whether directly, by the infliction of evil, or indirectly, by withholding benefits,* those who presume, not only to make improvements, but to *think* differently from what they have established. Their interest being in this department opposed to all change, their interference must be always, and in the highest degree, pernicious ; but, as to physics, it is their interest (when they are sane enough to see it) that those subject to them should be as knowing, as skilful, and as productive as possible, of the means of enjoyment, for *their use*. Still, notwithstanding the interest of governments, and their love of glory, even physical knowledge is everywhere repressed by them. Certain systems must be taught and learned. Utility is not the touchstone of what they disseminate. Teachers, well paid and indolent, are jealous of the unlicensed, meddling with their pursuits ; and odium is by them always directed to innovation. In consequence, the truth is, that almost all advances, even in physical science, and almost all efforts to diffuse knowledge, by publications immensely varied, have been the work of volunteer labourers, in every part of Europe. Were nothing known, or nothing diffused, but what these establishments effected or permitted, we should be now in little better than the darkness of the middle ages. These establishments have been reluctantly dragged on by the spirit and improvements of these later times.

Let us reflect for a moment on the immense effect, hitherto too lightly considered, of mere *institutions* in forming the human character, entirely independent of literary instruction to young or old, rendering men active or indolent, ferocious or gentle, intellectual or brutish, as the train of actions or circumstances dependent on them, varies. If little attention, in proportion to their importance, has been bestowed on the effects now every day

producing, and in past times produced, by these manufacturing engines of human character; still less thought has been directed to the immense benefits which social institutions, in accordance with the principle of security, must, henceforth, inevitably produce on all human beings, self-subjected to their beneficent influence.

An objection must here be obviated, though coming from those who have, of all men, the least right to make it. The supporters of old institutions (all of them founded on the principle of force—force in levying the means of their existence—compulsion in rendering necessary the assent to certain opinions) object to the improvement of the human character by means of institutions, as tending to drill men into machines.

It is freely admitted that, were this *moral* objection well founded, there could be no advantage produced by the mere multiplication and equal distribution of the objects of wealth, which could be adduced as a set-off against it. The benefits of free exercise of the judgments *of all, on all* propositions, on which they are called upon to entertain any opinion, particularly if that opinion necessarily leads to action, and of perfect voluntariness of action, are so transcendently great, and so equally indispensable to the continuance of wealth, of knowledge, and benevolence, that it is quite evident that any institutions, the support of which implied a dereliction of these advantages, would be too dearly purchased. In as far as any institutions, old or new, require such a sacrifice, they stand plainly condemned by the principles of this inquiry. No institutions are here advocated but such as operate on the *will* of intelligent agents, through their understandings.

Now, as all old institutions, political, social, or domestic, are founded on principles the reverse of these, namely on repressing the exercise of the judgment of those who learn, or who are subjected to them, in deference to the mandates of those who framed them, and in thus leading the will, either by perversion of the understanding or by

absolute compulsion ; it does seem strange that the admirers of such old institutions should perceive and remonstrate against the deformity of their own principles when connected with new institutions.

Human actions are produced by *desires* operating on the *will*. What generates, what gives rise to, these desires? The circumstances surrounding the actors. What is meant by these circumstances? The state of plenty or destitution in which they are placed, with respect to the comforts and conveniences of life, the degree in which they are dependent on the will of others for pleasures or pains. On what, again, do these casualties, wealth or poverty, freedom or slavery, with respect to voluntary actions, depend? On what but on the *institutions*, the different expedients, devised and upheld by the rulers possessing the public force, to maintain wealth and power so distributed as may best coincide with their particular views? By these expedients, or institutions, men's actions are restrained and regulated: to some, power over others is given; from others, all power is taken away—nothing left but the most abject submission, and, attendant on abject submission, abject want.

Various are the institutions or expedients, that men wielding the public force have had resort to, to generate motives for the guidance of the actions of their fellow-creatures in subserviency to their wishes. First of all, are what are called the political institutions, which, in fact, frequently include all the rest. Of these political institutions, that of paramount importance is the determining who are to exercise the powers of governing the community, of making permanent or temporary regulations, applying and executing them, which affect, in every possible way, the industry and the actions of the individuals constituting that community. What is it that renders the law-makers, those who guide the public affairs of communities of men—what makes statesmen, as they are called, men of more comprehensive views, of more improved

intellectual power, than other men excluded from their means of information? What but the habit of exercising these powers? of exercising their judgment on these measures? of learning in the school of legislation and public action—such as they are—what others are excluded from learning? Is it wished to make all mankind as intellectual as these few, in this universally-interesting science? Give them the same opportunities, admit them into the same school, give them a share in the making and the executing of the laws which concern their own welfare; and the same circumstances will give birth to the same results. But do you wish to make the community *at large* much more honest, more moral, than the present race of statesmen? still bring them up in the school of legislation; for on them, as to disposition to promote the public good, must the operation of the circumstances of such a school be altogether different from what they are on *the few* to whom their operation is now exclusively confined; and this without supposing an atom more of inherent tendency to virtue in the many than in the few. Let the many be as blindly determined to pursue their own interest in preference to any other, as the few can be; what is the consequence? If wise enough as to the means, they pursue this interest in the most effectual manner. But what is this interest of the many? 'Tis the very and the sole interest which enlightened wisdom, guided by benevolence, would wish to promote. The many, from the very nature of their feelings, promote, as far as they see how, the only rightful interest, their own. The few, also, pursue their own; but this being opposed to the interest of the many, is the wrongful, the sinister interest, and ought to be repressed. Under the influence of security, the more knowledge every individual in every department possesses, the better; because the more clearly he would see that the actual combination produced more of comfort to all concerned than any other that could be proposed; or, if he could propose any better for the happiness of all, he would feel confident

that it would be adopted. His motives to exertion, instead of being diminished, would be increased by his knowledge; for he would see that industry was as necessary to production as production to happiness, and obedience to the public regulations, ordained by those whom he co-operated to authorise to make them for the good of all, and whose mal-administration he could at all times co-operate to remedy, was but obedience to what he had contributed to establish as most conducive to general good, meaning thereby, the mass of individual good. Those political institutions, then, which are founded on the basis of self-government, by means of representation and election, are the most powerful instruments for diffusing knowledge; in the first instance, of what it most concerns men to know, their moral relations with their fellow-creatures; next, of physical nature, sciences and arts, from excited curiosity and activity; both one and the other species of knowledge called forth from the double operation of these institutions, in producing the best regulations, and in serving as a school for the evolving of virtue and talent from the adult population.

It is a possibility, and but a possibility, and therefore stated that it may not be said to be overlooked, that under the best constitutional code (that which determines who are to co-operate in the making, applying, and executing, public regulations), the worst, or at least very pernicious, regulations may be made. The formation of a wise constitutional code for a great community, requires, perhaps, more comprehension of mind and wisdom of combination, than the formation of any minor regulation. The very same powers of mind applied to the very same objects, must be employed in the one case as in the other. How very improbable, then, that a community, wise enough to adopt the best constitutional code—the most difficult work—should be wanting in wisdom to adopt useful subordinate regulations—matters of less difficulty!

But suppose, notwithstanding the institutions gene-

rated by constitutional laws, that pernicious regulations do exist in a community, such as field or domestic slavery, enormous taxation and a host of revenue laws to maintain it, restrictive systems of commerce, laws of primogeniture, or other laws interfering with the division and free exchanges of property, the exclusion of women from civil, necessarily following their exclusion from equal political, rights, with a hundred other enormities that might be named; we have to inquire what effect these several minor institutions produce as to the diffusion of knowledge and the progress of production.

Under the Turkish system of despotism, blacks and whites, men and women, are impartially, under certain contingencies, converted into articles of wealth under the name of slaves. Under the United States system of liberty, professing to be founded on reason and the equal rights of all men, slavery is established against one great branch of the human race, because they differ in a few physical circumstances, chiefly colour, from those who make them, like horses or dogs, articles of property. What, now, is the effect of such institutions, upheld equally by despots and self-called freemen, on the extension and diffusion of real knowledge, or of such knowledge as tends to add to the powers of production, to render the articles produced more productive of happiness by ameliorating the physical or moral constitution, or to secure the continuance of equal security and the natural laws of distribution? It is a curious fact that the institutions of slavery are apt to be less atrocious under despotism than in free states. Men themselves free, are more atrocious tyrants over their slaves than the slave-owners of despotism. And well are they punished for such foul institutions. All that intellectual energy, which, under other circumstances, would be devoted to the extension of the bounds of knowledge, or the diffusion of what was known in one or other of the three above-mentioned modes, is now necessarily directed to frame and uphold expedients for retaining the

slaves in slavery. What little mental power of observing and judging also is left the slaves, is expended in counter-expedients to lighten their work, or to break their chains. The policy of the slave-owner is of course to keep the slave as ignorant as possible. It would be impossible to devise an institution more destructive of knowledge as to improvements in sciences and arts. How stands it as to improvements in the physical and moral condition of the community? What but mutual alienation, mutual hate, can exist between master and slave, where all is power and enjoyment on the one side, all is forced submission and destitution on the other? Can they be honest, who can have no property, whose labour can acquire them nothing? Why should they speak truth, where the benefit of speaking it is only for masters whom they justly execrate? How can they who are tormented, or who are in the hourly dread of being tormented, have other feelings than those of hypocrisy and revenge? The pleasures of sympathy and benevolence cut off from the master from the absence of the *necessity* of exercising them, he seeks other means of happiness, and wallows in sensual pursuits, in cruel sports, and the indulgence of brutal passions. The master is only less wretched and immoral, less devoid of prudence and humanity, less limited in intellect, than the slave.

All institutions, then, supporting slavery, or in as far as they have that tendency, are not only incapable of being made useful for the increase of knowledge and production, but are amongst the most effectual engines for the ultimate annihilation of knowledge, production, and happiness.

Under no head, perhaps, so appropriate as that of field or domestic slavery, can be introduced the institutions, almost universally prevailing, whether in despotisms or republics, respecting that half of the human race which hypocritical sensuality calls the most lovely, the most innocent, and the best portion of it—women. Man is to woman the most lovely and joy-exciting creature in the

universe, as woman is to man ; therefore as to loveliness, and similar nonsense, the account is balanced. Nature has given woman less strength, and has subjected her to enormous physical inconveniences and pain, from which men are exempt. Are these reasons why man should add to these natural and unavoidable evils, artificial restraints and evils that may be avoided? or should he not rather endeavour to balance them, and render a compensation for natural unavoidable evils, by artificial advantages, that happiness might be ultimately equal to all? But let us look to the absolute effects as to the diffusion of knowledge, of the domestic, civil, and political slavery in which women are held. First, one-half of the knowledge and of the happiness to be derived from it, that might be enjoyed by all adult human beings, is wantonly sacrificed, by withholding from women the means equal to those enjoyed by men, of acquiring knowledge. In whatever way this knowledge may operate, whether as giving pleasure in the immediate intellectual culture and activity, whether as a source of the only useful power and influence on mind, or as acquiring gratification from new articles of wealth, the effect is the same ; the sacrifice is wanton ; 'tis like deliberately consigning one-half the wealth of a community every year into the ocean. Next, the general intellect of the whole community, male and female, is stunted or perverted in infancy, or more commonly both, by keeping from women the knowledge possessed by men. The first years of childhood must be everywhere, from physical conveniences, under their control ; falsehoods instead of facts, false reasonings, and pernicious habits, must be instilled in proportion to the ignorance of the tutors ; and the whole of after culture, even when judiciously directed, is frequently insufficient to undo the mischiefs of early false associations, instead of being free to direct its whole energy to the implanting, through the senses and judgment, useful facts, and truths, and habits, tending to happiness on the, at least unperverted, mind. Third, the intellectual

improvement of men, and every possible advance in knowledge (art and science), are chained down and arrested by the imperious necessity for mutual happiness from associations, the most near and intimate that human nature allows, between men and women. By the maintenance of ignorance in women, one-half of the human race is opposed in interest to, is in never-ceasing conspiracy against, the intellectual superiority of the other half. Women must make the most of the good qualities they possess to acquire influence over, and happiness from, men, as men do with respect to women, as well as towards each other. What's the consequence of this universal law of human nature? The alienation of women from mental pursuits, necessarily throws all their exertions into the physical line,—beauty, dress, manner, arts of exciting desire, or associations connected with it. All sensual things, and things of immediate domestic concernment, in which they can share, are necessarily put forward, and preferred by them to intellectual pleasures, to things of public or national interest, in which they cannot share. Thus, possessed of the means of exciting the strongest of human propensities, all this influence is directed to the triumph of passion and feeling, of immediate enjoyment and short-sighted and selfish pleasures (or at most confined to the domestic circle), over the pleasures of enlarged benevolence and comprehensive knowledge. The ignorance and the local selfish views of women are a balancing force always in operation, to bring down to their own level the expanding sympathies and aspirations for knowledge of men. Whatever, *not them*, man sets his heart upon, is with them *a rival*; and every art of malicious ignorance (for knowledge ceases to be malicious) is put into motion to decry its value. The incessant action of this fatal domestic machinery too surely accomplishes its purpose. The ignorant and the short-sighted sensualists amongst the men, lend their weight, to court women's favour, in decrying qualities unprofitable to them; and thus are the stronger half of human kind justly punished,

in the diminution of their own virtue and knowledge, for depriving the other, the weaker, half, of the means of acquiring them.

The only and the simple remedy for the evils arising from these almost universal institutions of the domestic slavery of one-half the human race, is utterly to eradicate them. Give men and women *equal* civil and political rights. Apply the principle of security, impartially, to all adult rational human beings; and let property on the death of parents be equally divided between all the children, male and female. Then would be seen a double emulation of knowledge, and consequently of virtue; an emulation between the two sexes at school and in after life, and an emulation on the part of women, in adding their influence to the rewards of public opinion, in the general encouragement of intellectual qualities, instead of their general depression; and sexual pleasures to both parties, instead of being diminished, would be increased a hundred-fold, inasmuch as they would be stripped of all their grossness, and associated with intellectual and expansive sympathetic pleasures. By the annihilation of this one iniquitous institution of the domestic slavery of one-half of a community, and substituting a perfect equality of rights and duties, the progress in acquiring and diffusing knowledge would be more than doubled.

Wherever we turn our eyes over the machinery of society, the irresistible effects of *institutions*, or of those states of things and circumstances in which mankind find themselves placed with respect to each other, both as affecting knowledge and production, arrest the attention. Several have been glanced at; it might not, perhaps, be unprofitable to pass before us all social institutions with this view, would it not lead too far.

From the conjoined operation of all these institutions, major and minor, on a community—supposing no oral or written addresses to adults or school education existed—would the character, including the moral habits, and the

knowledge of a people, be formed. By these all their actions, all their wants, are liable every moment of their lives to be operated upon. There is no external knowledge addressed to children or to adults, which can counteract their influence; the knowledge must destroy the institutions, or the institutions will blot out the knowledge. If, then, it be thought desirable that habits of industry, of truth, of fortitude, of temperance, of prudence, of beneficence, of mental cultivation, be universally formed amongst communities of men, as a basis for the greatest production, and maximum of enjoyment from wealth, the first attention of the wise will be directed to the existing institutions which stand directly in the way of the formation of those habits amongst the people, and which implant habits diametrically opposed to them. Institutions, and the interests they engender, operate, in comparison with mere knowledge, as things operate, compared with the words which represent them, as the taste of a peach, or the sting of a wasp, does, compared with its description. In order to clear the way, to afford an opening for the commencement of the diffusion of useful knowledge and moral habits amongst a community, all counteracting institutions should be removed; everything which impedes the greatest equality of the distribution of wealth consistent with security, or, in other words, which is incompatible with the natural laws of distribution, ought to be removed. Then would be seen the incalculable effects which real knowledge addressed to the adult, and to the young, in the way of education, in facilitating and increasing production and forming moral habits, the elements of happiness, would produce. Then would begin, not the perfection of the human character and of social condition, but the *commencement* of their forward career. All the skill and activity which are now employed for mutual competition and annoyance, would then be employed for mutual co-operation to the common good.

Almost all the useful knowledge that has been hitherto

diffused, and the improvements that have been made, have been done in spite of existing institutions. In the early ages of the existence and the associations of the human race, before the art of writing was discovered, and even through subsequent ages, before the further improvement, the art, by means of printing, of diffusing writings through a community, was discovered, the formation of human character necessarily depended altogether on the existing institutions. In all countries, these institutions were necessarily the result of fortuitous circumstances, and were almost universally the work of ignorant force or fraud, or a combination of both; the object always being, so to order things that the successful party might enjoy power and all means of pleasure, at the expense of the mass of the community. It could not be otherwise: mankind, till late ages, have had very little knowledge on physical subjects; still less on extensive moral combinations. Seldom has a feeble effort been made, founded on imperfect knowledge, by a whole community, as in ancient Greece, Italy, &c., at self-government; than, soon,—marred by that same want of knowledge, and the consequent usurpations of some aspiring body of men over the rest of the community,—the institutions were perverted. It is but of late that, even in theory, has been admitted the first principle of social justice, that “the sole object of all institutions and laws ought to be, to promote the happiness of the whole of the community; or, where there was any incompatibility, that the happiness of the greater number should be always preferred to that of the lesser.” Hence the almost universal prevalence of institutions, by which the happiness of the mass of the community is, as well through ignorance as by system, sacrificed to the supposed interests of the few who happen to possess the political power. It would be indeed surprising, if institutions, the motley mixtures of the results of force, fraud, and ignorance, should except by chance, have operated favourably to the interests of the whole or the majority of the members of com-

munities. As soon as, in spite of their pernicious operation, knowledge shall have penetrated amongst those subjected to them, they must all be remodelled with a view to universal happiness.

This, and all other good, must be effected by the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. The first mode of exciting, diffusing, or suppressing knowledge, by means of *institutions*, being disposed of in the few preceding illustrations, we pass to the second, by means of *instruction*, verbal or written, addressed to the adult members of a community.

SECTION 3.

OF INSTRUCTION, VERBAL OR WRITTEN, ADDRESSED TO ADULTS, AS THE SECOND MEANS OF DIFFUSING OR SUPPRESSING KNOWLEDGE. OBSTACLES TO ITS PROGRESS.

Hitherto, mankind have been governed by the unreflecting *habits* formed by *institutions*, with the necessary supplement of *force* always at hand to restrain their aberrations. Henceforth rational beings must be governed by reason. Since the invention of the art of printing, a new and altogether incalculable power of operating on mankind, has been silently working its way. The individuals happening to possess power in different communities, have more or less aided its progress as a new means of support or gratification to themselves, or annoyance to their enemies. This power is that of increasing knowledge, the improvement of human reason; when diffused and expressed, on matters of general interest, it becomes that moral force, before which all other is doomed to yield, the force of *public opinion*. In former ages this moral engine, even if its capabilities had been known to a few, could not have been called into action, from the prevalence of vicious social institutions, and from the want of diffusion and quick communication by the press. It is now on the point of governing all civilised communities. It is becoming alike the arbiter of public and private morals, and the modeller

of all institutions. When formally expressed, it will be the legal ascertained *will* of a rational community regulating its own affairs.

There is no species of knowledge, to the acquisition and diffusion of which, the ignorance and jealousy of men, happening to possess the governing powers of communities, have not opposed themselves. The reason is, that their power was necessarily founded upon, or associated with, the ignorant notions of physical as well as moral events and reasonings, which prevailed at the time their ascendancy over their fellow-creatures commenced. The less they knew of governing mankind by their interests, the more were they under the necessity of supporting their power by pretensions to superior knowledge and frauds of all sorts, always ultimately supported by brute force. Of these, one of the most common, was the pretension to an intimacy with, and delegation from, supposed superior beings. Under such a partnership, these men frequently promulgated, to increase and perpetuate their influence, systems of physics, and morals, or of morals, embracing more or less of physics, as a support to, or sometimes as forming part of, the laws and institutions which they framed. Hence those who succeeded the first active founders, necessarily ignorant and indolent from want of motives to exertion, would revenge, if they could, any doubt or disrespect shown to any part of the ill-arranged machinery on which their power was built. Hence almost all great discoveries in physics, astronomy, the form and structure of the earth, of the human frame, &c., have been persecuted, and their discoverers denounced as impious or seditious.

In this way warred, in every part of the earth, institutions and power with knowledge, till the discovery of the art of printing assured to knowledge the ascendancy. Since that time, knowledge has been gradually gaining on brute force and institutions hostile to security. Within the last fifty years, chiefly from the impulse of the mere

hope of rational political institutions, so much activity and ardour of inquiry has been put forth, and science and art have made such conquests over the external substances and powers of nature, in rendering their properties and energies subservient to human use; that the productive powers of labour in preparing the physical means of well-being, have been multiplied in some lines two, in others a hundred, and in others even to a thousand-fold, and objects have been accomplished which were thought beyond the possibility of human power. These mighty physical improvements have taken place of late years, because those in possession of the political power of communities, without being an atom more disposed to promote the general good when opposed to their apparent particular interests, have been intelligent enough to perceive that the more sciences and arts were improved, and the more the productive classes of the community produced, the more would there remain for them, from which, in a hundred ways, to extort plunder. Hence, in England and other countries, many of the ancient restrictions on security have been removed; this prospect of more extensive plunder by taxation, operating at least as *one* out of the many motives that produced, in different times and places, the gradual relaxation of barbarous laws, or of the open abuse of force. But the productive classes, the great majority of the members of civilised communities, have been hitherto very little if at all benefited, even in physical comforts, by the increased productive powers of labour. In the shape of *profits*, in the shape of unrelenting taxation, the increased productions of their labour have been taken away from the producers, and bestowed on certain idle, most frequently pernicious, unproductive classes, generally leagued with those in possession of political power. And in such ignorance have these productive classes been kept of their own interests and of self-respect, and so universally has the pernicious economical dogma been upheld of the necessity of *low wages* to flourishing manufactures, and the no less

foolish dogma of the prosperity of a country depending on the mere number of its people, that no prudential foresight could be by the productive classes exercised, in the way of limiting the increase of children to the probability of an adequate maintenance. Until knowledge on moral, particularly legislative, subjects, is diffused, this will be the deplorable issue of the utmost possible improvement in the physical sciences and arts, and in the increased productive powers of labour,—that the unproductive in larger numbers will be pampered with larger surfeits of sensual indulgences and sloth; while the producers will, from the contrast between their poverty and the lustre of the luxuries they have manufactured for the unproductive, be the more despised. The true remedy, then, for the deep and variously ramified evils of society, is to improve and diffuse political and other *moral* knowledge. The two reasons for this are quite incontrovertible: first, physical knowledge has comparatively no enemies or obstacles; second, all improvements in physical knowledge will be quite unavailing, without correspondent advances in moral science or knowledge.

“What, then,” it may be asked, “remains to be done, but that those who conceive themselves possessed of political and other moral knowledge not yet diffused, should endeavour to diffuse it? Are not the same *means*, writings and discourses, open for the diffusion of moral, that have been used for the diffusion of physical knowledge? Do not the same *motives* present themselves, pecuniary profit, love of influence, love of reputation, love of intellectual activity, and sometimes, or mingled up with these, benevolence?”

It is certainly on the diffusion, by individual effort, of moral knowledge, that all hopes of human improvement and happiness must be founded. From existing institutions the most that can be expected, is a mitigated hostility. A free unobstructed course, is all that knowledge would ask, or ought to accept of, from any institutions. From the moment that authority interferes, and pretends by its fiat

to render truth more plain, from that moment an improper bias is thrown on the judgment, and the result must be, *prejudice*, in the exact ratio that authority supersedes the exercise of the judgment. It may not be useless, however, to bring together the most prominent of the obstructions that still stand in the way of the diffusion of moral truth, amongst the adult members of almost every existing community.

The first obstacle comes from the ignorance, the prejudices, and particularly the poverty, caused by the insecurity produced by existing institutions.

The great majority of all communities are, by the present machinery of society, absolutely debarred from any exercise of judgment whatever, on the wretched substitutes for knowledge presented to them before manhood; and in point of real knowledge, that is to say, useful, physical, and moral facts and deductions, they are, even in this memory and repetition system, taught almost *nothing*. All the little really useful knowledge they acquire, is worked out by the incidents to which they are exposed by the operation of the surrounding institutions, and other circumstances not under the control of these institutions. So undoubted is the fact of the extreme ignorance of the great majority of mankind, that until lately, it was esteemed foolish or criminal to endeavour to substitute knowledge for this ignorance; and there are still those who openly maintain, and many more who secretly strive for, the perpetuating of this ignorance.

Now, the obstacles arising from this ignorance have not been sufficiently attended to. It is with the powers of the mind, or the brain, as with the muscular powers. If they have not been exercised when young, and susceptible of any impulsion, they acquire either a habit of rigidity, of inaptitude to motion, or an unfavourable direction of motion. It seems, indeed, that even when the muscular powers are found least susceptible at mature age, the defect is chiefly to be found *in the mind*: for, let the mind be

roused, let desire to succeed, and consequent attention be once called into life, the inaptitude or false motions of the muscles will gradually give way, strength will penetrate into the fibres with exercise and hope, and the facility and quickness of success will surprise the agent. Therefore, wherever the mind, the judging faculty, has never been roused into action and exercised, no resource is left to operate on any part of the human machine, and least of all upon the mind itself. The exercise is an effort; is a new thing; the pleasure of the exercise has never been experienced, and is not believed to exist; no good has ever been derived from it, and therefore it will not be believed that any can be derived. Address the senses, the passions—yes: but the faculty of reasoning is immovable. Such is the difficulty of rousing ignorance, where any train of thought requiring the least exertion, is necessary to enable it to see its own interest. What must it be where, superadded to ignorance, certain propositions, the province of the judgment, have been forced upon the memory, and with these have been implanted associations of *terror* and *antipathy*, attached sometimes to the very name of anything new in the way of knowledge, particularly moral knowledge? In every part of the world, the ignorant are taught to attach nothing less than infallibility to the notions on political and other moral subjects which those in power have thought proper to imbue them with. Never having been taught to *doubt*, they cannot conceive the possibility of forming more than one opinion on one subject, and that opinion, of course, the right one, and that opinion, of course, their opinion. And the greater the ignorance of those men in power, and the more pernicious the absurdity of the notions impressed, the greater, of course, is the necessity to guard those whom they teach, with such adjuncts of terror, antipathy, and infallibility. When to these obstacles in the way of reasoning with the minds of ignorance and folly (the road being supposed open to address them by way of dis-

courses or writings) is added another arising from the *poverty* of the great majority of every community, depriving them of the means of finding access to any information, verbal or written, which might be addressed to them, may not the friend of the "plain and simple truth" be well discouraged? Amongst the middle and higher classes, the obstacle of poverty, of course, does not exist. But the obstacles of prejudices, growing out of the interests and the associations of their professions and classes, are equally inveterate. The noble, the lawyer, the priest, have been severally subjected to, and live by, institutions repressing all freedom of inquiry, and drilling them, without examination, to the reverence for, and support of, certain dogmas, regulations, and establishments; and one of the leading associations in which they all agree is, that those who dispute their notions, ought, if possible, to be tormented till they cease disputing them. This necessarily arises from their having taken up their opinions without inquiry; for, if they knew any reasons, they would find pleasure, from vanity, love of intellectual activity, or desire of doing good, in showing the truth and utility of their opinions and practices. There remain, then, to be operated upon, with some fair probability of success, the middle classes of the industrious, whose pursuits do not necessarily beget peculiar interests or prejudices hostile to impartial investigation. Even amongst the interested and prejudiced classes, there are to be found individuals more influenced by the general interests, than by those peculiar to their own body.

Another host of obstacles to the diffusion of moral knowledge, arises from the circumstance that every part of this field, unlike the field of physics, is already occupied by a set of men, who derive wealth, possess power, and claim infallibility, in consequence of the notions they entertain, and are in the habit of disseminating, on these subjects. Go to the most important branch of morals, legislation—to the most important limb of this branch, the

constitutional (that which determines who shall make, apply, and execute the laws), and you will find it everywhere in possession of a parcel of mountebanks, who will admit of no reasonings, whose whole support and never-varying reply is, "It is established; it is the constitution; we have power, and, like any other pirates, we'll keep what we have as long as we can." On the *utility* of the powers which they exercise, these men permit no discussion. Sometimes they publish their will, in the shape of an edict or law, consigning to torments, most frequently to death, those who point out the evils arising from their system of rule. Mostly their arbitrary will is executed without the formality of any edicts. Sometimes, as in England, they denounce banishment on all who twice express *disrespect* of them or their proceedings. Now, till men can as freely discuss the utility of the political existence of a jury, a king, a president, a noble, a representative of the people, as of the culinary convenience of copper kettles, moral truth—the most important for mankind to know—cannot be elicited. The natural difficulties of the inquiry are quite enough, without superadding artificial difficulties. Suppose that people were liable to be thrown into prison, tormented to death with cold, damp, and privations, bereft of the earnings of their industry, because they endeavoured to convince as many as they could, in all possible ways, by speaking and writing, that copper kitchen utensils were pernicious to health, to length of life, and consequently to happiness; and suppose that the makers of these utensils had the power of punishment in their hands—would there be much chance of the improvement of culinary vessels while such a system of persecution lasted? Yet, such exactly is the case with the holders of political power. If their system is useful—no matter whether founded yesterday or ten thousand years ago—truth, which is merely showing things as they are, will confirm it; if not useful, it ought not to exist beyond the time that the majority of those

liable to its operation are convinced of its inexpediency. Respect paid to anything pernicious, established or not—the yielder of respect believing it to be pernicious—is a vice ; disrespect is a virtue.

From the political branch of moral science, if we proceed to the judicial, or the ethical (that of private morals), we shall find in the same way, almost everywhere, the ground occupied by pretenders to infallibility. Already, systems are established ; their advocates share the public wealth, and wield the public power, or are upheld by it. The bonze, the mufti, and the European priest and lawyer, are all of them equally indignant that any part of their systems should be called into dispute. What care they for their effects, except as far as they yield themselves the means of enjoyment ? Why should they have troubled themselves about their effects on the happiness of the community ? They find, by their own experience, that they produce happiness to themselves, and, therefore, they must be good. What business is it of theirs, to show the inquisitive and the idle what their effects are ?—they exist, therefore they are good—therefore those who say they are not good, are ill-disposed. All the lives of these men have been employed in getting their respective systems—mostly nonsense, or worse than nonsense—by heart. The *utility* of their systems, as to the happiness of the majority of the community, never entered into the contemplation of them or of their founders ; nor, if it had, were they prepared to form a right judgment on the subject.

So necessary, however, to human happiness, and so attractive is the pursuit of moral science, so interesting is the just distribution of wealth, and the simple but sublime right (founded, as all other rights and duties ought to be, on utility alone) of self-government, as well in man's private as social capacity ; that, as in the age when untutored reason sprang from the cold embrace of the superstitions of a thousand years, so that now she is comparatively mature and wise from experience, men will everywhere be

found ready to yield whatever blood and torments, political, legal, or religious persecution may still demand, till moral science shall be as unshackled as physical science, till *nothing* shall be esteemed too sacred for the uncompromising scrutiny of reason, and till all support shall be withdrawn from all institutions, old or new, but their *perceived utility*.

There are still other obstacles of no mean amount, opposing the discovery or diffusion of moral knowledge. In physical knowledge, almost every useful discovery has a fair chance of receiving an adequate, sometimes a more than adequate, pecuniary reward, either by its immediate application (guarded, if wished for, though at a totally uncalled for expense, by patent) to some of the arts; or by adding to the chance, by means of reputation, of being employed, or attracting pupils, as a public teacher. In moral discoveries, on the contrary, there is scarcely ever any possibility of such application to any of the useful practical arts, as could be turned into a source of pecuniary profit. The well ordering of the intellectual and moral machine, a school, by *new* processes (for, if by the old, it would be only superior management) may, perhaps, with a few other instances, look like exceptions; though, even in schools, real improvements are effectually, though indirectly, repressed by existing institutions. Perhaps the only way of remuneration common to physical and moral science, is publication by means of the press, of books, pamphlets, newspapers, &c. In this way it is, that, whatever good has been done, in the way of sapping old established errors by the diffusion of knowledge, has taken place,—that profit may have been gained by the diffusion. So influential have newspapers become by applying moral science to passing events, that they have acquired, by way of eminence, the title of the *public press*. One branch of moral science, political economy, exciting less the fears, than the hopes, of extended physical enjoyments, of rulers and those connected with them, and confining itself to the almost mechanical

consideration of wealth, has been pretty freely canvassed ; still, perhaps, with more of reputation than profit to those engaged in it. The most profound and celebrated writer on legislation, in this or any other country, has devoted a long life and an ample fortune to his favourite pursuit. Such are the sources of aid, in the way of pecuniary profit, to the discovery and diffusion of moral truth : for all discussion must ultimately lead to truth.

Another peculiarity in favour of physical over moral knowledge is, that a secret in physical science does not necessarily require to be widely diffused, in order to be useful to society. The knowledge of a particular process in any manufactory, though known to but a few manufacturers, and by them kept secret, might still ameliorate the quality or cheapen the production of articles of enjoyment, so as to benefit all using the articles as well as the makers. But moral benefits, being for the most part to be obtained by the amelioration of institutions,—and almost all ameliorations requiring a sacrifice of wealth, power, or reputation for infallibility, on the part of those supporting and supported by them,—they can only be changed by the public voice, after a long contest, influencing those in power to make or permit the amelioration. If the enemies to the use of the power of steam demanded that it should not be employed till a great majority of those able to judge on the subject were convinced of its effects, and demanded its employment, would not some sinister interest be suspected, particularly if they, at the same time, had establishments worked on other principles, and endeavoured to prevent any discussion at all as to the effects of steam ? Yet no more than this is asked of the opponents of moral improvement, that free discussion should take place, and that when the majority of those interested, judged any proposed changes improvements, they should then, and not till then, take place. Even under free institutions, no amelioration of them could, or ought to, take place, till the majority of those interested demanded it ; though, under such insti-

tutions, the agents of the community would be the most anxious to promote discussion, or to invite and adopt ameliorations; or if they opposed what was deemed useful by the community, they would be immediatedly displaced by more faithful agents. This comparative slowness of operation to produce practical good is, therefore, inherent in moral truth; though under institutions founded in security and free discussion, the process of diffusion and persuasion, by means of the press, might be incalculably accelerated.

Another obstacle to moral science arises from the peculiar difficulty of its cultivation. Whereas physics deal in things that can be seen and felt, and made objects of the senses, and can be subjected to every variety of experiment; in morals scarcely any rational experiments have yet ever been made; all has been the result of the fortuitous shock of passions and interests; and it requires the nicest discrimination to refer the moral effects to their real causes. The unorganised matter of physics is without feeling, and may therefore be decomposed as much as we please to prove the particular effect of every component part of the aggregate cause; while in morals all are acting in masses, and we can neither simplify the alternate agent and patient, man, or the numberless co-operating circumstances that are acting upon him. Even when we are sure of the *direction* in which the cause operates, we can rarely do more than approximate the *quantum* of the effects. We have no accurate weights or measures for moral quantities. And yet this, necessarily the latest, as the most difficult, species of knowledge, is just that which the audacious perverseness of rulers has everywhere assumed to be perfect—perfect in proportion to the ignorance of the ages, in all other matters, in which it was introduced! Henceforth, under the institutions of security, by the removal of all *interests* opposed to improvement, there will be no more difficulty in trying any rational experiment (and none not deemed rational will be entered into by communities of men where their own happiness is at stake), than is experienced by

individuals in physical matters, where their private interests are concerned. Besides these larger experiments, when the various existing obstacles shall have been removed, moral experiments, on a small scale, will be made; with a view, if successful, to their application on a large scale, provincial or national.

As if all these obstacles were not enough in the way of the acquisition and diffusion of moral knowledge, the craft of rulers has erected another obstacle; and *taxation* has tremendously opposed itself to the diffusion of knowledge, doubling or trebling the price of books, particularly of the political press.

Such being the obstacles to the discovery and diffusion of moral knowledge amongst adults, what hope can remain of its useful application to the distribution of wealth, or to the engendering of such habits as will increase the enjoyments to be derived from the absolute quantity of wealth which a community may be in the yearly habit of producing? Physical knowledge is little concerned in the distribution of wealth, but increases indefinitely its production; moral knowledge must regulate its distribution. This species of knowledge, however, from the impulse given by what is already acquired, in spite of all obstacles, must go on increasing till it extinguishes the empire of force in human affairs, and substitutes that of persuasion. The interests of mankind will ultimately ensure the free discussion of moral subjects, and particularly their application to the production and distribution of wealth. Every year the adult population will become more accessible to reason and their own interest, till they perceive and admit the crying injustice (amongst so many other prejudices), of forcing the minds of children into an uninquiring assent to their opinions, or to any opinions on any subject, beyond what the evidence produced would demand of unbiassed minds. From that time, when human beings shall begin to be thus educated to truth alone, according to the evidence, without any pre-excited partialities for any opinions,

will the progress of instruction to adults be rapid and influential to an extent hardly now to be conceived. Moral and physical truth will proceed hand in hand ; and their utility will be seen altogether to depend on their intimate union.

The third mode, therefore, of diffusing knowledge, so influential in the production and distribution of wealth, by means of *education*, previous to manhood, remains to be inquired into.

SECTION 4.

OF EDUCATION, STRICTLY SO CALLED, PREVIOUS TO MANHOOD, AS THE THIRD MODE OF DIFFUSING KNOWLEDGE.

The all-pervading influence of *institutions*, over all the members of a community, the hitherto partial, but ever-increasing influence of *instruction* or disquisition addressed to the *adult* members of a community, having been inquired into ; it remains to see what can, or ought to, be done, in the way of *education* before entrance into life, towards the diffusion of useful knowledge ; particularly of moral knowledge—of such as will make physical knowledge productive of preponderant good,—by leading to the universal reign of *equal security*, and of the utmost equality of enjoyment compatible therewith.

Numerous have been the questions raised of late years on the subject of early education. For a long time it was altogether opposed as a most alarming evil by those interested in, or prejudiced in favour of, establishments, as such, independent of their utility. Though all open opposition has ceased, yet have the friends of education done little, even with the aid of their new instruments, derived from Lancaster and Bell. The reasons of the failure are obvious. Its partisans were too sanguine, and expected too much from it as a *single* instrument of good. Many of them were as *viciously* determined to make use of the new instrument, to diffuse, *without inquiry*, their peculiar views on

moral subjects, particularly theological, as were their opponents; hence the contest was, who should have the drilling of the machines by the new mode; whether to truth or to error, they were still, and equally, to be drilled: the object was not to give the people knowledge for their *own sakes*, but to swell the numbers of the future partisans of some unimportant dogma. Another cause of failure was in the nature of the new instrument of teaching itself; it has been found that youths drilled ever so well to the system at the head seminaries, could not superintend establishments similar to those where they were educated, from want of enlarged views and a *general knowledge of the human mind*; when anything unexpected occurred, they had no general principles to guide them. There is, moreover, a radical defect in the systems of Bell and Lancaster, that the understanding is by them altogether sacrificed to the memory; this defect admits of an easy remedy; but neither Bell nor Lancaster had the comprehension of mind, or the real honesty of purpose, with respect to the independence of the minds of their pupils, even to wish to discover it.

Still education, even in its most restricted sense, and making every allowance for the over-zeal or want of knowledge of its exclusive advocates, may and will become a co-operating instrument of transcendent importance in the diffusion of knowledge. Education, in its comprehensive sense, including the effect of all external circumstances operating to form the mind and habits, is not now under contemplation; 'tis the reading, writing, hearing, and examining, by means of sensible signs, that take place in school or by means of books—the formal instruction alone, not the incidental—received previous to mature age, to which the attention must be confined. Hitherto, what little effect this instrument, thus restricted, has produced, on the great majority of the community, has been to co-operate with existing institutions in forming passive habits of blind obedience.

School education comprehends two important branches of mental culture, the intellectual and moral, in its limited sense, the acquisition of knowledge and the formation of moral habits. Both of these are produced exclusively by operating on the *mind* or *brain*. Habits and dispositions are formed, just as knowledge is acquired, by operating on the mind or brain alone. The effects of that state of the brain called knowledge, are more frequently exhibited in speech and writing; while the effects of that state of the brain, denoted by the words, disposition, or habits, are more frequently exhibited in muscular actions and motions. It is a falsehood, as strange as pernicious, to speak of the heart as holding a divided empire with the mind, or brain, in producing our voluntary actions, or as having any more connexion with thought or feeling than the lungs or stomach. The feeling and the judgment are equally a cerebral operation; the judgment, like all other mental processes, is only a modification of feeling. What is the consequence? *Therefore*, it is to the culture of the *mind alone*, that we must look, discarding all poetical absurdity about a second ideal agent, called the heart, for the formation of good habits, as well as of sound judgment and accurate perception.

Now, in which of these two modes of mental culture is school education calculated to produce the most efficient and useful effects? Beyond all comparison, in the conveyance of knowledge, it is calculated to produce the greatest good. But to which of these two branches have its efforts been hitherto, as affecting the great majority of communities, almost exclusively directed? To the moral branch, the formation of habits. But habits are generated by circumstances formed by institutions, over which schools have no control, and which they must follow or confirm, under pain of repeating to unhearing ears their disregarded precepts, because opposed to real interests acting from without.

Here, then, we have a satisfactory explanation of the

little progress made in education, inasmuch as that branch, in which its useful influence must be indirect, has been almost exclusively pursued by direct means, and by means—dictation, force, terror, &c.—otherwise the most unwise. Where, indeed, it has co-operated with vicious institutions, confirming the terror and antipathies by them excited, its influence has been sometimes great, but, in proportion to its magnitude, pernicious.

One reason, and by no means an unsatisfactory reason, why so little has been done in the way of communicating knowledge by means of school education, is, that till lately, little real knowledge, physical or moral, was known, and as little as to the mode of communicating it. The things taught, or professed to be taught, at schools—and it was necessary to teach something to fill up the time—were therefore necessarily mere words, or idle speculations, or empty precepts, impotent even when tending to good.

But the truth is, the little that has been done, or attempted to be done, by any community for the education of the great majority of its members, to whatever end perverted, or however unwisely conducted, must be set down in the scale of utility as *nothing*. Wherever any real efforts have been made in the line of formal education previous to manhood, they have been directed to the exclusive advantage of the privileged, or at all events of the rich, who could provide for their own education. Witness the establishments, colleges, universities, inns-of-court, &c., all supported, directly or indirectly, out of the toils of the productive classes, for the benefit, the exclusive benefit, of the few. They are necessarily exclusive, because the expenses attending them are so great that ninety-nine hundredths of the people are shut out from them. The aim and object of these institutions, and the discipline pursued in them, have almost invariably been directed, not to the investigation and diffusion of whatever in moral or physical science might be esteemed *true*, but to the support of certain prescribed opinions and institutions, on the utility of

which all doubt and examination were denounced as *vices*, and deserving of horror and punishment ; establishments, to drill the unproductive, at the expense of the productive classes, into interested and zealous machines for perpetuating the institutions, however pernicious, under which they originated, and *keeping down* for ever from knowledge, and consequently from comfort, the great mass of the community, by monopolising the little real, or supposed knowledge of the times.

What says the principle of utility to such establishments for the education of the few, and those the richest of the community ? Were such establishments ever so wisely conducted, ever so useful to those few, and to the enlargement of the bounds of knowledge, what would that principle say to them, which demands the pursuit of the *happiness*, and consequently of the *knowledge*, as one of the means, if not the most important of the means, of happiness, of at least the *majority*, and consequently the greatest happiness of the whole of a community ?

It demands that the direction of such establishments should be changed, and that, instead of being used for the interest of a few, they should be devoted to the improvement of the whole community.

“ But to make all wise, or to make the majority wise,” say the favourers of exclusion, “ is an impossibility ; the effort would be vain, and would be unproductively lost. Better to concentrate the means and operate on a few ; through whom, well instructed, more knowledge will be diffused through the whole, than could be done by any fruitless attempt at immediate communication through the whole ; at all events, better to have a few wise than all ignorant.”

Exactly similar excuses, and with equal confidence, have been put forward to justify the eternal efforts of what has been honoured as legislation, to *keep down* the wages, the comforts, of the productive classes. “ All cannot be rich ; therefore, at all events, take care to add superabun-

dantly to the wealth of the few; for wealth by being dissipated is lost, and *all* become poor and wretched. Better have a few rich and happy than all paupers."

To both of these allegations it may be replied, that the uniform tendency of any exclusive advantage, under the institutions of insecurity, whether wealth or knowledge, is to prompt the possessors of that advantage to use it as a means of still further superiority, not as a means of lessening, by diffusion or otherwise, their own comparative importance. As to wealth, the evil effects of its forced inequality, both as to production and distribution, have been already pointed out. For inequality in the diffusion of knowledge, there is less excuse than for inequality in the distribution of wealth; because the knowledge of one can in no possible way lessen the knowledge of others; but the fact is, that unequal knowledge has been sought almost solely with the view to unequal wealth.

Let us inquire, then, whether the majority of any civilised community could by education—not counteracted by other instruments—be made as intelligent and moral, and consequently, as happy, as those who are now the most intelligent and moral classes of any community. It may be shown that the means are at the command of every community, of making the majority of its members *much more* intelligent and moral—institutions flowing from representation or self-government co-operating therewith—than any of the present wealthier classes.

It is not insinuated that, in opposition to institutions, and to the existing state of knowledge, school education, under the direction of a parcel of rich zealots—could such be found—would effect this. No; it must proceed from the deliberate conviction of the majority of a community that it is a thing, "right to be done;" in which case, the means are at hand. If the interests of the absolute numerical majority of a community were, as they ought to be, the only interest attended to, whenever any smaller interest was incompatible with it, that majority would at

once perceive their interest, and ordain the conservative blessings of knowledge, by means of education, to be impartially dispensed to all. Nor is it insinuated that any of the old institutions, upheld by insecurity, could, consistently with their endurance, co-operate in the establishment of a system of universal education, whose distinguishing characteristic, in order to be useful, should be to teach *nothing but the truth*; that is to say, not what its founders conceived to be the truth, but whatever, on inquiry, might appear *to the educated* to be the truth; a system of education, which should avail itself of no terror, of no force, of no seductions, of no false associations, of no antipathies, to influence the judgment; which should demand no reverence for *any* institutions or propositions, old or new, but what their perceived utility or truth necessarily and voluntarily engendered.

Far different from such species of education is that afforded to the richer classes of the community, or to those for whose instruction the national funds provide. To teach what is true in real existence, in nature and in fact—what is useful (or tending to preponderant happiness) in the consequences and effects of actions and institutions, is not the object. Unfortunately, almost all who have advocated the cause of education, whether for the richer or the poorer classes, whether friendly to old institutions or wishing to introduce new ones, seem to have been inoculated with the very disease which they condemn in all but themselves; that of teaching their own opinions without appropriate evidence, addressing them prematurely to minds not yet prepared to judge, and refusing the perfect liberty of assent or dissent on review of the evidence adduced. The only obloquy attendant on the pupil's non-assent to *any* proposition ought to be, that simple and natural, sufficiently severe and efficacious obloquy, designated by the word *stupidity*, as when applied to one out of a class or of a thousand, not able to understand, when properly explained, that “the three

angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles." Till this fundamental error and vice in education, the presuming to teach *opinions* instead of *truth*; to dictate, instead of to propose, opinions with their reasons, for investigation, is extirpated, the majority of every community will be, more or less, machines, moved at their pleasure and for their profit by the mountebanks who have trained them. The members of every community of sentient rational beings, and of course the majority of those members, should be educated for their own sakes, with a view to their own happiness, and not to increase the number of the followers of the opinions, physical or metaphysical, theological or anti-theological, or to be made instrumental to the interests of any class or classes of men whatsoever; they should be educated for *their own sakes alone*. And as it is clearly the interest of every community, in order to form right judgments, to see things as they really are, the real qualities and relations of physical objects, real facts and the real consequences of actions, it is their interest to be taught *nothing but the truth*; the truth meaning nothing more than this.

Now, in the first place, the education which every civilised community has now the means of imparting to all its members may, and naturally would, be in this respect superior to the efforts hitherto made in instilling falsehoods and antipathies in greater or lesser numbers, under the shield of force and terror, into the minds of the rich or the poor. Truth, physical and moral, would be sincerely the sole object of intellectual pursuit, because in the acquisition of that alone could the interest of any community be found to be placed. Minor bodies, classes, privileged orders, parties, have found their interest in upholding tenets, practices, and institutions, however inconsistent with truth and utility as affecting the whole community, provided they favoured their particular exclusive interests. But with a community at large, this could not be the case. Truth can never be inimical to the

interests of a whole community: if subordinate interests are found incompatible with it, they ought to give way.

Here, then, is an obvious reason why no really useful plan of national education can be founded on a base less extensive than that of the great majority of a community; because the interests of no less a body can go hand in hand with the pursuit of physical and moral truth, the great intellectual polar-star of education.

But what are the means, the expedients, by which not only moral and physical truth is to be diffused amongst the great majority of a community, instead of the doctrines and dogmas hitherto taught to a few, but by which the quantity and usefulness of the matters taught to them will be so much extended as to put to shame the scanty stock of really useful information hitherto afforded even to the privileged classes? How is this useful physical and moral truth to be unfolded to them? First, by discarding at once about nine-tenths of the utterly useless matter now taught, or pretended to be taught, to the richer classes; second, by retaining the one-tenth of useful matter; and, third, by substituting highly useful and interesting matter from the lately investigated experimental and practical sciences, entirely adapted to the minds of youth, for the parrot-memory work of grammars and foreign words now practised.

“What! an education like this, superior to anything ever yet given, even to the most favoured, in the way of education, to be now given to every member of the community! Suppose the thing desirable and tending to the happiness of the community, where are to be found the *means* of doing it? Where the *materials* for such extensive physical instruction? Where, above all things, the *funds* requisite to carry so vast a scheme into effect?”

Of all the difficulties in the way of the education of a whole community, the most alarming to ordinary eyes will probably be the *expense*; and just those who have been in the habit of seeing with complacency the products of the

Most conducive to Human Happiness.

labour of the community lavished on the most useless or pernicious objects, will be those who will exclaim the loudest against the application of even a small portion of the fruits of their own industry to the real good of all, instead of the glittering exclusive interest of a few. But what would the expense of such an object be?

Suppose a community, like England, Ireland, and Scotland, consisting of twenty millions of individuals of all ages, the youth of whom it is proposed to educate, giving them suppose five years of instruction each. It will be found that we should have to provide for two millions of pupils every year. One master or mistress, by means of lessons (*to be made*), with the aid of an improved application, avoiding the evils, and retaining the advantages, of the monitor and self-teaching system, could manage a school of five hundred children, say three to five; averaging four hundred. One pound a-year paid by, or on account of, each pupil, would afford an ample remuneration for masters of enlarged minds, fully equal to the task of instruction, besides affording one hundred, or one hundred and fifty, pounds a-year, as might be required, for supplying and keeping up the materials of instruction, and repairs of the building. The whole sum required every year for *thus educating* the whole community of twenty millions of the human race would be two millions per annum! Only two millions per annum!

One half of the expense of education, or ten shillings a-year, *ought* probably to be paid, and all of it, the whole pound, if they thought fit, *might* be paid by the parents of the pupils; but none should be refused for poverty.

It is almost preposterous to show how very light *such* a contribution would be, amongst a community of twenty millions. The yearly contribution would be two shillings from each individual, were none of the salaries paid by the parents. But, as the probability is, that *more* than half would be paid by the parents,—for many, who now pay ten and twenty times a pound a-year for drilling ~~ing~~ all intellectual

capacity out of their children's heads, would gladly pay at these schools the whole price of a rational education, and even assist many others in making the full payments,—the expense would, in this case, be of course further reduced to one shilling a-year national contribution from each individual in the community.

The community of twenty millions of individuals, of whom we have been speaking, pay now in Government and provincial taxation of all sorts, tithes, poor-rates, and all provincial charges included, about one hundred millions of pounds per year, out of the yearly products of their labour. For what is this immense sum paid—no, but forcibly taken away from them? All but a very little, for the continuing them in their present ignorance, and actual or comparative wretchedness; in Ireland actual, in England with what they have been, what they might be, and with what those whom their industry supports, are. The one-hundredth part of this sum would raise these twenty millions of individuals, if applied in the way of education, into rational, industrious, moral, and happy beings. Look at your army; look at your navy; look at your colonies; look at your provision, from accountable and unaccountable sources, for the injurious luxury of *one* man of hereditary legislative and executive wisdom; look at the sums expended in sectarianism; look at the dead-weight pensions for successful murders; look at the pensions and sinecures for no murders or employment at all; look at the yearly interest of your debt; and say which of these could not well spare the sum necessary for the education of the whole people; or rather say which of them, or whether the whole of them together, can be put in competition, in point of utility, with this great object? And yet who so light-headed as to suppose that any such application will be made of any part of these forced contributions, by the men who levy them (averaging, as they do, about five pounds a-year from every man, woman, and child), in contempt of the delegation and

inclinations of nine out of ten of the community whom they control? No: till the community, through its representatives, frees itself from the locusts that are consuming, in unhealthy idleness, almost every green thing the land produces, it must remain in ignorance as well as wretchedness. 'Tis the community's voice alone that will confer this blessing on all, even on the descendants of those (then happier than their parents) who are now the champions of exclusive institutions: 'tis the community's voice alone that will command the diffusion of knowledge, because it is not reconcilable with the interests of anything less than the whole community, that knowledge should be equally diffused.

But the very extensiveness and perfection of the scheme we advocate, will subject it to objections.

"Reading and writing—yes—we can still manage them, *perhaps*, if they know only so much; but to make them as wise as ourselves, who then shall manage the people?" Who shall? or who ought? The very object is to enable a community to manage its own affairs, to make men equal to the task of self-government, both in private and public life; to banish every partial interest incompatible with the welfare of the whole community; and to give the great majority of the community the requisite *knowledge* to discover the means, as they have already the *interest*, to pursue and attain their own greatest possible happiness. The objector would find himself a more intelligent, moral, and therefore happier being, co-operating in one of these communities, than sharing in the management of ignorance, wretchedness, and discontent. If a little knowledge be good, the most that can be given, is better.

"Yes," it is urged, "but there is preponderant mischief in giving the people too much knowledge; because it consumes time, *many years*, which are thus abstracted from useful industry, from adding to the physical comforts, the enjoyments derived from the matter of wealth, of the families of which they form a part."

Now, the majority of a community are either industrious and comfortable, or the reverse, to a greater or less degree. If comfortable, they can afford the loss of the time of one member; if the reverse, there is no loss, the time not being worth any other application, and so of any intermediate stage of poverty or industry, in proportion as the loss of the time is expensive, it indicates an equally high reward for the remaining occupied industry of the family. But what is the real amount of this loss of time? It need not be much more than half the day for three or four years; as active muscular exercise is necessary in youth to relieve intellectual exertion, and this exercise would be found in the pursuits of industry for part of the day. Say, then, half the pupil's time is lost for four years, the whole for two; but at an age, when its industrious application would not earn more than a third of the industry of an adult. If we say it would earn the half, we have two years half adult earnings, equal to one year's full wages given for a useful education, over and above the small sum of money that the parents might contribute to the school. What is gained for this sacrifice? The pupil lives, suppose, thirty years after his education. By the knowledge and the industrious habits acquired during such an education, would not the productive powers of those thirty years be increased one-thirtieth? would they not more frequently be increased one-fourth or one-half? Would not such education afford the chance of engaging with effect in superior lines of industry, and of thus indefinitely increasing the productive industry of future life? Would not the *moral* habits, the attention to domestic economy, and to health, say only the one virtue sobriety, acquired during such an education, *save* more than a thirtieth, sometimes a quarter or a half of future earnings? besides the diseases and shortening of life which it would obviate? Would not the pleasing elements of knowledge acquired during such an education, supply materials for *useful* and interesting thought and conversation, during labour or

during leisure, as well as banish pernicious thoughts and conversations, by which the happiness of every hour of life would be doubled, or indefinitely increased! Would not the real knowledge, the acquaintance with the ordinary regular operations, called the laws of nature, which such an education would afford, guard its pupils for ever from the impositions and the mental horrors produced by impostors or fools on ignorant credulity? Would not the knowledge of rights and duties, of the uses and tendencies of institutions, which such an education would confer, create such self-respect and rational attachment to useful institutions, that no fear could ever exist of a return to the vices and miseries of forced inequality and insecurity? Would not the *natural laws of distribution* be for ever secured? would not the moral and political interest, inspired by such an education, in the discussions, regulations, and happiness of the provincial or national legislative measures of such a community, of both of which every one would feel himself a constituent member, create new and elevated sources of sympathy, of the purest and cheapest mental enjoyment, always varied, renewed with every opening year, with every rising day? Nor, in relation to society at large, are the effects of the diffusion of knowledge less conspicuous and useful. All the physical resources of the territory of a community would be soon *known* and brought into use; not a mineral, plant, animal, or useful indication of any sort, would long escape the curious eye of the everywhere well-informed peasant and mechanic. All the talents of all the community would be developed and brought forward for the public service; and universal competition would carry to the highest, the integrity as well as the skill of public agents in legislation, justice, or executive offices. All the sciences and arts would be everywhere advancing and improving in the double ratio of the increased number of their cultivators, and of the increased activity of the exhilarating competition thereby produced.

Are these effects real? are they not the natural consequences to be expected from such an education, when not counteracted by other opposing circumstances? If so, is not the one year's sacrifice of the wages of an ignorant rustic or mechanic abundantly recompensed by such advantages? Where is now the balance of the account? Will preponderant mischief, or good, arise from this real education?—for learning to read and write is only acquiring the keys of the store-house of knowledge, is merely introductory to real good.

One circumstance attending the diffusion of useful knowledge, by means of education, amongst the children of the poorer classes, of the great majority of every community, has not been sufficiently attended to. The children of the poor have a greater aptitude for intellectual instruction than the children of the rich, up to the age that both are sent to school; the children are as much more intellectually apt, as the adult are less apt than those of the better-provided classes; and both proceeding from the same cause. While children, the poor are not waited upon, are not carried about, do not find their wants anticipated, are not guarded by posts and nurses and attendants from all that might molest; hence they are compelled to use their own ears, eyes, and limbs, and quickly to exercise the judgment to avoid evils and to seek for good. In all these respects the children of the rich are in an opposite situation; and more accidents and mischiefs arise to them from want of culture of their own faculties, consequent on over-watching, than happen to the children of the poor from the little experiments they are constantly but cautiously making of their expanding senses, strength, and feelings. Again, the minds of those surrounding the young of the poorer classes are more on a level with their companions than those of the rich; hence they feel more interest and have more communication, more interchange of ideas with them, and all about simple things, objects of sense, exactly suited to the faculties of children. But the

adult rich have either real knowledge, or conventional cant and jargon which they call knowledge, or supposed refinement of manners and sentiments, all equally uninteresting because unintelligible to their children. When the rich, ever so well informed, address children, they generally, whether from vanity or ignorance of the mode of communicating knowledge, present to them complex, or abstract, or really absurd, though school, or college-learned notions, which serve no other purpose than to bewilder them. Now, the parents and friends of poor children cannot so disgust, by prematurely surfeiting, their understandings; therefore until the children come to a level of knowledge with their instructors, the simple and uninformed are better companions for them than the learned, if these learned have not learned the art of the gradual communication of knowledge. But from the time that real intellectual or school education begins, the poor child, the best to work upon, has been hitherto entirely neglected; and all effort has been expended to form exclusively the children of the rich. Hence the adult rich acquire again the superiority over the adult poor—aided, of course, by their greater intercourse with life and its incidents. Again, the excitement to a poor child when put into a theatre of education, is greater than to a rich child. To the poor 'tis a gain, a source of hope, a novelty, an introduction to those above him; to the rich child, it is a loss of liberty, a source of dread because of restraint, nothing novel but everything less comfortable than at home, and no honour in the introduction to poorer children or to a dreaded schoolmaster, nor any indefinite hope of future advantage.

Such are, and in so many ways, the peculiar facilities attending the honest wish of diffusing real knowledge, by means of education, through the productive, the really useful and efficient, classes of a community. But it is the community alone that will give such a blessing to itself.

Thus, in this chapter has it been attempted to show how knowledge is actually diffused or suppressed, and how

it may be diffused to an indefinite extent over the whole face of society, by means the most simple and altogether at hand; applying to literary as to all other labour, the plain wisdom of the natural laws of distribution,—“free labour, implying unrestrained competition, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges.”

Of the three great instruments—institutions, instruction to adults, and education—for the diffusion of knowledge and formation of moral habits, with the view of indefinitely increasing, by rendering more susceptible of enjoyment, the pleasures to be derived from articles of wealth, as well as of perpetuating the wisest distribution of them, and multiplying their reproduction, we have now treated. The object has been so to develop their mode of operation that they may cease to be perverted from their legitimate object, the greatest happiness of the whole community, that labour and knowledge may be re-united and may henceforth accompany and befriend each other, that industry may no longer labour in vain. But neither of these instruments can produce its genuine good effects if counteracted by the others. They must all act harmoniously, education, institutions, and public information, in order to produce all the inappreciable benefits of which they are susceptible. Little, comparatively, can be done by education if opposed by the other two. But the time is fast approaching when they will be all co-operating instruments in the pursuit of *truth*, the necessary basis of human happiness; and the articles of wealth will be as much multiplied as the enjoyments to be derived from them will be increased.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, AS RESULTING FROM THE INSTITUTIONS OF INSECURITY; AND OF THE MEANS OF REDUCING THE EXISTING *FORCED* EXPEDIENTS OF UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION, TO THE *VOLUNTARY* MODE OF EQUALITY LIMITED BY SECURITY.

UNDER the above head a chapter is written, consisting of about one hundred pages. This chapter is for the present withheld for two reasons; first,—lest the development of the effect of particular institutions, in addition to the few of a more prominent nature which have been already noticed, might lead to unnecessary and avoidable irritation of those now mechanically working under, and moulded by, such institutions, to modes of action pernicious to the general welfare, the universal interest; second,—that the inquiry might be comprised within one volume, and might as speedily and economically as possible be submitted to public consideration.

The concurrent operation of all these expedients of insecurity, in opposition to the natural laws of distribution, is in this chapter pointed out, and from a balance of the evil and fancied good they produce, they are shown to be inimical to equality limited by security, and consequently to the greatest happiness. An attempt is made to arrange them, not with any view to logical accuracy, but merely to facilitate their examination. The subject is divided into five heads, as follows:—

SECTION 1. *Of the GENERAL EVILS of the abstraction by political power of the products of labour without the consent of the producers or owners of them; termed here PUBLIC plunder, and shown to be more extensive, more difficult of cure, and consequently more pernicious, than PRIVATE plunder.*

SECTION 2. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose most obvious effect is to GENERATE forced inequality of wealth—or that inequality not called for by equal security.*

Such are, 1. All laws or contrivances interfering with what ought to be the equal right of all to *unappropriated* articles. Such are,

Game laws.

Many of the navigation and fishing laws and customs.

All laws, customs, &c., controlling what ought to be the equal right of all to appropriate by labour, air, water, minerals, &c., not previously appropriated.

2. All laws or contrivances which limit the free *direction* of labour to articles previously appropriated by the labourer, or with consent of the appropriators. Such are,

Those which require apprenticeships to particular trades.

Those which require freedom of guilds to practise trades in particular places.

Those which control the locomotion of labourers through, or out of, the community.

Those which establish monopolies ; which distribute bounties.

Those which impede the free direction of labour, with a view to, or under pretence of, external or internal defence, revenue, &c.

3. All laws or contrivances which control the rate of the wages of labour, diverting them from that standard to

- which the natural laws of distribution would lead. Such are,
Those which violate security by wholesale, called *slave laws*.
Those which compel labour *without any reward*.
Those which compel labour for less than the labourer chooses to take.
Those which regulate, by raising or lowering, the wages of labour.
Those which prevent peaceable combinations of labourers to keep up or advance their wages.
Those which aid combinations of capitalists or others to keep down the wages of labour.
Those which, under the name of *by-laws* or *local laws*, regulate and oppress labour in particular districts.
Those which prohibit labour on particular days.

SECTION 3. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose most obvious effect is to PERPETUATE forced inequality of wealth.* Such are,

- Those which establish hereditary power.
Those which aim to establish perpetuity of property, without labour, in the descendants of particular individuals.

SECTION 4. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose obvious effect is both to GENERATE AND PERPETUATE forced inequality of wealth.*

Such are, I. All laws or contrivances for abstracting

the products of labour, without the consent of the producers, by political power, for its own immediate use.

Such are,

Those which levy taxes in kind—
tithes, &c.

Those which levy taxes in money.

Those which levy taxes concealed, or
included in the price of commodities.

Those which control the mercantile
value of the currency.

2. All laws or contrivances which seize the annual products of labour to indemnify capitalists or their representatives, for wealth, by them given to political power, and by political power squandered. Such are,

Those which levy taxes under the
name of interest for what are called
public debts.

3. All laws or contrivances whose effect is to monopolise knowledge to a few, keeping the mass of society in ignorance and delusion.

Those which supply places and means
of *education* exclusively to the rich;
neglecting at the same time the edu-
cation of the poor.

Those which monopolise to the rich
the knowledge, and consequent means
of wealth and influence, derived from
theology.

Those which monopolise to the rich
the knowledge, and consequent means
of wealth and influence, derived from
law.

Those which monopolise to the rich

the knowledge, and consequent means of wealth and influence, from medicine, and from all other pursuits requiring knowledge.

SECTION 5. *Of the means of reducing these existing expedients of FORCED unequal distribution, to the VOLUNTARY mode of the natural laws of distribution, inducing equality, limited only by equal security.*

1. The universal establishment of representative institutions on the best plan the actual knowledge of the community permits ; giving a just foundation to *public* morals, the parent (by means of institutions) of private morals.
2. The gradual removal under these, by simply withdrawing the force that protects them, of all the above institutions violating equal security and sacrificing universal happiness.
3. The diffusing of every species of knowledge of physical and moral truth (not the notions of the propagators) amongst the whole community ; particular attention being directed to those of the community most devoid of knowledge and most in want of it.

The object, or the effect, sometimes one, sometimes both, of almost all the past and existing institutions of society, however variously modified, has been to increase the unavoidable evils of inequality, justifiable to any extent only by the superior claims of equal security. By equal security as to matters of wealth, is meant the faculty of "free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges." On these principles, called the natural laws of distribution, should be founded all regulations of positive law, and of human conduct unconstrained by law, respecting wealth.

CHAPTER VI.

BENEFITS AND EVILS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH AND HAPPINESS, AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION.

HITHERTO the object of this inquiry has been, to contrast the system of equal security of all adult sentient beings—never yet more than partially established in any community—with all past and present systems respecting wealth, more or less violating equal security. The object has been to contrast security with insecurity, freedom of labour with the empire of force and fraud, the exercise of the instruments of persuasion and knowledge, with those of ignorance and delusion.

The only modes or systems of labour hitherto practised amongst men, have been those of labour by constraint, or those of labour by individual competition. The immense advantages of the entire freedom of individual competition, over any regulations not founded on the persuasion and voluntary acquiescence of those whose actions they regulated, have, it is hoped, been demonstrated. The utility of *equal* security has, it is hoped, been proved.

But, equal security established; the right of every adult rational human being, male or female, to free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges, being established, a new question presents itself. *Is there no mode of human labour consistent with security*—whose paramount importance even to production has been demonstrated—but *that of individual competition*? May not a mode of labour be found, -consistent with security, and still more productive of happiness, than labour by individual competition? Will equal security permit no further approach to equality, and consequently to virtue and happiness, than that which individual competition can

effect? Manifold, as has been seen, are the benefits of individual competition when compared with systems of restraint, of involuntariness, are there no means of obtaining the blessings of unrestricted individual competition—abundant production, and development of all the faculties—without the evils which, even in its best form, must accompany such individual competition? Nay more, may there not be found a mode of labour consistent with security, which will not only obviate the evils of individual competition, but which will afford its peculiar benefits—abundant production and development of all the faculties—to a greater, an incalculably greater extent, than the best arrangements of individual competition could afford?

No mode of labour can produce preponderant good, which does not respect the natural laws of distribution, “free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges,” or the principle of equal security regarding wealth.

But if, respecting these laws, and producing otherwise greater benefits than labour by individual competition, there can be found any mode of labour which will satisfy the questions above put, that mode of labour should be preferred.

Such a mode of labour has been proposed. It has been called the system of labour by mutual co-operation; and its object and effect are to produce perfect voluntary equality of enjoyment of all the fruits of united labour. This system has been partially used in several places to such an extent as to prove its *practicability*. Its utility, and superiority to the system of individual competition, remain to be inquired into.

There are, then, three systems of human labour,—that of constraint by mingled force and fraud, that of free individual competition (the mode hitherto advocated in this inquiry), and that of mutual co-operation.

Before entering on the consideration of the system of labour by mutual co-operation, the subject of the next

chapter, it may be useful to point out some of the good and bad effects of the principle of individual competition as compared with that of mutual co-operation.

Let us observe that whatever good now exists in society, arising from—

1. Activity, of mind and body, in pursuit of wealth ;
 2. Knowledge and benevolence, to the degree existing ;
- are to be attributed to the efforts of free individual competition, in opposition to the constant efforts of ignorance to restrain by force or fraud the equal security, or free individual competition, of individuals. To these may be reduced, and in these may be comprised, all the blessings of individual competition. Activity, knowledge, and benevolence, *to the extent in which they now exist*,—admirable when compared to the desolation of the rudeness and ignorance of savage life, of despotism, or of superstition,—have been produced by individual competition.

But what is the amount of the activity, the knowledge, and benevolence now existing, compared with what it is desirable for the happiness of communities of the human race, that they should be ? First, as to activity : of *absolute* activity, there is not one-half that there might be ; of *well-directed* activity, not the tenth part. As to knowledge, it has been, in many communities, assiduously cultivated of late years, but confined to a very few, and used as a mere tool to acquire wealth and power ; the diffusion of knowledge amidst the great mass of men, is still little more than a mere speculation. As to benevolence, it is unfortunately confined to fewer individuals than even knowledge ; so powerfully in all past ages, as well as at present, have the institutions of society, generating the circumstances surrounding men, and these circumstances generating their habitual motives to action, forced men into selfishness to the exclusion of benevolence.

It is true that the undeviating adherence to free competition under equal security, would wonderfully increase useful activity, would almost banish *pernicious*

activity, would extend and diffuse real knowledge, and with real knowledge benevolence would expand. But to this increase of useful activity, of knowledge, and benevolence, there are limits in the very nature of the principle of individual competition itself. These limits necessitate certain evils, which it is useful to have fully in view, that the mind may be always alive to the means of removing or modifying them ; or until they can be removed or modified, that they may be submitted to as *unavoidable evils*, and not rendered the sources of irritation and unavailing regret.

The most prominent of these evils, arising from free competition in its most unrestricted and best form, may perhaps be comprised under the following heads :—

1. It retains the principle of selfishness, necessarily warring with the principle of benevolence, as the leading motive to action, in all the ordinary affairs of life.
2. It paralyses the productive powers as to wealth, of one-half the human race, women, by the waste and other mischiefs of individual family arrangements ; and renders difficult, if not impossible, that equalisation of rights and duties between the sexes, which is necessary for the equal enjoyment and greatest happiness of all.
3. It occasionally leads to unprofitable or injudicious modes of individual exertion, from the limited field of judgment open to individual minds.
4. It affords no adequate, no unobjectionable, resource for sickness, old age, mal-formation, and other accidents incident to human life.
5. It obstructs the progress of useful physical and moral education, by the prejudices and despotism of continued domestic control, rendered overwhelming by command of individual property ; and it also obstructs the progress of general knowledge, from the necessity of concealment, in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain.

In the *very principle* of individual competition do all these evils seem to be inherent; preponderating in good as that principle appears to be, when compared with the principle of restraint by force and fraud. As we have shown, however, what labour by free individual competition can do for human happiness, it is right to show what it cannot do. To remove these evils, we must seek out another principle; or, if that cannot be found, must endeavour to reduce these unavoidable evils to their lowest term, and to bear them so reduced as patiently as we would unavoidable physical calamities.

The first and the greatest objection to the principle of labour by individual competition in its most perfect form, is, that "it retains the principle of selfishness as the leading motive to action in all the ordinary affairs of life."

The object of all the exertions of individual competition as to wealth, is to acquire for immediate enjoyment or accumulation, individual property. Every individual striving for *self* at the ultimate peril of want, destitution, and death, there is a constant motive operating to regard the interests of others as opposed to his own. There is, therefore, a constant temptation to sacrifice the interests of others to his own as often as it can be done, by whatever means may seem necessary to accomplish the end. Hence the necessity of the interference of law, with its brutal punishments, in order to counteract this tendency of selfishness. Hence the number of actions taken under the sanction of law, erected into crimes and marked out for punishment, till men are reduced to be the automata of arbitrary regulations. It will be in vain to object that all virtue, even benevolence, must be founded on self-interest, under all possible social arrangements. True. But comprehensive wisdom, resting on the most enlarged experience, demonstrates that self-interest is never so effectually promoted, as when it is sought for as the general *result* of the happiness of all those liable to be influenced by the conduct of any individual agent. In those cases in which the happiness of

others is not diminished by the pursuit of individual good, their benevolence smiles on the individual exertion. Selfishness seeks its self-interest primarily, and to the exclusion of others. Benevolence seeks its self-interest in conjunction with the happiness of all whom its actions may influence, and as the result of that general happiness; the aggregate mass of happiness being primary, self secondary and mingling with it.

In all the pursuits of life under individual competition, this unhappy tendency to war with benevolence might be pointed out. Every labourer, artizan, trader, sees a competitor, a rival, in every other labourer, artizan, and trader near him; and not only so, but they all see a second competition, a second rivalry, between the whole of their calling and the public. In medicine, it is the interest of the physician to cure diseases, but to cure them as slowly and with as much profit as the competition of other medical men will permit. It is the interest of all medical men that diseases should exist and prevail, or their trade would be decreased ten, or one hundred, fold. Hence the almost universal inattention, nursed by the interest of physicians, to regimen, to the *preservation of health*, by attention to food, air, moisture, cleanliness, and all other circumstances influencing it. It is the interest of mankind that the state of health should never be deranged; it is the interest of the healers of wounds and diseases that these incidents calling for their exertions and remunerations should be as frequent as may be. Individual remuneration is thus opposed at every step to the principle of benevolence; and the only remedy to the public evil which the system admits, is private competition between individuals of the same calling, mitigating the evils of selfishness on a large scale, by developing them on a smaller. It is certainly desirable for human happiness that there should be no opposition between these two principles, but that they should, if possible, proceed harmoniously to the same object, the promotion of the great-

est sum of universal happiness. From the pursuit of self-interest in the acquisition of individual wealth, proceed almost all vices and crimes. These vices and crimes must, to a certain extent, continue, till the interest of self ceases to be opposed to the interest of others.

The next evil that seems to be inherent in the principle of individual competition in the pursuit of wealth is, that "it paralyses the productive powers, as to wealth, of one-half the human race, women, by the waste and other mischiefs of individual family arrangements, and renders difficult, if not impossible, that equalisation of rights and duties between the sexes, which is necessary for the equal enjoyment and greatest happiness of all."

Individual family arrangements, rendered necessary by the pursuit of individual wealth, confine the exertions of one woman to the domestic affairs of herself and family, though there may be no really useful employment for three hours in the day. The fires, the meals, must be prepared, and all the little items of domestic drudgery done at stated hours. To remedy this enormous waste of time and unproductive thrift, it has been proposed that numbers of families adjoining each other, should form a common fund for preparing their food and educating their children, thus relieving the women from a considerable portion of unproductive domestic drudgery, and of course rendering much of their time disposable for useful pursuits. There is nothing more desirable than such a scheme. But it can never rest at this point; either the principle of mutual benevolence will be engendered by it and will prevail, in which case it will lead to entire mutual co-operation and equality of enjoyment of the products of united labour; or the principle of selfishness will prevail, and the habit of individual acquisition will bring back in everything the love of individual expenditure and enjoyment, were it but for the sake of the distinction, however dearly purchased, of those, whose individual efforts procure them the most wealth. The loss, therefore, of the greater por-

tion of the time of women may be reckoned inherent in the system of individual competition. The magnitude of this loss is appalling: suppose it to be but one-half the time of women, it is one-fourth of human effort, for machinery now so completely supersedes the necessity for mere animal strength in all the more delicate and valuable exertions of human industry, that women, if equally trained, might be as productively employed in them as men.

While women continue to be condemned to the seclusion and drudgery of half-idle slaves, all their actions liable to the arbitrary control of other human beings, their exertions and duties limited to looking after the domestic comforts, as they are called, of their masters and children, they will never rise in the scale of social existence. To be more respected, they must be more useful. In the race of individual competition for wealth, men have such fearful advantages over women, from superiority of strength and exertion uninterrupted by gestation, that they must probably maintain the lead in acquisition by individual effort. Inferiority of wealth, other circumstances being equal, necessitates inequality of enjoyment. Let knowledge be equally and impartially conveyed to both sexes, let civil and political rights be equal to both, let acquired property at the death of parents be equally distributed to male and female; still the inequality of powers in the race of individual competition for wealth, must have a continual tendency to keep the average acquisitions of women under those of men, and of course to decrease their average enjoyments. But while individual competition exists, is it probable that man will not continue to make use of his greater facility in the production and acquisition of wealth, to withhold an equality of knowledge and of civil and political rights from those over whom nature has given him animal, physical, advantages?

The third evil here imputed to the very principle of individual competition is, that "it must occasionally lead

to unprofitable or injudicious modes of individual exertion, from the limited field of judgment open to individual minds."

The system of labour, under the present wretched practice of individual competition, controlled and disheartened everywhere by the expedients of insecurity, depends for its very existence on the extraction of profit out of it, to the holders of the food, tools, and materials, necessary to make labour productive. Till this condition, of profit to capitalists, can be complied with, labour, though teeming with the capabilities of making millions happy, must lie entirely dormant. Hence, and from the depressing competition of labourers amongst themselves, the unskilfulness, the unprofitableness, the almost absolute idleness as to useful production, of more than one-half the human race, even in those countries where most fully, or least uneconomically, employed. Under equal security, every man becoming possessed of the physical and mental means necessary to make his labour productive, every labourer being also capitalist, the great mass of these evils would doubtless disappear. But, still, while individual competition exists, every man must judge for himself as to the probability of success in the occupation which he adopts. And what are his means of judging? Every one, doing well in his calling, is interested in concealing his success, lest competition should reduce his gains. What individual can judge whether the market, frequently at a great distance, sometimes in another hemisphere of the globe, is overstocked, or likely to be so, with the article which inclination may lead him to fabricate? He is evidently reduced to act on the most general and vague probability. And should any *error of judgment*, whether induced by useful originality of view, by too great caution or too great confidence, lead him into an uncalled for, and, therefore, unprofitable line of exertion, what is the consequence? A mere error of judgment, though attended with the utmost energy of activity and benevolence, may end in severe

distress, if not in ruin. Cases of this sort seem to be unavoidable under the scheme of individual competition in its best form. If by any other scheme of human labour they could be avoided, it would surely be desirable that that mode of labour—no preponderating evils following in its train—should be preferred. As long as the practice of useful modes of action, called virtues, do not uniformly conduce to the happiness of the individual practising them, as long as institutions obscure the judgment, or prevent the possibility of judging respecting the consequences of actions, so long will morality remain a game of chance, and fail of acquiring that respect, attachment, and pursuit, which human welfare requires. Here is, therefore, in the very principle of individual competition, a source of occasional misery, and of falsification to the calculations of the most useful virtues, activity and industry, guided by benevolence.

The principle of individual competition is moreover charged with “affording no adequate, no unobjectionable resource for mal-formation, sickness, or old age, or for numerous accidents incident to human life.”

It is evident, that no system of individual competition, however freed from force or delusion; that no system of labour by mutual co-operation or by any other conceivable mode; that no advancement of the neglected art of preserving health, can ever, wholly, obviate the above evils. Under all possible combinations, they must occasionally afflict humanity. All that can be done, is to afford the utmost compensation that the nature of things will admit, in the way of mitigating the evils when they arrive. The remedy proposed for them, under the system of free individual competition, by the celebrated Condorcet, is the extension of the principle of “Insurances,” to be adapted to every possible contingency of distress. The evils attending these expedients,—supposing the schemes and management to be unobjectionable—are, the unavoidable expense of the management, the risk, however small, of

failure of the fund, and the risk of accidents befalling non-subscribers. How utterly futile, under all past and present systems of insecurity, where the productive labourers are every day becoming more productive and more depressed, and where the number of mere idle consumers is every day increasing, and those increasing numbers more greedy after the vanities of mere unenjoying means of distinction, would be the hope of any general good from any such insurance schemes, need not be mentioned. Under all existing systems of insecurity, the advancement of knowledge is made use of by the few to devise new and more ingenious expedients for new exactions, or for rendering the old more productive. But though representative institutions prevail, though the happiness of all the sentient rational beings of a community be impartially sought under the natural laws of distribution; still will the class of evils now before us prevail, occasionally and from accidental circumstances, in however mitigated a form. There is no doubt that human happiness would be increased if such evils could be universally compensated or mitigated when they occur without any of the risks of schemes of insurance. How far this may be practicable will be seen in the next chapter on the new scheme of labour by mutual co-operation.

We come now to the last evil imputed to the principle of individual competition, that "it obstructs the progress of useful physical and moral education by the prejudices and despotism of continued domestic control, rendered overwhelming by command of individual property; and it also obstructs the progress of general knowledge from the necessity of concealment, in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain."

In order to do justice to the principle of free individual competition in everything, we must suppose that all the existing restrictions on the diffusion of real knowledge, to

the young as well as to adults, have ceased, and that a scheme of universal education, as comprehensive, and at least as useful, as that proposed in the fourth chapter, has been adopted; such improvements being evidently compatible with individual competition. What obstacles will still remain in the very principle itself to the acquisition of truth by the young? All parents are more or less incrustated with the prejudices, on all subjects, moral and physical, of their infancy, which they have never been able to inquire into; and amongst all those prejudices, there is not one more pernicious to human improvement than the common notion, that, in consequence of their being parents, the formation of the mind of their children belongs of right to the caprice of such parents. That the *power* of forming such infant minds to virtue or to vice, to wisdom or to folly, must, while the system of individual competition for wealth lasts, remain in the hands of the parents; and that more evil would be produced by transferring such power to any other hands, than by letting it remain in the hands of the parents, cannot be disputed. But the power is one thing, and the propriety of using, or the most useful mode of using, such power is another. White men have the *power* of making black men and white women slaves: it does not follow that they act justly, that it adds to the mass of general happiness, of the happiness of the black or white slaves or slave-owners, that such power should be so used. Just so as to the power of forcibly constraining the limbs or the minds of children. In China now, and lately in these countries, the feet or the head or the trunk of infants were twisted and forced out of their natural development. All the rational in these countries, have now relinquished the barbarism of constraining the palpable visible development of the physical frame, from attending to the ill effects of such restraints in producing deformity, impotence, and disease. But the development of the mind being unseen, and the ill effects of constraint consequently more difficult

of demonstration, the far more mischievous effects of force as applied to mental operations, have been overlooked. The only wholesome food for the mind—lead where it may—is *truth*, or a perception of things as they really exist or have existed in nature. If parents have the right, because they have the power, of applying poisonous food to the body, so have they the right to apply the poison of falsehood to the minds of children. The laws of all but the most savage countries punish the one, the other as atrocious act, popular morality scarcely yet condemns. No human being can justly, or without preponderant evil, assume that all or any of his notions are true, and force them, *without inquiry*, into the mind of any other human being. Are the diseases of the mind, are false judgments misguiding conduct, and bitter hatreds withering all glow of benevolence and provoking universal retaliation, less productive of misery than diseases and deformities of the body? Freedom to the mind and body, are necessary to their perfect development; the ultimate and greatest happiness of the individual through the whole of its existence, is the only rightful object of education, as it is of human life.

Now, as long as the production and acquisition of wealth by individual competition lasts, as long as all parents are possessed of the separate individual hoards on which the comforts, the existence, of their children depend, so long must all parents possess a tremendously despotic power over the minds as well as bodies of their offspring, not only during childhood and youth, but, though in a modified degree, as long as the parents live—a power altogether independent of reason and justice, checked only by public opinion, and that public opinion again chiefly formed by those possessing the power. So vast a power in the hands of every parent, at least of every male parent, wise or foolish, must be liable to enormous abuses; its existence, and of course its liability to abuse, seem to be inseparable from the system of individual competition; and from the natural inclination to save trouble and men-

tal exertion, power must be generally used, when to be had, in lieu of influence by persuasion and benevolence. If any system of human labour and exertion could be devised, by which the whole of this parental power that could be used to evil purposes, should be lopped off, while all that could be well employed, that is to say, for the purposes of persuasion and beneficence, should be retained, would it not be desirable that such change should be effected? and that the use of mere brute force and terror should be superseded in parental education as well as in all the other concerns of life?

Again—the principle of individual competition “obstructs the progress of general knowledge, from the necessity of concealment in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain.” In all cases justice must be done to the principle of individual competition, by giving it credit for the removal of all the evils which equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, would banish. Still, while individual competition lasts, every one must endeavour to make available for the increase of his individual board, though all were capitalist labourers, whatever powers of mind or body he might possess. To endeavour to render these powers common to all, would be to divest himself with his own hand of his advantages for the acquisition of happiness. Concealment, therefore, of what is new or excellent from competitors, must accompany individual competition, though shielded by equal security, because the strongest personal interest is by it opposed to the principle of benevolence. Is it possible to devise a state of things, in which these principles should run exactly in the same direction? in which it should not be the interest of *self* to confine knowledge or anything useful, but to diffuse them and make them the possessions of all? in which every motive for useful activity would not only be left in full operation, but would be increased, while all motives to pernicious activity, exercised at the expense of others, would cease? As long as

individual competition lasts, the interest of self must be the primary object of pursuit, the general good being necessarily subordinate thereto, and to be pursued only when conducive to the primary interest. Knowledge and all other advantages must be more or less exclusively or jealously guarded; the evil to a certain extent seems inseparable from the very principle of individual competition. If the interest of self could be made to co-exist with that of others, and to be mingled with it so as to form one homogeneous undistinguishable mass, this would surely be an improvement on the principle of individual competition. The separation of self-interest from the general interest, not to say the opposition of the one to the other, must tend to the exclusive guarding of knowledge, like any other possession, as one of the efficient means of private benefit.

Such appears to be the amount of the evils, or of the most material of the evils, inherent in the system, however modified or improved, of labour by individual competition, and, of course, of individual property. No community of property can possibly co-exist with production by individual competition. The two principles are irreconcilable. Individual competition necessitates individual possession and individual enjoyment. To demonstrate the benefits of this same principle of individual competition, when freely operating under the protection of the natural laws of distribution, as opposed to all past and present systems of insecurity supported by mere force and delusion, has been one of the leading objects of this inquiry.

But such are the benefits of equality, if to be had without violating security, that any system of labour founded on the reconciliation of these two principles, on their equal and concurrent activity, would be amongst the most desirable objects of human attainment. Such a system, embracing all the advantages of individual competition and individual property, without any of their disadvantages, has been proposed. It must be examined.

CHAPTER VII.

OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.
LABOUR BY CO-OPERATION OPPOSED TO LABOUR BY INDIVIDUAL
COMPETITION.

It has been shown in our first chapter, that of all possible modes of distributing the objects of enjoyment, amongst any number of individuals, perfect equality of distribution tends to produce the greatest quantity of happiness, provided the shares are not so reduced as to render their acquisition an object of indifference ; and that such equality does not infringe on equal security.

An indistinct perception of this truth, has led the everywhere degraded majority of mankind, in all ages, to look with an evil eye on the systems of forced inequality of wealth under which they have been compelled to live, and has been the fruitful cause of divisions and strife amongst communities. Smarting under the evils of inequality, evils aggravated in a thousand ways by expedients, many of which have passed under our review, they have at times endeavoured, by the clumsy instrument of *force*, to rectify the evils of which they complained. But the application of force, although it might rectify for a moment the evils of inequality, brought in its train evils still more tremendous. Industry and reproduction, we have shown to be incompatible with the *forced* equality of wealth ; *that* security in the use of the products of labour and in the free exchange of those products, which is necessary to ensure reproduction, is annihilated by the exercise of force. Non-production is a greater evil than inequality of distribution. Hence the necessity, at all hazards, and by whatever miserable expedients, of upholding what was called security. Under pretence of maintaining this security, equal to all, political power has everywhere established real and enormous insecurity, protecting its own

acquisitions and those of a favoured few, however obtained, but violating at its pleasure the security of the rest of the community; thus wantonly superadding to the necessary and unavoidable evils of inequality, the unnecessary, avoidable, and, therefore, factitious evils of insecurity.

Under the name of *systems, or institutions, of insecurity*, and *system of equal security*, the effects of these two modes of conduct on the wealth, the intelligence, the dispositions and the happiness of communities have been pointed out and contrasted.

So far have we arrived in the argument. Equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, must be maintained, in order to ensure reproduction; and particularly in order to ensure the largest and most useful reproduction; but as equal security comprehends a power of voluntary exchange or transfer, a choice between labour in co-operation with any number of individuals and individual exertion, as well as between the common and the individual use or enjoyment of the articles produced; a way is left by operating on the understanding, to influence the affections and the will to many different modes of production and distribution, all of them compatible with equal security. The products of individual exertion *may* be equally and voluntarily divided amongst any number of associated individuals, though the quantity produced by each might be ever so various. This mode of equal distribution and common enjoyment of articles produced by individual exertion, has been often tried; particularly under the auspices of Peter and the other Apostles, by the first Christian communities at Jerusalem and elsewhere; but its continuance has never been found practicable. The only expedient for equality of distribution worthy of consideration, is that which is founded on mutual co-operation, if not on equality of co-operation, in the production. Equal distribution and enjoyment seem to be incompatible with individual production.

The important question therefore presses upon us. As

equality of distribution has been shown to be attended with preponderant evil when obtained at the expense of the *forcible* transfer of the acquisitions of industry, "is it, or is it not, possible to bring about this desirable state of equality of distribution and enjoyment amongst communities, without violating equal security, without the employment of force, and by means simply of the *voluntary* transfer of the acquisitions of industry?" If, without violating security, without the employment of force, without the transfer of the products of his labour from the industrious producer to the idle non-producer, perfect equality of distribution of the articles of wealth, the products of human labour, could be effected, it would be the manifest interest of communities that it should be so effected.

To effect this desirable equality of distribution of the articles of wealth, different expedients have been proposed by intelligent and benevolent men. There is not one of those expedients which has not been founded either on the employment of force and the consequent violation of security, or on the delusion of the understandings of those subjected, or proposed to be subjected, to them. Force or fraud, or combinations of these, are the means which men have hitherto employed, through ignorance of more appropriate means, for effecting even the most benevolent or praiseworthy objects, schemes of equality, as well as others.

To examine, after what has been said through the whole course of this treatise, systems of equality proposed to be maintained by force, by constant violations of equal security, would be a waste of time. Almost as little worthy of attention are those systems of equality maintained by delusion, whether by mistaken or wilfully misrepresented views of interest on the part of the proposers of them, or of those to be influenced by them, or of both. A real statement of facts, and those facts really consistent with the interest of those invited to co-operate in an equal

distribution of wealth, are the preliminaries requisite to entitle any proposer of even voluntary equality of distribution to a hearing from the advocate of equal security. Equality of distribution, if rendered practicable by being rendered consistent with equal security, and if proposed to be brought about by the operation of the understanding on the will of rational agents, from a calm view of real interest; far from being a scheme to be repelled without examination, would merit, from the mere novelty and reasonableness of the terms in which it was proposed, as well as from its all-comprehensive influence on human happiness, the most anxious and dispassionate consideration of every real lover of human happiness. To reconcile equal and perfect security with equality of distribution, is a problem of mighty import, which legislators and philosophers, or those few of them whose efforts have been sincerely directed to the production of the greatest mass of happiness, have laboured in vain to unravel, and which they have almost always concluded, by abandoning in despair of a solution, or by cutting through. Wide will be the admiration, delightful the sympathy of mankind for him who shall have solved this problem, and shown them how to reconcile and to enjoy, at the same time, all the blessings of the equal distribution of wealth and those not less prolific of good which spring from equal security and its overflowing reproduction.

An individual has been found bold enough to undertake and to put forward, on rational principles, a solution of this mighty problem, "how to reconcile equality of distribution with perfect security." This individual is Mr. Owen, of New Lanark, in Scotland. Mutual co-operation, and equality of distribution, are the instruments by which he operates. In whatever language he may clothe his ideas, this is the real and laudable object, and would be the effect, of those magnificent combinations, the result of a rare union of profound thought and unequalled practical knowledge, to which he invites the attention of all men interested in the

pursuit of happiness. To estimate the practicability and the utility of this plan, according to the principles herein developed, is a duty necessarily arising from the undertaking to demonstrate the happiest distribution of wealth. The mode of inquiry shall be, not that of an advocate for or against, not so much the plan of the individual as the principles of the new combination in their supposed most perfect form. Whatever is supposed imperfect or unessential to the main design, will not be noticed, as the object is to ascertain truth, not to support or condemn an individual.

In the first place, then, the developments in the first chapter, demonstrating the increased happiness produced by equality of distribution (when not obtained at the expense of equal security), are entirely in accord with his principles. He everywhere assumes, and reasons on it as a first principle, that equality of distribution tends most to happiness. In establishing this important principle, an equal and mutual support is afforded to his principle of *social* security by mutual co-operation, and to the system herein advocated of equal *individual* security by equal competition. Both systems repose equally on the natural laws of distribution. In the *prima-facie* benefits of equality, the two systems of social security (co-operation) and individual security (competition) are agreed. But the system of *individual* security requires a restraint on equality in order to ensure reproduction; while the system of *social* security professes to require no restraint on the full enjoyments of equal distribution.

Again—the two systems, of social security and of individual security, equally deprecate all the past institutions of communities as founded on restraints, exclusions, monopolies, and injurious competition, and generating by a variety of expedients forced inequality of wealth and all the mischiefs in its train hitherto prevalent since history has preserved records of human communities. The object of both is equally to banish these evils. The object of

both is to show that those injurious institutions may be easily and peaceably replaced, and to the increase of the real happiness of all, by substituting more simple institutions for them : but the system of social (or common) security by co-operation, professes to remove altogether the evils of insecurity and inequality, while the system of individual security by the most chastened competition, professes to do no more than to reduce to their lowest term the still unavoidable ills of partial inequality.

SECTION I.

ESSENTIAL OR CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY OF WEALTH.

Let us now inquire what are those *essential* and *characteristic* circumstances by which the system of social equality must be judged as compared with all other schemes of social organisation, whether those of insecurity or of equal individual security?

In justice to the system, and in superior deference to truth, it is necessary that it should be clearly understood as a preliminary, that it is proposed that the new institutions of social equality shall be founded on truth alone, on the real and perceived interest of those engaging in them, and on the voluntary consent of every individual member. All force, all fraud or delusion of any kind, are excluded, both in their original formation and their subsequent economy. The system of social equality thus reconciled with our principles of perfect equal security, we come to the proposed essential and characteristic arrangements.

It is proposed, that any number of individuals, whose mutual co-operation can, according to circumstances, say from five hundred to two thousand or upwards, produce for the common use and enjoyment of all, the greatest quantity of the objects of wealth contributing to human happiness, shall voluntarily associate together to produce

by their united labour, with all the aids of science and art, such maximum of the means of enjoyment: supply and demand being thus rendered always commensurate to each other.

It is proposed, that these communities shall in all cases cultivate so much good land, at least, as will provide for their own healthful and pleasurable existence, say half an acre to an acre and a half for each individual; that where human labour is more productive, and otherwise more useful, than that of inferior animals, as in the spade husbandry, it shall be used in preference; and that the surplus of their labour shall be directed to the fabrication of the most useful clothing, habitations, and furniture, and lastly to the fabrication of such articles of minor comfort or convenience as may be most desired, or of things which may be exchanged for them, or which may be necessary to discharge the debts contracted by, or the charges of political power imposed on, such communities in common with the rest of society. The direction of the surplus of labour to manufacturing or agricultural pursuits, to be determined by local circumstances, such as soil, natural products, markets, acquired skill, and pecuniary means, of the co-operators.

It is proposed, that where these individuals so associating for mutual happiness, have the means, say about forty pounds for each individual, and four times as much for a family, they shall contribute sufficient for the erection of their dwellings and the purchase of the necessary stock and machinery, agricultural or otherwise, in such a situation as they may approve, and on such a plan as may be submitted to them, and of which they may also approve, combining health and convenience with the greatest facilities for production. Where they are more wealthy, the contribution of about another forty pounds a-head, would buy the land on which their habitations would be built, and their agricultural and manufacturing operations conducted.

It is proposed, that these associations, if not rich enough to buy the land, shall rent the land; and if not able to erect their own dwellings and other buildings, or buy their own stock, shall borrow the amount requisite for one or both of these purposes; the land and the buildings with the fruits of their labour being security for the rent and the amount borrowed. Any person, whether intending to live in the community or not, may subscribe any amount for these purposes; the interest to be paid out of the products of the yearly labour of the community, and the capital borrowed, itself, to be ultimately repaid out of the same fund. Any subscriber to the building fund, wishing to live in the community and share its benefits, without co-operating in the labour, may do so on paying a certain sum (perhaps forty pounds), annually, to be allowed him out of the amount of his subscription; or, yielding the subscription to the community, he may become a non-working member;—the proprietors of the subscribed stock for building, appointing a committee, and the working associates another, to arrange and erect the whole establishment, and to purchase the agricultural and manufacturing machinery, &c.

It is proposed, that each individual shall be fed and clad out of the common store, that the children and young people shall sleep in common dormitories for the different sexes and ages, and that single adults shall have one private apartment each; if married, or two men or two women living together, to have two rooms between them, with use of the public rooms for dining, reading, lectures, amusements, &c. The number of private rooms liable of course to be increased according to the funds and notions of convenience of the community, or according to the amount of subscription to the capital fund.

It is proposed, in order to render more productive, more healthful, and more pleasant, the labour of these co-operators, that they shall all be alternately employed in agricultural and manufacturing industry. It is there-

fore desirable that amongst the co-operators should be those skilled in every useful art, that they may, by proper arrangements, communicate to each other the knowledge and skill necessary for such useful alternation of employments. Should none skilled in any particular line of industry, thought to be desirable by the community, be found amongst the co-operators, some persons so skilled, and not of the community, must be induced, through benevolent or pecuniary motives, to teach the co-operators the art required.

It is proposed, in order still further to increase the useful products of the labour of the community, that women shall be relieved from the care of children over two years old, and from the drudgery of family cooking; the children being to be educated in common, under a proper number of superintendents, but always under the eye of the parents, and the culinary arrangements for the whole community to be performed in a common kitchen; meals to be taken in the common sitting-rooms, or in the private apartments of the co-operators, at their pleasure. The departments of labour,—agricultural and manufacturing, or, otherwise,—to be done by women, to be such as is best suited to their physical and intellectual powers.

It is proposed, that all the children of the community shall share the best physical and moral education that the present state of knowledge and the means of the community can afford, incomparably superior to the best education that the best educated in society now receive, giving them an outline of all real knowledge exposed to their senses and expanding judgment, adapted to the real wants of their future lives, and embracing the application of science to the useful arts, with occasional practice and illustration from the establishments in the midst of which they are educated, and of which they will become, when adult, joint proprietors. The expense of such education, to be the labour of a proper number of the associates; or in the beginning, if there are none qualified, assistance for this purpose

must be derived from without. The plan of education to be laid before the community and assented to by them.

It is proposed, that entire freedom as to thought and worship, on religious, as well as on all other, subjects, shall be the rule of the community. Some of the associates may be clergymen, and perform from *pure motives* (for here no others can prevail) clerical duties, in a building to be erected for that purpose, which different sects might use; or the members of the community might resort to whatever churches or chapels they thought fit out of the establishment. Neither the institutor of the system of social co-operation, nor committee of stock proprietors, nor any other individuals whatever, shall in any way dictate to the community, or any part thereof, as to their religious affairs.

It is proposed, that the government of the community shall be inherent in itself, in all its adult, male and female, members, whether by committees appointed by election, or rotation, or seniority, or any other manner that may be proposed to such community and by them agreed on. But as the basis of the association is mutual co-operation, and equal united enjoyment of the products of common social industry, as the object of the institution is to identify individual with social feelings and enjoyments, as all individual competition is excluded; it is evident that no *factitious* rewards or punishments can prevail in such a community; they must be such as arise from the good or ill opinion of the associates, to be ultimately authenticated by the removal from amongst them, on payment of his share in the joint property, the person whose conduct might have been injurious to the general welfare. The rewards and punishments must be such only as flow naturally from the actions themselves, from the human constitution and surrounding circumstances. The regulations would be mostly directions and recommendations as to the members, and exchanges as to others. The general laws of society would be incompatible with most sorts of factitious

punishments in these communities. As to factitious rewards—from whence are they to come? Of the common stock of products the individual has already what he wants; and the community has no other fund than the common stock,—without making exchanges out of the common stock for that particular purpose,—out of which to give. He that has sincerely associated for the common enjoyment, will find no pleasure in individual factitious rewards. Voluntariness is the life principle of these associations, compulsion their death-warrant. As to the rest—the plan of government will be submitted to the community, and they will delegate its powers to whom they think fit, on the best view their knowledge will permit them to take of their interest.

It is proposed, that every art and science, manual, mental, or partaking of both, productive of real preponderant happiness to the community, being within their pecuniary means, and not opposed by physical obstacles, as want of fuel, peculiarity of soil, &c., shall be cultivated by some of the associated members of the community for the common benefit of all; the surplus hours of artists, medical, or literary men, being devoted to some of the healthful useful occupations of the rest of the community, or to the diffusing of their peculiar knowledge, by aiding in the education of the young, or by experimental lectures, or otherwise, to the adults.

It is proposed, that all misunderstandings (for all rancorous strifes about individual wealth are removed by the very constitution of the society) amongst any of the associated members, shall be arranged by such internal conciliatory means, arbitration or otherwise, as to the community may appear best calculated to engender and perpetuate kindly dispositions.

It is proposed, that every member of the association shall be at perfect liberty to leave it whenever he or she may think proper, with claim on the society for whatever proportion of joint property, or of stock lent, the retiring

member may be entitled to. Should any vacancy occur in the establishment, the society admits a new member under whatever forms of admission it may deem most useful.

SECTION 2.

BENEFITS OF THE SYSTEM OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY OF WEALTH.

Let those who are in search of truth and their own happiness, pause and consider well the effects of the preceding arrangements, proposed to be made by and for rational beings co-operating together for their mutual interest. Let them consider, on the one hand, what are the *benefits* which the proposed scheme of voluntary equality, if generally carried into effect, and as far as carried into effect, would produce; the restraints on equality and security, and consequently on morality and happiness, which it would remove. Let them, on the other hand, consider what are the obstacles, if any, to real equality and security which this scheme would fail in removing, and what, if any, are the obstacles which its establishment, unattended with co-operating arrangements of general society, would even tend to aggravate. The practicability of the plan will be subsequently discussed.

The obvious benefits of the proposed arrangements seem to be, that

1. They would save the waste, at least within the precincts of the association, of mere *unproductive consumption*.
2. They would save the *waste of labour* and skill, now unemployed, through mere ignorance or want of market, or now uselessly, or perniciously, directed.
3. They would save the waste, now consumed under the name of *profits*, of wholesale and retail dealers; every co-operator being himself a joint

proprietor and capitalist; production and consumption being shared equally by all.

4. They would save, by means of physical arrangements and the communication of knowledge, the waste of life, of *health*, and enjoyment, now caused by poverty, ignorance, and neglect.
5. They would save the incalculable waste of happiness now arising from the contentions, animosities, and cruelties engendered by the institutions of insecurity, and in some degree inseparable from the most chastened pursuit of individual gain; the social combinations proposed removing the *causes* of those crimes and vices, and by the education of the understanding implanting opposite, permanent, dispositions and habits.
6. They would render supply and demand always commensurate, and reduce the economy of supply and demand, population, and other contested questions of morals, legislation, and political economy, to fixed and easily ascertained data, and principles founded thereon.

Respecting each of these benefits some explanation and detail will be necessary. That all the above are benefits of the highest order, and that they are to be procured by social co-operation, provided that beings like those of the human race *can be induced voluntarily to co-operate in their production*, no one will doubt. To prevent idle, unproductive consumers from seizing on the fruits of the labour of the industrious, to teach the unemployed, skill, so as to render their labour to the utmost degree productive, to share amongst all the co-operators the benefits of profits now confined to a few at the expense of all, to improve the health and capacity for all enjoyment, and consequently to lengthen the term of human life, incalculably to add to virtue by banishing almost all temptations to vice, and to prevent the benefits of these operations from being ever lost by keeping supply and demand

always commensurate—surely, if there be any objects of human pursuit worth the attainment, these are amongst them.

The benefit of social co-operation first noticed, is, that it “would save the waste, at least within the precincts of the association, of mere unproductive consumption.” All the co-operators must be productive labourers; there would be no idle capitalists or landlords; all the productive labourers would be either directly, or ultimately, landlords and capitalists; landlords and capitalists of a joint benevolent stock for social universal happiness, not for selfish individual distinction, enjoyed only because contrasted with the poverty and wretchedness around. Even those whose ordinary labours are more of a mental than of a muscular description, will find it useful for health and variety, to devote a part of their time to some of the ordinary agricultural or mechanical operations. The perverted association of disgrace—but the very natural association, from the union of dirt and fatigue, want, ignorance, and misery forced upon it—now attached to *labour*, will, under the new circumstances, be transferred to *idleness*, from the union which will be found between labour and comfort, intelligence and happiness. Public opinion will exert an influence hitherto unknown and unsuspected; for the very simple reason that every individual of the public will be personally interested, the supply of the wants, of the comforts, and conveniences of life, will depend on the useful exertion of the industry, of the useful co-operation, of every other member of the community. Public opinion awards now its disapprobation against the liar and the drunkard; but suppose that every member of the community from which that disapprobation emanated, suffered personal evil, or loss of comfort, from the effects of the falsehood and drunkenness, instead of, as now, only sympathising with their effects on others, with what an irresistible moral effect would the expression of the public opinion of such a suffering community be accompanied!

Who can calculate its force? Who can set bounds to the wonders to which it may give rise? But such would be exactly the situation of these associated communities. The comforts of every member of them would be individually dependent on the active social exertions of every other member; which would give to public opinion the energy of family sympathies, of family love, or family disapprobation. Even now, who can bear the averted eye and the altered manner of a single friend? But under the arrangements proposed, where every co-operator is a friend, and an always busy friend, always employed for the benefit of the idle as well as of the rest of the co-operators; who could live exposed to the alienated feelings of such a community of friends, to whose intelligent and interested glance, and to whose moral inspection and control he must be every day exposed? No one, certainly, constituted as human beings usually are. But suppose such a one to be found, incapable of being influenced by the usual interests and sympathies of other men. He would be either regarded as an unfortunate idiot, whose partial insanity would be harmless, as it would find no imitators, or if the example were likely to be productive of mischief, the society would exercise, under whatever forms and regulations might be judged most useful, its power of self-preservation, by refusing the benefits of co-operation, by excluding from its number the member ceasing to co-operate. Once in joint possession, every individual a proprietor of the land, the buildings, the machinery, and other stock, the basis of their operations, what could lead to the admission of a member not contributing by his industry to the common comfort? Nothing but the possession of some peculiar talent, the exercise of which might be deemed by the community more conducive to general happiness than any other mode of employing the individual so peculiarly disposed.

The next saving noticed from the proposed arrangements for mutual co-operation, is, "the saving of the

labour and skill now unemployed through mere ignorance or want of market, or uselessly or perniciously directed." For all articles of prime necessity and prime comfort in these communities, their own consumption would always form a market for themselves ; and the accidental greater or less supply of non-essential articles would add to, or detract but little from, their well-being. No one would be ignorant where there would be a demand for his labour, and meet perhaps the punishment of a criminal, under the name of a vagrant, after traversing the land to find employment ; nor would any, though unskilled and ignorant of the mode of applying their labour, be studiously kept in that ignorance and awkwardness, by surrounding jealousy and ever-calculating selfish competition. Under the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation, it would be the interest of every member that the knowledge and the skill of every one of his associates should be as great as possible, as much greater than possible even than his own, as his interest depends incalculably more on the skilful co-operation of his associates than on his own individual exertions. Under these new circumstances, every one would be interested in removing the ignorance and awkwardness, and infusing and adding to the knowledge and skill, of his associates, to increase the common produce, as much as he is now interested to perpetuate the one and obstruct the other, for fear of educating a rival to his own gain ; no one, under these arrangements, could derive benefit from the ignorance or awkwardness of others ; no one could increase in knowledge and skill without benefiting all. Thus would ignorance and awkwardness be gradually transformed into knowledge and skill, and no one would fear their competition in lowering the remuneration (wages) of his labour.

A community associating together under these arrangements for the production of wealth for mutual enjoyment, would form a new and rational estimate of all the wants, factitious or real, which now prevail in artificial society,

that their labour might be directed to the gratification of those, in the first place, which produce the greatest quantity of preponderant good, immediate pleasure and ultimate consequences, both taken into the account. Whatever, though immediately pleasurable to the taste, brought by the compulsion of habit to its relish, was ultimately prejudicial, shortening life, inducing present or laying the foundation of future disease, such as intoxicating liquors and tobacco, would be at once discarded, and would not be used if procurable without labour, much less at the expense of what might otherwise be the best-directed labour. Wretchedness of mind and body, ignorance of consequences, exhaustion from over-work, from exposure, and under-feeding, want of means to procure substantial gratifications, now lead men to these pernicious momentary indulgences. In the new communities, even those addicted to them would soon lose their relish for them, their wants being supplied with wholesome food, and all other causes of perverted inclination being withdrawn. Neither, therefore, would the healthful produce of their fields and orchards be converted, at a great cost of labour, into consuming poison; nor would the useful products of their labour be exchanged for such pernicious articles. There would be no restraint, certainly, but the exertion of their own will; but this will would be necessarily guided in a short time (all motives to delusion being removed) by a correct view of their own interest. The saving of the waste of labour from this cause alone, would be from one-third to one-tenth of the whole labour of the community—to say nothing of health and morals. Strange it is, but true, that in proportion to the poverty and ignorance of the people, the *comparative* amount, as balanced by their whole earnings, expended on such pernicious articles, increases with the ignorance and poverty. Amongst such communities there would be no wholesale manufactories or storehouses of *poison; physical health, by means of suitable food, clothes, and shelter, as the basis of all

happiness, would be the first object sought for. Hides, wool, flax, the materials of the most useful domestic manufactures, the produce of their own lands would supply. Fruits, honey, milk, and every useful garden vegetable, labour would create in the required abundance. Exchanges would therefore be very limited, and confined to a few superfluities, besides the materials of the arts, such as iron, &c., where not produced on the soil.

Hence arises, under this head, another saving from producing and consuming on the spot, the waste of land and water carriage, the labour expended on transportation, which in general society amounts frequently to a tenth, and from that, according to distance and bulk of the article, to even one-half the cost of production—on some few articles much higher. Three-fourths, at least, of the labour of mere transportation would be saved to the associated communities by the proposed regulations. The transportation labour thus saved, would be doubly productive: first, the support of the men, horses, and machinery, employed in transportation, would cease to be a drain on the common stock of labour for useful production and enjoyment; and next, the labour of these very men, horses, and transporting machines would be transferred to increase the common stock of useful products for increased enjoyment; for it must never be forgotten that under the new arrangements, an excess of industrious producers, an excess of supply, can never be complained of, the whole community and all the individuals in it, and all newly-admitted increase of numbers being always consumers and producers to each other; the only limit to useful production and enjoyment being the distant want of land and materials to work with and upon.

A further saving, under this head, would be of the waste of human labour now expended in the production or seeking for numerous articles, of no sort of intrinsic value, but serving merely as means of distinguishing, unaccompanied with merit of any sort, certain individuals from

their fellow-creatures. Such are ornamental precious stones, pearls, costly trinkets, and in general all things that serve for mere distinction beyond their intrinsic use. Were sparkling and reflecting stones procured as easily as flowers, and sought for for their mere prettiness, where not for their use, they would be as innocent ornaments; but, procured as they are at immense cost of useful productive labour, and giving no intrinsic enjoyment—for the mere pleasure of reflection to the eye is beneath ridicule—they are a constant drain on human happiness, not only by the labour misdirected to their acquisition, but by the unsocial passions and contentions which they generate. A rational community, such as mutual co-operation would suppose or produce, would waste its labour on no article for mere distinction sake; would bestow labour in proportion to utility alone, *i.e.*, to preponderant happiness, present or future, over the labour of the acquisition. As all the members would be equal *as to wealth*, the real wants and comforts of *all* would be supplied, before the factitious wants of any could be thought of; as to mere factitious distinction, grounded on anything but the possession of useful personal qualities, it would soon cease to be sought for, and would be held as the fool's pursuit. As soon as all possible physical wants and conveniences, and all intellectual and moral pleasures *of all* were abundantly provided for; then, and not before, would the unemployed time of such a community, be as harmlessly devoted to the gathering and polishing of pretty stones as to the cultivating and gathering of ornamental pinks and roses. As harmless the pearl as the rose, if as easily procured and giving as much intrinsic pleasure; but till then, it would not be preferred as an ornament, but applied solely to useful purposes. As to general society, these co-operating communities would not envy them their distinguishing and merit-suppressing baubles; for such things they would not exchange the useful products of their labour; by far different tests would they measure and award their sym-

pathies to the members of their community and to all the world.

A vast additional saving of the waste of time and labour would be produced by the essential arrangement of teaching every member of the community both manufacturing and agricultural operations. The intellect that can learn one of these, can learn the other; the facility of teaching ordinary trades in a few months has been put out of doubt in numerous manufacturing, poor-house, and criminal, establishments, both on the Continent and in England. Frost, rains, and shortness of winter-days, with the addition, in some countries, of compelled holiday idleness, subtract about one-sixth, and from that up to a third, from the productiveness of the labour of agriculturists; and so must it be as long as they remain mere agriculturists. By learning other species of useful labour, and having the workshops on the spot, these wasted hours will be turned into the means of increased enjoyment by increased production. Again, many agricultural operations require an immediate doubling or trebling of the ordinary strength of labour; on these occasions, the whole force of the community would be within call, and would be trained to the operations required, the manufactures suffering no loss from the temporary delay produced by needful and grateful change of employment. Many manufactures in their turn may not advantageously occupy the whole year, the whole day, or the particular season, of the individuals whose inclinations lead them to make such arts their chief occupation. In the healthful variety of agricultural pursuits, will such waste time be advantageously employed. There are out-of-door trades, too, such as the slater, now unemployed in bad weather; manufacturing workshops of clothes, furniture, conveniences, or matters for exchange, would turn to account all such precious hours; now wasted, to the loss and misery of the tradesmen. The saving of the waste of the productive powers of human labour by this arrange-

ment alone, substituting a variety for a fixation of employment, would be, perhaps, equal to a sixth of its present total amount.

Another saving of waste, under the head of labour, of still more importance, is that produced by the arrangements for the employment of women, and that mechanical part of the education of children called their training. Women, forming one-half of human society, and not one-half of useful human operations requiring, with the present aids of machinery, more strength than they possess, they could, if properly trained, contribute their half, by useful productive labour, to human enjoyment; that portion of their time deducted which is necessarily occupied in the production and care of very young children; an occupation more useful, not to say more necessary to human existence and happiness, than any other whatever. It is evidently desirable for the happiness of all, that this time should be as much as possible abridged. Under the present system of individual effort and isolation, the whole of the time of married women is taken up in looking after a few children, preparing food for a few, and in other little matters of what are called domestic economy. From more than five-sixths of this species of labour, the proposed arrangements free married women, and enable them to co-operate almost as effectually as the men, in contributing, by productive labour, to the common happiness. From purchasing and preparing solid and liquid food, fire-making to heat and light apartments, with all the attendant operations, and retail bargainings, they are relieved by the common kitchen, and lighting and heating apparatus managed by a few for the use of all. From the care of children over two or three years of age, they are relieved by common dormitories, and places of useful training within their view. We may set down the value of this capital arrangement very fairly as one-third added to the means of human happiness, as far as dependent on articles of wealth. Its other effects, pro-

ductive of ulterior benefits in other ways, will be presently noticed.

The waste of labour saved from all these sources, would be such a fund of production in the hands of mutual co-operation for common benefit, as, with the present aids of science and art, would convert want and misery into plenty and enjoyment. Under the existing restraints of insecurity, all these sources of waste must go on, because it matters not that the interest of the millions might be promoted by putting their productive powers into beneficial motion, if the interest of the ascendant few is not equally advanced, and their *comparative* superiority still maintained. To the capitalist, *as such*, neither the useful employment nor even the existence, to say nothing of the health, morals, and happiness, of his fellow-creatures, are objects of more regard than the employment of inferior animals or machines. Besides supporting and making themselves happy by their labour, will they yield him an average profit? If so, let them be employed. Will they not yield him an average profit? Then let them live or die as they may, with their well-being he has nothing to do. Though their own happiness might be increased a million of times by their united labour, the capitalist, *as such*, is in no way concerned; to make others *as happy* as himself was no part of his education, but to make himself *richer* than others. By mutual co-operation alone, can the unprovided, or the slenderly provided, advance at once to production and happiness, leaving to the few who are well provided, the use of what they have acquired.

As important as the last effect of the proposed arrangements in saving the waste of labour, is the next pointed out, of saving "the waste of *profits* of wholesale and retail dealers; every co-operator being himself a joint proprietor and capitalist; production and consumption being shared equally by all."

That this arrangement, essential to the system of

voluntary equality by mutual co-operation, is an *advantage*, is here assumed, and the first chapter, section eleven, is referred to for demonstration. If voluntary equality of wealth be desirable—its practicability will be hereafter considered—individual profits, implying inequality of wealth, must be undesirable. With the profits of general society already accumulated and formed into capital, the proposed regulations do not at all interfere; they simply prevent the future growth of any such excrescences amongst the associated communities. Will it be asked, “How, then, could the business of distribution be done? who would undertake without profit such offices of care and trust?” It should rather be asked, “Who in such a community would not press forward for equal remuneration to the discharge of duties so light, and implying so much of public confidence?” The general management of the affairs of the whole community by those best qualified for the task, will supersede the necessity of large managing capitalists for the entire, as one great compound manufactory; while individuals, for minute distribution in a few particular departments, will supply all the retail labour that such a community would require. The fact is, that the retail labour would be reduced to almost nothing.

In society, as now constituted, two circumstances give rise to the immense waste of labour, and consumption of the products of the labour of others, in the endless retail establishments that everywhere meet the eye; these are the distance of the consumers from the producers; and the numerous individual, personal, or family wants, that must be supplied. Under the proposed arrangements, distance—for all essential articles—between consumers and producers, would be annihilated, as they would reside together; and the wants of one or two thousand persons would be supplied as those of one family or one individual. Wants being supplied in common, there would be nothing to retail. *Now*, five hundred families consuming bread and butchers’ meat; support between them ten or a dozen

master butchers and bakers, besides the journeymen at these trades, the journeymen doing the work, the masters superintending and distributing its products, in the quantities demanded by each customer. The waste by this retail system is about one-fourth to one-fifth of the value of the bread and meat, by way of profit to the master tradesman, besides the necessary support of the workmen, though frequently on a very uneconomical scale. These retail master tradesmen and their profits would disappear; and their labour, like that of the carriers, would be added to the joint stock of production for mutual increased enjoyment; and as joint producers and consumers of the new association, they would gain much in physical comfort and convenience, and much more in happiness, over and above what they enjoyed under the competitions and anxieties of their former employments. As little demand would there be for profit in the *manufacture*, as in the *retail* or distribution of any article used by the community; the machinery, the tools, the workmen, the materials, and the storehouse to receive the work done, being supplied, the demand for profit is superseded. The retail of articles of food (as well as light and heat, and all the endless apparatus now connected with them), being superseded by a common kitchen and common supply, whether consumed in the common hall or in private apartments, there would remain the distribution of articles of furniture, clothing, and convenience. For these, one storehouse of general consumption arranged according to convenience, and one superintendent to note down the members receiving the supply, would be perhaps sufficient for the whole society; as there would be no bargain-making to consume time. Nor would there be any temptation to exchange them for articles of convenience from without; for, is the object wished for a chemical or philosophical machine, a useful book, or anything really tending to preponderant good? In the library, the laboratory, the work-shops, the reading and news-rooms of the associated

community, they would be to be found. In such a community, the individual appropriation of such articles of common reference, not of continual use, would be regarded rather as an incumbrance, than as an object of rational desire. They are now sought for, first, as mere silly means of distinction; next, because no provision is made for a common supply, so that even for occasional use they must be appropriated. Various are the limits which the prudence of different associating communities might, perhaps, at first, think proper to impose on the early-formed propensities of new members; limits assuredly sufficient to restrain them from any injurious development.

The next advantage (in order, the fourth) noticed as arising from these arrangements, is, that "they would save, by means of physical arrangements, and the communication of knowledge, the waste of *health*, of enjoyment, and life; now caused by poverty, ignorance, and neglect." On preserving the animal machine in perfect health, depends not only immediate comfort, but the capacity for all enjoyment and exertion, intellectual and moral, as well as physical; on its undeviating preservation, depend the *aptitude* to disease, the consumption, and, of course, the average length, of life. And yet, under the institutions of insecurity, engendered by chance and ignorance, no adequate precautions are taken for the maintenance of this basis of all well-being to the whole, or to any part, of the community. Chance and ignorance are left to direct everything; even the value of health is not known. How different in their essential features the proposed arrangements! Were the production of health the only object, instead of the production of the greatest possible quantity of things useful for enjoyment, they could not more certainly promote it. Every essential arrangement tends to the preservation of health, surely, but unostentatiously. Knowledge, and the most favourable circumstances, are both supplied to every individual to secure to him this indispensable good. In his dwelling, clothes and food,

rest and labour, variety of occupation, choice of site of the associated buildings, every known obstacle to health is removed; by every circumstance favourable to the preservation of health, is the associated community surrounded.

What determines *now* the place of habitation, and labour, of the productive classes? The conduciveness of the site to the *profit of the capitalist*. The merest accident, the vicinity of any one real or supposed convenience to the proprietor, caprice, determine the site of the habitations of human beings. The evils of ill-health being remote, the chance of escaping them relied on; the claims of want, the necessity of wages to existence being immediate and urgent, the industrious vegetates and works, wherever chance has placed, or employment invites him. Bereft of capital, for the support of even a few days' existence, he must work where he can get work, or starve. Bad air, dampness, putrid or mineral effluvia, morbid gases, frequently take years to disorganise the frame; and during their gradual operation, counter-stimulants, keeping up a continual excitement of fever, are generally made use of. Disease at length comes; they die comparatively young, in wretchedness and pain, who might have lived happily an additional ten or twenty years. What consequence to the capitalist? They die; so do horses, and in a much smaller number of years; and yet a succession of fine horses, or of industrious men, will never be wanting, while capitalists permit them to obtain food and work, while able to work.

There is still another source of delusion attending the effect of situation on health. Noxious applications to the lungs, particularly want of pure air well supplied with oxygen, do not seem to operate by any means as prejudiciously on adults as on the young, particularly infants. Their pulse and blood move faster; and they require double the supply of oxygen that adults do, to repair the rapid waste of growth. Children would die in

an atmosphere where men would live in health; the health of adults seems to be more dependent on heat than that of children; of children, on pure air than that of adults. Hence, in crowded cities and manufacturing districts, the waste of early life; hence the distress caused to parents from inferring that where they live in comparative health, their children will also live in health.

Under the proposed arrangements, the site of the habitations and workshops for the whole community, is not left to individual ignorance, short-sighted cupidity, or caprice, but is to be chosen by the members themselves, through whatever instrumentality they may think proper, on a full consideration of its adaptation to health. Knowledge being within their reach, neither caprice, nor momentary interest, nor want, can distract them from their interest in choosing the healthiest situation. As the healthiest site, by crowded buildings, want of ventilation, and dirt, may be made pestilential; by adopting the open, square, or quadrangular form surrounding certain indispensable buildings and exercise grounds, the healthiness of the situation will be preserved, and pure air for the utmost demand of the quickest circulation, and most rapid growth, will always surround and pervade the community, in the gardens, the fields, the workhouses, the dwellings. Even in the mode of communicating heat in winter, by diffusing it equally through the air of the apartments, instead of its partial emission from fire-places, heating injuriously one part of the frame, or of those present, at the expense of the rest, health will be promoted hand-in-hand with economy. The dirt, effluvia, and inequality of the heat of coals, will be exchanged for cleanliness, purity of air, and *equality* of temperature, a circumstance more necessary than any *particular degree* of heat, to preserve health; equality round the whole frame, as well as equality through different periods of time.

No less effectually, and admirably, are the peculiar circumstances necessary for the health of the children

provided for, by means of their early classification, as soon as they have sufficient muscular power to be capable of training, than those for the health of the adults. By the common and airy dormitories, and grounds, and apartments, for the exclusive education of the children, they may be supplied with quantities of fresh air, heat, and liberty of muscular motion, which might not be either grateful to the feelings, or useful to the health of their parents, at their private apartments. The health and comfort of both parties will gain by the classification. While forced, as now in common society, old and young, into one small space together, their health and comfort are certainly incompatible with each other. One or the other must be sacrificed. The new arrangement provides equally for both, and improves both.

The general site of the whole buildings, and the particular relative position of all the individual apartments being adapted to serve the most useful supply, according to the different ages, of pure air, dryness, heat, light, consequent cleanliness, with the addition of as many objects, rural and otherwise, pleasing to the senses, as may be within command; the quality and mode of supplying the *food* of the whole community, are made equally tributary to the health of the inhabitants. Of all the uses of food—to gratify the sense of taste, the appetite of hunger, to supply strength, and rotundity as connected with beauty, to facilitate intellectual or moral exertions, to increase the enjoyment of any particular sense—there is not one which ought not to be made altogether subservient to the preservation of permanent health; *i.e.*, perfect freedom from all pain, all uneasiness, free action of all the viscera, and of all the animal functions, and perfect use of all the faculties, muscular and intellectual. The simple reason is this: Promote health, and you are in a state to enjoy the greatest desirable quantity of any of these, or any other, ulterior sources of happiness; promote any of these secondary objects of food at the expense of health, and

you not only sacrifice all other pleasures to the one sought, but find that the want of general health takes away the faculty of enjoying even the one pleasure sought, nourishing, at the same time, a depraved appetite, which extinguishes all power of self-command, and consequently of change of system. From want of early training and education, directed to any one useful pursuit connected with human happiness, co-operating with the other institutions of insecurity, the wretched and only objects now sought for from food, are, on the part of the poor, the mere means of prolonging life in whatever state of wretchedness, and on the part of the rich, the pampering, and necessarily the over-excitement, of the pleasures of taste. The consequence is, habitual uneasiness from undue actions of the system to all, occasional diseases of one sort to the poor, of another to the rich, and universal abridgment of the term of life; for there is no other way of prolonging life than by keeping up permanent health. Alternate health and skilful treatment of disease are most useful to the trade of medicine; but to all other human beings uninterrupted health should be the object. Now, under the new arrangements, permanent health being the paramount object sought for from food, the subordinate depraved tastes and objects of the rich or the poor must be equally disregarded, and that species of food must be provided by the labour of the community, if possible directly, if not by exchange, which experience has found to be most conducive to this end.

To the substance and texture of the clothing of the whole associated community, with reference still to permanent health, the *interest* of all will direct their attention. On this subject, as on that of food, accurate experiments, extending, under an exact similarity in all other influential circumstances, through the different periods of life, remain to be made.

In the arrangements for variety of occupations, rest and labour of all the members, the same paramount

principle of health is kept constantly in view. Being the first requisite to happiness, no increase of wealth is put in competition with it. One additional year of happy life would be ill bestowed for the addition of all the wealth in the universe; for to the happiness of a community possessing the simple but sufficient means of all natural, intellectual, and moral pleasures, what addition of happiness, even for a day, could it give them to be called the possessors of the world's wealth—if to be made use of for themselves, and not to be directed to the raising of others to a state of happiness equal to theirs? With this view, as well as for other purposes, only second in importance, all members of the community are to be conversant in some species, both of agricultural and of manufacturing industry, in occupations of a sedentary as well as of an active nature, in occupations to be performed within in wet and cold, as well as without in fine weather, in the long dreary evenings of winter as well as in the fine closings of summer days. *Now*, the health of the agricultural labourer is frequently attacked by the cold, wet, and damp, to which he is unavoidably exposed. As the seasons wait for no man, as he must be either altogether idle, or make the best of a bad day, as he can call on no assistant to make up by co-operation for neglected labour, the agriculturist must brave the seasons in spite of health. *Now*, also, the manufacturer, confined from morning to night in apartments more or less unwholesome, deprived of the proper use of air, exercise, heat, becomes a prey, in his turn, to weakness, perhaps loss of appetite, and peculiar diseases, from which it is impossible for him to escape, under the penalty of starving, by means of such a period of absence from labour as would be necessary to re-establish his health. With agricultural labour, which would accomplish this object, he is unacquainted, and would neither be hired by the farmer, nor admitted to intrude amongst the agricultural labourers: he therefore frequently struggles through a life of disease, and dies.

It is, however, conceived, that the object sought for, by saving the waste from unproductive consumption, from unemployed or misdirected productive powers, from wholesale and retail profits, is merely to increase to the utmost, the quantity of articles of wealth, in the shape of accumulated goods, or what is called capital? The ultimate object is not accumulation, is not capital, but enjoyment, immediate or future. Herein differ the mere political, and the moral, economist. The accumulation of wealth or capital, and particularly in large masses, is the sole object of the mere political economist; happiness, health, particularly of the productive many, are with him *secondary*. Here they are primary; and wealth, and particularly accumulation, are only secondary. True it is, that in a great number, perhaps in a majority of cases, the accumulation of capital, from labour, even under the restraints of insecurity, has produced more happiness than would have existed without such accumulation. Hence, the proposition was generalised; and from this most partial experience it was inferred, that to produce the happiness of society—as far as wealth was concerned—the one and only thing necessary was to increase production, accumulation, capital,—which to be apparent must be in large masses and in a few hands. The moral economist, on the other hand, never loses sight of the great polar star, happiness, from *all* sources, in the greatest quantity, consequently of the greatest number. Before wealth, and as the basis of all happiness from whatever source, he finds it necessary to maintain *health*; wherever the two are incompatible, wealth must be unhesitatingly sacrificed.

Wherever, therefore, employments injurious to health, cannot, by additional labour in the way of mechanical or chemical contrivances, not exceeding in value the article gained, be reconciled therewith, such employments, with their pretended advantages, must by a community of rational men be relinquished. By savings from every possible source of waste, an immense mass of productive

power is brought together for the common benefit of the associated community. Enough can be spared from this fund to render all employments healthy; or, if this be unattainable, to substitute others productive of preponderant benefit. Enough can be spared from this fund to obviate injurious fatigue, to prevent labour from ever ceasing to be an occupation of useful, and, therefore, interesting amusement, to afford time for relaxation, for mental amusement, for the enjoyment of every pleasure of the senses, and social, of which the human machine, under the guidance of prudence, is susceptible. Wherefore were all the sources of waste of human capabilities so rigorously scrutinised? To turn human beings into endless producers for production's sake? No, but to economise time for every rational employment, for the enjoyment, by the whole community, according to their advances in talent, wisdom, virtue, and the varieties of their physical constitution, of all other sources of happiness, *besides those of wealth*. Of these, health being the first and the basis of all the rest, neither time nor exertion will be devoted to any occupation incompatible with it; and the mode and quantity of muscular exertion most conducive to it, will be diligently studied, and with cheerful alacrity supplied, whether it be three, or fifteen, hours, out of the four-and-twenty.

Besides all these means,—chiefly physical and arising out of the very structure of the community,—for the preservation of health, the youth of the whole association, male and female, will learn, as one of the most useful branches of human knowledge to all, the structure and functions of the human machine, the mode of operation of the arrangements surrounding them, and all those minute circumstances which tend to derange or favour the healthful play of the vital powers.

Health thus amply provided for by the proposed arrangements; the next class of obstacles to human happiness generated by insecurity, which they would remove,

are those which render impossible while they exist, the acquisition of habits of social and personal virtue by the members of the community. The proposed arrangements "would save the incalculable waste of happiness, now arising from the contentions, animosities, and cruelties, engendered by the institutions of insecurity, and in some degree inseparable from the most chastened pursuit of individual gain; the social combinations proposed removing the *causes* of those crimes and vices, and by the education of the understanding implanting opposite permanent dispositions and habits."

Look round society, examine the contentions that embitter life, the actions, sometimes the mere words, or supposed intentions, which criminal laws have erected into offences, and which *they* visit, in the name of humanity, with all the cruelty of torturing punishments; look to the deceits, perjuries, forgeries of all sorts, that encompass all our transactions; look at the deeds of violence, and fraud, that desolate human life. From what source do nine out of ten, nay, ninety-nine out of a hundred of them, directly or indirectly, proceed? From what, but from the pursuit of individual gain? from the pursuit of individual wealth, whether for the mere sake of influence or distinction, or for the sake of the supposed immediate selfish benefit, to be derived from the article sought? For the gratification of any passion or desire unconnected with wealth, scarcely any contention—certainly no injurious contention—is excited; because either the means of gratifying such desires are ample and open to all; or else force or fraud cannot aid in the acquisition of those *personal* qualities which are the objects of such desires. The sexual passion is the only exception; though what are called its aberrations, are in reality almost always connected with wealth, yet are there some few cases in which wealth is in no way concerned.

Now, as to all the vices and crimes arising from the mere pursuit of individual gain, by the competition of

individual with individual, or with all other individuals, nothing is more plain, than that such vices and crimes could not have place in a society where no such thing as individual gain, as individual possession, was known. Though the clothes, and the private apartments, may be in some measure called individual possessions, at least during the time of occupation and use, yet, as every other member of the community has apartments and clothes, equally extensive and good, adequate to every rational personal demand, what motive can there be for any contention about the possession of any such articles? Wherefore are perjuries, and forgeries, and frauds, of all sorts, now practised? To facilitate the acquisition of some portion of individual wealth. But in these associated communities of voluntary equality of wealth, there would be *nothing to be gained* by these perjuries, forgeries, or other species of falsehood; the motives to lying, as to theft, would be withdrawn, and, therefore, without supposing any change whatever in the nature of man, he will cease to lie and steal, simply because he will find in his altered circumstances, that nothing is to be gained, no increase of happiness, by lying and stealing.

Thus, by the simple operation of the proposed arrangements, will the crimes and vices of falsehood and violence respecting property, cease within such communities; as a lamp ceases to burn, when the oil or gas that supplied it is withdrawn.

The passions of envy, jealousy, hatred, pride, vanity, &c., and the crimes against person or property, to which they sometimes give rise, are almost always connected with property; and will, therefore, cease with the altered circumstances of joint and social possession and enjoyment. There remain those few cases of the development of such passions not connected with wealth.

At the head of private or simply personal vices—which seldom are, but which never ought to be erected into crimes, and made punishable by the laws—stands

intemperance as to eating and drinking. The poor, the wretched, would now, perhaps, over-eat even at a healthful meal, from the variety of the enjoyment and the certainty of its non-recurrence; but, under the proposed arrangements, these incitements would be removed, as the healthful meal would be the universal meal, and the recurrence certain. Every healthful gratification of the appetite, every gratification attended with preponderant good, being not only permitted but sought for by the benevolent united wisdom of the community,—the *fool* only would injure himself by any excess, and the number of such fools would daily decrease.

On the same principles would be regulated mere personal excess (dissevered from all other consequences) in the gratification of the sexual passion. Even under the institutions of partial security, those vices and crimes, unconnected with the pursuit of wealth, which arise from misgoverned sexual desire, abduction, rape, and such like, are very trifling in amount or magnitude. With the most partial advance in civilisation they are irreconcilable. What now leads to the few offences of this class that are committed? Uncommon brutality of disposition, or inequality of situation with the object of attachment. All those cases arising from inequality of situation as to pecuniary affairs, would cease at once under the proposed arrangements, because every man and every woman under them are equal, as to wealth; joint possessors of all wealth and all social advantages, private individual possessors of nothing. Personal qualities alone, therefore, would decide the attachments of love; good qualities of body and mind. From the progress of education and just views of happiness, mental qualities would be continually gaining on the merely animal. The employment of force or fraud to operate on the conduct in the co-operating communities, not being practised, nor, of course, known, personal good qualities and persuasion, would be the only means of exciting attachment that

could occur to the members. In truth, the mutual desires of the two sexes would be, under the proposed arrangements, an additional link to the chain of motives calling forth the cultivation of personal good (*i.e.*, useful) qualities; and a link of what efficacy! Who can, under the present feverish toil for mere wealth and distinction, by any factitious means, estimate its energy? *Now*, the one sex, being degraded into a mere puppet, deprived of almost all civil, and of all political, rights, for the amusement of the other, operates as an eternal, countervailing force, to all expansion of mind and enlarged benevolence; love is the seal of mental imbecility and indolence; and nature, as the poets would say, stands avenged on the despotism of man, by linking him with the abject creature of uncalculating sensuality which he has made. But, under the proposed arrangements, woman being in every respect an equal participator with man in all the blessings of education, as well as in all the other benefits which the combined exertions of the community can command, the two sexes would operate, in a new and mutually beneficial way, on each other as friends and equals. Improved intellect and elevated sympathy would shrink from association with the ignorant and depraved; the bars of wealth and the impertinences of rank unknown in these communities, preference would have nothing else to feed and banquet upon, but useful, and, therefore, estimable qualities: the sphere of choice of all would be enlarged, and open to all, and all artificial restraints to sincere attachment would be removed. Prostitution,—that most wretched of the trades of insecurity, mowing down in early prime, more of human life in the one sex, than the insanity of war does in the other,—could not exist, in such communities. Man, not being the guardian of individual wealth, would have no bribe wherewith to insult woman for the purchase of that which loses all real value when it can be bought. Woman, being in as full possession as man of all the enjoyments procured by the mutual co-operation of the

whole community, *could* not—education even out of the question—be driven by either want or vanity, to yield to such degradation. Neither distress, nor delusion, nor compulsion, could turn to bitterness those ever-springing sources of beneficent sympathy which, by the very laws of our organisation, mature health diffuses through the frame of the sexes for each other.

The vices and crimes not connected with wealth, springing from the passions, such as envy or jealousy of superior talents and hatred of their possessor, remain to be dismissed. Against the few cases in which such passions could be developed, general culture and the continually operating influence of the new circumstances, would provide. Utility being recognised as the standard by which all qualities are to be judged, mere distinction would soon cease to be an object of desire or admiration. If divested of utility, present or future, to the possessor or others,—why should the possessor of any quality be envied, not to say hated? What good will such a quality do its possessor in a co-operating community? what sympathy will it procure for him? Admired and esteemed, if the quality be useful—yes. A useful quality is esteemed by such a community, because it increases the happiness of the possessor, or of some other members of the community. Partaking of this feeling of esteem, of admiration, because it is the interest of every one to be benefited by the good qualities of every other member of the community, and no factitious rewards being known,—what is there left to be envied? what to be hated? the utter uselessness of such passions, or rather their gratuitous self-torment inflicted on those who harbour them, must be so apparent to an active and usefully occupied community, that they would find no sympathy in the minds of any, and would therefore cease. Not that occasional errors of the feelings and misregulations of the voluntary actions would not occur, as derangements of the animal economy from the state of health would sometimes take place; but these

would be so rare and so light, that public opinion would be quite sufficient to restrain them within harmless bounds.

Almost all the motives engendering vice and crime thus withdrawn from a community of mutual co-operation, from its mere position as such; if we want to know what would be their conduct as to positive virtue, to active beneficence, we have only to inquire what is their real interest? and will they be placed in such circumstances that they must perceive that real interest? When no possible good is to be got by out-witting, plundering, or otherwise tormenting each other, it will be plainly their interest to try if no increase is to be had to their happiness, by cultivating as much as possible the social affections. Nothing so contagious as happiness: nothing, but light, so much abounding in reflections, and so much dependent for its general effect on their number and variety. By an association of our nature, from which there is no escape, dependent partly on organisation, and partly on early inevitable habit, the usual indications, by means of the countenance and otherwise, of happiness in those around us, excite a glow more or less lively of kindred feelings in ourselves, whenever some real or supposed counteracting interest does not mar the effect. Scarcely any one can enjoy happiness surrounded with the miserable. Scarcely any bounds can be assigned to the increase which individual happiness is capable of receiving, from the associations of reflected happiness: though minute, yet gentle and ever-springing, they are frequently of potency sufficient even to banish personal uneasiness. What pleasures so cheap as these, requiring no purchase, but yielding to their impulse? What wisdom so great as to increase them to the utmost?—by every possible act of mutual kindness to increase them? All essential wants of all already gratified, no painful personal privation could interpose its chilling veto.—But, if these things be so, what is to prevent a community with all its wants supplied, all temptations to maleficence removed, from

plainly perceiving its interest in this respect? Factitious interest and ignorance are the causes that lead men not to pursue their real interest: these obstacles withdrawn, knowledge within their reach, and the greatest sum of happiness to all, the sole and avowed end of their association; is it within the scope of any rational probability, that such associated members should not perceive that the same motives which led them to mutual co-operation in essential matters, demand that in every minor pursuit they should seek the happiness of all by mutual kindness and good offices? This is the principle of a virtuous disposition; and thus do we find it included in the very ground-work of these communities. The pleasures of sense so amply provided for, they must inevitably seek for additional pleasures by cultivating to the utmost the pleasures of sympathy.

The last of the advantages,—not as excluding other advantages, but as the most prominent, immediate, and most closely connected with our subject,—mentioned as arising from the proposed arrangements, is, that “they would render supply and demand always commensurate; would reduce the economy of supply and demand, of population, and other contested questions of morals, legislation, and political economy, to fixed and easily ascertained data.”

The paramount mischief of all systems of insecurity, by whatever subordinate and varying expedients accomplished, is, that by throwing into the hands of a few the dwellings of the whole community, the raw materials on which they must labour, the machinery and tools which they must use, and the very soil on which they live and from which their food must be extracted,—these few, by combining together, seizing on, or allying themselves with, political power, reserving knowledge to themselves and keeping the mass of the community ignorant, acquire the absolute regulation of the remuneration of all the productive labourers of the community, and possess the

faculty of forcing that community, or any portion of it, to starve, whenever, from whatever causes, the exercise of their industry does not, under these same expedients of insecurity, yield such a return as will not only give ordinary support to the labourers, but also that quantum of the products of the labour to themselves, under the name of profits on capital, which they have been accustomed, from whatever circumstances, to look upon as their due. Now, though political power were to seize on nothing out of the products of labour, but to leave the whole to the discretion of the owners of capital, land included; yet would it be entirely in the power of these capitalists, by regulations of cupidity and ignorance, to prevent the development of industry, and, of course, the production of human life and enjoyment. The real interest of the capitalist, as such, is always and necessarily opposed to the interest of the labourer; and he will always make use of all means in his power to make that interest available; the only personal check is his own calculation, always blinded by his interest, of the effect of his forced restraints on the spirit, and thence on the productive powers of the labourer.

But the fact is, that though the restraints of insecurity imposed by capitalists to increase their profits; or any two or three of those restraints, would be sufficient to keep down the happiness of the labourers; and though also the public plunder of the products of labour by political power would of itself be abundantly sufficient to produce the same effect; yet have these two moral engines of human misery always gone hand in hand, sometimes the one, sometimes the other taking the lead. Now, whenever—from either of these causes operating singly, or from both operating in whatever proportions—the exertions of labour do not produce a healthful subsistence, after deduction made of the plunder or profit, or both; it is said “there is no demand for labour,” the seats at the table of nature’s mighty banquet are occupied. The evil is said to be

irremediable; and those who cannot find employment must live as long as they can.

Under the system of equal security, of the natural laws of distribution, and the simple institutions compatible with them, it is evident—provided that skill and knowledge were, as they might be, communicated to all the members of the community—that every labourer would become a capitalist, that the plunder of political power could not exist, and that all the members of the community would be producers and consumers to each other. The first object of the united labour of the whole community is to provide an abundance of wholesome food, for their own wants at least. A reserve store also for as many months' or years' supply as experience shows may be rendered necessary for the deficiency of bad harvests, forms an essential part of their economy. The next object of the united labour of the community, is to provide in equal abundance, but without any waste, a supply of the most useful clothing for the whole, and to preserve well, the common buildings and dwellings. The surplus labour goes to procure, immediately or by exchange, comforts and conveniences. In this state of things, consumers, *i.e.*, employers, can never be wanting; for the whole community are the consumers, the employers. Nor can productive labourers be wanting, for the whole community are also the productive labourers. Demand, therefore, and supply, of all articles necessary to health, must be commensurate; from more or less of other articles, little inconvenience can be felt; for such a community would be very careful how it directed its surplus labour to the production of any articles, however glittering the immediate profit, for which the real and regular wants of society at large, did not guarantee something approaching to a permanent equality of demand. Whenever the community found that any part of its surplus labour was misdirected, it could with the least possible inconvenience, from the varied skill of its members and the possession of

mechanical power, give it a new direction; or if all but the impossible circumstance arose, of a total want of demand from without, in the way of exchange, for any articles which the surplus labour could produce,—the only consequence would be, that this surplus labour would be put to work under the direction of excited ingenuity to fabricate home products into substitutes for external conveniences, no longer to be procured without too great a waste of useful labour. Thus would the tremendous evil of want of employment and consequent wretchedness, be absolutely banished from such associated communities; thus would supply and demand be strictly and eternally commensurate; thus would the eternal and disgraceful question of want of employment for the poor, be gently laid to rest; there would be no human beings in such communities to whom such a degrading epithet as *poor* could apply.

On an equal footing with the question of employment, is that of *population*. Want of employment, excess, or existence in any quantity, of a miserable population, low living, whether on mere potatoes or other under-exciting food; all these and many others, so often put forward as *causes* of the misery of the majority of the community, are nothing but *effects* of some or other of the ever-varying combinations of expedients, to which insecurity, under different circumstances and according to the existing state of knowledge, gives birth. Let those expedients or institutions of insecurity remain, not to say all of them, but only a few of those which are influential, and these evils will follow as certainly as water will find the horizontal figure of the earth. Remove these mighty master-springs of evil, and employment, population, and food, will find their level and regulate themselves; but insult not the suffering mass, the great majority of mankind, with the glaring falsehood, that by means of limiting population or not eating potatoes, their own happiness is in their own hands, while the causes are left in full operation which

render it morally and physically impossible for them to live without potatoes and improvident breeding. All the laboured obstacles to human improvement, which,—with a view to palliate, and to blind the eyes of men (the preachers doubtless sometimes themselves blind) to the overwhelming evils of systems of insecurity,—have been put forward as arising from the principle of population, have been founded on this *false position, that “increased comfort will necessarily lead to increase of improvident breeding.”* All the facts of history, and all investigation of human motives, demonstrate the utter falsehood of this position. There is no disposition or physical interest amongst mankind, elevated but one step over the merest savage existence, if even in that state, to breed beyond their absolute comforts, whatever they may be; and as these comforts increase, accompanied as they are with an increase of knowledge, the tendency to improvident breeding uniformly decreases with their increase. Not a single instance can be quoted from history, or from the conduct of any living community, of over-breeding taking place in consequence of increased comfort alone, where all expedients of insecurity had been removed. Look again for illustration to the non-slave provinces of the United States of North America, approaching the nearest to a state of equal security. Have the inhabitants of the old States increased in improvident breeding in consequence of their increased comforts? On the contrary, has not their increase of comforts and of population gone hand in hand, and has not every new generation demanded rather more than less of comfort from the associations of early habit than its predecessor? The tendency to multiply has certainly increased with the increase of comforts, but the tendency to *improvident* multiplication has, as certainly, diminished. Both in the old and new States, population keeps up, though at a different rate of increase, or nearly keeps up to the level of comforts, but does not go beyond them; though nothing has been done in the United States,

deserving the name, to give education, knowledge, to the whole community. That done, and all the vile remnants of insecurity removed, whenever the population of the whole Union, or of any part, arrives at that state that it cannot be further increased without lessening actual comforts attended in the opinion of the people with preponderant good, it will then cease to increase; and reproduction will exactly balance the waste of life.

In what way the proposed regulations affect population, will be presently noticed. Meantime, it is evident that everything in these communities, on such influential matters, may be, and will be, matter of record. Experiments in morals, legislation, and political, including rural, economy, may be instituted, or inferences may be drawn, with a confidence and accuracy which they have never hitherto attained. The whole of the arrangements form one grand moral as well as economical experiment. 'Tis an experiment, as well for almost eradicating vice, as for increasing physical comforts to the utmost.

To the enlightened moralist, what a field would these associated communities afford! With what a development of human motives, whose very existence the infancy of his science had hardly suspected, would they supply him! motives gentle and all-pervading like the descending dews, unappreciated till the leafy forest and the bending crops of gladness attest their universal operation. The efficacy of the social motives has never yet been tried; human society, as hitherto constituted, has afforded no opportunity for their development; the experimental moralist must hail their establishment whether successful or not; on experience and experiment, and the just inferences drawn therefrom, the only solid advance that ever has been or can be made in physical and moral knowledge, must be founded; all else is idle speculation, if not delusive absurdity.

Education forming so essential a part of the proposed system, it may be wondered at that it is not put prominently

forward here, as one of the advantages of the system of mutual co-operation.

The main moral improvement to be expected from the system of mutual co-operation, will be produced by the *altered circumstances* of the community, not by talking or writing about rights and duties, and issuing empty threats, to induce one line of conduct, while substantial motives of interest are permitted to exist impelling to its opposite. This applies particularly to the adults ; and to all, as far as their habits had been previously formed, on first entering into such a community. That part of education which may be called literary, and which consists in diffusing real knowledge, in communicating truth, physical and moral, to the understanding, always under the caution against hypocritical assent without perception or conviction to save the trouble of exertion, must be communicated chiefly to the younger members of the community, and would therefore be more prospective, even to them, than the other benefits, which would be immediately reaped, and which are incorporated, as it were, with the very movements of the social machine, and which more directly relate to wealth and distribution. There is certainly no part of the system of more deep and ultimate importance than the diffusion of real knowledge ; of which nine-tenth parts are undisputed, the other tenth consisting of discoveries not yet fully canvassed, nor, of course, universally admitted. But no particular plan of education is laid down, nor is, indeed, essential to these co-operating communities. Their places and materials for instruction form part of their general arrangements ; the children and all the materials of art and science on the spot, and the real agricultural, manufacturing, and scientific operations always in motion and within sight for exemplification ; the command of all circumstances so as to remove all sources of delusion and false judgment, so as to present nothing but real facts for the young mind to judge upon, being completely in the power of the institutors ; where has ever existed, or been

conceived, a situation for the education of the young so replete with advantages hitherto deemed incompatible with each other? The effect of such states of things in the development of all the variety of intellectual capabilities, and in the implanting of moral associations, founded in truth and tending to happiness, cannot be appreciated. The delineation of just expectations would appear the dream of fancy.

Another advantage arising out of the arrangements for mutual co-operation, not here put forward, because not so immediately connected with our main inquiry—the distribution of wealth—is, that just equality of rights and duties, and enjoyments, which it would establish between the two sexes. This, it may be said, is included in the more extended equality of all the members of the community. Under the proposed arrangements, it is; but not necessarily under all arrangements for the equality of men, either as to matters of wealth or political power. However equal, *men* may have been proposed to be made to each other, the relative inferiority of all *women* to all men has been ever insisted on; old association and the brute right of superior strength have everywhere prevailed. The weaker sex, as the weaker men, have been universally the prey of the stronger. Moreover, as these communities are all subject to the common laws of the general society amongst which they are established, they cannot, by any private act of theirs, alter such laws, or abstract the women of their association from the capricious degradation to which such laws consign them. If they cannot prevent an insane husband from ordering, as he would his horse, his wife, happy in such a community, to leave it at his bidding; they can, at least, by the previous consent of all the associated members, remove almost all those occasions which would tempt husbands to the exercise of those brutal and senseless prerogatives which almost all laws give them. Disputes about property, about household affairs, about children, would be rendered almost

impossible, almost all the arrangements on these matters being in common. In the use of all the property of the community, the woman has as ample liberty as the man ; little being left to mere private household economy. While the family remains in the co-operating community, no inducements fitted to operate on the minds of men, as ordinarily constituted, will be found, tempting the men to the exercise of any vexatious power. In point of fact, therefore, as nothing but the pleasure of vexing could be derived from the exercise, under such circumstances, of arbitrary command,—as all the usual motives for the exercise of a husband's legal superiority would be withdrawn, it would be soon forgotten, and sympathy and reason would be the sole umpire between husband and wife, as between every individual in the community and every other individual. Moreover, the unmarried women of such communities, would be at perfect liberty to refuse any other connexions than those, perfectly equal and voluntary, which might take place within the community itself ; neither the care and support of children, nor disputes about succession to individual wealth, nor fear of neglect of the mother in gestation, remaining any longer as motives to compel women to submit to the slavery, as to them, of the marriage obligations of general society. Their marriages might be simple, and within the community, like those of the Quakers : but, not operating like the Quakers for individual gain, they would be under no necessity of superadding the shackles of law to their own simple, voluntary, and perfectly equal contracts.

Were it fit here to enlarge on all the collateral moral benefits that seem necessarily to follow from the operation but for a few years of such communities of social co-operation, on their own happiness, or from their good example on society in general, the examination of advantages might be carried to an indefinite length. We must, therefore, cease with those most intimately connected with our subject, and pass on to inquire if there are any obstacles

to human happiness, any restraints of insecurity, which the proposed arrangements would not remove; if there are any which they would even tend to aggravate.

SECTION III.

OBSTACLES TO HUMAN IMPROVEMENT WHICH THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS WOULD NOT REMOVE, OR WHICH THEY WOULD SEEM TO AGGRAVATE.

One of the most curious and extraordinary features of the proposed arrangements is, that they demand no alteration whatever in any of the existing institutions of insecurity, the protection of their joint property excepted. But then, in return, their *immediate* benefits are confined to the co-operating members. The system of equal security and individual exertion, advocated in our previous chapters, herein differs from the system of mutual co-operation. In the system of equal security coupled with individual exertion, not a step can be made by individuals without the aid of the legislature; but then the whole community is at the same time benefited; not indeed the active aid of political power, but the ceasing to oppress, the removal of restraints on equal individual exertion; while, on the contrary, in the system of mutual co-operation, no aid is demanded of the legislator, no removal of any of the restraints of insecurity on individual exertion: the exactions of capitalists and the plunder of political power, and all the expedients or institutions of insecurity are passed by; no change is sought to be made in them; to whatever pressure, whether under autocratic or privileged-order institutions, the rest of the general society in which they live is subjected, they submit themselves likewise; excepting in as far as those very institutions have left them the faculty of ceasing, by voluntary consent, to inflict on each other certain portions of the evils of insecurity. If political power in no way aided these communities, 'tis hardly to be supposed they would be persecuted by unequal taxation. All equal and

just taxation, their economy of labour and real utility of expenditure would enable them to discharge with much more facility than an equal number of individuals in society at large, selected indiscriminately, and in just proportion, from all existing classes.

It must be always recollected, however, that no individual is bound by his engagement to remain one moment longer in such co-operation than he deems it his interest, whether wisely or not, to continue such co-operation. No power of compulsion do these communities claim. Enlightened views of individual, identified with social, interest, and the influence of public opinion, are to them arms sufficiently powerful for every useful purpose. They ask no aid from law.

But let not these proposed arrangements be charged with *excluding* national or provincial affairs from the consideration of the individual members. Though members of a co-operating community, they have not ceased to be members of the great general community in which they live. They take no monastic vows of voluntary seclusion from the world. They cease not to be men and to have a country, because they engage in a large family concern of many co-operating members, any more than if they had engaged for the supply of their physical wants and the amelioration of their habits on a smaller scale.

The sympathies of such communities will be enlarged, not contracted, as their understandings are improved. By reason, by generosity, they will always seek to promote the public good. Different members will necessarily take different views of public affairs, as of all other matters of human concern; but, removed as long as they remain in the community, from the pursuit of any sinister pecuniary interest of general society, their opinion as to the regulation of public affairs will possess the more weight as their motives must be pure. Liable to the operation of all laws and taxes as well as the rest of the general society, why should they not be interested in its concerns, even

personally interested, as far as these matters extend? Where, with so much calm and benevolent anxiety as amongst such men, could questions of morals, legislation, education, political economy, as well as of all the physical sciences, be discussed? to whom could they be more attractive, or who would have better data to form judgments upon them? No more control do the proposed arrangements seek over the political, than over the religious, opinions of men; they aim only to put them all on the road of attaining mutual kindness and truth, the interest of all.

With many it may be matter of objection, that this system of mutual co-operation does not connect itself with any particular sect or party. Having the equal happiness of all in view, it can identify itself with the opinions of none, but affords perfect freedom of opinion to all. Others perhaps will regard it as a proof of the wisdom and benevolence of the system, that it is essentially neuter as to all possible political and religious establishments, guaranteeing merely the common and equal liberty of opinion of all.

We will conclude this section by briefly noticing *the obstacles to human improvement which the proposed regulations would seem to aggravate.*

One of the main pillars, as we have seen, one of the universal expedients of insecurity, is the abstraction which it makes without consent of the producers, in the shape of public plunder, levied by direct or circuitous means, out of the products of labour. Public plunder, now that knowledge is diffusing itself, is the real support of all existing systems of insecurity. The co-operating societies, if successful in a few instances, would rapidly diffuse themselves, till economy of labour, co-operation in producing, and equality in distributing, would by degrees supersede, wherever such advantages could be procured, the present waste of labour and happiness. But as a necessary consequence, the production of wealth would be annually and indefinitely increased; increased, it may be said, to add to

the comforts of the producers, but increased also not unseen by political power, not without exciting its cupidity to rifle the honey of such industrious bee-hives. If gold and silver continued the *bonâ-fide* medium of exchange, and the quantity obtained from the mines remained sufficient to supply the annual waste and preserve the present relative proportion between money and commodities ; not only might all the present demands of political power be annually paid out of the products of such increasing wealth, but the amount of those most tremendous iniquities of all systems of insecurity, public debts, as they are falsely called, might be gradually discharged.

What prospect could be more exhilarating than this to the holders of political power? They see the industrious of the community forming themselves into groups, to increase by mutual co-operation, instead of isolated individual competition, fourfold or a hundredfold, the annual quantity of wealth hitherto produced. The industrious yoke themselves to the new talismanic cars of production, and, without stipulating or inquiring who are to be the drivers, proceed in their career of industry. Political power continues to plunder ; the exaction is not felt. The facility of acquisition and the sweets of possession and enjoyment, whet the appetite of political power. New exactions are made, the old debts of insecurity are lessened, and co-operative industry still smiles, provided abundantly with health and comfort, even after the satisfaction of these increased demands. Political power smiles also ; smiles with content ; smiles at the honest simplicity of co-operative industry, and curtails no more his views of magnificence at home, his ancient amusement, necessary to keep up emotion, of pillage and murder of human beings, under the name of war, abroad. A new race commences ; a race of increased expenditure against the new race of industry. As the old debts of political power are diminished by tens, new debts are contracted by

hundreds. What are the increased capacities for the production of wealth by means of co-operative labour, when compared with the increased capacities and caprices of the possessors of political power, and of the thousands and millions of the expectant idle, greedy of the plundered honey, and anxious to form a partnership with, and bulwark around, political power? Let the one be ever so great, the other must still exceed it; because it is always easier to desire and consume than to produce.

Were it one of the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation, that neither the whole co-operating community as a body, nor any of its individual members, should interest themselves about the possession, or the exercise, of the political powers of the whole provincial or national community amongst which they lived, and were such arrangement an indispensable condition of their organisation; it does not appear that any benefits of increased production and improved habits to be expected from them, would at all counterbalance the evils of *insecurity*, to which they would be thus subjected.

Now, were such a regulation—so flagrantly destructive of human sympathy and human right—proposed, who is there that would, on such condition, unite himself with such co-operating community? Who would withdraw himself from the race of competition, the scramble for wealth, the excitation of hope and fear, the presumption of success, the lottery of life, in which, in a continual fever, he now lives, to devote all his intellectual and muscular powers, calmly to multiply with his fellow-men, by mutual co-operation, the products of their united labour, if he had not some assurance of *security* in the joint enjoyment of these increased products—security, not only from casual, ragged, starving thieves, but from the ever-present, irresistible, well-clad, and sleek arm of political power? All the evils of political insecurity would be so increased by such an undertaking to submit, and new expedients would be so easily devised for shackling the industry of

men working in co-operation (just as easily as they had been previously devised to shackle the industry of men working by individual competition), that all co-operation, under such circumstances, would be vain.

The alarm, however, is groundless : no such condition is to be found amongst the arrangements. Such a condition would be altogether inconsistent with another necessary condition—that of perfect freedom of opinion on *all* subjects amongst all the members.

The consequence of any submission to arbitrary plunder, of these societies, would be to counteract the natural tendency of the new circumstances to operate on the minds of the idle consumers. To them there would be no change, but the more industry, the more honey to be plundered. They would form a society and a public opinion of their own, reinforced by increased numbers of idle consumers, and of accumulating means of wasteful expenditure. New wars, increased waste, multiplied taxation, would compel expostulation and resistance, or would bury the industry of the mutual co-operating societies, with all their multiplied productions, in one grave with security. Wherefore should not the co-operators in these communities, deliberately warn political power that they were no more inclined to accumulate thought and skill, and labour and production, that the fruits thereof might be abstracted without their consent, to pamper *their* unreal wants, than to supply the real wants of the far less wicked because more ignorant, the pitiful private plunderer? Why not guard against these obvious sources of contention, these oscillations of misery? Why encourage political power in false and pernicious views of increased plunder? If political power were sincere in its pretensions to benevolence, it would rather voluntarily remove all existing taxation from such communities, than look forward to their multiplied exertions with a view to robbing them of their fruits. If it be desirable that the evils of insecurity should cease, why not endeavour, by every possible

development of truth, to convince the majority of every community, to arrest as speedily as possible their mischievous career?

Such will be the course of events. Bees labour and produce honey, and men consume it; because bees have neither knowledge nor foresight. But from these co-operating communities of human bees, knowledge and foresight cannot be withheld; they are the very fires that must kindle the mass of mankind into activity and happiness; more necessary to them than to the short-sighted calculators of individual competition in general society, whose views the necessity of existence terminates, for the most part, with the day or the week. And from such men, acting by mutual co-operation, whose whole scheme of life is founded on comparatively remote and extensive calculations, is it likely that the palpable interest and necessity to their very existence, of equal security, should remain unheeded, uninvestigated, and unclaimed? No; the prosperity of these co-operating communities, is not, and cannot be founded on the desertion of the interests of their fellow-creatures. Insecurity is equally the foe of all human exertion, whether conducted by one, or by the co-operation of ten thousand individuals. By the unwearied exhibition of truth, the majority of every community must be persuaded of the mischievousness of insecurity, that it may cease for ever.

SECTION IV.

IS THE SYSTEM OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY OF WEALTH PRACTICABLE?

Thus we have seen that the evils connected with these co-operating communities are few, transitory; but above all things that they are perfectly avoidable, and, whether deemed by any persons essential to them or not, are in fact such as the progress of the human mind, in and out of these societies, must ultimately, perhaps speedily,

remove ; while the advantages of voluntary equality are numerous, permanent, and such as not even equal security, unassisted by mutual co-operation and common enjoyment, could produce.

The simple question, then, that remains to be solved—seeing that such a state of society is desirable—is, *is it practicable* ? Is there anything in the nature of man, in his organisation, muscular or mental, that incapacitates him for such co-operation ? Is there anything in the physical circumstances surrounding him, in the disposition of the materials on which he must labour, or through the instrumentality of which he must operate, in the climate in which he may be placed, irreconcilable with the system of mutual co-operation, for the production and equal enjoyment of all useful things ? Are the motives which the system of voluntary equality would discard, and which have hitherto been the leading motives of human conduct, the only ones by which energetic and permanent exertion can be produced ? Are there no other motives equally efficacious, by which the understandings of men may be operated upon, to lead them to equally energetic and permanent exertion ?

A fond and childish notion has been bandied about from lips to lips, even of the grave and learned, that “nothing but some over-ruling, some superhuman motive, some general bond of artificial connexion, ever has kept, or ever can keep, together, communities of equality by mutual co-operation or otherwise.” The short and conclusive exposure of this sophism, is this : This over-ruling motive, this general bond supplied by superstition or otherwise, can only produce its effect from an apprehended view of interest to be gratified here or hereafter. If the interest will bear examination and be real, no more is wanted ; let it be universally applied ; and it will in other more useful cases produce the effects of union, which it has already, for less useful purposes, produced. Explaining the real, physical or temporal, interest, in conjunction

with the superhuman, must add to its interest, and make it irresistible. If, on the contrary, the over-ruling motive, the general bond, be, after all, a delusion—how has it operated? Evidently from a *supposed* view of interest. Now, if a supposed view of interest has led men to co-operate, why should not a real perception of real interest, produce the same result? Is there any magic power in delusion beyond what truth possesses? It is absurd to maintain that a supposed, but false view of interest, will lead to more energetic action *of the useful class*, than a true and real view of interest. It would be imputing the power of thought and motion to the shadow, instead of the rational agent that intercepted the light.

All the schemes of equality hitherto proposed, have been found, on examination and from experience, productive of preponderant evil. But they have all been founded on compulsion, or delusion, religious or otherwise. These two species of equality rejected, it never occurred that there remained a third species, which had never yet been tried, the impracticability of which had never been demonstrated, the system of *voluntary* equality, from a comprehensive view of the utility of mutual co-operation to increase individual comfort. No system of equality hitherto proposed, promised any more than a fair and equal division of the usual products of the ordinary industry of the associated members; none promised (because they did not know the means, they did not suspect the possibility of doing it) to increase those products, to an *ultimate* extent not to be defined, to an *immediate* extent of three or four times the average comforts of ordinary individual exertions.

Excelling as the system of voluntary equality does all previous systems in the magnitude of the objects to be gained, it does not less excel in the means by which the association is formed. Force and delusion, the vulgar means hitherto exclusively employéd for every purpose, are altogether excluded from the new system. It is

founded on the *individual interest* of every one of the co-operating members, as perceived and recognised by their understandings. The independence, the right of judgment, the security of every individual are scrupulously preserved. The very nature of all preceding systems of equality, rendered the employment of force or fraud necessary. The real object of the institutor was always different from the apparent object of increasing the happiness of the co-operators; the institutors had always something to conceal, some pretended magnificent end of their own, some scheme of government, superstition, conquest, to promote which, all the machinery of equality was set in motion. Here the object is one and simple; the institutor is nothing; the first and last end in view, is to increase the happiness of the co-operators. With this object sincerely and solely in view, the means must be those of persuasion and security; and in order to be permanently useful, must be founded in truth.

Now, is it wise to cast aside without examination a system like this, with objects and means so different from all previous systems of equality, on the general presumption of its incompatibility with human motives, or with the circumstances in which men are by nature placed, without taking the trouble to understand the combinations proposed? proposed, too, by a man who has in practice realised to a very considerable extent the benefits he promises, and whose whole solicitude is to invite an examination of his principles and practice?

We shall inquire then, first,

Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable from the known motives that influence human conduct? next,

Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable from any of the physical circumstances by which men are surrounded?

“Whatever mode of conduct promotes the happiness of men, whatever it is their interest to follow; that mode

of conduct, if otherwise practicable, they will pursue, without compulsion or delusion, as soon as their understandings are really convinced that it is their interest to pursue it: action necessarily follows this real persuasion, as long as it lasts, and in proportion to its intensity." It is presumed that all reasonable men who have investigated this proposition, will assent to its truth, and therefore admit it as a basis of argument.

This proposition admitted, two conditions remain to be complied with before the system of voluntary equality of wealth can be practised; first, it must have a real tendency to produce preponderant happiness—which has been already shown: next, the means must be found to demonstrate to the understandings of those called upon to engage in it, that it is their interest so to engage.

On the first of the above questions, as to the impracticability of voluntary equality from motives of human conduct, a most unwarrantable assumption is frequently made by the opponents of equality, and sometimes admitted by its unreflecting friends. It is said, "Self-interest always has governed, and always must govern, all sentient beings: any system demanding a sacrifice of this main principle, however modified in its application to details, is not worthy of consideration; because, however great the advantages of such a system, there are no means of acquiring them, self-interest being withdrawn. This principle withdrawn, nothing but force or fraud can prop up systems of equality; and equality can offer nothing to counterbalance the evils of these."

So far is this objection from being true, as applying to the proposed system of voluntary equality, that this system is founded altogether on that self-same self-interest which is assumed to be incompatible with it. The mistake seems to lie here. Self-interest implies a general desire to promote our own individual well-being, without reference to any particular means. Selfishness implies a desire to promote by all *immediate* and *direct* means in our power

our well-being, without calculating the effects of our conduct on the feelings and conduct of those whom it may affect, nor of course their reflex operation on ourselves. Selfishness is a short-sighted and ignorant pursuit of self-interest, and is necessarily hateful to those whose feelings it disregards. These two words, self-interest and selfishness, are frequently confounded and used the one for the other. The friend of voluntary equality, execrating selfishness, which is necessarily short-sighted, and the most destructive foe of his system, is apt to abjure self-interest also, and thus to appear to act without rational motive, laying himself open to the ridicule of his antagonist. Self-interest, allied with ignorance, may be, and naturally is, developed in selfishness. But self-interest, allied with wisdom, may be, and is necessarily, developed in the cultivation of the muscular and mental powers, in sympathy, and beneficence. The selfish man is guided by self-interest; so is also he that is called the most disinterested. The object sought is the same,—well-being, happiness;—the greatest possible quantity of these. The difference is in the *means* by which that object is sought. The one seeks it by direct, short-sighted means, ignorantly disregarding the surrounding interests of other sentient beings; the other seeks it on an enlarged calculation, estimating the interests of all human beings within the sphere of its influence. The general pursuit of self-interest is only, in other words, the general pursuit of happiness. Though the strength of mind that can look forward and appreciate distant enjoyments and weigh them against the present, may be able also to calculate the interests of others as affected by its proceedings, it does not follow that it will always do so. Wherever it does not, though long-sighted, it is still selfish and comparatively ignorant. But he who associates with others, for mutual enjoyment, through mutual co-operation cannot be selfish. With him there is a necessary connexion between his happiness and that of all those with whom he associates. In him are conspicuous the two requisites,

separating enlightened self-interest from selfishness. While, on the one hand, all distant sources of happiness, ever so remote, are taken into his calculation; on the other, he calculates the effects of all his actions on all sentient beings around him, and their reflex operation. Without this extent of view in this double direction, he cannot advance a step. Selfishness he must cast off at the beginning of his career, and never again embrace. By self-interest, enlightened and benevolent, because it promotes his happiness that it should be so, he will be always governed.

The general principle thus cleared, the universal motive to all human action thus plainly put forward, without pretension, and without disguise; let us see what are the particular modifications of this principle which are said to be necessary to human exertion, and which are, at the same time, said to be excluded by the system of voluntary equality.

When we take a survey of human actions, important and unimportant, those of the child just beginning its voluntary actions, and those of the reasonable man, we cannot but distinguish two great classes of motives, one or the other, or both of which, must be always present as the predisposing cause of every action. First, if a child suffer its body to over-hang so far from the centre that the power of the muscles shall not be sufficient to counteract the force of gravity, it falls, and probably receives pain. If a man tell a falsehood or betray a trust to any one on one occasion, it is almost certain that he will lose the advantage of being believed or trusted by the same person, very probably not by others, on subsequent occasions. In these two cases of the child and the man, there are certain consequences, the falling, and the loss of confidence, which, from their own natural organisation and that of surrounding objects, sentient or not sentient, necessarily follow, without any effort of theirs or others, the doing of the acts. These consequences follow, as cause and effect,

according to what we call the laws of nature, physical and mental. The contemplation of the probability of these natural consequences, operates on the mind of the child and the man respectively, and influences them not to repeat such actions, lest similar unpleasant natural consequences should be experienced from them. This influencing contemplation forms the *motive*; and when it is directed to consequences like these, flowing directly from the acts themselves, without any interference from without, we call it the *natural* motive to action.

On the other hand, suppose that any person, parent or not, has seen the child fall, and, according to the modifications of its ignorance, beats the child or beats the object on which the child may have fallen, diverting the attention of the child from the instructive natural circumstances attending the fall, to these arbitrary beatings, exhibiting or engendering cruelty, cowardice, revenge, and imprudence. In like manner, suppose that some one overhears the falsehood or the breach of trust, and in consequence thereof, from an indignation which he may amuse himself by calling holy or moral, cuts the finger or the cheek of the offender; here also is a consequence, out of the natural course of things, following the falsehood or the breach of trust. Also, a person likely to profit by the falsehood or the breach of trust, might give a reward of any sort to the person committing either of them—another accidental consequence arising out of the transaction, and no more necessarily connected with it than the cutting. Yet the apprehension to the child of the beating of itself, or its gratification at the sympathy manifested by the revengeful beating of the object on which it fell; the apprehension to the man of the cutting, or his gratification by the reward, though only fortuitous circumstances, might operate on the mind of the child or the man respectively, to cause a repetition or a discontinuance of the actions in question, and thus operate as *motives* to their future conduct. Now, to all such motives, to all motives, whatever, not necessarily

following from the actions themselves, but imposed from without, we apply the term *factitious*.

Here, then, we have two great classes of motives to human conduct, *natural* motives and *factitious* motives; both of them operating sometimes by pain, sometimes by pleasure, sometimes in the shape of reward, sometimes in the shape of punishment. Both of these classes of motives may be dependent equally on every variety of pain and pleasure; they may be both of them immediate or remote in their operation: many other qualities we shall find they possess in common.

What is the reason that one action is called good, and another evil, or bad? Because the one is productive of preponderant good, immediate or consequential, that is to say, of a clear balance of pleasures over pains, to those whom it affects; while the other is called evil, simply because it is productive of preponderant mischief, immediate or consequential, or a clear balance of pains over pleasures, to those whom it may affect. Why then add to the evil, the pains, of the evil action, any additional evil in the way of punishment, over and above what nature (physical organisation and surrounding circumstances) have attached to it? why add to the good, the pleasures, of the good action, any additional factitious good in the way of reward, over and above what nature has attached to it? Is it not preposterous in the one case to increase the evil which we affect to deplore, by adding gratuitous evil? and in the other case, is it not preposterous to add artificially to the pleasures, thus holding out fallacious inducements, which experience will not make good, to the practice of the particular action? What other effect can these factitious rewards and punishments produce, than to divert the mind of the agent from the contemplation of the natural consequences of his actions, the real tests of their value, to the contemplation of arbitrary lots of pleasure and pain, which caprice may attach to these actions, and may at its pleasure vary?

From this first showing it would appear, that *if the object sought for, were simply the happiness of the agents*, nothing could be more preposterous than the addition of factitious rewards and punishments, to those consequences of the actions themselves which nature has attached to them. Where these consequences, these natural rewards and punishments, were not known to the agents, it would appear to be the sole duty of the really benevolent, to bring forward these consequences to their contemplation, that they might serve as motives to regulate their conduct on future occasions.

But the fact is, that the object hitherto sought by both moralists and legislators—to say nothing of political economists—has *not* been the interest or happiness of the agents, but the support of whatever system or set of institutions, wise or foolish, they may have deemed it fit or convenient to support. To support these as a primary object, it has been unavoidably found necessary to sacrifice individual interest as often as it interfered with them. But individual interest would not be voluntarily relinquished, actions ever so injurious to the system or institutions, would continue to be performed or avoided according to the preponderant natural good or evil to be expected from them, and according to the degree of knowledge possessed by the calculating agents. What is to be done, then, to supersede the inducements of these natural motives? and to lead men to resign their real natural interest in favour of this new interest sought to be promoted? To a man who had fairly observed the consequences of his actions, natural motives would dictate that the speaking of the truth on all occasions was his most obvious interest; but political institutions, intercepting, as we have seen, by various expedients, the products of his labour, without his consent obtained, or, restraining the free and useful direction of his faculties, mental or muscular, subvert this course of natural interests, and hold out energetic motives, the saving of his property from the

grasp of violence, to the protection, by falsehood or any other means, of the property sought to be snatched from him. Hence arises an obvious necessity for the introduction of factitious motives. Natural motives will lead an individual to speak truth, as long as a preponderance of good to all affected by the words, requires it; and no longer. But political power requires truth to be spoken for its own purposes, not for the interest of the speaker, after these natural motives have ceased to operate. Thus man's interest is placed in opposition to his duty; arbitrarily so placed by political power, for its own real or supposed benefit. The imparting of knowledge in this case would do mischief to the views of political power; it would not lead man into the line of conduct pointed out by political power, the surrender of his earnings or of the direction of his faculties—but would more clearly show him how much opposed it was to his real interest to surrender them. Knowledge being the enemy of these usurpations, natural motives opposed to them, where were motives to be sought for, to enforce a compliance with them? Where but in the factitious class? where but amongst factitious rewards and punishments,—chiefly amongst punishments, rewards being in their nature so very limited? where but in the application or threat of force or delusion? Thus, as soon as the rules of beneficence and justice are violated, factitious motives, factitious rewards and punishments, become necessary to sway human conduct, as a substitute for reason.

Now, when we assert that *rewards and punishments are not necessary* to influence either children or adults to the uniform practice of moral conduct, or that species of conduct which will produce the greatest sum of happiness to themselves and their associates; we allude solely to *factitious* rewards and punishments, as opposed to the *natural*. Instead of rejecting the aid of natural rewards and punishments, we rely on them altogether as entirely adequate to our purpose. But then, in order to render

them operative, we remove, by voluntary agreement, from the co-operating community, all those mutual attacks and restraints—save the plunder of political power—which counteract, in ordinary life, the operation of these natural motives. We show men how to place themselves in such circumstances, that their interest shall be always in union with their duty, that if they act wrong it must be through ignorance, and that it shall be always the interest of every one around them to enlighten this ignorance.

The pretext put forward for the present universal employment of factitious rewards and punishments, is the remoteness of many of the natural consequences of actions, the absolute ignorance of the great majority of mankind of the existence of any such consequences; and their incapacity, from want of acquired habits of self-control, to resist the temptations of immediate pleasure in favour of such remote consequences, even if perceived.

The present besotted ignorance of the great majority of human beings, and their lamentable want of self-control, forming together so large a portion of their character, arise altogether from the circumstances in which they have been placed, that is to say, from more or less of the various expedients of insecurity to which they have been subjected. Were these circumstances—the factitious work of insecurity—changed, knowledge and self-control would succeed to ignorance and passion, and the remote consequences of actions would be estimated as well as the immediate, their value, however, always decreasing in proportion to their remoteness, from the uncertainty of eventual possession which remoteness includes.

The natural motives, once in operation, are permanent as our organisation. They act with force exactly proportioned to the preponderant good or evil to be produced by the voluntary actions to be shunned or avoided. According to the degree of knowledge, and power of self-control—possessed by each individual, will these motives influence him to good, or to his own real, greatest, happiness. The

power of self-control is a necessary consequence of a sincere conviction of the real, though remote, consequences of actions ; and this knowledge of consequences, and this habit of resigning immediate present, for greater future good, will be both acquired, just as habits of sloth and intemperance are now acquired, by the operation of the new circumstances, education and early training included, with which the new associations will find it their interest to surround themselves.

Let those, however, who doubt the possibility of dispensing with factitious rewards and punishments, even in the interior concerns of a voluntarily associated community, bear in mind that these associations are still liable to all the laws of the land in which they live, just as any ordinary member of society is liable to them. At the requisition of any member of the association, or of any individual from without, the laws of the country may be at any time appealed to against him who does any act which is by such laws visited with factitious punishment. These communities, then, by bringing into active operation the natural motives to intelligence and beneficence, do not take away from the aggregate of motives to useful conduct, but increase them by an immense power hitherto neglected or opposed.

One thing is certain, that hitherto factitious rewards have been used in all ages, and particularly factitious punishments in every shape of horror, towards the young, in education, and towards adults, by the laws ; and vice and crime seem to have thriven under their sway. They have signally failed in producing virtuous conduct. The combinations of voluntary equality, removing almost all the temptations to vice and crime engendered by the vicious institutions of insecurity ; it is conceived that factitious motives will, under these new circumstances, be quite superfluous. At all events, these motives having hitherto failed, is not another course worth the trial ? What, then, are the natural motives, the natural rewards

and punishments, to operate on the young and on adults, to produce virtuous conduct amongst all the members of the association under their new circumstances? Natural punishments are,

First, The immediate evil or pain caused by the act itself to the agent or to others, when unattended by any consequences.

Second, The aggravated evil of the act when followed by other evils, or the preponderant evil when followed by partial good or pleasure to the agent or others.

In the same way those natural pleasurable motives, called natural rewards, are either the immediate good or pleasure, or the consequential good or pleasure to be derived from an action.

So simple appear the materials, natural pains or pleasures, immediate or consequential, from which must be fabricated the motives for the practice of every virtue, for the avoidance of every vice, under the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation and joint possession and enjoyment!

Children, for the most part, must be induced to act from motives of immediate pleasure or pain; youths and adults, according to the improvement of their understandings, from the preponderant good or evil of their actions, weighing all their consequences, immediate and remote, on themselves and others. All motives of the first class, leading to actions attended with immediate pain or pleasure, and not followed by any consequences, good or evil, to the agent or others, are to be obeyed in proportion to the magnitude of the pains or pleasures attached to them, and for a stronger reason where the *ultimate*, are of the same nature, whether good or evil, with the *immediate*, consequences. Where the consequences are both in good and in evil, to the agent and to others, *there* is the demand for wisdom, in determining the conduct which it is most the interest of the agent to pursue.

The pains and pleasures, the natural rewards and

punishments, attached to actions, whether immediate or consequential, are,

All the pleasures and pains of the senses and appetites, internal and external.

All the pleasures and pains arising from the active use or neglect of the muscular system.

* All the pleasures and pains arising from the active use or neglect of the intellectual faculties.

All the pleasures and pains of a purely social nature, arising from our intercourse with our fellow-creatures, those of sympathy and beneficence, and of antipathy and maleficence.

There are none of these pains or pleasures which are not necessarily connected with some of our voluntary actions, sometimes immediate, instantaneous, in their development, sometimes remote. Many also of the different sorts of pleasures, or of pains, may be attached to the same action: even pains and pleasures of many sorts may at the same time attach to the same action. It is in these cases that moral calculation is so requisite and so difficult: first, to find out the real, though remote and ramified, consequences of actions; next, to weigh the different lots of pleasures and pains, and by the preponderant good or evil to estimate the value of the action.

The perfection of moral conduct on the part of the individual, is so to regulate his voluntary actions as to obtain through the whole of his existence the greatest sum of happiness, or preponderance of pleasures over pains, from all these sources. To effect this, it is necessary, when living in society, that he should consider himself as one unit and no more, as to claims for happiness, amongst those, whatever may be their number, with whom he is connected.

The pleasures and pains of the first class, those of feeling, taste, sight, &c., of hunger and thirst, of the sexual appetite, and of the healthy or obstructed (diseased) action of all the internal viscera and organs, are familiar to every

one; and are known to be frequently connected with our voluntary actions, forming the motives, the natural rewards or punishments, to their pursuit or avoidance. But when these pleasures and pains are remote, not immediate, consequences, they are apt to be overlooked, like all other remote objects. So with the second set of pleasures and pains, those from muscular exertion or muscular inactivity, they are more operative on the young than on adults, but are familiar to all. The third the intellectual, and the fourth the social, pleasures and pains, are more operative on adults than on the young, in proportion to extent of knowledge and accuracy of judgment; though, under a judicious mode of instruction, the extent to which even these may be made to operate on the young, has been contemplated but by few.

From these several sources of pleasures and pains is derived an abundant supply of natural rewards and punishments, not to be distributed at the arbitrary pleasure of the instructor, but to be studied by him that he may be able to present them readily on all proper occasions to the mind, as the effects which will inevitably follow the pursuing certain lines of conduct, those attended with preponderant mischief being denominated vices in consequence of the natural pains or punishments that attend them, and those attended with preponderant good being denominated virtues in consequence of the natural pleasures or rewards in their train. These pleasures and pains in fact include all, of which man's nature is susceptible. As to number and efficiency, then, there is no want; the want is simply that of intellectual power to trace their connexions with our voluntary actions.

It may be necessary here to obviate an objection,—“How are children or ordinary men to be able to follow the analysis of the motives by which they are governed? If such previous investigations be necessary to make them virtuous, they never will be so.” It is by no means necessary that those even, whose lives have been governed

by certain compounded or simple motives, should be aware of these motives, much less that they should be able to analyse the whole of the operations of their minds. Was not the blood propelled by the heart to nourish every part of the human body, before the circulation of the blood was discovered? As the blood circulates, so do motives operate on the individual; he feels the agency, he obeys the impulse and performs the actions, but is no more bound to develop those motives, than to explain the circulation of the blood under pain of ceasing to derive benefit from it. The blood circulates, the motives operate; and both might circulate and operate eternally without sufficient intellectual power in the agent so operated upon, to look into himself and develop the animal machinery, physical and mental, employed. From the progress of knowledge in these communities, there can be no doubt that their members would speedily comprehend the whole system and motives by which their social organisation was upheld; more particularly would the children, educated under this system to truth and real facts, become conversant with their intellectual organisation, as well as with all other branches of useful knowledge.

Such being the fund of natural rewards and punishments, where are to be found the species of actions of children or men, which these unaided consequences of their very actions, are not sufficient to control?

Any pursuit, injurious to health from its continuance, intensity, or accompaniments, or, though not injurious to health, so offensive to any of the senses as to outweigh the benefit to be derived to the individual from it (including in the individual's interest his contemplation of the social benefit such action may produce), these natural rewards and punishments would not cause to be undertaken. All such actions or labour, therefore, now carried on to the waste of human life, or the annoyance of the operators, for the profit of capitalists or the luxurious convenience, the supposed happiness, of a few of the wealthy of society,

would of course cease ; these motives being inadequate to impel to their performance. Wherefore should such actions be continued? If not attended with preponderant mischief, with a diminution of the sum-total of happiness, these motives are sufficient to cause them to be done. If attended with preponderant mischief, 'tis folly to continue them.

All these pernicious or excessive modes of exertion thus cleared away, what remains? That species of exertion alone, which being compatible with health, comfort, and even pleasure, is moreover necessary to all of these. Without compulsion or delusion, men will not exert themselves beyond this point. Natural motives of self-interest, natural rewards and punishments, will ensure this salutary degree of exertion.

What are the natural rewards and punishments within the power of a community of voluntary co-operation to bestow, in order to excite and keep constantly in action such moderate exertion? They are nothing more than such of the pleasures and the pains of some one or more of the four classes, of the senses, muscular, intellectual, or social, before mentioned, as necessarily follow the yielding or the withholding of such exertion. Are comfortable dwellings in pleasant situations, is a regular supply of grateful food, are neat and useful articles of clothing, objects of desire and motives to exertion amongst men? If so, four times the quantity or goodness of these means of procuring pleasure or avoiding pain or discomfort, would the members of these communities enjoy, that the same labour would procure them by individual, isolated exertion and consumption. Are alternate, gentle, muscular exertions and repose, necessary to preserve the health and energy of the system, the capacity for all enjoyment, and to fill up with an occupation and a source of interest the otherwise blank and heavy hours of existence? Just such exertions, and no more, as will be attended with these natural rewards, do these communities require from their members.

Are the pleasures of the interchange of ideas, of hearing, judging, and communicating thought, so great even to the lowly in intellect, as to add considerably to the happiness of life, particularly when time so devoted is withdrawn from what would otherwise be spent in excessive or unhealthful occupations? If so—then are such pleasures, with opportunity of improvement by books or lectures to any extent, to be added, as additional natural rewards, to stimulate and repay the moderate exertions of the members of such communities. Above all, are social pleasures of any avail in throwing rapture over the otherwise almost insipidities of sense, of muscular exertion, even of intellect? the sympathies of respect and attachment between equals, between the two sexes (also equal in rights, duties, and enjoyments, and therefore yielding to each other, pleasures a thousand times increased), between childhood and youth and the old, between man and all his associated fellow-creatures around him? If so, then would the *common interest* of these communities superadd such social motives to individual exertion as not only do not exist in ordinary society, but as are altogether banished therefrom by the rivalships, jealousies, and hatreds of ordinary competition; deterred only from force or fraud by the real apprehension of legal punishment, by the idle and distant threatenings of interested superstition. On what basis must be laid the superstructure of these so cheap, now so rarely enjoyed, pleasures of sympathy? In the previous abundant gratification of every reasonable physical want. Till a sentient being is happy and satisfied within itself, it cannot look out of itself for objects to partake with it, and over which it may diffuse the overflowings of its happiness. Physical wants are so urgent, that they cannot be bribed or deluded; they must be gratified, under pain of the engendering of selfishness, if not of maleficence. Wherever, as in these associated communities, all natural wants are abundantly gratified, without the possibility of over-excitement, *there*, is the fittest soil for the social affections.

Wherever contending interests are removed, and all temptations to mutual annoyance and fraud are withdrawn, *there*, of necessity, where *nothing is to be got* by mutual tormenting, will sources of occupation and emotion be sought for, by mutual kindness and assistance. Not a smile will remain unproductive on the lips of the happy: from every eye it will be reflected, through every mind will it vibrate, propagating itself like the moved air when thought is borne upon its bosom. Here, every one is directly interested in the moral habits and in the industrious conduct of every one. Here, public opinion will have all the gentle, the pervading, the useful influence, without any of the tyrannical control, of the most pure domestic circle. Here, every one will read in the countenance of every one, the value of his exertions for the happiness of all: this gentle approbation of surrounding friends, will become every day, more and more, an accustomed, a necessary solace of existence; to be bereft of it will be like the withdrawing of the solar heat from the animal economy; a principle of action, one of the springs of activity, will be felt to be withdrawn, and exertion will be redoubled or its direction changed, to re-acquire its vivifying influence. When our reason tells us that this public opinion is rightly directed, it is impossible to escape its control—as well may we expose the nerve to the passage of the electric fluid, and expect to escape its peculiar sensation. It is impossible to conceive a state of social existence, in which the principle of sympathy, the force of public opinion, can be so energetic, because nowhere can the interest calling for its development be so universal. Nowhere also have opportunities ever existed so constantly recurring, for its expression. Times of labour, of meals, of recreation, of social, literary, or scientific meeting, every day, almost every hour of the day, afford these occasions. Even in the very private apartment, the air breathes the public-sentiment, conveyed to it by the increased impetus of the system from the reflecting mind.

Where, out, can a member walk or move, that this all-pervading sympathy with his actions, is not likely to meet and to surround him? How even in thought can he escape from it? But, wherefore should he wish to escape from it? Can this sympathy be unjustly directed? Can it be morose or severe? Can it be such as a well-regulated mind would not rejoice to share and to obey? No actions but such as are really injurious to the community, will they take the trouble of disapproving; but in this intimate connexion of interests, there is scarcely a private vice, really injurious to the individual, by which the public interest is not affected. Is the health of any individual impaired by any species of intemperance, by neglect, by the effect of any ill-regulated passion? His aid in production, in instruction, in healing, in superintending or distributing, is lost, in whole or in part, to the society. Every one suffers by his loss of health; every one is interested in his recovery of health. Here private interest and public interest, here private virtue and public virtue, both as to the individual and the community, are one and the same; here interest and duty are united. Every one will sympathise with the pain, and be anxious to remove it—every one will reprove the error. But every one knowing the force of circumstances and his own liability to err, will endeavour to soothe, instruct, and amend, not to add to the mental or physical pangs of the erring. Amongst such friends, to have erred, will but excite, when the error is removed—and by such means it must be removed—remembrances of kindness, assistance, and persuasive truth, not shame and apprehension; it will enlarge the mind to a perception of the utter foolishness of the injurious conduct. Who is he, therefore, that can be found sincerely to say that he believes not in the controlling energy of sympathy and public opinion in such communities as these? Where, rather, is the vicious to be found who will dare to encounter them? that would not be abashed and withdraw from their influence? that would

not rather hug his vices in secret where no surrounding eyes could see, where no scrutinising minds could scan and present to his contemplation the frightful consequences of his actions? In such communities, would the idle or the otherwise vicious remain till that natural alternative which is implied in all voluntary co-operation, the reciprocal avoidance of the contract by the one party when the other has ceased to fulfil the conditions, should have been enforced? Would he stay till the community separated itself from him? Would a case be ever found in which retirement would not precede, by a thousand degrees, such forced abdication? Would not the power of expulsion, inherent in every voluntarily formed community, be in this case entirely superseded by the previous uncontrolled operation of the power of public opinion?

“Soon,” exclaims an admirer of the systems of insecurity, “will the mere appetite for the necessities, for the comforts and conveniences, even for the luxuries of life be gratified; but more generous motives soon engage the attention, and activity becomes more active in proportion as it is sated with the means of enjoyment. The sordid motive of mere animal gratification soon ceases to operate; the desire of excelling, the *love of distinction*, of being admired, perhaps envied; these are the motives that act on lofty minds, and lead to all the vastness of exertion and accumulation.”

This objection requires to be sifted. Those, first, who have gone along with the reasonings and facts of our second chapter on “the evils produced by the present systems of forced inequality of wealth,” will reply, that this motive to exertion, “the love of distinction, &c. of lofty minds,” for mere distinction sake, is a vicious propensity, because productive of preponderant evil; they will reply that the pursuit of mere wealth is now over-excited and in most pernicious activity, that it is quite necessary for human happiness that this pursuit of wealth should relax and cease as soon as all really useful wants

are supplied, and just at the point where the lofty minds begin to sigh for more and more wealth, as mere means of factitious distinction.

But wherefore prevails the love of distinction, of heaping up more than others, or expending more ostentatiously, in ordinary society? Wherefore but to attract public notice, to gain the sympathy of others? Who would labour to excel, to accumulate, to be distinguished on a desert island, himself the sole proprietor? Public opinion is therefore the object really sought for; and distinction by accumulation and expenditure, is but the means. It is that inevitable dependence in which we live on the smiles and frowns of our fellow-creatures, that makes men seek to be distinguished by any folly, however absurd, however atrocious. In these communities, the public sympathy, and its expression in public opinion, are to be earned in all their freshness and vigour of sincerity, without any superfluous efforts after inequality of wealth. Inequality of useful qualities, of social effort for the general happiness, of success in any new and difficult, if at the same time useful, branch of art or science; these are amongst the useful distinctions to which the rewards of public opinion will be attached, instead of the mere idle distinction of wealth. And as this desire of public sympathy, is allowed to be so strong in every day society as to call forth these efforts of exertion and accumulation, to earn which they are employed; with what superior effect will the same instrument operate, where it is so much more powerful, in these communities, in producing those peculiar exertions, whatever they may be, which are necessary to procure it?

“But still,” says the lover of inequality of wealth, “lofty souls can never relish the overflowing smiles of such a public opinion without the substantial association of superior wealth. How can such lofty minds endure to be no better provided for than the ordinary herd of their fellows?” We can only ask the lover of inequality, in

reply, "What proportion would these lofty souls, unsusceptible of the ordinary sympathies of their fellow-creatures, probably bear to the whole number of such communities? one in ten or one in a hundred?" Whichever it may be, does he really think the associated communities would be the less happy, though all these lofty minds left them and seceded in a body to exalt general society with their *generous* motives? or though they never condescended to join in their united labours?

No one will defend for a moment as a useful motive to action, the desire of possessing more than others, or the incapacity to enjoy, because all around have equal means of enjoyment. It is the very principle of misanthropy or malevolence. To every well-constituted, benevolent mind, happiness is doubled when shared with an equal, equally happy. Ten masses of happiness, those of ten human beings, must not be sacrificed to *decrease* the happiness of the eleventh grasping the whole, incalculably under what it would be, if in a healthy state of aptitude for receiving favourable impressions.

Public sympathy and public opinion, then, in or out of these societies, is the real universal motive to action, over and above the desire of gratifying real wants and substantial or preponderant pleasures. It urges the savage to slaughter or to endure pain, the superstitious to die or to persecute for the error of his brain. Where public opinion is most energetic, the most energetic action will be produced; where public opinion is most enlightened, there will that most energetic, be also 'the most useful, line of action. In these communities, public opinion must be at the same time the most energetic and the most enlightened.

"Alas! the habits of the first co-operators in these communities must have been formed in ordinary society. In proportion to their individual exertions, they have hitherto experienced, or been taught to think that they ought to have experienced, individual and exclusive benefit. Individual idleness has been attended with

individual loss. Individual industry has been distinguished by its superior earnings ; the idle has not eaten the bread of the industrious."

If in these communities the arrangements were such that the idle could eat the bread of the industrious, that error would be fatal to them. But, in these communities, it is impossible that there can be any voluntarily or viciously idle. Accident or disease alone, will restrain from that easy and delightful exertion, where social feelings give a zest to the pleasures of muscular exertion, to the interest of a common pursuit, in which all are principals and proprietors. How is it possible that an idler could remain or find support in these communities? How could he find admission? for what purpose could his presence be tolerated? If the community were compelled to support a certain quantity of idlers, there would be some sense in the objection ; but to suppose that a set of men, under no compulsion, should voluntarily give the fruits of their labour, or permit to come or to remain amongst them, a swarm, or a single individual, of the class of idle consumers, of miserable imbecile creatures, is to suppose that such a community are not benevolent, but mad. All fear of discouragement on this score, then, is absolutely vain.

"But, if no absolute idlers, some might not work as diligently as others, and the diligent would be discouraged by not receiving more reward for their labour than the torpid." The absolute practice of society, shows how little evil is to be apprehended from this source. Agriculturists, weavers, carpenters, sailors, respectively, even now under the system of competition, work almost universally for the same wages : and yet every one conversant with labour knows that the best hands, excelling in strength or skill, in all these lines, do once and a half or twice the work that the worst do. To the skilful, or the strong, or the active-minded, double the quantity of work is not more irksome than half to the

unskilful, the weakly, or the dispirited. The mere praise of being the best workman, is sufficient to keep alive the superior efforts of the superior men. The great majority yield from their labour the average of production, the regular motive to labour being the regular average reward. And this takes place—observe—where there is no public opinion, nothing but the necessity of ordinary exertion, to secure the wages; this takes place where there is a divided interest between the capitalist and the producers, where the general tendency of the whole of the workmen as a body, is necessarily to do as little and get as much as they can. But under the united interest and ownership, under the expanded sympathies and energetic expression of public opinion, of these communities; under the increased rewards of the comforts and conveniences of life which an average of labour will procure equally for every labourer, who can dread any discouragement to the most skilful and active minded of such a community, from the malevolent motive of grudging the happiness of their fellow-labourer, to whom nature and circumstances have not given powers of exertion equal to theirs? No; the regret will be on the part of those, whose powers of co-operation and usefulness will be the least. On the part of the superior workmen, there will be a constant effort to improve these. Wherefore? Because it will *then* be their interest to improve them, whereas *now* it is their interest to keep them eternally back and depressed; every one now thriving on the comparative ignorance and helplessness of his neighbour.

“But ordinary common labourers have not now, in point of fact, the strength of mind to look forward to the general result of the year, much less of extensive united yearly labour, as the reward of their toils: the evening must bring the reward, or the motive arising from the reward, however great, is lost on such minds.” True, as to the lowest class of imbecility of mind, produced by existing systems of insecurity: but altogether absurd as

applied to ordinary minds living but one year under the operation of the new system ; and still less applicable to minds to be trained, as of the young, altogether under this system. But—in order to begin these communities, what class or description of persons are they who will volunteer out of general society ? Is it the ordinary minds of the day, those who have no foresight, who can make no calculation ? Not one of these, from the very nature of things, will join such communities : and surely the communities will not implore of general society the aid of press-gangs or Inquisition-familiars, to *compel* such to come in. If, however, a number of such unfortunate creatures, as Irish peasants for instance, were drawn, like fish in a net, into one of these communities, and associated with but a third part of their number who could see to the year's end and to the common interest ; though their mental power had been so nullified into stupid selfishness as to be incapable of immediate foresight, of comprehension ; yet would they by the operation of the system be drilled into such new and agreeable *habits* of exertion, repose, and enjoyment, as to delight in the system at the year's end, though they knew not why. By degrees, wherever nature had placed no cerebral defect in the way, as again in the case of the Irish peasant, the understanding would be compelled to perceive the useful workings of the system for individual interest ; and it would soon be much more difficult to drive out from such communities these originally stupid co-operators, than it was to drive them in.

“ Habits ”—rejoins again the lover of existing systems, “ here the new system fails ; in these are founded the duration and superiority of the existing. No matter how absurd the practices, how uneconomical the labour, how unjustly distributed its products, existing habits, the results of ages, are all formed for existing systems. 'Tis not reason, but habit, that governs men. Though truth, interest, and virtue were in favour of the new, yet habit alone in the other scale shall master these.” There has,

unfortunately, been a time when the friends of force and delusion could use such language truly. That time has ceased to exist. So much truth is now known, and the modes of simplifying and diffusing it, of operating on the understanding even of the lowly, are now so widely diffused, that injurious habits of thinking and acting will be compelled to give way to views of real interest. . All habits, moreover, are individual, not hereditary: at least, no strong presumption of any transmitted cerebral aptitude to particular habits, has yet been demonstrated; and if such were, it must be very slight. Habits, then, being formed with every individual, their succession through a past eternity is of no consequence. Truth is an over-match for delusion, and will weaken every day more and more the mere force of habit. As reason improves, mere habit becomes unnecessary as a guide to action. Hitherto old and vicious habits have been scarcely ever attacked with anything else than *mere words*, the circumstances generating these habits, from ignorance or want of power to remove them, being suffered to remain in full operation. The principle, or one of the principles, of the new system, is to reason by *facts* and *things*; to operate on the mind by circumstances, and to make use of words to explain these. These habits, however, in favour of old systems and old operations, are altogether over-rated; they are in fact at this moment everywhere extremely and most beneficially weakened; and a new impulse is sought for. This impetus new circumstances will give. Though enlightened interest and truth, rather than habit, will be the ruling motives to action of the new communities; though the constant effort there will be to retrace habits and to compare them with real interests and real facts, yet habit on such a basis of reason once established, as by such a process it necessarily must be, will be as much superior in useful effect and in permanence to the mechanical habits of old systems, as truth is superior to error, and real interest to delusion. Habit, then, instead of being the foe,

will be converted—as far as it is worth retaining—into a most useful ally of the new establishments.

It remains for us to inquire whether there is anything in those motives which govern the young, which is incompatible with their training under the new system.

The general facts and principle respecting the human mind being the same in infancy and adult age, this branch of the inquiry will not detain us long. If, as we have shown, it is not only possible, but most useful, to guide the actions of adults, with their increased strength, their superadded passions, their increased energy of common passions, by the motives, the natural rewards and punishments pointed out without the addition of any factitious rewards and punishments whatever within these communities; how much more easy will it be for an overwhelming majority of adults to guide the voluntary actions of the children of the community by such natural motives! Hitherto, one great error in the management of all children, by all adults, as in the management of all adults themselves by political power, has been the controlling of their actions for the supposed benefit of the governors, by force or fraud, instead of truth and reason. If force and fraud can be dispensed with as towards the most untractable, how little need can there be of their exercise towards those who are more under control; towards those who are the absolute dependents on those who govern them?

But though adults are stronger, have ~~new~~ *passions*, and stronger passions than the young, though the general principles of the human mind are the same in both cases; yet if adults can be governed without force or fraud, it is because they have *reason* to be acted upon. The minds of children, it may be said, not being developed, compulsion must be used to restrain them; and though no laws directly apply to their actions, yet is it because the laws give almost all their power, and in the most arbitrary shape, into the hands of parents and their delegates.

These statements of fact are to a melancholy extent correct. They do not weaken, however, any of the arguments before made use of against factitious rewards and punishments. In proportion as children acquire strength and the power to do injurious actions, they are capable of acquiring, and by proper training will necessarily acquire, reason also. As they can have no motive in this early stage of their existence, except where bad passions have been systematically and with great effort drilled into them, to injure others, the object of the earliest part of education is simply to remove from them, to keep them out of the way of being themselves injured by, injurious causes ; thus giving them unobstructed scope for the development of all their senses, of their muscular and intellectual powers. Under this management, the muscular and intellectual powers, strength and reason, go on increasing hand in hand : by the time the child is able to do anything hurtful to others, it has reason to be guided to the avoidance of such hurtful actions ; nothing of course but ignorance will lead it to hurt itself ; for which real knowledge of facts, not force, is the appropriate remedy.

But it is still curious, and useful, and necessary to inquire what are the *peculiar modes* of instruction and persuasion which are best adapted to those imperfect, undeveloped, periods of human existence, childhood and youth ?

In childhood everything is new : and mere novelty, from the nature of our organisation, wherever nothing otherwise painful attends the sensation or emotion, is a source of pleasure. The repetition, at a certain interval, when the nerve and cerebral structure have had time to recover what is called their tone, or capacity of being again acted upon, of an agreeable taste, is pleasing : but if another taste, equally agreeable but new, is substituted, every one knows the pleasure is increased. This is one of the ultimate facts respecting our nervous system. Now, to adults, in proportion to their acquisitions, the pleasures to be de-

rived from mere novelty are few, and every day diminishing : but, on the other hand, the pleasures of comparing and of judging of all these facts, of looking into consequences, of inventing or hearing of new combinations of actions, or of things useful in the sciences or the arts ; all these, under the name of intellectual pleasures, are numerous in proportion to mental culture, are continually expanding, and must be used as motives to the guidance of the actions of adults. By reason chiefly, without neglecting observation and novelty, adults must be guided ; by immediate observation and novelty chiefly, without neglecting reason, and solely with a view to its future successful cultivation, children must be guided. Adults, however limited their stock of facts, find more pleasure in comparing the endless combinations of these, in planning the gratification of their more impetuous feelings, than in making new simple observations, in acquiring the neglected knowledge of facts and things, and their qualities. For a contrary reason, the great delight of children is in activity and curiosity ; in muscular exertion and new sensations, and in comparing these as their little stock increases.

Hence follow plainly, the course that should be pursued in early education, the natural rewards and punishments that should be made use of. The double object is to infuse real knowledge or truth (*i.e.*, real facts, real things, real consequences, real resemblances and differences), and to implant habits tending to preponderant happiness, in the young.

First, then, as to the implanting of moral or useful habits. This operation is necessarily begun previous to the time when the reason of the child can perceive any useful tendency in the habit taught. These habits are taught by means of what is called association. Let the doing of any act by a child, as the killing of flies, tormenting kittens, or beating anything offensive, be always accompanied with the expression of pleasure on the part of its teachers : these acts (except by the countervailing

tendency of some natural punishment, as the biting or scratching of the kitten) will infallibly be deemed good and fit to be done by the child in proportion to the intensity of approbation bestowed by the teachers, particularly if they themselves give the example of such conduct, and add other factitious rewards, such as the gratification of any of the senses, on the performance of these actions. Although it is thus true that bad habits are formed, and that good habits ought to be formed, and may be formed, by association previous to the development of reason, it does not follow that it is necessary or wise to dispense with the exercise of reason when unfolded, even with respect to these very habits,—to the most moral and useful of them. Nothing is more delicate or important in education than the management of these early associations. Three rules, it would appear, are necessary to be observed respecting them. First, “Let no association be used for any purpose that is not founded in truth, and not only so, but in truth universally recognised not only by all sects and parties, but by all civilised men.” Universal kindness, truth, fortitude—these and such like universal virtues, because it is the interest of all that they should be practised towards them, may be taught ever so early by the association of sympathy and by example; but the local supposed virtue of kindness to people of any particular sect or party, or respect for any possible speculative opinion, alleged fact of history, or other matter within the province of the understanding, and not necessary for the immediate guidance of the child’s conduct to the happiness of itself, and of those affected by its conduct, should never be impressed at all by any association. The necessity of the case, that demands the employment of association previous to the development of reason, should also strictly limit its exercise to points of necessary and universal morality. It is a dangerous power, of tremendous efficacy for evil, of very partial and only temporary use for good purposes. Second rule: “Let no moral association what-

soever, however true and universal, be strengthened by any factitious reward or punishment, nor even by the expression of any exaggerated or affected emotion." When the Indian woman presses her child to her breast, and points with expressions and gestures of horror to a fellow-creature, a neighbour, of another caste, the impression, often repeated on the terrified imagination of the child, remains for life, tormenting equally itself and others. Though the person pointed at were a robber, liar, murderer, and his arts ever so worthy of disapprobation, no possible good could arise from this exaggerated expression; it is not necessary for the child's preservation, it takes away the power of forming a future calm judgment of the value of the act, and can lead to nothing but indiscriminate, unjudging, hatred and vengeance. Third rule: "Let not the association, in any case, be so strongly impressed on the mind as to render it incapable of an impartial examination of the characters, or of the good or ill consequences of the actions connected by it, as soon as the understanding is sufficiently developed to form such judgment." Be these moral associations ever so true, ever so universal—be the expression of approbation or disapprobation ever so measured and appropriate, still, if it incapacitate from future impartial judgment, with respect even to the most universally acknowledged virtuous act, it leaves the agent with respect to *that act* (and if with respect to that one, why not as to others, and to any others, good or bad?) a slave to prejudice, to the forming of opinions before reasons, or without reasons. The legitimate use of association is as a substitute for reason until it is developed, and an ally of reason to enhance the pleasures of perceived utility. Its *exclusive* use is only for the immediate temporary guidance of the child. Nothing more simple than the reason of this. If the actions originally performed or avoided through the associations of sympathy, be really productive of preponderant good or evil, on an examination of all their consequences, what

so certain as that this examination will increase the force of every useful association ; will place its future operation out of the power of chance ; will apportion its energy exactly in proportion to its utility, and will render reason and sympathy eternal co-operators to good, instead of being, as now, eternally antagonising principles of action?

Under the head of association is included the principle of imitation. If the rules laid down with respect to all moral associations are observed, imitation affects usefully almost the whole of early moral training where large numbers of children are brought up together ; the *new comers* almost immediately adopting the modes of acting of the little society into which they are introduced. But, as many actions immediately pleasing, may in their consequences be most pernicious, and as young children can know nothing about these consequences ; hence the vast importance that the general actions and feelings of the school or community of young people, should be useful and benevolent. This is the high duty of the director of early education in the skilful management of association, till reason can gradually interpose to judge and unite in useful bonds, interest and duty. The principle of voluntary imitation is, in ordinary cases, quite sufficient to form the habits of the new comers to those of the mass of pupils whom they join : bad or good, if the actions afford exertion, and are repaid with the sympathy of their little companions, children will immediately join in them. Hence the incalculable advantage (or one of those advantages) of training children in large numbers ; but hence also the increased and awful responsibility of forming aright the habits of these masses by just use of the great instrument of association, in the first formation of them. Where the associations are useful, the elder children will, in the course of action, without effort, explain to the younger as their minds open, not as lessons, but as matters of mutual interest, more usefully than any adult teacher can do, the pleasures of which they are productive.

Imitation in education is, therefore, secondary in importance to association; and its good or evil effects depend entirely on the character given to the mass whose actions are imitated. A child of extraordinary vigour of muscle or mind, may occasionally break the uniformity of even useful imitation by new and injurious modes of action. Carefully to observe, and skilfully to manage these deviations, is amongst the duties of the superintendent of the general habits of the children trained.

The first object of early education, the implanting of moral habits, thus provided for by a force of association, fearful in its efficacy, though unaided by factitious rewards and punishments; the second object, that of infusing real knowledge, presents itself. We shall find also that this branch of education is better promoted by natural, than by factitious rewards and punishments, and that there is nothing in the way of ordinary human motives opposed to this branch of education, under the system of voluntary equality.

By what motives shall the young of these establishments be induced to find pleasure in the acquisition of real and of useful knowledge? By the joint pleasure arising from the exercise of their faculties and of novelty, and from the gratification of the constant desire of these pleasures under the name of curiosity. From every object calling forth the exercise of any of the senses, and not otherwise attended with pain, a child receives pleasure. What from long repetition has ceased to please the adult, every new form, colour, sound, smell, taste, is a source of gratification to the young. Now, these sources of gratification nature presents in almost endless variety, in the minerals, plants, and animals, that people this globe, beyond the reach of the most tenacious memory. But no sooner has the child been gratified with the external form and appearances, as brilliancy, brittleness, hardness, softness, with the colour, smell, sound, taste, effect on the touch of these objects, than it seeks for other information. Curiosity

wants to find out what the substances are made of, what's inside of them, how they are composed, what's doing within as well as without them. The external structure known, the child wants to find out the internal. Utility here again goes hand in hand with inclination : this also is a kindred branch of the most useful knowledge a child can acquire. The internal structure of minerals, of plants, and of animals, ending with a knowledge of its own frame, the most perfect and to man the most interesting and useful to be known of animal forms, closes this branch of early education, called "Natural History." During the examination of the outward and inward structure of these articles, endless collateral points of curiosity respecting them, the country, the soil, the climate, the people from which they came, the mode of procuring them, their uses, their character and habits, if animals, will be inquired into. The gratification of this species of curiosity is a further source of useful knowledge and of pleasure. Here again nature is to be followed, and her rewards to be seized and made the most of. But at the same time that the mind is employed, why not let the muscular system, the love of motion, be gratified? Not a natural object presented to the senses, that should not be sketched by the pupils to afford employment to the hand, to teach the rudiments of the useful art of drawing, and to imprint more strongly the lessons on the memory. With the same view useful facts and short descriptions should be written under the sketches ; and thus writing as well as drawing would be taught incidentally, and without any particular effort, forming only a relief and a support to the main object in view, the acquisition of useful facts, of real knowledge.

Such is the natural mode of beginning education with the culture of the simplest and first acquired faculties. When these objects and facts are known to the young, then springs up curiosity afresh for a bolder flight. Out of these materials which we find on the earth, above and around us, are fabricated all articles produced by labour

for human use. Food, clothes, furniture, houses, all useful things, are derived from these elements; by taking them to pieces, decomposing them, causing their minute component parts to operate on each other, and forming new combinations under the name of chemical processes, new sources of wonder are opened for curiosity to feed upon, and applications to the useful arts of every day life, are continually presenting themselves. The *memory* now must be constantly on the stretch to bring up for use all the facts acquired in the previous pursuit of natural history; and the *judgment* is now constantly employed in more lengthened comparisons and deductions of chemical investigation.

But while some of these objects of natural history are made useful by decomposing or making new compounds of them under the name of chemistry; others are turned to use in masses, and without destroying their texture, their physical powers or properties are made use of, under the name of mechanics, to abridge or facilitate human labour, to add a thousand fold to human force, and to the capacities of many of the senses. In the construction and uses of all these machines, and the few simple principles on which they are founded, what excitement is held out to curiosity, what gratification in the discovery of the powers and the means they afford! From every step in the intellectual progress, the pleasure of *success* is derived, of looking back and comparing our present with our past state of knowledge, the self-gratulation experienced on perceiving ourselves possessed of new powers, or of increased means of happiness; for no one wilfully makes use of power but as a means of happiness; to himself always; if wise, to himself as connected with his fellow-creatures.

But to the pleasures of perception, of memory, and judgment, to all others that may be styled merely personal pleasures, are not confined the motives to intellectual culture. *Social* motives are constantly present and are eminently powerful in all stages of the progress, but constantly increasing in strength with increasing

knowledge. These pleasures, all operating as motives, as natural rewards, are the pleasures of sympathy, the pleasures of intellectual intercourse, the pleasures of benevolence, or those arising from a contemplation of the benefits flowing from the knowledge already acquired or expected from future acquisitions of knowledge. In most young and ardent minds, will naturally be to be added to this list, the anticipation of contributing hereafter by discoveries in art or science to the further progress of knowledge, of human power and welfare.

The pleasures of sympathy prompting to the acquisition of knowledge, are those of the children towards each other, of the teachers towards the children, and of the parents and the community in general towards those who make the greatest progress or take the greatest pains in improving themselves. Neither children, teachers, parents, or the public, particularly when so wisely limited as that all shall know all, and have an influence on the conduct of all, can avoid feeling and exhibiting feelings of approbation or pleasure when a superior intellect, any more than when a superior article of a physical kind, is presented to them. A useful article of any sort must give more pleasure in its contemplation, let the causes leading to its usefulness be ever so necessary, than one less useful. This feeling must be perceived by the person possessing, or being the object that excited it, and must give him pleasure, though it were a mere unspoken recognition of the act of improvement. With particular force this principle, of the associations of sympathy, acts on children, all of whose early actions were swayed by it. There being no arbitrary punishments or rewards to divert sympathy from its proper channel, and to enlist it in opposition to improvement, it will under such circumstances and in such a community, where nothing but what is useful is taught, operate with a force hitherto unknown in education. With the useless pedantic jargon now taught in schools, who out of them, can sympathise?

The next natural social motive to improvement, are the pleasures of intellectual intercourse. In an education directed solely to what is useful, and what must of course interest by turns every member of the community, particularly in a community constituted like this, these pleasures of the pupils must be of every day's occurrence. Walking the fields, learning agricultural operations, the mineral or plant of the lesson selected, will be the mineral or plant of the garden, the orchard, the field; the chemical compound or the machine of the lesson, will be found illustrated in principle, if not in exact counterpart of resemblance, in the operations of manufacturing industry, to which the children will be equally trained. To ~~what~~ endless interest of conversation and improving little discussions, will not such coincidences give rise! how will labour be dignified! how will study be rendered familiar and attractive! These pleasures and motives to attention are not now enjoyed by children, from the utter want of interest, the absolute uselessness of almost all that is now taught them, as well as from the repulsive methods of teaching. But where all factitious rewards and punishments are altogether discarded from education, the teachers must study the nature of mind and of the human affections, must give exciting and pleasing food to the mind as well as to the body, and must thus depend upon the pleasures of intellectual intercourse experienced by the pupils, for increase of their anxiety to add to their stock of knowledge, the means of increasing these intellectual pleasures. Various charms will attend their conversations with their companions, their parents, all their adult friends surrounding them in the community; and by all will they be stimulated to new improvement, to increased curiosity for additional knowledge.

The next natural motive, of the social class, leading to intellectual improvement, is the benevolent contemplation of the benefits flowing, or to be expected from, the powers to be derived from increased knowledge. This pleasure

of contemplation, requiring some extent of view, frequently both a wide and a remote tracing of consequences, good and evil, and a balancing of these to ascertain the preponderance of good, is not calculated to act on the very young; and, though the most noble, is therefore deferred to the last of the natural rewards in education. Towards the end of education indeed, utility, comprehending all good, present and future, becomes the predominant motive to the acquisition of knowledge. The touchstone of morals, every pursuit is, with severe benignity, scrutinised by it. Long before the close, however, even at the very commencement of education, it operates, its force depending on the skill of the teacher. From the time that the first associations of infancy come to be examined and moral habits secured on the appropriate foundation of reason and interest, the *uses* of everything proposed to be learned, will be always pressing themselves into the minds and upon the lips of the pupils. The most simple and immediate only of these uses, can be first explained to children; but even these will be to them enough to implant the *principle* of utility, and with it that of benevolence, looking even into the interminable future. From the mere exercise of the understanding in tracing out the uses, the affections become enlisted in the pursuit; and what was first mere calculation, ends—from the association of fact, of the indissoluble union of each individual's interest with that of his fellow-creatures—in the exalted and delightful sentiment of benevolence. “What's the use of this?” Is there an intelligent child who has not at some early period of his education, asked this question, till repeated blows or despair of receiving any satisfactory answer, whether from the stupidity of the teacher, or the more frequent impossibility from the uselessness of the thing taught, arrest his inquiries, his curiosity, and benevolence, for ever? In the schools of these communities, on the contrary, under the natural system of useful, and nothing but useful tuition, tuition useful to the individual taught, not to make him or her

a passive slave to any other interest whatever; from the first moment such a gladdening question is asked, the progress of the pupil will be deemed secure. As his mind expands, he will be shown and will discover new uses, till the persuasion will spring up that no species of *real* knowledge can be useless, and that for every possible increase of knowledge, a use will some day be found.

Still another natural motive to intellectual exertion, arising and combined out of almost all the foregoing, is the desire on the part of the pupil of contributing, one day, to the progress of knowledge and human happiness, by discoveries in art, or science, or other intellectual pursuits. Who that has ever derived when young any pleasure from knowledge, does not recollect the frequent expansion of this wish in his mind, though, perhaps, from a mingled generosity and selfishness of motive, according to the training which he had previously received? With some young persons, under the name of literary ambition or emulation, it absorbs every other motive, and selfishness predominates in it. From these communities, as in their whole conduct, so in their plan of education, selfishness is banished. Ambition, or the love of mere power, for any other use than that of activity or promoting happiness, emulation, or a desire of seeing ourselves superior, and of course of seeing our fellow-creatures inferior to us, are both of them motives, whether natural or factitious (for 'tis only the *useful* natural motives that must be employed in education), which are inconsistent with the principles of these communities; the use of such motives being attended with preponderant mischief. Under the circumstances and the operation of motives hitherto detailed, such feelings and wishes as these would not arise in the pupils' minds. Power, superiority, they would value simply because they afforded the means of increasing happiness to themselves and others. From every leading act of their lives, the happiness of others would have been so associated in their minds with their own happiness, and reason and utility

would have so strengthened this association, that the pernicious ingredients, now necessarily mixed up with the young romantic wish for excellence and discovery, could with them have no place. The desire of emulating others, would be simply the desire of promoting as much happiness as those others had been the means of promoting; the desire of emulating always joined with admiration and love of those whose example is proposed for imitation. What we admire, we must wish to imitate: whatever appears to us morally excellent, we must, from the constitution of our nature, admire: to imitate, to do as much good, well—to do more, better: the double pleasure of the active exercise of the faculties and of benevolence, prompt the wish: once excited, and selfishness banished from it, who can set bounds to the wonders which, in communities where public opinion was all powerful, it would produce?

Hence, it is presumed, it appears, that there are an abundance of useful natural motives, surrounding the teacher who has the skill and the kindness to use them, for all the proper purposes of the education of youth; and that there is nothing in the nature of human motives, as respects the young any more than adults, inimical to the system of voluntary co-operation and equality of enjoyment.

From the foregoing sketch of matters to be taught in the commencement and earlier parts of education, let it not be inferred that these are the only matters: biography, history, moral and intellectual subjects of all useful species, the numerous applications of the physical sciences, and afterwards of both physical and mental, to the complicated operations and affairs of life, to the art of preserving health and avoiding disease, to comprehensive social regulations (always increasing in interest to the pupils in proportion to their extent) embracing whole districts and nations and families of nations; all these, everything really useful, that is to say, attended with preponderant good, balancing the time spent in education against the future appropria-

tion of the same quantity of time, as to its effect on the happiness of the whole life, will be assuredly taught in these schools, or a basis laid for their future development at the lectures given by some of the members of the community. To show the operation of natural motives, it was necessary to apply them to some branch of knowledge: and the first in order to be taught, the most interesting and the most simple, presented itself: the object was not, to give even a sketch of the course of education to be pursued.

It is not, in fact, in the management of the young that the difficulty of dispensing with factitious rewards and punishments, has been felt by those whose minds were any way enlarged, and dispositions kindly. Force and terror are now beginning to be generally disused by all but the most ignorant and brutal: the factitious motives retained by any who now lay claim to anything judicious in education, are limited to the arbitrary employment of, or additions to, the natural motives, as shame, forced idleness, emulation, &c. To show the injurious consequences of these, would be a useful task, but wandering too far from our immediate subject; enough if it have been shown that there are natural motives sufficient to render their employment unnecessary. 'Tis in the management of adults, that the great difficulty has been found. When vices, caused by the wretched circumstances which entangle men, run high, criminal laws interfere with their restraints, terrors, and physical pains, to stay the spreading of the evil. To dispense with these, was the difficulty; which is simply done by remodelling anti-social circumstances, by removing the temptations to vice. These removed, natural motives in abundance exist, as has been shown, to the practice of mutual beneficence.

But we have also to inquire under this section, "Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable—if not from the known motives that influence human conduct—from any of the physical circumstances by which men are

surrounded?" This part of the inquiry need not delay us long.

That numberless favourable situations for the establishment of such communities of mutual co-operation for the supply of all the necessities, and even comforts of life, are to be found in all inhabited parts of the globe, no person disputes; the objection is, that there are some spots, immense tracks of rugged mountains, barren sands, or otherwise unproductive soils, where numbers could not be congregated together, and, consequently, where this system could not supersede that of individual exertion, economy, and reward. Again, workmen in immense mines, navigators, could not practise all these arrangements. Suppose that one-tenth of all civilised nations were, from these and similar circumstances, debarred from enjoying, like the rest of the community, the benefits—supposing them to be ascertained benefits—of economical co-operation and expenditure, does it follow from thence that these benefits are not to be enjoyed by those within whose power they are placed? As well might it be said, that if all mankind cannot by any contrivance escape from any particular disease, as the consumption or the gout, no precautions whatever ought to be taken by the great mass of mankind against the approaches of such maladies. If diseases are bad, the less of them mankind have, though but by one-tenth, the better. If mutual co-operation, joint possession, and expenditure, are good, the more these blessings are diffused the better, though we may never be able to make them universal. Have the lovers of forced systems of insecurity hitherto acted on this principle? Have they ceased to accumulate wealth by all means in their power because they could not make their fellow-creatures rich? On the contrary, does not this enhance, to their diseased minds, the anti-social pleasures of their wealth? Is not the secret dread of seeing their fellow-creatures raised to an equality with themselves, one of the strongest reasons of their repugnance to a system

of equality, ever so voluntary? where everything is to be created; and where nothing is asked to be by them bestowed? Were this system, however, securing to the united labourers the entire use of the products of their labour, produced, possessed, and enjoyed in common, found to be practicable as well as beneficial by the great majority of society; the remuneration of the labour of the less fortunate few, who could not partake of these advantages, would be raised to the average, if not beyond the average, —as unpleasant occupations have even now an increase of wages,—of the physical comforts of those living in social co-operation. These intractable occupations would naturally be the quarry to which would soar those unquiet spirits, on whom no other incitement than inequality of wealth and adventure, could operate as a sufficient stimulus to exertion.

Another view presents itself. All those trades and manufactures, or expeditions, then, which could be undertaken by any of these stationary communities or by detachments from them, would be undertaken, not as now by one great capitalist and hundreds or thousands of ignorant, depraved, overworked slaves of law or institutions, but by joint stock companies of equals; and the results, particularly when fostered by the kindred spirit of the co-operating and co-enjoying communities, would be nearly as productive of equal happiness, as the united communities themselves.

Where a situation abounded in materials, particularly if bulky and difficult of carriage, and the soil was niggardly of its produce, the chief operations of such a community would doubtless be the working up of the bulky articles near at hand, getting a mere subsistence from their own immediate soil, and living chiefly by exchange. All the co-operators of such a community, however, though they possessed a mine, instead of an over-land manufacture, and worked therein alternately with agriculture, would nevertheless as much be joint possessors, labourers, and

enjoyers, as the communities possessed of the finest agricultural settlement. Nay, a community of mere miners who did not raise a day's work of their own food, but lived altogether by exchange, might do all their operations by joint labour, possession, and enjoyment, just like any other co-operating community; whether it would be wise to establish such a community without any agricultural labour, is another question.

As to the difference of latitude, the heat and cold of climates, and the different productions for food, or exchange, it is evident that none of these circumstances could make any difference in the principle of co-operation and enjoyment. Sugar, grapes, cotton, or tobacco, (if human beings remain long insane enough to throw away their labour on such a pernicious poison as the latter,) may be cultivated by joint labour, as well as oats, potatoes, and flax. In Van Dieman's Land, it could be adopted as well as on the banks of the Oronoco or the Neva. Wherever there are human beings, knowledge, and suitable land, nothing but despotism, or insecurity arising from some other cause, restraining the freedom of action from forming such communities, as in Russia, Turkey; or the political plundering of the fruits of their labour when produced, as everywhere but in the non-slave States of North America, could prevent their successful establishment. Mere geographical limits not inducing sterility, have no control over the formation of these communities. A society of watchmakers and agriculturists could be as readily formed on the plan in Switzerland, as a society of linen-weavers and agriculturists in Ireland. The influence of climate or productions, is absolutely nothing as to physical obstruction; as to prudential, yes; as, supposing the produce to be lead ore, a prudent community would not, for any possible consideration of profit, devote much of its labour to such occupations as mining, or smelting the lead.

At present in the most civilised and fully peopled communities, of whose internal arrangements we have any

accurate knowledge, those of Europe and North America—for respecting the internal economy of the half-civilised barbarians ruling over the millions of China, we have but mere rude outlines of knowledge—the quantity of good land and materials, or the facility of creating the materials is so great, so much more than necessary for the actual population *under the new arrangements*, that it is quite idle to talk of physical obstructions. If in one hundred, or one thousand, years, such obstructions should present themselves, the knowledge and foresight of such communities as will then exist, will doubtless be able to grapple with the evils, and reduce them to their smallest amount; or, more likely, precautionary measures would be adopted to prevent their approach. But how strange the caution to people in search of happiness, to warn them to resign the greatest happiness of the whole of their lives and those of their immediate descendants, lest peradventure their children's grandchildren might not be as happy as themselves!

We may dismiss, then, all notion of physical obstruction to be apprehended from the ultimate progression of the system, as mere idle speculations, not calculated, even if true, to produce any effect on the conduct of living men. To the progression towards improvement by means of individual exertion and reward, the very same objection of an ultimate obstruction to the progress might be made—every one sees how vain. The subject of population will not be overlooked in the next section.

SECTION V.

POPULAR OBJECTIONS TO THE SYSTEM OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY OF WEALTH.

In this section it was proposed to discuss the popular objections to the system of voluntary equality. We must endeavour to be brief; for if the reins were given to speculations on remote contingencies respecting a system

which includes all social arrangements and interests, and the nature of the human mind, which has its theory as well as its practice, the whole space of this inquiry would not afford scope for the discussion.

First, then, we will pass by the popular objections to the *theory* of the plan as that theory has been developed by Mr. Owen, because though the theory were found here and there defective, whether in an economical, political, or intellectual point of view, it would no way affect the practical arrangements and ascertained facts; it would prove only that the general conclusions were not accurately deduced from these or other facts. Thus, for instance, Mr. Owen advocates the doctrine of what has been called "philosophical necessity," and says, that "the character of man is formed by the circumstances surrounding and acting upon him," that "his character, opinions, &c., are formed *for* him and not *by* him;" and as a consequence, that "men may be trained to anything good or evil consistent with their organisation." These propositions, as understood and explained by Mr. Owen, appear to be quite just. Many object because they misapprehend the meaning; others because they cannot part with early associations about free-will (*i.e.*, a power of acting or forming a volition without motive, or contrary to the strongest motive), as existing in point of fact, or as justifying a being, whom they style benevolent, in tormenting without object,—when all benefit from example would have ceased,—the creatures he made. Discussions like these, so delicate, and so bordering on theological reveries, cannot be indispensable preliminaries to rational practical arrangements. Let men theorise as they may about the idle power of acting without motive, they all admit that this power is seldom exercised, and that man's conduct is in point of fact *very much* influenced by the circumstances in which he is placed. They do not recollect that the immediately preceding state of every man's mind is one of the most influential of the circumstances, which, co-operating

with those from without, produce his immediate subsequent conduct.

Now, be these circumstances as they may ; let men be supposed to possess ever so despotic a power over their wills, every one admits that it is very seldom they are so foolish as to exercise this power. in opposition to their perceived and acknowledged interests. So much conceded, affords a basis for entering at once into an examination of the popular objections to the practical arrangements. These objections may be roughly classed under the names of moral, economical, and political ; few of them perhaps will be found strictly confined to any one of these heads ; but, for the sake of order, let them be considered according to that characteristic which is the most apparent.

To begin with the objections of a moral nature—it is said, that “ the arrangements for voluntary equality are founded in *restraint* ; that though they may be well adapted to the wretched, who for the sake of subsistence would or must submit to such restraints, yet none above the pressure of want would, for any pecuniary consideration, submit to them.”

Were this objection, so repugnant to the principles advocated in the first chapter, nay through the whole of this work, well founded, the plan of pretended voluntary equality must be at once dismissed ; but the fact is, that it is founded altogether on an ignorance of the subject.

The arrangements for mutual co-operation and voluntary equality, are capable of different modifications. Where the community is so poor as to be under the necessity of borrowing the money to erect their houses, to buy their land and stock, no doubt they must be under such restraints and liable to such conditions, as to the repayment of the capital borrowed, as any other individual or individuals would be, entering into voluntary arrangements to repay capital out of the products of labour. According to the respective knowledge and benevolence of those with whom they contract, the terms of repayment

and the quantum of control given to the capitalists for the security of their capital, will be more or less onerous to the borrowers. In these engagements, however, they have the general protection of the laws of the land respecting all contracts; and if they give a power of interference beyond the law, it is no longer binding on them than while they find it their interest to obey. To simplify the matter, we shall dismiss all those cases where capitalists have any sort of control in the internal affairs of the community, and then compare the restraints of ordinary life with individual exertion, to the restraints of the individual members of such a community, owners of their own establishment.

In entering these communities and leaving them, there is perfect freedom of action. Can the same be said as to the employments of ordinary life, whether singly conducted or in partnership? The individual working for himself, is mostly controlled by the situation in which he was born, and the establishments to which he succeeds, and in which he must continue under pain of a great pecuniary loss. If in partnership, the individual cannot leave it without the consent of his partner. But in these communities, no consent of partners is necessary; for the stock and all the operations are on so large a scale, that the withdrawing of any individual member with his share thereof, could produce no effect on the prosperity of the whole; there would be therefore no need to insist on the consent of the community (as in small private partnerships where the whole concern might be deranged by the withdrawing of one partner and his capital) to the withdrawing of any individual members. There would be absolutely no loss of capital from a change of individual employments; no perceptible inconvenience to the individual or the community. This gives such a facility of changing abode and occupation, as must be ever incompatible with individual arrangements without great attendant sacrifices; if practicable at any sacrifice. So far, then, the restraint

is clearly and enormously on the side of individual exertion. These communities remove an immense burden of restraint; they enable all their members, without loss of capital to any one, without loss of time, to change their abode, society, and mode of life. Supposing the removal to be to another distant community on the same principle of co-operation but of dissimilar occupations and physical circumstances, restraint on removal is not only taken away, but all risk of success in the new occupations is removed, as it was in the establishment left. In fact, if these establishments were numerous and in different places, changes of abode and occupation, instead of being, as now, some of the most serious events of life, would be mere excursions or experiments of pleasure, either by selling out of one and buying into another, or by simply exchanging. Nor would there be any need of the formality of the assent of the two communities or of either of them, to sanction these exchanges of abode and co-operation. The variety would be useful and pleasant to each community, and no evil could arise from this gratification of individual inclination; if the advantages of the two communities were not nearly equal, exchanges would not be made; and although the intrusion of an ordinary individual from general society without the consent of the community, *might* be productive of evil, yet the exchange of an associate from a similar community accustomed to and approving of the same plan of life, could not by possibility produce any evil to an extensive community to counterbalance the evil of restraint on its individual members. On the contrary, nothing could be more useful for every community than these voluntary individual exchanges; by means of them, all the uncongenial members of every community would be gradually withdrawing to societies more attractive to them; and the result of this individual exchange and constant power of choice, would be to maintain the utmost possible cordiality and unanimity between the members of every community,

held together not only by their general interest as co-operators, but by their particular attachment as friends. These exchanges would operate as safety-valves to every community for the retiring of every irritating and irritated member, and for the attraction of members whose views and pursuits would harmonise with those of their new associates.

What species of restraints remain to be feared in communities, self-governed, like these? Vexatious internal regulations, prescribing times, and meals, and rest, and labour, and mode of dress, and all the details of life, almost the whole interest of which arises from their voluntariness? No restraint of this, or of any sort, will be imposed upon the community, that is not imposed by their own hands. A restraint self-imposed, a voluntary restraint, is a contradiction in terms. The majority may be ill-formed and may judge erroneously, but they can lay no burden in the nature of a restraint upon themselves; nor will any just and rational men, forming a majority, impose any restraint on even the smallest minority, except in those rare cases in which the interests or the gratification of the majority and the minority are clearly incompatible with each other. The minority, it is true, may be dissatisfied; and may likewise be in the right. By what human contrivance can this evil be remedied, as long as men are permitted the exercise of their reasoning powers? Where has the evil been reduced to so narrow a compass as here? First, voluntary entrance into the community; then perfect freedom of departure, accompanied with no loss, dependent on the permission or assent of no one, affording the easy means to ever so small a minority to withdraw from the influence of regulations, which they may deem restraints and unwise, if they deem the effort hopeless of convincing the community of the undesirableness of such regulations. But why should a rational man despair of making their interest apparent; amongst a community of co-operating friends? Is it possible, on calm discussion, by writing

and speaking, in public and private, where no sinister pecuniary interest can exist to warp the judgment, that right conclusions should not be ultimately admitted and adopted, by men seeking nothing but their own happiness? where all the data for forming a correct judgment and the means of proof by experiment, are in their power? To talk of restraints under such circumstances, is using a language which, if applied to any other communities, would imply the utmost extent of freedom.

Suppose, then, the worst, suppose the majority of a community so unreasonable as to pass, or to permit their committee to pass, such a regulation as that all men should wear their beards, or, like Peter of Russia, that no man should wear his beard, that no person should dance, or play on a musical instrument, or write or recite a line of poetry? Where are the *sanctions* to enforce these restraints? Where are the rewards or punishments to cause their observance? We have seen long ago that all factitious rewards and punishments are rejected from the government of these communities, and that many even of those, usually esteemed natural rewards and punishments, are also rejected as inducing preponderant evil. Where is the penalty, then, for the breach of these dreaded restraints? where are the guards of Peter to cut off the beards and hew down the rebellious? The only guards, the only enforcing power is *public opinion*, the public opinion of the community. If this public opinion be formed of a very small majority, its force will be weak; the beards, or the dance, or the music, will be seen or heard notwithstanding such feeble public opinion; and the expression of it will but give rise to friendly discussions, which will ultimately establish through the community the innocence or the injurious tendency of beards, dancing, or music. Thus, public opinion being the only sanction, over and above every one's view of his own interest, of these restraints; a mere majority will gain little more by enacting them than to bring them forward, as matters of

doubtful utility, for the consideration of the community. But as this can be done in the ordinary way of social intercourse, it will be quite superfluous to express any public opinion on the subject until the public mind of almost the whole of the community is formed. The expression of the opinion of the majority thus formed, may be useful, as ascertaining the fact of its tendency, and by necessary consequence rendering it imperative on those who act in opposition to it, to reconsider the reasons on which their conduct is founded, to weigh all the consequences of such actions.

Who now so weak as to dread such restraints?—restraints self-imposed, —restraints enforced by the perception of their utility alone, as announced by the expression of public opinion?—restraints removable, as soon as their injurious tendency can be shown—restraints from which, though there be but a single dissentient voice, the owner of that voice may remove without loss, without requiring the assent of any other human being but his own?

Shall we, after all, be told that the vital objection is to this sanction itself, to the very restraint of public opinion, to the tyrannic exercise of that power before which even laws and institutions are compelled to bend, which penetrates all the chambers of the mind, and places there the eye of man's fellow-creature and equal, scrutinising his motives and prescribing his actions? Shall we be told that the charm of independence consists, not only in not being dictated to, but in not being even observed or judged of—that the prying curiosity and the opinions of others would root out all our delicate pleasures—pleasures which retire from the public gaze, from the public conversation and scandal still more?

There is no doubt of the possibility of the public opinion of one of these, like any other community or society, great or small, being altogether misdirected; but under the original and fundamental stipulation for freedom of opinion on every possible subject, all real evils from this

source are obviated. Where freedom of discussion exists, and sinister interests are removed, it is impossible that public opinion should continue long or very injuriously misdirected. 'Tis sinister interest and the force and fraud by it engendered, that corrupt and brutalise public opinion. The very assent to such arrangements and principles as those on which these communities are founded, indicates such a state of mind, on the part of the co-operators, as to render quite impossible any gross misapplication of the public or popular sanction. Even such moral impossibilities, however, are guarded against by the power of withdrawing. Little, indeed, is the danger that the public opinion of such communities would be found revolting to the intellectual or moral feelings of its most enlightened members; but great, very great, is the probability, that such enlightened members would sway, to the full extent of their intellectual and moral powers, the march of that public opinion. Never was theatre of rational and sentient beings so well prepared for the diffusion of truth. In no community have the wise and good ever enjoyed such ample opportunity of directing aright public opinion. From the wise and good, therefore, will not proceed the objection of submitting to its gentle, its salutary control.

But there are other classes of persons. There are those who are neither wise nor good; whose characters have been so moulded by the circumstances through which they have passed, to acts injurious,—on a calm review of all their consequences,—to their own happiness, that they dread the clash of public opinion, anticipating its condemnation, as applied to gambling, drunkenness, enervating debauchery, insolence, idleness, and similar qualities. No doubt the restraints of enlightened public opinion, where all would know all, would to such men be most galling; and the more enlightened, the more benevolent, the more galling. Utter concealment in the midst of the hundreds of thousands of an overgrown metropolis, would better suit the habits of such men. If prudent, they would not

join such communities if not determined to reconsider the tendency of their habits, and to trust themselves to circumstances which would gradually remove them. If wedded to any such habits as the above, they could not inflict a greater evil on such a community than by associating themselves with it. With such characters, an industrious rational community would be as ill assorted, as they would be with the community. They are not fit materials out of which such a structure could be raised. If their habits were not to be parted with, they could not long remain attached to such communities; better, therefore, never to join them. It is admitted that such a community would lose the co-operation of all such characters as dreaded the exercise of public opinion; but such loss would be an advantage to such a community.

As to minor private uninfluential actions, and private sympathies, that only pass from eye to eye, is it to be believed that the majority of a community founded on the absolute freedom of private opinion, would turn jailors and inquisitors of themselves, would pry for their mutual misery into each other's secrecies and retirements, and find out a malicious pleasure in blasting happiness uninjurious to others, by dragging it into publicity and encompassing it with slander? This abuse of the influence of public opinion will not take place, simply because it never can be the interest of the majority that it should take place. The majority cannot be formed of the old, the unfeeling, the morose. The majority must be composed of those—the middle-aged—who will cherish every possible pleasure, unattended with preponderant evil; whose influence will establish such a public opinion of mutual kindness and forbearance, as will make slander and prying curiosity unknown in the community. Property belonging to all in common, and opinion free, what is to be gained by slander or molesting other persons' enjoyments?

Compare, now, the restraints of these free communities with those which prevail in general society—the restraints

of trade, the restraints of law, the restraints of public opinion, the restraints of superstition, the restraints of political power by means of public plunder, and it will be seen, that the great preponderance of evil, arising from restraints, is with society as at present. We have not space to make the comparison in detail, under each of their separate heads; but, by way of illustration, will take the first,—the “restraints of trade.”

In trades, the labourers of general society, without tools, materials, or land to enable them to work, not only under restraint, but absolute dependence to those who have contrived to lay hold of all these means of production, with the thousand expedients of insecurity by which capitalists extract labour and life from the ignorant and wretched, are as complete automatons, by the operation of these expedients, though by themselves frequently unseen, as the little figures dressed like men exhibited to cheat the vulgar with the appearance of voluntary motion. So, in general society, is the productive labourer cheated with the appearances of voluntary action. The restraints of insecurity, he is taught to look upon as the changes of the seasons, or the dogmas of his creed: no choice with respect to these is left to him. But submitting to all these, he is then told he may change his abode, he may work or not work, may take or refuse the wages doled out to him! Truly so; but what is the consequence if he change his abode, or refuse to work at the prescribed wages? He starves. Let him go where he will, the same restraints await him. Such is the hypocritical freedom from restraint, of systems of insecurity! A prey to the operation of the thousand unseen causes that annihilate the demand for the only article he knows how to work at, what can he do when this gentle restraint arrives? He has the option of starving, thieving, or begging, or in some places of becoming a pauper. But take the case of the most fortunate of the productive labourers, to whom it has never happened to want such employment and remu-

neration as systems of insecurity afford. Is there one in a thousand of such who has knowledge and curiosity sufficient to prompt him to wish to visit neighbouring cities or counties, to see the manners or productions of other places? If so fortunate as to get regular employment, they stay at home gladly, and become attached to their home. 'Tis want, want of employ, *necessity*, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand, that compels them to leave their homes. How very absurd, then, to talk of the freedom from restraint of such beings, and to contrast it with the real freedom from restraint to be enjoyed by every individual of a community of mutual co-operation, joint possessors of all things requisite to make the whole of the products of their labour (excepting always that which is seized by political power) their own ! From all commercial and manufacturing restraints, and from some of the most galling of those of taxation, these communities, possessing from the first all their own capital, free themselves by their voluntary mutual concession of the power to over-reach and oppress each other, by the very act of their mutual co-operation and joint possession. No masters are, there, restraining apprentices ; no tradesmen restraining the uninitiated, unless by seven years or corporation freedom, from following their craft ; no capitalists restraining wages by possession of the tools, materials, clothes, food, and house of the labourer, and superadding to these the absolute forcible fixation of wages ; no imprisonings, whippings, and other torturing of human beings, to compel them to work for this pittance ; no combinations of masters, and counter-combinations and conspiracies of workmen, restraining and tormenting each other ; no dread of worse than restraints from failure of employers, or want of demand ; no restraints of trade, no regulations whatever but such as are self-imposed, with a view to some preponderant benefit to be enjoyed by the individual members of the community, not by any abstract thing called the public good, and meaning generally the supposed

private interest of a few leading men. But individuals of these communities, from their superior information, may wish to travel to acquire knowledge and verify what they have read. What follows? If the community think that more happiness is to be gained by travelling,—each in his turn, one month, or a longer or shorter proportion than a twelfth of their time, every year,—than by devoting that time to the increase by labour, muscular or mental, of the comforts and conveniences of life and domestic enjoyments, where is the restraint to prevent them from indulging in such gratifications? They have only to will it, and it is done. No fear, from the absence of the master's eye, that the stock and trade left will become deranged. The few absentees from such communities, can never derange the operations or risk the loss of the stock; the establishment proceeds in its regular course, uninfluenced by such temporary absence, and guided by intelligence and skill equal to what has departed from it. Who, on the contrary, does not see that the physical and moral restraints on the locomotive powers of the productive labourers, not to speak of tradesmen and even many capitalists, of general society, are such that to speak of their travelling for information or curiosity, would be looked upon as a species of insane ignorance of the world? Again, as to the length of a day's labour, and the nature of his occupation, the custom of the place condemns the machine of ordinary society to labour or pine; but in these communities no restraint whatever, physical or moral, compels to one hour's more labour or to any species of employment which the majority may deem injurious to their health, or productive of any other preponderant evil. 'Tis idle to proceed; there can be no comparison made between the restraints of the industrious of general society and those of these communities; the life of the one is a net-work of artificial restraint; they cannot stretch forth their hand without being entangled in it; the life of the other is freed from almost every other restraint but

that of nature, which renders it necessary to produce in order to enjoy.

The next popular objection in point of importance, of a moral nature, against the system of voluntary equality by joint possession, labour, and enjoyment, is the ill-grounded fear, that "it would, by withdrawing the stimulus of individual reward, annihilate, or very much lessen the chances of, genius, exalted talents and exertions, and thus limit the career of human improvement and happiness, to the abundant gratification of mere animal wants."

This objection has some truth, and some error in it. As far as it is true, the talents and exertions it would repress, ought, for the happiness of humanity, to be repressed:—as far as it is false, the talents and exertions it would not repress, but would stimulate, are all those the development of which is useful for human happiness.

No error is more common, than to confound individual reward in general, with individual reward of a pecuniary nature, or of the matter of wealth. All enjoyment must be individual enjoyment; all motives to produce individual action must be brought home to the individual to be acted upon; the pleasure of seeing others happy is as much an individual pleasure, as the pleasure of eating a pineapple or other favourite fruit; it is one of the individual rewards which the constitution of our nature and surrounding circumstances have attached to the cultivation and exercise of benevolence, and serves as an individual natural motive to the practice of this first of the virtues. But why should a man practise this virtue of benevolence, called, when put into action, beneficence? For no other possible reason than that it is clearly his individual interest to practise it. His individual pecuniary interest? Most generally, but not necessarily so. His individual interest on the balance of chances of happiness from all possible sources, immediate and remote? Undoubtedly,

yes. But can we say, because it is not a man's individual *pecuniary* interest in a particular case to be benevolent, that he has therefore no individual interest,—or, in other words, no interest at all, whether of an earthly nature or to be enjoyed in ever so many millions of years,—to be benevolent? If so, man must act without motive: for a motive not individual is to him no motive: a social motive, if you please, and not a selfish motive; but, selfish or social, it must be *individual*—must come home to the real or supposed interest of the agent, or he cannot act.

Having briefly exposed, in the last section, the motives to human exertion, the desire to obtain the pleasures of the senses and appetites, external and internal, those derived from the active use of the muscular system, from the active use of the cerebral or intellectual structure, from sympathy and from all the endless combinations and modifications of which these are susceptible—it is enough to refer to these to point out the entire fallacy of the assumption and inference, that all individual motives being centred in those of wealth, no stimulus to high exertion can remain when these are removed. Wealth is only a means of acquiring some of these advantages; and, in society as now constituted, is much more efficient than it ought to be for the acquisition of them.

But without making a parade of the motives that, in these communities, would call forth the exertion of every useful, of every exalted talent, as well as virtue, the motives that absolutely produce, at the present moment, the most exalted of these qualities, will demonstrate the fallacy of the objection. Once raised above the reach of want—and in the co-operating communities every one would be so raised—the compounded motives that lead to superior exertions and excellence in intellectual pursuits, in actions of great difficulty, whether useful or pernicious, are, the pleasures of action, muscular or intellectual, of the pursuit, the pleasures of mere power, the pleasures of wealth as a mere source of distinction, the pleasures of

sympathy as expressed by simple gesture, by approbation, by consent, by conviction, by admiration, the pleasures of benevolence, or of the contemplation of the happiness—the real advantages of any sort—expected from the exertions in question.

The use of some of these motives leads to unmixed good, of some to evil, of most to a mixture of good and evil. The pleasures of exertion, muscular, mental, or both, in the pursuit, the pleasures of benevolence, the pleasures of sympathy justly proportioned to the exercise of talent and beneficence: all these motives do now usefully prompt to the most energetic exertions in general society; and their operation, by the increased force of public opinion, and the universal diffusion of real knowledge, would, in the co-operating communities, be a hundred-fold increased. The love of mere power, for the sake of influencing the actions of others, without any regard to benevolence; and the love of wealth, for the mere sake of the distinction it would confer, without regard to the substantial use of the articles of which it is composed, could scarcely exist amongst the associated communities; nor, even in general society, are these motives often productive of useful exertions. Under the name of ambition and avarice, they lead to an immense preponderance of mischief. There are minor occasional motives, such as love, hatred, jealousy, revenge, envy, &c., which sometimes lead to energetic exertions, but are too limited in their sphere of operation to be noticed here. The motives which produce useful energy of thought and action exist in greater force in the associated communities than in general society; the motives which only occasionally do good, but which lead in general to preponderant evil, are, in these communities, cleared of their pernicious accompaniments, and rendered instrumental to the higher motives of benevolence, sympathy, and the pleasures of exertion, or activity.

It is a fact, as certain and as pleasing as it is important,

that almost all the useful of the higher attainments and discoveries of men, in science and action, have been produced by the operation of the better motives; while almost all pernicious activity has been engendered by the love of mere power, or mere wealth, and occasional ill-regulated passions. Look to conquerors, statesmen, priests, lawyers, privileged classes of every species; avarice and ambition, love of mere power, love of mere wealth, have been their almost exclusive motives to the most persevering and difficult exertions. But look to all those, the discoverers of physical and moral truth, men of genius in the fine arts as well as in mechanical operations, and you will find the great majority of them, particularly the most illustrious amongst them, either but partially swayed by such injurious motives, or raised entirely above them, and under the sole influence of the more useful springs to action. From Homer to Milton, Shakspeare, and Barry, in the fine arts; from Epaminondas to Washington (and almost every succeeding American President), and Bolivar, in patriotic exertion; from Anaxagoras to Galileo, Lavosier, and Priestley, in physics; from Epicurus and Socrates to the founder of the principle of utility, or the proposer of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation in morals;—the men who have been the most ardent and successful in useful discovery and exertion, have not only been almost exclusively governed by the useful motives, but have persevered in opposition to the frowns of power and the risk of want, even braving persecution. Of the men of genius now living, who devote all the exertions of their lives to moral and physical improvement, by writing and action, perhaps the greater part suffer loss, both in wealth and power, for the love of their ruling pursuit; demonstrating the utter ignorance of the human mind of those who assert that high intellectual exertion depends for its excitement on such motives as avarice or ambition. Although those who have no extraneous means of support must live by their exertions, it does not follow that the love of the wealth

necessary for their support was the influential motive to their higher exertions ; because they could in general gain more wealth by other less toilsome means. In general, where mere love of wealth has been the influential motive with men of talent, it has brought down their exertions to the comparative grossness of the parent motive. To gain renown, that is to say, the sympathy and the consenting judgment of their fellow-creatures now living, or even to anticipate the sympathies of future generations, is, at this present hour, in general society, a sufficient motive with numbers, to devote not only their whole time and exertions, but also their wealth (by whatever means acquired), to intellectual and other pursuits connected with human improvement ; the love of activity animates others ; the desire of increasing and diffusing happiness many more. These three motives, in various ways compounded and modified, have actually produced, and are now producing, the greater part of the higher useful intellectual and moral exertions amongst men ; those, not rich, exerting themselves from such motives, must include the means of living in their remuneration ; but it does not follow that the desire of obtaining those means, was the inspiring motive to those higher exertions. It is doubtful whether, in almost any well-authenticated case, the mere love of wealth, for its palpable pleasures or distinctions, or both, has been the sole motive to any really useful exertions of genius, in writing or action ; so also of the mere love of power ; they have led men to difficult, to splendid exertions, but to most pernicious exertions, which have been the curse of their fellow-creatures' happiness always, and mostly of their own.

In general society, 'tis only a few, the rich, that are above the reach of want, and permitted to come under the possible influence of these higher motives ; but even these, from their education and habits, such motives can seldom reach. Their wealth also, from the caprices and frauds of political power and of the various expedients of insecurity, is always in danger ; so that few have the opportunity,

and still fewer the inclination, of resigning themselves to the influence of these motives, and engaging in the useful exertions to which they would lead. Almost all the higher intellectual exertions of society are now perverted from useful general objects to the pursuits of selfish individual gain ; and the highest powers are prostituted, in the race of envy and strife, to stand foremost in the acquisition of wealth as a source of distinction ; so that the comparatively few, who, from useful motives, pursue useful objects, are by the general herd looked upon as unaccountable beings, fools to their own interest ; the objectors having never felt any other interest but that of a pecuniary nature.

In the co-operating communities, all these circumstances would be reversed. There, *all* are raised above the reach of want ; there, the pursuit of wealth as a mere source of distinction, or for any other purpose than the rational one of enjoying its products, cannot exist ; there, all the young are equally educated in all really useful knowledge and good habits ; there, all have leisure for intellectual pursuits ; there, public opinion is steadily and usefully operative, and always ready to reward with its sympathy and gratitude even the unsuccessful efforts of him who labours by rare and difficult exertions to increase the common stock of happiness ; there, will operate most strongly the desire of benefiting general society, of benefiting all of the family of mankind ; there, the paths of avarice and ambition are blocked up ; there, are no paths left for the development of exalted talents and exertions, but such as are useful to the agent and his fellow-creatures ; there, are no constantly operating sources of distraction to bribe or force all exalted talent and exertion into the eternal career of competition for endless heaps of individual wealth ; there, all the capabilities of the community are kept under a species of constant requisition, by the means of instruction presented equally to all, so that no peculiarity of talent can fail of being called forth.

Can there be, then, any sort of comparison as to the

quantity of the higher species of talent and exertion, of *the useful class*, to be expected in these communities and in general society? for it is freely admitted, that for those high qualities and actions vulgarly called great, no motive will, in the co-operating communities, be to be found.

“Of the merely useful class it may be,” continues an objector; “on utility these communities are founded: to mere useful objects will their exertions be directed. But is human exertion to stop there?—what becomes of the *ornamental*? painting, sculpture, music, poetry, eloquence? Are these to be abandoned as useless?—what time is left for such refined pursuits? how, under the co-operating arrangements, can they be cultivated? Are these amongst the useless or the pernicious pursuits?”

The fact with respect to these secondary or lighter pleasures, called ornamental or those of taste, seems to be, that, in the co-operating communities, the capacity and the inclination of deriving pleasure from them, will be diffused to the utmost extent; that is to say, will be shared by all the members of the community; whereas, in society at large, it is not one individual in five hundred, who has the inclination, the time, or the means of pursuing or enjoying these lighter pleasures.

Doubtless, in as far as any of these communities may, on a rational estimate of the time and effort requisite to enjoy the more delicate pleasures of the fine arts, deem them productive of preponderant happiness over any other way of expending the same time and effort, they will be pursued. Beyond this point, 'tis folly, not wisdom, to pursue them. The enthusiast for excellence in any of these, will here be under the most favourable circumstances for the development of his peculiar talent; not, as in general society, seeking out patrons, and a prey to want; but here, a good general education having laid the basis for all real excellence, half-a-dozen leisure hours every day being at his disposal, as soon as a tendency to excellence is discovered in painting, in poetry, in sculpture,

in music, would it not be equally the interest of the community and his own, that he should devote even some, or the whole, of his ordinary working hours to his peculiar talent? Is his talent, painting, sculpture, music, poetry? he ornaments the community's buildings and grounds, or amuses their ears or minds with the products of his art. *at the cost of ordinary labour*,—not, as now, at the cost of one hundred times ordinary labour. The reward of excellence, sympathy in the increased pleasures of his friends, he obtains. Does he wish to *sell* his talents to general society, he has but to leave the community, either by selling his share to the community itself or to any other purchaser; thus acquiring a stock for immediate support. If he be animated with the flame of real genius guided by benevolence, he will not leave the community, but attract to it the additional admiration of those who set a rational value on ornamental pursuits, and teach the proud possessors of specimens of the ornamental arts, what this real value is. Music, all will more or less learn, as an accessory amusement in the course of education. Drawing will be an instrument of education, impressing more strongly on the mind, objects of nature and art, their qualities and uses, and varying mental with muscular exertion. The only useful part of poetry, that which justly describes human feelings and actions and objects of nature and art, surrounding them all with useful, endearing, or energetic, associations, may here be pursued;—pursued with all the ardour with which nature and truth inspire young minds: but to these—to nature and truth—will poetry in such a community be ever subordinate.

The delicate pleasures of the fine arts thus disposed of, shall we be frightened with an anticipation of a dull uniformity of character? Dulness, it need not be said, is in these communities of free inquiry impossible, till all the facts of nature, and the command of all her energies, shall have been explored and mastered. *Then*, if the

mere use of all these mighty means of happiness, acting on the various, and perhaps improved, nervous susceptibilities of our organisation, be not sufficient to ward off dullness, such communities must be satisfied to be dull. To uniformity they must also plead guilty, if to be all intelligent, moral, and happy, be to be uniform. Variety of characters and incidents in ordinary life, and the tumultuous excitements of society, arise from two sources; from the mixture of the depraved and the wretched on the one hand with the general mass, and on the other from the mixture of the enlightened and good. That part of the variety and stirring excitement, which arises from the admixture of vices and crimes, the co-operating communities certainly cannot enjoy. Better to be dull, than to be excited by the hearing and seeing of vices and misery. Thieving cannot exist, where every one owns everything, where every want is supplied, and where, of course, there is nothing to steal; falsehoods and perjuries cannot exist where nothing can be gained by practising them; civil strifes and contentions cannot exist about property, where there are no individual possessions: where none are in want, assaults and murders cannot take place to extort the necessities of life, nor will such occupations as those of highway robbers, shop-lifters, &c., exist. Hence the high excitements of fear, of violence, and fraud on the one side, and on the other of tormenting and life-destroying punishments at public executions; hence the high excitements from the gentlemanly reverses of gamblers, from the after-pangs of drunken midnight debauch, the suicides that so beautifully vary the terminations of human existence, will be unknown. Almost all the lofty excitements to vigilance of conduct arising from these, and from crimes and vices like these, will cease; and the uniformity of enjoyment, morality, and happiness, arising from the cessation of crimes and vices, must be borne, though such a state should appear dull. But as it is allowed that a state of non-excitement cannot be to sentient creatures a state of happiness, these commu-

nities will be impelled, in order to withdraw themselves from the monotony of inorganic existence, from mere freedom from evil, to seek out for some exciting causes, over and above the supply of their physical wants, and the amusement and interest of their daily occupations. These will be found in a ten-fold or a hundred-fold increase of all those excitements of pleasing enthusiasm, which the general pursuit of science, art, and beneficence, cannot fail to produce. Not an improvement in moral or physical science, that will not give more general interest throughout all these communities of well-informed men, than the announcement of wholesale robberies and murders under the name of war and glory, now produce in general society. But the feelings excited, how different in their nature and effects! The wide wish of benevolence will dilate from the expanded foreheads of such communities over the interests, the affairs, of all nations; from the contest of mutual destruction, their thoughts will be directed to the emulation of mutual good. Whatever social regulation, agricultural or mechanical improvement, have been anywhere made; whatever casualties or natural phenomena occur over the globe, will be, at meals, at labour, as well as at hours of leisure, the means of constantly-recurring excitements to such communities, while man and nature exist; because there are none of those things which, by the equal opportunities of common enjoyment, will not be brought immediately home to the interest of every individual. The differences of the nervous, as well as the muscular and organic systems of individuals, will ensure, under the rule of free inquiry, and the thence resulting eternal progress in knowledge, all the freshness of originality, as well as individuality, of character, which is necessary for individual personal excitement. Add to these, the affections of friendship and love, where these feelings can neither be bought, nor sold, nor feigned, nor entered into, nor bound together by mercenary motives; and it will be found that while in these communities almost

all sources of painful excitement, leading to preponderant mischief, are excluded, the sources of pleasurable excitement of the highest class, and leading always to preponderant good, are beyond calculation increased.

The two popular objections to the proposed system of voluntary co-operation, which have been discussed—the dread of restraints, and the dread of uniformity of character—are the only ones of a *moral* nature which appeared of that importance to call for particular notice here. The popular objections of an *economical* nature next claim our attention.

It is said, “that the establishment of these co-operating communities would not root out the principle of competition, nor the consequent injurious depression of wages; but would shift the competition from individual labourers to individual communities; that, as these communities increased, they would vie with each other in the sale of their surplus produce, as individuals do now, and in the same way bring down the remuneration of their labour; that competition in dress, in other comforts, and even in luxuries, would spring up between these rival communities; that wealth, instead of being pursued and hoarded by private individuals, would be as keenly contended for by these mutually jealous corporate aggregates of individuals.”

This objection proceeds on the admission of by far the greater proportion of the benefits expected from the system of mutual co-operation. All the clashing of interests, and the crimes and vices to which they give rise, between the individual members of the communities, cease; the advantages of the increased productiveness of labour are enjoyed by all, in increased comforts and increased leisure, disposable to other sources of happiness; and all the facilities for education and instruction remain. Nor are these blessings to be lessened until the communities become so numerous as to begin to supersede the present mode of production by individual competition. It would appear, therefore, that an evil so remote, and extending to so small

a portion of the system, might be left to find its cure by means of expedients, which the increasing wisdom excited by the new institutions would induce. To fling away an immense mass of good, because a small portion of the evils of our present institutions must, after all our efforts, remain attached to it, would not appear to be wise. Is it any way probable, however, that these evils would take place?

All the individual members of these communities being essentially capitalists as well as labourers, and labourers as well as capitalists, the one character would merge in that of the other, and in all transactions the greater interest, that of the labourer, would preponderate. The co-operating communities have, each of them, a mass of surplus produce to dispose of; but under what interest do they dispose of it, and to what species of customers? They dispose of it as labourers who have produced it, not to mere capitalists, but to other communities, labourers (as well as capitalists) like themselves. Why should these communities of capitalist-labourers wish to undersell each other, further than as new processes had enabled them to produce with less labour? Is it their interest to undersell? Evidently not. All underselling is a sacrifice of produce—of the means of happiness; and will not take place if some stronger interest do not come in the way to compel it. Under the expedients of insecurity, that stronger interest has place; necessity forces the producers to the sacrifice, to a sacrifice never voluntarily made, but by the lovers of insecurity ignorantly or hypocritically styled voluntary. This necessity of the labourers underselling the produce of their labour, arises from the higher necessity of continuing existence, though in a state of depression. Under mutual co-operation, where could such necessity be found? Neither of the communities exchanging, is under any necessity, for the support of existence, to sell: the very first object of their mutual co-operation, is to procure an abundance of food and the other necessities of life. Where is

the motive then, where is the necessity, for a sacrifice of their surplus produce for any other articles produced by less labour than they expended in that produce? If on such terms they cannot exchange, what is to prevent them from making the article immediately themselves, instead of anything to be exchanged for it; or, from making a substitute for it? or, from doing without it, and directing that portion of their labour into a channel entirely new? It is clear that the general exchanges of the co-operating communities with each other, would not tend to the competition of underselling, so contrary to their interest, and demanded by no superior necessity, but to a demand of a just equivalent of labour for labour, and no more. Why wish to procure in exchange from another co-operating community of kindred producers, more of an article wanted than could be made by a quantity of labour, equal to that which they expended on their own produce offered in exchange? 'Tis the interest of both communities, to get as much as they can respectively for their surplus produce. The desire of the one is met and checked by that of the other; neither of them is compelled to sell to support existence, all the immediate wants of both being supplied, and neither having any factitious advantage over the other. What will be the result? Necessarily the fixing on that price, the medium of exchange, which will promote most the interest of both parties. What is that? The amount of the labour contained in the articles to be exchanged. To aid this just estimate, spring forward the habits of the lives of the exchanging communities. From all their internal arrangements, the principle of competition, with all its mysteries, falsehoods, and circumventings, has been banished. To enjoy the products of united labour and no more, has been the rule and practice of their lives. How revolting to them the injustice of taking away the products of the labour of others, without the voluntary consent of the producers, either by force, or by fraudulent representations of value! Bargain-

making is unknown to them. Here, then, are interest and previous habits both operating on the side of justice—labour for labour, equal amounts for equal amounts; if no exact estimate can be found, mutual good faith will arrange, to the satisfaction of both parties, the apprehended amount of the labour to be exchanged, as represented by the commodities. Here, also, is no counteracting necessity, to over-rule habits and all minor interests. The exchanges, therefore, will be made on the basis of the presumed amount of the labour expended on the respective productions. Should the labour of either of the parties have been misapplied, and consequently less productive than the average of labour, such defects cannot be taken into the calculation; but the discovery of them will lead the neglectful or unskilful party to revise their habits or improve their machinery or skill. If these communities exchange their surplus products with the capitalists of general society, their principles, because their well-understood, comprehensive interests, will be the same; but from the habits of the second party, more time and trouble may be expended in making the arrangement.

The interest of capitalists, which under the institutions of insecurity plays so important a part, which swallows up all other interests in the arrangements now made for the distribution of wealth,—under the proposed arrangements of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation, would cease to exist. There would be no other interest in the community, but that of producers; there would be no capitalists. Capital would signify no more than the necessary means of labour, or products of labour for enjoyment. No capitalists distinct from labourers, no capital as a source of revenue, of support independent of labour, would exist. None of those evils, therefore, which spring from the competition, or rather from the force or the fraud of capitalists, mostly under the shield of political power, could have place, either in the interior of such communities, or in their exchanges. In exchanging, the

communities are mere labourers, desirous of a fair equivalent in labour for what their labour has produced. They desire to procure for enjoyment an article which they want, in lieu of one of which they have a superabundance. If they make what is called a good exchange, what is the consequence? Simply, that the whole community has a fourth or a fifth more for consumption of the article procured in exchange. Which is more likely, which is more wise, that the community should enjoy this increased quantity (supposing it not to be superfluous for use), or that it should direct it to be erected into a stock for barter? Why should the community set aside any part of the articles procured for their annual consumption and enjoyment, for the purpose of obtaining profit by exchange? Has their labour produced them more than they can advantageously consume and enjoy during the year? If sō, how absurd to add to it, to make provision for an increase of that which is already superfluous! or, to surrender the immediate enjoyment of large masses for the future uncertain enjoyment of smaller, in the way of profit! Why *over-labour* one year, in order to *under-labour* another? Why not spread moderate labour, so necessary to health and enjoyment, equally over every year? Though an individual might, perhaps, wisely overwork, during health, to provide against contingencies of disease, old age, or accident, no such reason could operate with a whole co-operating community, who form an insurance company to each other within themselves, and whose aggregate health never fails. If the useful and healthy labour of the present year produces enough and to spare for the enjoyment of the year, what is to hinder the labour of the succeeding and of every future year from yielding the same abundant produce? If the mechanical labour of the year have been too productive, why not lessen the time for labour, and devote it to other pursuits more productive of happiness? Could the foolish idea be harboured in such a community, that it is easier and sweeter

to live by profit and idleness on others' labour, than by industry and healthy exertion on their own? Has the whole of the history of mankind told them in vain that the mercantile concerns of great bodies of men have been always mismanaged and directed to the aggrandisement of the managers of such concerns, at the expense of the capital accumulated by the previous industry of the individual contributors? And with these results of experience before them, will they embark on a fallacious, or needless, or wicked plan of amassing capital, to endeavour, by means of the expedients of trade, to live in idleness on the produce of their fellow-creatures' toils? As far as capital is made use of as a mere means of productive labour and enjoyment, it may be most beneficially managed by such communities through their committees or otherwise; but from the moment that it is converted into a trading stock and made a source of profit, the inevitable evils of barter will follow in its train.

If the communities were numerous, such a thing as bartering could not exist. There would be but one *wholesale* exchange in every community, for every article necessary for all the members thereof. Suppose these articles were thirty or forty; there would be so many wholesale transactions with other communities producing such superfluous articles. Retail bartering is out of the question. The same motive that led one community to exchange with a manufacturing community, without intermediate agents, their mutual surplus products, would lead all other communities to do the same; and though it would be quite absurd for an individual to supply his small demands from the manufacturer (the expense of communication, carriage, &c., more than counterbalancing the increased sale price) in preference to the retail shop, it would be as absurd, in a whole community, not to supply its wholesale demands in that manner. 'Tis private individual consumption that makes all the intricacies of bartering inevitable. A wholesale speculating community

would not find customers, were it able to support the immense warehouses and the immense double carriage such wholesale transactions would require. Neither during the progress, nor at the ultimate prevalence of such communities, would there be any danger of their forming themselves into mercantile or trading establishments. If a co-operating community exported its own surplus produce, this would be adding only one to its yearly or half-yearly exchanges. Men now accumulate capital for profits, because it is acquired, not at the expense of their own labour, but of the labour of others. Where the producers accumulate, the check of the inconvenience of production, is always sufficient to prevent injurious accumulation for profits, to prevent further accumulations than such as are necessary to increase the productive powers of their own labour.

For these reasons it may be safely relied on, that these communities can never convert themselves into trading companies ; it is not their interest, and they must necessarily be wise enough to see their interest.

Instead of such short-sighted and abortive attempts to live, by trafficking, on the labour of others, the increase of enjoyment will steadily proceed amongst the co-operating communities, with the progress of industry and improvement in the sciences and the arts of life, whether effected by themselves or by others. This progress will be in many respects similar, in many superior, to that which would take place amongst individuals under the influence of equal security. A community makes an improvement, in agriculture, suppose, by which grain is produced at one-fourth less cost of labour than before. What are the consequences ? If the quantity of grain produced were before abundant for all useful purposes (including always a stock in hand against the casualties of the seasons), one-fourth of the labour, or time, previously directed to the production of grain, is now free for any other purpose of muscular or intellectual exertion, or of amusement or

repose, which may be deemed most conducive to happiness. By means of the press, the improvement is immediately diffused through society at large; and by the improving community is enjoyed the additional pleasure of being the cause of diffusing so much additional happiness, or means of happiness, to all other individuals, by cheapening the production of one of the articles most necessary for human comfort. No patent, no monopoly, no exclusive privilege of any sort would be sought for by the discoverers. These expedients are induced and rendered necessary under the institutions of insecurity; by the regular operation of which the labourer is deprived of the products of his labour, by direct plunder or by indirect fraud and terror. That all motive to improvement, by the loss of which the privileged as well as the industrious would suffer, may not be withdrawn, patents and similar expedients are resorted to, to meet such cases and to remunerate the improvers. Were all the expedients of insecurity removed; were all individuals, whether producing alone or in mutual co-operation, assured of the free use of their faculties, and of all the products of the exertion of those faculties, the desire of enjoyment on the one hand, the love of public sympathy and of diffusing happiness on the other, would be motives abundant to prompt to every possible effort at improvement and to repay those efforts. In another co-operating community, discoveries are made by which heat or light are disengaged, or by which leather, woollens, or linens are fabricated at half the usual cost of effort. An additional quantity of labour is thus set free for other useful purposes, first in the community making the improvements, next, and quickly, throughout society at large. Thus every community derives immediate benefit from the progress of industry wherever developed; and the reciprocity, the quickness of the extension of the mutual benefits to all, produce incalculably more happiness than could be procured by confining the secret and the enjoyment of each discovery to the individual, or community, who made it.

In case the improvement was made upon an article of surplus produce, for exchange, what would be the effect? The article produced, say with half the labour, is of half the value it previously was : of course, as the improvement becomes generally known, double, or nearly double, the quantity will be necessary to command the articles previously obtained in exchange. This increased quantity will either supply and give enjoyment to those who were before unable to purchase at the high cost of production, or will give increased enjoyment of the same article to those who previously used it, or will set free a portion of their time and labour for other pursuits. In consequence, they will be enabled by this surplus time to produce more abundantly those things, whatever they might be, which they were accustomed to give in exchange. They will, therefore, be able to afford to give, and they will give, the products of *rather more* than half the labour which they were formerly under the necessity of giving for the now cheapened articles. So as to every other thing which the improving community gets in exchange for its cheapened surplus produce ; the benefit will be shared between it and those with whom it exchanges, in proportion to the quantity of labour set free to each by the reduced cost, the reduced labour expended in production, of the cheapened article. Thus will the benefit of the discovery of every new useful article, or improvement of the old, be equally diffused through the whole of society. If any of the purchasers of the cheapened article refused to give more than the exact half of the produce of the labour they used to give, when its cost of production was double, the consequence would be, that the improving community would direct a portion of its freed labour to the production of the article withheld, or of some substitute for it, which, or the capacity of doing which, would reduce the demand to that of a fair equivalent.

If any particular community, not being, from whatever cause, as industrious or skilful as its neighbours, produced

less in the same time, it must be content to enjoy less, if it made no exchange. Making an exchange, the value of the products of its labour must be estimated by the average produce of ordinary industry: to rate them higher, would be to give a premium to indolence, enabling the most idle and least skilful of the communities to live at the expense of the industrious: rating them at this standard would quicken the industry of all.

If the fear be altogether vain, that the competition of these intelligent capitalist-labouring communities would, in the disposal of their surplus produce, reduce it beneath the cost of production, how much more vain is the fear as to competition in dress, elegancies, luxuries, &c., between the members of different communities!

All communities having from nature an equal capacity for production, each will direct its productive powers, or enjoy repose, as it may deem most conducive to its happiness. Objects of dress, elegance, luxury, will be estimated according to their intrinsic value, their real utility; not forgetting, in the estimate, any one pleasurable quality—the lustre and softness of the silk, or the peculiar flavour of the exotic production. All factitious importance given to articles of wealth as mere sources of distinction, will be forgotten with those distinctions, which equality of wealth annihilates. If, therefore, the members of any community should see those of another dressed in a different way, using a new article of food, or of furniture—what follows? The question occurs,—Is this dress, on the whole, more useful than ours, colour, form, texture, material, cost (quantity of labour employed in its fabrication), and all other items included? If so, we will adopt it; and the community now using it, will aid us in the calculation and instruct us in the mode of fabrication. Just in the same way as to articles of furniture or food. As it will be ultimately in the power of every community, by so directing its labour, to use the same articles with other communities, such articles can never be objects of

vain emulation. As they will no longer indicate superior individual wealth with all its present attendants, there will be no public deference paid to the whims of particular individuals in varying their dress or furniture. Utility apart, they will be as unimportant as the colour of gooseberries, exciting wonder towards the person who should deem them of importance. As a stimulus to excite industry, substantial use terminating in happiness of some species, is sufficiently energetic for all good purposes. Respecting clothing and food, many experiments remain to be made; little accurate knowledge is yet ascertained on these, as on so many other, subjects important to human welfare.

What has been said may perhaps serve as an answer to another *economical* objection, namely, that "these co-operating communities would acquire a corporation spirit, that the rule of them would be seized by a few, and the spirit of domination, if not of gain, would creep in, and mar the expected benefits."

If these co-operating communities were governed like other corporations, by charters given at the caprice of political power, and containing regulations out of the control of the associated members, by means of which, a few or any number less than the majority of the community, could make the interests of their fellow-creatures (the guidance of what ought to be their voluntary actions or the use of the products of their labour) subservient to their supposed peculiar interests; no doubt such ruling individuals would be moulded by the unfavourable circumstances in which they would thus be placed; and should by political power, they would form a new support and partnership with it, and new institutions of insecurity would be invented to control and frustrate the efforts of *associated* labour, as they have been hitherto devised to render impotent *individual* exertion. No *such communities are advocated in this work*. Whatever community is not self-governed as to its internal regulations,

wants that *security*, without which all industry and all enjoyment, whether by co-operation or by individual effort, are suspended by a thread, and cannot by rational men be pursued in peace. Such communities, if governed by charter and on corporation principles, would cease to be communities of *voluntary* co-operation; their charm would be gone: the few of them so established would find no imitators; and if such were the principles, the surrender of private opinion as to the most interesting matters of internal arrangements, on which alone they could be established, they would soon cease to be instituted.

But of all the objections brought forward against social improvement, whether to be produced by individual exertion or by mutual co-operation, none has of late days been so triumphantly put forward, as that arising from what have been called the "principles of population." Particularly against systems of equality, has this objection, half moral, half economical, been directed. It has been the grand scare-crow to frighten away all attempts at social improvement. It cannot, therefore, be entirely passed over here, though volumes have been written upon it. This objection in effect says: "Improve as you may, multiply ever so abundantly the means of physical, intellectual, and moral good; there is lurking in the very constitution of man a source of evil, a principle of counter-action hitherto overlooked, the mischievous action of which will be accelerated in proportion to this very improvement, and will produce an extent of devastation commensurate with the extent and intensity of previous happiness."

Were all this true, the question to be solved would be, "Will more happiness, on the whole, be produced by letting things remain as they are without effort, or by bringing about alternations of splendid happiness and deep misery?"

But the objection is founded on a gross mis-statement of fact, and on an utter ignorance, as well of the artificial nature of the absolute structure of society, as of the human mind, and of new social combinations.

It is admitted to these objectors, that there is a physical capability of increasing the numbers of the human species greater than any known physical capability of increasing the quantity of food necessary for human subsistence. It is also admitted, that nothing could be more useful in the present state of human knowledge, than to bring forward this important question for minute and uncompromising discussion.

In the physical constitution of man, there is a possibility of increasing the numbers of his kind at a quicker rate than the quantity of food. There is also a physical possibility of increasing the number of sheep or of silk-worms beyond the quantity of food (grass, roots, or leaves) necessary for their support. But who ever inferred from thence that human prudence was not sufficient, by means of the most obvious calculation, to limit this possibility of increase of these useful animals, to the food to be afforded them, and the purposes to be derived to man from their existence? As this power of breeding in their own species, is fully as much under the control of human beings, as the same power in any animals which they rear; why should not the same principles of prudence be used in regulating the increase of men, as in regulating the increase of sheep or silk-worms? This general reply appears sufficient to the general objection.

But particulars are adduced; a long parade is made of historical facts; and from these it is sought to be established, that the mass of mankind are not only utterly devoid of prudence in this particular, but that in proportion to the general improvement in their circumstances, the supply of food always included, they necessarily indulge in the propensity to increase, till, from the mere effect of over-numbers, of numbers beyond food, the old state of wretchedness, or a worse state, is brought back again; and so always, and eternally in irremediable succession of want, vice, and misery; and abundance, morality, and happiness.

It is necessary here to premise, that were all this satisfactorily proved as to the *past* conduct of the great mass of mankind, it would only prove that great evils had been hitherto experienced by this great mass, the ignorant part, of mankind, from want of prudence respecting the increase of numbers. It would, by no means, prove that these evils were irremediable, that prudence could not be acquired, and that those evils must proceed for ever, because they had hitherto existed.

Instead of such conclusions from such facts with respect to the improvement of the social machine, the simple conclusion of reason would be exactly similar to that which every maker of a steam-engine would come to, on discovering a defect hitherto unperceived retarding its motion, or counteracting the useful results expected from it. He would look upon the discovery of the defect as no unimportant step towards its removal, and would use double exertion to discover the means of removing it; no well ascertained law of nature (regular unvarying succession of natural phenomena) opposing such removal.

In this moral case, however, respecting the social machine, the remedy is absolutely indicated at the same time, and by the same process, that the defect is discovered. The defect is the tendency to increase beyond the supply of food; this defect arising from the want of prudence in the regulation of a natural appetite, on the part of the great mass, the ignorant mass, of mankind. If it be possible to impart prudence to the great mass of mankind, the evils said to arise from a want of prudence are plainly not irremediable. Not only has this prudence respecting the tendency to increase, prevailed amongst the rich portion, those living without labour, of every community; but they have been constantly reproached with the excess of this prudence as a vice; they have been punished for this supposed vice by foolish penal laws, and their numbers have been constantly kept up by recruits from the poorer classes. To impart prudence, is to impart knowledge of

facts and habits of self-control restraining immediate inclination for the sake of greater preponderant good. If it be possible to give this knowledge and these habits to one portion of society, we are at all events so far assured as to see that there is no law of nature against imparting knowledge and habits of self-control to other portions of society, or generally to all the members thereof. This leads to the real solution of the pretended difficulty. The lovers of the institutions of insecurity, know full well that no law of nature prevents knowledge and habits of self-control from being given to all; but they more than fear that such knowledge would be incompatible with their institutions; and with them, such institutions, systems, or expedients, are of more importance than the happiness of the whole human race. Therefore it is, that they lay it down as an axiom, that the mass of mankind must always necessarily remain ignorant and slaves to the impulses of momentary feelings, inasmuch as their ill-apprehended interests require, in their opinion, that such ignorance should continue. "Human beings, like rats, as soon as they have an abundance of food, will breed on till they kill each other; if the animals with four or two legs had knowledge, this over-breeding would be stopped; but if they had knowledge and bred less, we should not be able to seize on so much of the products of their labour, which our wise institutions have secured to us as our property; this property in the fruits of their labour is the world to us; therefore it would be absurd, wicked, impious, impracticable, and what not, to impart knowledge to the majority,—the working portion of mankind,—who are of right, and from all eternity, doomed to labour and to ~~nothing~~ but labour."

necessary to their system. That ignorance and that perversity, were the necessary creation of the systems of insecurity to which they were attached ; and they therefore decreed them to be eternal and irrevocable as any of the physical laws of nature. Whether they are so irrevocable, or necessarily attached to the constitution of human kind, those who have read the preceding pages will judge.

But the facts which they have brought forward, in support of this supposed past perverseness of ignorant human creatures, over-breeding and destroying, themselves, their own happiness, the moment that abundant food and increased comforts afforded them the means, with prudence, of enjoying it, are altogether mis-stated. The real facts, as ascertained by human experience, are directly the reverse ; they prove that every advance made in the career of industry and comfort, has a tendency to engender habits of *prudence*, and instead of producing a superfluous population greater *in proportion to food and comforts* than the previous numbers under a smaller share of industry and comforts ; their uniform tendency, on the contrary, is to produce a lesser proportion. A greater *absolute* population always follows increased industry and comforts ; but, as ~~certainly~~, a smaller *relative* population, a smaller population in proportion to the increased comforts and necessaries of life. It is by not attending to this distinction, not perceiving or wilfully confounding things so different as an absolute and relative increase of population, that much of error on this subject has arisen. It is submitted to those who apprehend evils, so great as to arrest the progress of human improvement, from the increase of population alone, that even under the institutions of society, as they have hitherto existed,—even under the institutions of insecurity where human industry has not been entirely suppressed,—

1. Increased comforts of life have always produced, in every community permanently enjoying them, increased (instead of diminished) prudence respecting the increase of their numbers.

2. Increased comforts of life permit an *absolute* increase of population consistently with the exercise of that prudence.
3. Increased comforts of life prevent any *relative* increase of population, proportioned to food, which would lessen those increased comforts.

And—what is still more important—all these effects on population arising from the possession of increased comforts, have been produced without any instruction, without any aid of laws respecting population, simply by the influence of the new circumstances in which communities have found themselves placed, those new circumstances affording new motives to action. What would the effects on general prudence have been, and of course on prudence as applied to population, had equal security, instead of expedients of insecurity, been the lot of all, and had knowledge been universally diffused?

An appeal to the prudential habits of every nation at different periods of its history—as far as those habits from certain transmitted facts can be ascertained—as well as to those of all the different people who now occupy the earth, will prove the first proposition. To instance those countries which we know the best, where amongst them exist in the greatest force prudential habits with respect to increase of numbers? In the poor or in the rich countries, in those possessing the most or the least of the comforts and conveniences of life, in Poland, Ireland, Russia, Naples, or in parts of Norway, Switzerland, England, France, the United States of North America? And in what districts again, amongst what classes, of all these countries, the poor or the rich, those enjoying or those wanting comforts, do these prudential habits most prevail?

In Ireland it is notorious that the great bulk of the community are not only without the conveniences and comforts, but often in want of the necessities, of life. Amongst those destitute members of the Irish community, it is equally notorious that no prudential habits exist with

respect to the increase of numbers; but in the north of Ireland, where increased industry and superior comforts prevail, there prudential habits with respect to marriage and increase prevail also. In England, where increased comforts did prevail amongst the mass of the community, prudential views with respect to increase of numbers everywhere prevailed. In those parts of the country where wages were permanently highest and most comforts prevailed, there those prudential views were most prevalent. Still more prevalent in the middle classes; and in the richest, most of all.

In Ireland, there has been for the last fifty years an immense increase of population, in the midst of the absence of all the comforts of life. In the United States of North America, there has been a similar increase of numbers in the midst of abundance and comparative happiness. Mark the explanation. In Ireland, deprived by insecurity of comforts, the increase has been *both absolute and relative*; absolute as compared with the preceding numbers, relative as compared with means of support. In America, on the contrary, where partial security permitted the enjoyment of comforts to the whole community, the increase has been absolute merely, not relative. In America, the prudential check has operated differently in different parts of the country, but everywhere preventing an increase of numbers relative to food. The comforts of the people have been constantly on the advance with the increase of population; population has advanced because it was compatible with the continuance of increased comforts. Nay, such was frequently the remuneration of labour, that very young children could earn more than enough for their support, thus holding out the bounty of still increased comfort to the parents on their production. • Under such circumstances, *not* to increase numbers would have been the height of imprudence.

In many parts of Norway, we are told, of Switzerland, and in Holland, the situation of the people as to the

comforts and conveniences of life, has been much above that of those surrounding them. The circumstances, physical and political, of those countries, are very different. The conduct of the people with respect to marriage and increase, is also very different. The circumstances in which they agree, is in the possession of superior comforts by the people. What is the consequence as to increase of numbers? That the prudential check is everywhere in operation, struggling against the opposing and varying expedients of insecurity, to preserve to the people those comforts; and this prudential check exactly adapts itself to the varying physical and political circumstances of each country. In Norway and Switzerland, where the climate is healthy, where life is long, and there is no room for an increase of numbers without diminishing their comforts, marriages are late. Until there is an opening, by the natural departure of the previous possessors of a dwelling and of employment, for a new marriage and consequent increase, an increase does not take place. But in those parts of Holland where the mortality is great from the unhealthiness of the climate, and where there is no more room for an increase of population than in Norway or Switzerland, the prudential check is differently exerted; more children must be there born, as well to supply the greater waste in childhood, as to succeed and replace the more quickly departing adults. Earlier marriages, more marriages and births, are there requisite to keep up the absolute population, preserving the same comforts to the new comers that the preceding occupants enjoyed, or rather not diminishing the previous comforts of the increasers of the population. Thus increased comforts beget, under-varying circumstances, an equal desire to retain those comforts, and consequent disinclination to part with them, through the expenses of marriage, as much as through any other means.

In Russia, where there are no comforts, the mass of the country people being absolute slaves, sold always with

the soil, like the rest of the live or dead stock,—frequently disposed of, detached from the soil, like the slaves in the Southern States of the *free* Union of North America, the prudential check with respect to marriage is unknown. Fatigue, privation, indiscriminate intercourse, regulation, may prevent the increase of slaves, black or white, in Russia, the West Indies, or the United States; but the exercise of foresight, the prudential check, never will. They will constantly breed up to the means of support, however wretched, to which they had been accustomed; and general ignorance, and the habit of yielding to motives immediately stimulant, chiefly those of force, render them incapable of calculation and quite indifferent as to the effects of breeding beyond these means. All processes of thought, calculation, and prudence, are left to the master: obedience and labour, and enjoying what he can get, are the province of the slave.

The increase of numbers in England and Ireland during the last fifty years, is a demonstration of the falsehood of the position, that increased comforts beget imprudence, and lead those possessing them to increase their numbers to an extent incompatible with the enjoyment of those comforts. In England the people had comforts, in Ireland they had not. In Ireland the population has increased more than fifty per cent. beyond the ratio of increase in England. The cause of the increase in Ireland was the possibility, from the removal of some of the previous restraints of insecurity, coinciding with the greater demand for agricultural produce, which the increasing manufacturing industry of England had produced, of maintaining a greater number of human beings in the same state of discomfort in which they had been accustomed to live; or, perhaps, even with some little increase of comfort. The cause of the increase in England was the continually increasing productiveness of labour for many years, permitting an increase of numbers to exist possessing the same comforts previously enjoyed. In Ireland, where there were

no comforts, increase went on without prudence: in England, where there were comforts, increase went on with prudence, the increasing numbers enjoying like their predecessors. True, that even in England, notwithstanding their comforts, as well as in Ireland, this seeming prosperity was arrested, and the increased population fell, and are falling, into wretchedness. What caused this? Was it the effect of increased comforts, generating imprudence, and over-population? No such thing. It has arisen from the operation of circumstances, producing results, which not only the prudence of the people, working hard and enjoying mere comforts, could not have foreseen, but which not even the prudence nor the fears of the wisest, not labouring, but devoted to thought,—and to thought on economical, political, and moral subjects, had anticipated. It arose from the deep-seated, wide-spreading, and secret-working machinations of political power, operating by means of the old and of superadded expedients of insecurity, plundering the products of present labour, anticipating the products of all future labour, and engrossing to itself and the possessors of capital, all the benefits of the immense facilities of production, which mechanical and other improvements in the sciences and arts had put within the reach of the whole community. Was it to be expected from the prudence or the knowledge of the artizan or the agriculturist, that he should foresee that in a few years the exertion of the same persevering labour and skill, which had enable him hitherto to enjoy a certain quantity of the comforts and conveniences, as well as the necessities, of life, would no longer render him the same advantages? Was it for him to calculate the effect of *always* fraudulent and devastating changes in the currency? Was it for him to calculate when it would please his plunderers to order him to pay two measures of wheat instead of one, which he previously paid? Was it for him to calculate the effects of the ceasing to squander in wicked expenditure the hard-earned capital of the country? under the name of

loans accumulating what is called a national debt? Was it for him to anticipate or to provide against capricious changes in taxation, the amount or the mode of levying taxes, rendering certain branches of industry unproductive to-day which had been most productive a few days before? Was it for him to anticipate or to provide against the effects of foreign treaties, battles, revolutions, of never-ending laws, each more wicked and absurd than its predecessors, interfering in favour of capitalists and the privileged classes, with the free direction and the remuneration of labour, over which he could have no control? the effect of which, and numerous other events, in raising and depressing the remuneration of labour, was perfectly indifferent to the holders of political power, provided certain selfish objects of their own were attained by them? Was it for him to anticipate the effects of the treacherous bounty of poor-laws, the succedaneum for the mischiefs of the expedients of insecurity? These were the events,—all these and such as these, entirely extraneous to the regular course of industry,—that rendered unavailing the calculations of prudence: these were the events, and not the pretended folly of over-breeding under increased comforts, that have been bringing down the English people to the situation of paupers, and that must keep all mankind in a state of want, vice, and misery, as long as they are permitted to exist, as long as any institutions of insecurity, under whatever new disguises they may put on, remain amongst men. Were it not for these, were equal security established, or even that approach to it which permits a considerable share of comforts to the productive labourers, the mere habit and love of immediate enjoyment, would of itself guard against the loss of those comforts by over-breeding: how much more when this mere selfish feeling is aided by knowledge, by a prospective sympathy with the discomforts of those whom imprudence would bring into the world, by a dread of lowering the state of the productive labourers themselves to equal discomfort? In that country, and in

that part of every country, where the people are the poorest and most ignorant, where the least comforts are enjoyed, *there* is uniformly the greatest increase of the population; and in proportion as comforts are increased, the *comparative* progress of population diminishes, the love of comforts, and the disinclination to part with them, seeming always to increase with their amount. No truth of economy and morals is more certain, than that the increase of comforts amongst mankind engenders prudence, and arrests, instead of encouraging, the tendency to increase their numbers beyond the supply of those comforts.

If, under the individual exertion and competition of equal or even partial security, the progress of improvement, and consequent increase of comforts, would constantly tend to increase the prudential check, and limit the increase of numbers to the constantly increasing command of enjoyments; what would be the peculiar effects under that branch of equal security, which takes mutual co-operation for its mode of production, and equality for its rule of enjoyment?

The general state of the country in which one or more of the co-operating communities may be placed, must be either stationary, advancing, or declining, as to general wealth and population.

Let us suppose, then, that the state of the country in which these communities exist, is merely stationary, and admits of no increase of population, of nothing more than the replacing by new births those who yearly cease to live. In such a state of things, in ordinary society, as we have seen, when the people live in comfort, the prudential check is called into full exertion, and is abundantly adequate to prevent any injurious increase of members, or such as would lessen those comforts: but when the circumstances of the people are wretched, 'tis not the prudential check that operates; prudence has no place amidst eternal want; breeding goes on as amongst the lower animals, till cold, nakedness, hunger, disease seize on their victims and keep

down the population by misery to the level of their wretched means of support. What, then, is the modification that would be presented in the use of the prudential check by means of the system of co-operation, reposing, as all industry must repose, under the shelter of security? First, abundant comforts, and the habit of enjoying, would beget an unwillingness to part with them as before. Next, superior information and extended sympathy would increase and justify this disinclination, from a view of the discomfort it would produce to the new sharers as well as to the old. True that the inconveniences of a large family would not, under mutual co-operation, press so heavily on the individual as under competition with the most perfect equal security: but a regard for the common welfare and common loss of comforts, in which their own would be included, would soon become at least as powerful a curb, in such minds as those of the co-operators, as the simple individual motive produces in the minds of competitors. Suppose this motive, however, of the loss of general comforts, to be ever so much weakened, to be reduced to nothing, still no evil would arise from its absence; for the *circumstances* of the new communities form such a barrier around them in the way of population, as would seem almost to render superfluous the exercise of that prudence, with which, on this as on other occasions, they must be pre-eminently imbued.

The case supposed is, that the co-operating community cannot increase its numbers without decreasing its comforts by dividing them amongst a larger number, and that this numerical expansion of diminished enjoyment, will not counterbalance the loss of its intensity to the smaller number. It is hardly possible to conceive any set of expedients better calculated to meet such a contingency, than those proposed for the co-operating communities. The size of the establishment, the number of apartments for married people, is determined, as well as every other detail of the arrangements, for a given population. The

original settlers of a community are, say, five hundred married persons, one hundred unmarried occupying rooms, and six hundred children and young people of all ages not adult. Any of the unmarried adults occupying rooms, have the means of marrying in the community whenever they please. In the course of a few years, some of the elder children become adult: but in the course of these same years, mortality is walking his silent rounds, and many of those desiring to marry succeed to the vacant rooms. Still vacancies may not occur as quickly as the expanding development and health of the young would demand them. Will not imprudent marriages take place? Impossible: at least, unless the parties marrying wish to leave the community. If, in spite of prudence and the benevolent opinion of the community, they marry; where will they live? All the marriage apartments are already occupied. Though married, they must live in the dormitories of the young till vacancies occur for their accommodation. But the probability is that such preposterous marriages would never occur, that regulations, in the formation of which these adult young people would have as much influence, in proportion to their intellect, as any other individuals, would be formed by the whole community, which, supported by enlightened public opinion, would cause such premature marriages to be unheard of. Here is, therefore, the physical check, which keeps the population stationary, never encroaching on absolute comforts; the state of society, by the supposition, not permitting of such increase. As on a map, the circumstances of the whole community as to population, and of every individual in it, are under the eye, seen, registered, for the information of all. What detached community living by competition, could ever afford a view of its circumstances to be in any way compared to this? Under competition, the establishment of the parent must be the resource of the child, and to that his attention is almost exclusively directed, all else depending on chances, more

or less in the nature of lottery or gambling. Under co-operation, the vacancy of the particular rooms of the parents, is no more under the eye of the children than any other vacancy ; all, as they occur, are open to all that want. Under competition there is an injurious clashing of interest between parents and children, the happiness of the one by marriage depending on the vacating of the establishment by the other ; an opposition of interests frequently fatal to all benevolence, occurs, implanting one set of vices in the parents, another in the children. Under the system of social co-operation these injurious circumstances are withdrawn ; and no motives looking forward to fortune and independence of action on the death of parents, none, but such as accord with intelligence and virtue, are left to operate between parents and children. The depression, too, arising to the whole community from the loss of an old co-operating friend, will be always soon succeeded and relieved by the certain prospect of lengthened happiness to the young, long and warmly attached, and to whom no pecuniary, no corrupting motive, none but the most generous sympathies could have served for grounds of attachment. A simple rule would present itself—those whose names, given in by themselves, longest remaining on record, should be the first married. In almost all cases they would be the oldest ; and no hasty ill-judged alliances could take place. Marriages would of course under these circumstances be late ; later in proportion to the healthiness of the community ; ten years, perhaps, later than where the circumstances of the society admitted of a pretty rapid increase.

For the rest, it has been before shown that public opinion would necessarily be in those communities, the most enlightened of society, because it would have the best data for judging rightly, and would have no contrariety of interests opposing a right decision ; and that its influence would be the most efficient, because known to every one and partaken in by every one. If, even in ordinary

Society, public opinion is strong enough to command the chastity of the richer classes of women frequently through their whole lives, can it be without influence where its restraints would never be either partial or capricious? In these communities, there is no monopoly of private wealth in the hands of men, to enable them to keep mistresses, seraglios, or to hire prostitutes. Women have as much command as men over the common property of the community, partake of the same education, and thus raising themselves to the same level, cast off at one bound their antiquated degradations and miseries, and at least double the happiness of both sexes by raising all their intercourse to that of intelligence and affection amongst equals.

So very trivial being the evils to be apprehended from the principle of population amongst the co-operating communities, even under the most unfavourable circumstances in which they can be placed; what, if any, are the evils to be apprehended from this principle when the circumstances are more favourable and admit of an increase of population more or less rapid? The declining state has not been enlarged upon, because it is impossible, the laws of physical nature remaining as they now are, that anything but enormous mis-government on the part of political power could reduce such communities, or indeed society in general, to such a state as not to be able to support their own members. With any other but political power, these communities would be strong enough to cope. Once established, political power alone would be strong enough to render them declining. The decline of industry, whether carried on by competition or co-operation, must arise from the want of security. Nothing less can make real knowledge, so useful to mankind, to retrograde. The political power that would be able and would be inclined to oppress these communities when established, would also be able and inclined to prevent their establishment to any useful purpose, to any

purpose but that of rendering them machines of despotism—a purpose altogether inconsistent with their nature, which requires free exertion and palpable benefit as the connecting bond of their united labour. It is under free governments only, or those the most nearly approaching to perfect equal security, that mutual co-operating communities can flourish, or even perhaps that they can be established.

Declining circumstances, except from physical causes or general insecurity, being impossible to such communities, and the stationary having been discussed, it remains to be considered, what effects, as to happiness, would arise from the principle of population, amongst co-operating communities, in an advancing state of society.

The organisation of man affords him the sources of certain pleasures, those of the senses, of the gratification of hunger and thirst, of the sexual passion, of the feeling of health, or the easy play of all the internal animal functions, of the use of the muscular and intellectual faculties, including those of sympathy and benevolence; the aggregate of all of which, or their preponderance over the pains to which he may be subjected, constitutes his happiness. Not wisdom, but insanity, is the conduct which refuses to avail itself of the utmost possible enjoyment from all and every one of these sources. The limit is the production of ulterior preponderant evil, to the agent or others, by the gratification, or the expenditure of time in pleasures of a less value, which would add more to happiness if devoted to those of a superior order. With such limitations, necessary because conducing to happiness, it would be the object of these co-operating communities to increase to the utmost, as well the pleasures derivable from the sexual intercourse, as all other pleasures. In itself every pleasure is good, and the only rational object of living. By means of true and useful associations, the simple pleasures, and none more eminently than those of the sexual passion, may be raised in value (their grossnesses rejected) almost

beyond calculation. To produce this effect with respect to this passion, what are the arrangements of the co-operating communities? First, the sphere of choice is enlarged to both sexes to the utmost possible extent, even to *all* the members of the community : next, the health, intelligence, and benevolence of all these multiplied aspirants to mutual sympathy are so universally excited, that the attractions of the lowest and the capacity to increase mutual happiness, must exist in a higher degree than amongst the best gifted with these qualities in general society.

To appreciate the immense accession to human happiness from this one source alone, the right direction of the sexual passion, would appear like romance. Let it be judged of from the immense mischiefs now experienced from its forced misdirection under the expedients of insecurity, leading whole hosts of religionists, ascetic moralists, and fanatics, to denounce the very passion itself, to make war on the continuation of their own species, and to confound all pleasures, except an admiration of their own extravagances, under the name of vices. In general society, the choice, not only of one, but of all classes, is arbitrarily reduced to the narrowest possible limits ; and from the prevalence of the competition for wealth, even where circumstances such as those of station are supposed to be equal, personal qualities are mostly disregarded, and pecuniary convenience regulates the most important contract of human life. The denial of all education, as of all equal justice, to women, rendering them for the most part of no character, the passive instruments of the animal propensities of men, co-operates in increasing the attachment to mere wealth, so that a connexion founded on esteem and real mutual admiration for palpable pleasing and useful qualities, as well as for nicer inappreciable circumstances, is quite a rare, and by most persons regarded as a very foolish, occurrence. This limitation of choice is by no means confined to the higher classes, but is diffused through all. The lower presume not to look to the higher,

but revenge themselves in finding out the most trifling sources of distinction amongst each other, which in their eyes would make disreputable a union with one below them, though the cause of inferiority may be seen by no eyes but those which fancy themselves the superior. One endless cause of limitation of choice, is the slightest difference as to wealth, or rather degrees of poverty. The consequence of all which is, that sexual enjoyment becomes, like everything else in society, a matter of trade, of exchange, just like any other commodity, and every possible art of competition is made use of to buy the persons and lives of the sex, whom nature has made weaker, and want of education more ignorant, at as low a price as possible. The animal pleasure is all that remains even to the stronger sex, shorn of all its enchanting capabilities of sympathetic and intellectual association, which can only be enjoyed in the perfectly free intercourse of equals. Privation and neglect, even as to this animal enjoyment, are the lot of the higher orders and of all the married of the weaker sex ; and physical and mental pain after short-lived excitement, and speedy decay of the fever of life, are the lot of the great majority of the remainder of women, the use of whose persons is a matter of trade. All these evils being supposed unavoidable consequences of the sexual passion, and the institutions of insecurity being supposed of superhuman appointment and incapable of change, no wonder that well-meaning ignorance was confounded, and, knowing nothing of the blessings which the passion rightly directed might produce, prayed for its annihilation, in consequence of its abuses, though that of the human race were included in the prayer !

But were it possible that the free mutual choice should be enlarged under the institutions of insecurity, little benefit would be derived therefrom. The general ignorance and perversity of all, counteracting each other in the pursuit of happiness, and the peculiar factitious imbecility of women chaining them down the passive tools of male

animal selfishness, the numbers from which to choose would add little to any other variety but that of wealth : of this there would be all possible shades, but of moral and intellectual qualities still a blank. The flock would be larger, but the individuality of them would be the same to any other eye but that of the shepherd. A continual succession of similar selfish propensities, of similar blanks as to knowledge. In the co-operating communities, how different would be this effect of increased numbers out of whom to find congeniality of mind and affections ! With the length, or terms, of the connexion we have nothing here to do ; that matter falling under the head of general legislation : but it is obvious that the question of restraint, and that for life, would be disencumbered of its only plausible excuse, the desertion of the wife and the comforts and education of the children, under arrangements where neither the comforts nor property of the wife or the children, nor the education of the children, could be at all affected by the duration of the contract. The iniquitous partiality of the law, giving unbridled range to the adulteries of one of the parties, while it punishes the other, those to whom nature has given less animal, and partial institutions, less mental strength, in a mode next in severity to the loss of existence, would, like so many other of the expedients of insecurity, be evaded in the co-operating communities. Divorce from bed and board, and permission to re-marry, would be as acceptable, in case of ill-treatment or disagreement, to the weaker party as to the stronger. Community of property would dash to impotence the cruel infamy of the code of exclusion against one-half of the human race, leaving them without property, civil or political rights, and consequently without knowledge, but keeping them liable to punishment, frequently aggravated, in case of contravention of the code. Hence, in these communities, from all these combined circumstances, it is almost impossible that any alliance of the sexes should be formed on any but the most virtuous principles, from a

mutual perception of good personal qualities and a sincere desire to increase each other's happiness. Where there is nothing but affection and personal good qualities to be gained by the union, nothing else will be sought for. Where nothing is to be gained by ill-treatment of the physically weaker party, and where the means of tyranny, equally pernicious to all, are taken out of the hands of, or rather voluntarily relinquished by, the stronger party, merit and kindness will necessarily be the qualities cultivated to ensure the esteem and conciliate the affections of parties so connected. No distinctions arising from the impertinences of what are called birth or rank, any more than of wealth, being known in these communities—personal qualities founded on utility, or tendency to happiness, being the only sources of distinction—it is evident that any one having these—all, after the first founders, having partaken of one common and comprehensive education of real knowledge and useful habits—may aspire to please any other person of such a community. None, calculated by peculiar shades of character and feelings to increase each other's happiness, would be separated and rendered miserable by perverted public opinion, or unfeeling private pride. Not only would all the unmarried be free to all, for the finding out of kindred inclinations within each community, but throughout every other co-operating community the universality of mutual choice would exist, so that amongst all such communities, the choice would be as unrestrained to the members of each other, as at home. With such an opening for the exercise of esteem and affection, and all the pleasing associations attending on the sexual passion, who, of such communities, could ever think of wantonly flinging away the higher gratifications of this passion for its lowest impulses, encompassed with disgust and satiety, because not relieved by intelligence and sympathy? A thousand fold, therefore, would the pleasures arising from, and connected with, the sexual passion be increased by mutual co-operation and joint possession, the

sources of the evils arising from its misdirection being dried up.

But, will it be asked, "In this free scope for esteem and affection, will not jealousies and rivalries spring up, and evil from this source be increased?" The chief cause of jealousy and rivalry—next to the general and all-pervading principles of disunion arising from the institutions of insecurity—is the low estimate in which women are now held, as mere articles of property, ornament, and occasional use to men. Women are supposed to have no feelings, no choice of their own; like houses or sheep, they are supposed to be quite passive as to the occupant; the perfection of the ascetic morality being that they should have no feelings at all, or if any, those of alienation from men and from happiness. Now, where all these circumstances are reversed, where women are brought up and treated like rational beings, and enjoy in all respects equal advantages with men, they will not, like ripe fruit or bales of cloth, be fought for; their opinion will be of some trifling weight in the disposal of their persons and happiness for life; and no greater indignity could the imagination frame for such women, than the supposition that they were to become the willing prey of the stronger or more fortunate of two contending savages. Where the choice of two men is the same, the choice of the woman will of course be the preponderating motive; and *vice versa*, should two women happen to have an equal affection for one man. Besides the extent of the choice, the removal of all artificial restraints, the numbers all around of intelligent and amiable companions, hold out so much of hope in a new choice, that it is impossible gravely to apprehend any evil, further than the excitement of occasional and temporary regret for accidental miscalculations, from such a source. From peculiarities of physical temperament and natural defects of the mental (cerebral) organisation, no state of social combination can guard.

The circumstances of general society admitting, by our

supposition, of an advance of numbers, how is this increase to take place in these co-operating communities? As soon as some of the young become adults, wish to marry, and find no private rooms in the community made vacant by nature, their wishes are made known. As adults, they have as much influence, in proportion to their means of persuasion, in the regulation of the affairs and the disposal of property, as any other members of the community. The sole question is, would it add to the general happiness, that of old, young, middle-aged, children, and aspirants to marriage included, either that pecuniary means of establishment should be afforded out of the general stock, or that new habitations should be erected for the accommodation of the new couples? Whichever mode of proceeding is judged wisest, will be adopted. As even now in general society we find that parents sometimes abridge their actual comforts, or those they might otherwise enjoy, to establish their children, feeling more happiness from sympathy in the increased enjoyments of their children, than pain in the loss of the personal use or ownership of the articles of wealth which procured those increased enjoyments; how much more probable is it, that such pleasures of sympathy will be rated at their highest, where articles of wealth are estimated solely for their intrinsic use, and not at all as means of factitious distinction? So strong will, doubtless, frequently be the attachment to the scenes, the incidents, and the companions of youth, in these communities, that many, though wishing to marry, would prefer deferring and remaining amongst their friends to acquiring an establishment by purchase in another community, or as parties of a new community. Others, again, would be pleased with the variety of new settlements. None, it is presumed, would return into the comparative vices and miseries of general society. Should the parties wishing to marry, be of different communities, the rule followed, that of freedom as tending to the most happiness, would probably be that the parties, when agreed, should be per-

mitted to fix on the community they liked best for their future residence (if determined to wait for a vacancy), the party removing to transfer an individual's share of stock from the old to the new-adopted community. The just value, under prosperous circumstances, to be given to adults preferring a settlement out of the community to waiting for a vacancy within, would be an equal share of the whole accumulated property, one out of a thousand or two thousand in proportion to the number of members. This, or any smaller sum, would be given according to various circumstances, at different times, in the same or different establishments. On the freedom of choice in marriage, or even the time of marrying, no restraint whatever would be laid by these regulations, the general laws of society rendering such restraint by compulsion impracticable, and the interests of the parties themselves not rendering a voluntary restraint probable. The effect of such premature marriages, would be simply, the want of a settlement of private rooms within the community, or of funds to procure a settlement without, accompanied of course with the censure of public opinion on an act of imprudence, should such connexions under such circumstances be deemed imprudent. But these casualties could only occur in a declining or stationary community; the present is supposed to be under advancing circumstances, under which the accumulations of the community would be always proceeding, in anticipation of such regularly-occurring demands. Where the original numbers were small, where additional adjoining land could be procured, where new buildings could be conveniently added to the original, or an additional story given to their height, such a mode of providing for increasing numbers, by enlarging the establishment, might be adopted; and nothing but experience will determine what number of co-operators, under different circumstances, will give the largest result of individual and of course of universal, happiness. It is evident that under such circumstances of prosperity

amongst co-operating communities, no evils, whatever would arise from the sexual passion. Usefully and easily gratified, it would be the gentle bond of universal sympathy: restraint would not provoke it to crime, nor would means or opportunities of excess, reduce it to satiety, disgust, or cold selfish sensuality.

We come now to the last of the popular objections to the system of voluntary equality, by means of joint production, possession, and enjoyment,—to those of a *political* nature. The only one under this head that seems here deserving of notice, is that which alleges that “these co-operating communities, if successful, would gradually supersede all the present institutions of society by withdrawing mankind from their operation.”

This objection is well founded. If the present institutions, the comforts, the characters, and enjoyments to which they give rise, were such as they ought to be, it would be superfluous to devise new arrangements to evade or improve upon them. It is exactly because these institutions are supposed to be defective, to be irreconcilable with the real improvement and happiness of man, that the new arrangements are proposed for adoption. But in what way is it proposed to supersede these old institutions founded in the ignorance and passions of past ages? By convincing those who support them, as well as those who are injuriously affected by them, that their happiness would be increased by joining in the new social arrangements. It proposes to take nothing of acquired property from any one. Its object is to raise all, even the most depressed, to an equality of happiness with those who now esteem themselves the most fortunate. Now, are the holders of political power, and the retainers of these institutions, unwilling to trust themselves as judges in their own cause? to permit themselves to adopt what on examination they may deem most conducive to their own happiness? Would they wish to bind themselves to remain, in spite of their own convictions, the eternal slaves of institutions,

though they might wish, on examination, to be no longer in bondage to them? Or would they wish to take away from their fellow-creatures that liberty of judging respecting their happiness, which they would claim for themselves? Political power has now no choice but the following left: it must either adopt this alternative of free discussion, or subject itself to the daily risk of the attacks of force from secret combinations. The truth has got abroad amongst the inhabitants of Europe, that all political institutions ought to be tributary to the happiness of at least the majority—and if of the majority, almost always of all—of those whose interests they affect, and that that happiness ought to be pursued in the way deemed by that majority the most conducive to it. Neither compulsion nor delusion can much longer govern the affairs of men. Human beings must henceforth judge for themselves, and must be governed through their understandings.

But, there remains another objection, partaking of the nature of all the preceding, economical, political, and moral, to the anticipations of equality of wealth and universal diffusion of happiness from production by mutual co-operation. It is said, that “communities possessing the richest land, though in no greater quantity than necessary for their own support, will always have an advantage over those possessing poor soils requiring more labour in culture and manure to obtain the same amount of produce; and that this advantage will be constantly increasing as population advances, and less and less fertile lands are necessarily brought into cultivation.”

This statement supposes that the system of mutual co-operation has so far advanced, that all the communities are possessors of their own soil and capital; a result which would certainly take place in a few years after their establishment, even where the original co-operators were so poor as to be under the necessity of borrowing the whole of their capital. The more destitute such a community at its commencement, the longer, probably, and more per-

severing would be their daily labour to work out their independence.

That the advantage pointed out, would be enjoyed by the fortunate holders of rich land over those cultivating the poor, though held by each in quantities no more than sufficient for the supply of their own wants, cannot be doubted. But the following considerations will show how very small is the amount of this apprehended evil.

As there is in every country, in proportion to its present population, an abundance of land of the first and second quality, whether naturally rich or sterile, to support its present population under the system of labour by mutual co-operation, and in most cases to support a much larger population; there can be no necessity for tilling bad lands, not to say the worst, till the working of the system of mutual co-operation shall have very much increased the population of all nations adopting it.

When this shall have taken place—reverting to the operation of increased comforts in begetting a desire to retain them, and habits of foresight and prudence to secure their continuance, as well as to the operation of knowledge, by education and otherwise, on the minds of young and old of these communities—when all the good lands shall have been cultivated, it will then be a simple question of calculation, how far it would be desirable—productive of increased happiness to the whole society—to proceed in the cultivation of inferior lands. Let improvements in culture be what they may, as we cannot suppose but that rich as well as poor lands will partake of their benefits, or that they will ever make rocks, sands, and mountains as fertile as loams, the difference of soils and the superiority of the good must continue. There will be always in every country, and almost in every district, some lands so barren, that not all the labour of a whole community during eight hours, or every hour of every day of the year, could extort from them enough to preserve the lives of the cultivators. Were rock and sands, by breaking down,

mixing, and absolute superinduction of an artificial soil upon them, made productive, the want of heat, from elevation, would in many cases baffle the effort; and the enormous yearly toil requisite to keep such artificial soils in repair, would always ensure the advantage of the naturally fertile soils. The inequality of effort, requisite to procure for different communities an equal supply of food and other articles procured by labour from land, must therefore continue. But we may safely trust to the wisdom of future societies, to prevent a waste of their labour on such unproductive soils, to discontinue their efforts at that point of infertility when labour will cease to yield preponderant good. The check will operate in this way. The young people of the flourishing and happy communities already established on the good lands, wish for marriage unions before vacancies (rooms) occur in their respective establishments. Their share of the capital of the community to which they belong, we suppose they can command. What is the choice before them? Either to join with other young people like themselves, and devote the united labours of their lives to improve a portion of the sterile land, or to remain surrounded with every rational comfort where they are, till the circumstances of the community permit their marriage. Let the desire of marriage and settlement be ever so strong, the experience of all men in all times, convinces us, that it will not be gratified at the expense of the sacrifice not only of the previous physical comforts of life, but of all those ties of kindred and friendship which would here so powerfully prevail. What *now* makes emigrants and settlers on new, though even the most fertile, soils? *Distress*: distress of the emigrants; and of the parent society from which they emigrate. Who ever heard of the emigration and new settlement of prosperous young people, in order to anticipate by a few years the period of marriage? But even if they did *now* take place, when every individual, without any data for judging, trusts to his chance in the lottery of life,

and gratifies at all hazards a present inclination, what reason would that afford that under circumstances so altered, where chances on all sides were reduced to certainties, the same imprudences would occur—imprudences no longer, but converted into absolute insanities? It is almost needless to observe, that whatever lands could not be advantageously cultivated under mutual co-operation, could much less be cultivated under individual exertion. To pasturage or some other use than tillage would such lands be converted.

The mass of the evil ultimately apprehended from this source being thus removed, we might still follow its minutest traces; we will, however, content ourselves with the statement of an expedient, just to all, not a forced but a voluntary expedient, by which all fear of this *obstacle of nature* to a perfect equality of wealth from the different productiveness of different soils, must be effectually dispelled.

All restraints, and of course all institutions, of insecurity being, as we suppose, removed, still the same principle of co-operation of communities, will be requisite in conducting the national affairs of common interest of all the individuals of all communities, that is so admirably beneficial in conducting the comparatively private affairs of a family of individuals in each separate community. If the principle be good for the co-operation of a thousand individuals in one community, it is equally good for the co-operation of a thousand or a hundred thousand communities, where their joint interests are concerned. Contributions of national wealth will still be requisite to carry on national undertakings, to maintain *security* from without, as well as from within. Public as well as private plunder ceasing, the products of the labour of no community being abstracted from its own use without an equivalent by it deemed satisfactory, its consent must be obtained to every such abstraction. The amount of these voluntary abstractions or contributions for district, provincial, national, international, or philanthropic purposes,

would be, inconceivably small, when the passion for individual accumulation and display of wealth had ceased, and when almost all the occasions for the exercise of the ordinary functions of government had also ceased, being superseded by the voluntary discharge of such of those duties as were found necessary within each separate community for its own benefit. Small as they might be, suppose it was proposed to these communities, or any individuals representing them, that the owners of the rich soils producing more wealth, with equal effort, than their less fortunate neighbours, should, according to the degree of fertility of their soils, contribute towards these necessary annual payments. Is it to be supposed that such a contribution, for none but useful purposes, would by such favoured communities be objected to?—a payment in the shape of what is now called rent, the accumulation of which in individual hands is one of the main-stays of excessive inequality of wealth. The contest more probably would be on the part of the communities with poor land, for opportunity to share the pleasure of contributing to such useful objects. Suppose, again, the worst, that all were selfish, and none wished to pay any part of the public burden, though for purposes of which all, or at least a great majority, approved, and in which all were interested, the will of the majority decrees a tax in the shape of rent, in lieu of all other taxes, to be levied on the rich lands in proportion to their surplus fertility over the poorest generally cultivated lands. By such a regulation, the public burdens would be discharged, and perfect equality as to labour and enjoyments derived from wealth, would be produced. If, therefore, after the explanations that have been given, the evil from unequal fertility of soils is still esteemed great, the remedy is simple, is at hand, and quite commensurate to the disease.

SECTION VI.

EQUALITY OF WEALTH MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY REASON ALONE.

Such is the survey, which truth, according to the best judgment of which I am capable, compels me to take of the system of voluntary equality in the distribution of wealth by means of mutual co-operation, under the shelter of equal and perfect security. All force and delusion being removed, the co-operation of each individual depending on his perception of the tendency of the proposed measures to exalt his individual happiness by associating it with that of others, all sinister interest or mysterious design on the part of the agents and promoters of such plans being removed, what remains but that rational men should everywhere try so magnificent an experiment?

Much remains to be done. Knowledge remains to be diffused. Mystery must be disclaimed. The whole truth in all its simplicity must be laid before the minds of all. Neither from the few holders of political power, nor from the real society, everywhere plundered, made vicious and miserable by the wretched institutions of which the holders of political power are the tools and the champions, must any part of the truth be concealed. All *consequences* must be frankly laid open. Men must be henceforth governed by their reason, contemplating their interest. These communities will not be formed, and ought not to be formed, by enthusiasm, any more than by the arm of authority. Every individual co-operator must be, and ought to be, convinced. This individual convincing, remains to be achieved. It is not enough that no force, no delusion, no sinister interest should exist; the very suspicion of them should be cleared away from the minds of those expected to co-operate in such communities. Whether Jesuits, Moravians, Shakers, or Harmonists, no communities of mutual co-operation have hitherto been instituted, that have not been founded on principles of

exclusion. Hence the persuasion that it is impossible to found them on other principles. Ignorance on the part of the flock, blind submission to their mountebank leaders, proscription of all free inquiry and all other knowledge than that scanty portion requisite to make them regular producers and feeders, have been hitherto the characteristics of labour by mutual co-operation. No wonder that the enlightened and the sincere, no wonder that all lovers of truth, turned from them in disgust.

These deep-rooted associations must be broken: on free inquiry and knowledge, must these communities be henceforth founded: their utility, not only as to food and raiment, but as to every other source of human happiness, particularly as to freedom from sinister control, must be demonstrated. Men must ultimately see and pursue their interest when plainly laid before them. A more important and more extensive change in human society was never contemplated by the mind of man. Reason is the only agent worthy of effecting such a change. The puny and suspicious aid of self-constituted political power, would but mar the mighty work. The deliberate wisdom of whole nations, expressed through those, or in the manner, they may appoint, may hereafter facilitate to all individuals so inclined, the acquisition of the entire use of the products of their labour by mutual co-operation. Meanwhile, let individual persuasion go forth: for surely a scheme for the production and distribution of wealth, combining all the benefits of all the opposite modes of human exertion hitherto practised, and for the attainment in the highest degree of all other human enjoyments, a scheme so wise and so beneficent, and withal so gentle even to those who must be its opponents, creating and not destroying, raising all and depressing none—in real happiness depressing none—the progress of human knowledge never, heretofore, enabled human being to disclose.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

OF all the sources of error in reasonings respecting wealth, none have been more frequent or more unavoidable, than assuming that the circumstances surrounding the writer, in whatever country writing,—circumstances generated by the modifications of insecurity there prevailing,—were unavoidable and necessarily permanent. The institutions of insecurity, generating peculiar moral or immoral habits, and causing endless modifications in the production and distribution of wealth, not only differ in every country on the face of the globe, but are continually varying in the same country. Hence the improbability of establishing any permanent or universal truths on such partial and treacherous foundations; but hence, also, the prevalence of the error of generalising, or drawing false conclusions from insufficient data.

As in physical, so in moral inquiries, we must first ascertain facts. In physics, material things and their properties; in morals, institutions, actions, and their consequences. In morals, the real difficulties—and till of late years the persecutions—attending the inquiries, have retarded this first step of science. This step, however, only preparatory to real knowledge, has been looked upon as knowledge itself; the materials of judging have been used as a bar to prevent the exercise of judgment. Explaining the way in which wealth had been hitherto produced and distributed, inquirers thought their work was done. A collection of all past laws, would be as rational a substitute for the best code of legislation.

Our object being to ascertain that mode of distributing wealth which would lead to its greatest reproduction and to the greatest preponderant happiness from all other sources, all former modes of production and distribution have necessarily been discarded as authorities to preclude our judgment as to new combinations, and have been used simply as materials to enable us to form that judgment aright. Slavery and free labour, with all their modifications, the institutions of Hindostan and those of Britain, have been equally used as materials of judging, have been equally spurned as authorities to preclude judgment, and have been equally subjected to the rigid scrutiny of utility. In this mode of inquiry, discarding all particular interests, all existing modes of distribution, or rather merging all particular ill-understood interests, all those aptly termed sinister interests, in the universal interest, the interest of the great mass of men, we have endeavoured to disentangle the question from the intricacies of expedients, instituted for the most part by passion and ignorance, to attain objects for the most part also undesirable, and to reduce the question of distribution to its simplest elements. Men, labour, materials; the materials afforded by nature, out of which the mental and muscular powers of mankind must fabricate all those means of happiness which wealth affords; such are our simple elements. How out of these to fabricate, by means of wealth, the greatest mass of happiness, has been the problem to be solved. This problem solved, another inquiry, only secondary in importance, presented itself—how, with the least inconvenience, to reduce the present chance-formed modes of producing and distributing wealth to that mode which would produce the most happiness?

It was found in the beginning of the inquiry, that *equality* of distribution was calculated to produce incalculably more happiness than any other mode of distributing wealth, provided the ultimate lots were not so small as to be unworthy the trouble of acquiring and enjoying them,

and provided such distribution were effected without the evils of force.

Equality of distribution ought, therefore, to be the rule, to be departed from in those cases only where reasons can be given productive of preponderant good.

There being no other way of producing wealth but by human effort; sometimes by individual exertion, sometimes by the united exertions of more than one, sometimes by united exertions of hundreds; it is obvious that if the principle of equality of distribution of any given quantity of wealth were extended beyond those concerned in its production, though the present pleasure of enjoyment by the distribution were increased, yet the motive to the future production of wealth would be taken away from the producers, and would by no means be given to those to whom enjoyment was given by equality of distribution, without having shared in the labour of production. The producer or producers of wealth would never voluntarily consent that what they had produced for their own purposes, for their own use and enjoyment, should, after production, be taken from them and distributed to increase the happiness of others not co-operating in its production. This principle applies equally to the cases where the wealth in question has been produced by the joint efforts of two hundred or two thousand, as where it has been produced by two. This limitation as to equality of distribution of the articles of wealth, is called the principle of security. Equality must be limited by security. Security means "free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges." Without security there is no reproduction. In proportion to the completeness of the security—knowledge and all other circumstances remaining equal—will be the abundance of the production. In proportion to the defect of the security, will be the falling off in the production, till it shall ultimately cease. Whether wealth is produced by one or by a thousand individuals, by individual competition or by mutual co-operation, the necessity

of security to reproduction is the same. If the articles of wealth produced by a thousand or ten thousand, be without their consent distributed amongst twenty or a hundred thousand, amongst as many as think the shares so reduced worth their acceptance, will not the future productions of these one thousand or ten thousand, be as much discouraged, as the production of an individual would be by a like distribution of what his single efforts had produced?

The universal and paramount claim for security—which can only apply to articles procured by labour—thus established, and no other principle being discovered to restrain the blessings of equality; it follows that equality ought always to be the rule of distribution where not incompatible with security, much more where the dictates of security and those of equality point the same way.

The term “security” has been stripped of the falsehood and sophistry with which it has been hitherto associated. The security here spoken of, is the equal security of all, not the security of a few only, with the insecurity of the greater number; it is the security of “the power of producing,”—of producing indefinite quantities to be consumed and reproduced every year, of the productive powers of every individual, not of the mere handful of accumulated products of those powers which some few have, by whatever means, accumulated.

The only justifiable limit, that is to say, the only limit productive of preponderant good, to equality of distribution, being *equality of security*, the effects of upholding impartially this principle of equal security, have been anxiously traced; and it has been shown that equal security impartially dealt out to all members of society, instead of being confined to a favoured few, becomes in its progress the companion and the only firm and unfailing support of equality of distribution; not, as hitherto falsely supposed, its enemy. Though it may not produce absolute equality, though it may not preclude the possibility of casualties arising chiefly from physical causes, though

some may be still found richer and some poorer than others, yet will all extremes of wealth and poverty be banished. The great mass of the vices and miseries arising from excessive wealth and excessive poverty, will cease, and those only will remain which are inseparable from the competition of talent and exertion in its most useful form.

That spurious security, upheld by the terrors of political power, and too often slavishly or ignorantly worshipped by political economists,—security in the enjoyment and *perpetuation* of all existing modes of acquisition, or rather of commanding the products of the yearly labour of others, to their chance possessors, though wrung from the insecurity of the rest of the community,—has been exposed; and the monstrous hypocrisy and other vices, the various wretchedness, and the weakening even to the annihilation of industry and reproduction in proportion to the extent of its sway, which this false substitute for real impartial security has everywhere produced, have been exhibited. To this fatal usurper of the name of security, has been given its real and appropriate title, “insecurity,” and all the various and ever-shifting means of force and fraud, which it has employed to attain its ends, to perpetuate its usurpations over the happiness of men, have been styled the “expedients or institutions of insecurity.” While the genuine principle of equal security leads to an almost actual equality in the distribution of wealth, produced by impartial competition, the false principle of spurious security leads to the utmost inequality of its distribution, by trampling down competition and excluding all the world but itself from the benefits of security. To such horrible abuses has the spurious term security been applied, that under its name has been justified and is still upheld, the system of human slavery, that assemblage in one word, that wholesale license for the perpetration, of all human vices and crimes affecting the property and the person of another. The security in all shapes of one human being must be surrendered to maintain an incon-

siderable atom of the security, that of part of the property of another human being !

The characteristics of genuine, or equal, security and of spurious security, or of security and insecurity, have been developed.

<i>Equal security</i>	<i>Spurious security</i>
Protects the free direction of the labour of all.	Restrains the free direction of labour to all but its favourites ; to whom, in addition, it permits the use of force and fraud.
Protects all alike in the entire use of the products of their labour.	Permits the plunder of the products of the labour of all, by those having political or other power.
Protects all voluntary exchanges.	Restrains all exchanges in order to increase or perpetuate the acquisitions of its favourites (<i>by means of which acquisitions they engross almost all the products of human labour</i>), or to facilitate the collection of public plunder, or for other partial purposes.

These characteristics of equal security as to wealth, embrace what have been vaguely called the "Natural Laws of Distribution," or those fundamental rules respecting the distribution of wealth, which no law of any society can violate without detracting in a proportionate degree from the greatest mass of happiness which wealth is calculated to produce:—*Free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges* ; so simple are the rules on which all just distribution of wealth ought to be founded.

Spurious security directs its almost undivided atten-

tion to the *actual accumulations* of wealth, to the preservation of the divisions and modes of division which actually exist: equal or genuine security, looks more to the *productive powers*, to the capacity of producing future wealth, than to the actual quantity accumulated; and neither to that portion which is, or which may be, accumulated, is its attention directed with any other view than that of educating therefrom the greatest possible mass of human happiness, that of the non-possessors as much as of those who possess. To estimate the importance of this distinction, we should inquire, which of the two masses of wealth, that already accumulated even in the most wealthy community, or that capable of being produced, yearly, or in a few years, by ordinary skill and industry, are the greatest in quantity and the most influential on human happiness.

It is little thought, by most persons not all suspected, how very small a proportion, either in extent or influence, the actual accumulations of society bear to human productive powers, even to the ordinary consumption of a few years of a single generation. The reason is obvious; but the effect very pernicious. The wealth that is annually consumed, disappearing with its consumption, is seen but for a moment, and makes no impression but during the act of enjoyment or use. But that part of wealth which is of slow consumption, furniture, machinery, buildings, from childhood to old age stand out before the eye, the durable monuments of human exertion. By means of the possession of this fixed, permanent, or slowly consumed, part of national wealth, of the land and materials to work upon, the tools to work with, the houses to shelter whilst working, the holders of these articles command for their own benefit the yearly productive powers of all the really efficient productive labourers of society, though these articles may bear ever so small a proportion to the recurring products of that labour. The population of Britain and Ireland being twenty millions, the average consumption of each individual, man, woman,

and child, is probably about twenty pounds, making four hundred millions of wealth, the product of labour annually consumed. The whole amount of the accumulated capital of these countries, it has been estimated, does not exceed twelve hundred millions, or three times the year's labour of the community; or, if equally divided, sixty pounds capital for every individual. 'Tis with the *proportions*, rather than with the absolute accurate amount of these estimated sums, we are concerned. The interest of this capital stock would support the whole population in the same comfort in which they now exist, for about two months of one year, and the whole accumulated capital itself would maintain them in idleness (could purchasers be found) for three years! at the end of which time, without houses, clothes, or food, they must starve, or become the slaves of those who supported them in the three years' idleness. As three years to the life of one healthy generation, say forty years, so is the magnitude and importance of the actual wealth, the accumulated capital of even the wealthiest community, to their productive powers, to the productive powers of only one generation; not of what, under judicious arrangements of equal security, they might produce, particularly with the aid of co-operative labour, but of what, under the defective and depressing expedients of insecurity, they do absolutely produce! It is probable that were the whole society at full and easy work under the co-operative system, they would be able to reproduce in a year and a half (were they in the meantime supported) the seeming mighty mass of existing capital; to maintain and perpetuate which (or rather the command of the products of yearly labour which it serves as the means of engrossing)—for no one wishes to lessen it—in its present state of forced division, are all the horrible machinery, the vices, crimes, and miseries of insecurity, sought to be perpetuated. As nothing can be accumulated without first supplying necessities, and as the great current of human inclination is to enjoyment; hence the comparatively

trifling amount of the actual wealth of society at any particular moment. 'Tis an eternal round of production and consumption. From the amount of this immense mass of annual consumption and production, the handful of actual accumulation would hardly be missed; and yet it is to this handful, and not to the mass of productive power, that attention has chiefly been directed. This handful, however, having been seized upon by a few, and been made the instrument of converting to their use the constantly recurring annual products of the labour of the great majority of their fellow-creatures; hence, in the opinion of these few, the paramount importance of such an instrument. Of importance, that is to say of benefit, to them, yes; but of a far different, a melancholy importance to those, the labour of whose life it makes tributary to the enjoyments, supposed or real, of the favoured few; of importance, as compared with the labour of the lives of the productive classes, none whatever. As about one-third part of the annual products of the labour of these countries is now abstracted from the producers, under the name of public burdens, and unproductively consumed by those who give no equivalent, that is to say, none satisfactory to the producers, it is evident that even under the present arrangements, *this abstraction ceasing*, the amount of the present capital, twelve hundred millions, could be accumulated, though at the expense of great privation and distress, in nine years. The annual produce being four hundred millions, the produce of nine years would be three thousand six hundred millions, the one-third part of which, or twelve hundred millions, is the capital demanded. Under the co-operative system of labour, half the time, or much less, would produce the same result, and allow of ample comforts to the producers during the accumulation. Both of these cases suppose that the present burdens of insecurity were removed. While they remain, individual exertion and co-operative labour must both pine; though co-operative labour would thrive, were it silly enough to

bear it, under a burden which would crush to the earth individual exertion. ■

A fair estimate, it is hoped, may now be formed of the comparative importance in the scale of human happiness of accumulated wealth, as opposed to productive powers of creating wealth. With the accumulated masses, particularly when held forth in the hands of a few individuals, the vulgar eye has been always struck. The annually produced and consumed masses, like the eternal and incalculable waves of a mighty river, roll on and are lost in the forgotten ocean of consumption. On this eternal consumption, however, are dependent, not only for almost all gratifications, but even for existence, the whole human race. The quantity and distribution of these yearly products, ought to be the paramount objects of consideration. The actual accumulation is altogether of secondary importance, and derives almost the whole of that importance from its influence on the distribution of the yearly productions.

It is in this point of view that the happiness derivable from wealth has been here considered. Actual accumulations and distributions, have been always considered in reference, and subordinate, to the power of producing. In almost all other systems, the power of producing has been considered in reference, and subordinate, to actual accumulations, and to the perpetuating of the existing modes of distribution. In comparison to the preservation of this actual distribution, the ever-recurring misery or happiness of the whole human race has been considered as unworthy of regard. To perpetuate the results of force, fraud, and chance, has been called security; and to the support of this spurious security, have all the productive powers of the human race been unrelentingly sacrificed. But it is here maintained that no actual mode of distribution is worthy of a moment's regard, except in as far as it tends to promote a preponderance of happiness of the whole society, the poor as well as the rich included.

To set free the *future* productive powers* of the community, is what equal security demands. Actual accumulations must be separated from the power of future production. While on the one hand equal security interferes not with the great mass of past real accumulations, on the other it shields the future exertions of productive power from the future continued attacks of that force, fraud, and chance, to which they have been hitherto exposed.

It has been shown that equality and security equally demand, that in order to obtain the greatest blessings of which they are susceptible, it is necessary that every producer of wealth should have the entire use of the products of his labour or exertion. But as long as the labourer stands in society divested of everything but the mere power of producing—as long as he possesses neither the tools nor machinery to work with, the land or materials to work upon, the house and clothes that shelter him, or even the food which he is consuming while in the act of producing,—as long as any institutions or expedients exist, by the open or unseen operation of which he stands dependent day by day for his very life, on those who have accumulated these necessary means of his exertions—so long will he remain deprived of almost all the products of his labour, instead of having the use of all of them.

Force (as well as fraud and chance) being altogether excluded, as inconsistent with genuine equal security, from being employed as an instrument in producing the benefits of equality of distribution, or of the greatest practicable degree of equality; and the great mass of productive labourers being now without those means of making their labour productive to themselves or to those whom they wish to benefit by it; it has been proved that a strict adherence for the future to the natural laws of distribution, free labour, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges (implying, of course, the abolition of institutions or expedients inconsistent with them), would lead peaceably to this desirable result, and gradually put

all productive labourers in possession of the several articles, under the name of capital, which are necessary to them to enable them to gather the fruits of their industry.

But, under the protection of the natural laws of distribution, or of equal security, there are two modes of production which may be employed to attain this most essential object, to put all productive labourers into the possession of that portion of capital, and no more, which may be necessary to secure to them the products of their labour. It is as inconsistent with human happiness in general, as with the greatest production of wealth, that capital should be possessed by one set of individuals, and labour by another; utility demands that all productive labourers should become capitalists, that labour and capital should be in the same hands. Knowledge, in the present state of the human mind, will follow the union of capital and labour.

Many political economists, it is true, assert that this state of things can never generally exist. If you ask, why? the reason is, "It has never been." This reason, at best but partially true, is not worth examining. Not so, the amount of the extortion by these means practised on the producers of wealth. By taking out of the possession of the labourer the articles necessary to make his labour productive, and vesting them in other hands than his, in the hands of a distinct set of men, called capitalists, by the open and covert expedients of insecurity, the producer is frequently defrauded of three-fourths of the produce of his labour. If the producer owned his own house, machinery, materials, &c. to the amount say of a hundred pounds, what would be to him the yearly cost or waste of such property? If these articles lasted one with another fifty years, the expense would be two pounds a-year, to which for repairs add one, and three pounds a-year will at the end of the fifty years replace the original capital of one hundred pounds, keeping it all the intermediate time in a state fit for production. Suppose the worth of his

labour to be two shillings a-day for three hundred days in the year, we have thirty pounds to represent the yearly value of his labour; out of which, three pounds, or one-tenth, is consumed in keeping up the things necessary, under the name of capital, to make his labour productive. The remaining nine-tenths of the products of his labour, remain free to be applied to the purposes of enjoyment, either by immediate consumption or by the fabrication of articles calculated for the use of many years. How different is the case when this capital, instead of being possessed by the producer, is possessed by another person called his employer! For the use of the one hundred pounds capital, the employer will require a profit of ten to twenty, say on an average fifteen, per cent. The yearly value of his labour remains as before thirty pounds. Thus one-third, a half, or two-thirds, of the value of his labour, according to quantity of capital accumulated, and other circumstances influencing the rate of profits, are abstracted from him and handed over to the possessor of the capital. And lest this extortion should not be sufficient, the modes of regulating wages and keeping down combinations amongst the producers, are resorted to, to reduce still further to the smallest possible pittance, the remnant of the produce of his own labour left to the producer for his support. But this capital, represented by one hundred pounds, if produced by the labourers themselves, would not cost one-half the labour represented by that sum. On the other hand, the abstraction by political power of one-third of the remaining products of labour, reduces to a contemptible decimal the portion of the produce of their own labour left to the producer. Lest his eyes should be opened to this multiplied and enormous injustice, he is kept everywhere in the most profound possible state of ignorance; the advocates of insecurity shrewdly and wisely suspecting that if he acquired knowledge, he would become unfit for his situation, and discontented with it. Doubtless as knowledge is diffused, this tremendous state

of things will cease, and the labourer possessing knowledge, will not only be entitled to, but will enjoy his reward in the entire use of the products of his labour. Capital, labour, and knowledge will be re-united, never more to separate.

The two modes, under the shield of equal security, of effecting this union are,

The mode of production by labour, with equal individual competition,

The mode of production by labour, with mutual co-operation.

The advantages of the system of labour by free and equal competition over the present everywhere existing systems of restraints and exclusions, have been pointed out; and the still superior advantages of labour by mutual co-operation over the ordinary mode of labour under these same expedients of insecurity, have also been pointed out. The advantages of the system of labour by mutual co-operation over the best direction of it by individual exertion, have been explained in many particulars; enough to show the great superiority of that mode of production, not only as respects wealth but every other source of happiness, over all the modes of production hitherto practised. It is evidently for the interest of society, and even more as to happiness from all other sources than from mere immediate wealth, that as much as possible of human labour should be performed by mutual co-operation; in preference to the system of individual exertion and competition, even in the best form of which it is susceptible.

These two schemes of production, or systems of labour, resting equally on the broad basis of impartial security, so far from being incompatible with each other, must lend each other support for their mutual protection against the expedients of insecurity, against the revival of them, or of new expedients of oppression. Whatever number of individuals from the different isolated occupations of life, associate together for common benefit, the rest of society

is left unmolested, its previous accumulations of capital untouched. The associated communities produce and consume like large families, of such numbers as to supply conveniently the whole of each others' wants and comforts of all sorts worthy of the trouble of supplying them by labour, without in any way interfering with those who labour by competition. The associated communities, for all important articles, are a demand and supply to themselves. If from the effect of their superior combinations and universally diffused skill, they are able to undersell the capitalists of general society, in the disposal of that part of their produce which they raise, to be exchanged for articles which they cannot at equal cost of labour produce themselves at home, one important effect will be, that productive labourers and all rational idlers (if such there be), retailers, and such classes, will see, day by day, the policy of adopting the line, always open to them, of changing their mode of labour by competition for that of co-operation. It is not till the co-operating communities spread over the face of society, absorbing almost the whole domestic and foreign supply of such articles as they deem it wise to produce, that these communities will, in an extensive mercantile way, clash with the interests of large capitalists and their individual pauper producers. Should such time arrive, then the producers by competition of such articles must of necessity adopt the improved method of associating together, and supplying their wants by mutual co-operation. From the impossibility of living any longer isolated, each striving for himself, they will be forced—capitalists and labourers—to make themselves happy by a combination of supply and demand. If they are undersold in their old mode of industry, a new and superior mode is always open to them; a mode which does not admit of over-stocking, where on themselves alone will depend the supplying of all their essential wants.

The great object of wisdom and benevolence with respect to the distribution of wealth should be, to make

every member of society a capitalist-labourer and a contributor to the joint stock of happiness ; and, with this view, to devise arrangements by which this great object may be effected with the least possible inconvenience, not only to the holders of the capital already accumulated, but even to the idlers who are now a mere burden on productive labour, and of little benefit to themselves. Whatever the supposed inconvenience, 'tis as nothing compared with the benefits of the mighty change. Political changes are useful in as far only as by establishing, or making advances to the establishment of, the great principle of genuine "security;" their obvious tendency is to bring about this great change, which the unnecessarily degraded mass of mankind,—without knowledge, without comfort, without mutual kindness,—demand of the hand of justice, and which the real interests of those who esteem themselves *privileged* classes, almost equally demand.

As long as the accumulated capital of society remains in one set of hands, and the productive powers of creating wealth remain in another, this accumulated capital will, while the nature of man continues as at present, be made use of to counteract the natural laws of distribution, and to deprive the producers of the use of what their labour has produced. Were it possible to conceive that under simple representative institutions, any such of the expedients of insecurity should be permitted to remain in existence as would uphold the disunion of capital and labour, such representative institutions (though all the plunder of political power should cease) would be of little further benefit to the real happiness of mankind, than as affording an easy means for the development of knowledge and the ultimate abolition of such expedients. *As long as a class of mere capitalists exists, society must remain in a diseased state.* Whatever plunder is saved from the hand of political power, will be levied in another way under the name of profits, by capitalists, who, while capitalists, must be always the law-makers. The possession of larger

masses of capital than the ordinary average, by a *few* scattered through society, and forming an exception to the general rule, would produce no apparent mischief: its influence in the way of extortion, would be nothing in face of the general system of capitalist-producers. Producing by competition, or producing by co-operation, till the producers become possessed of the houses in which they live, and of all things requisite to make their labour productive, and to secure to their own disposal the whole products of their labour, they will remain, though by whatever indirect means, the efficient, though apparently voluntary, slaves of those possessed of the things without which their power of producing is vain.

But the case supposed is an impossible one. Representative institutions are incompatible with the expedients of insecurity; their very establishment includes the ceasing of the most mischievous of all expedients, that of public plunder, of abstracting, for any purpose, the products of labour without the consent of the producer; their very establishment tends to the dissolution of the league between capitalists and the holders of political power; because the great and paramount interest of those not possessed of capital would be as fully represented as that of those possessing it; their very establishment gives the power to the majority, whose interest it is, to abolish one by one every expedient of insecurity, and at the same time affords the most efficient means for the acquiring of that knowledge, which is necessary to all having power, for its right use, the production of the greatest mass of happiness.

Inimical to every scheme of labour, to every arrangement tending to remove those of the present pernicious distinctions of society which are unconnected with moral or intellectual worth, inimical to every project for raising their fellow-creatures to a level with themselves, whether by competition or co-operation, must the holders of political power necessarily be. Otherwise they would use

that power for the sole purpose of abolishing, with as little inconvenience as possible to any human being, all such distinctions. Are they not, like all other human beings, the creatures of the circumstances in which they are and have been placed? And can it be rationally expected that they will become the admirers of systems, the ultimate effect of which must be to abolish all factitious distinctions between them and their fellow-creatures? all those distinctions, on which depends almost the whole of the little happiness of life they possess, though purchased by the wretchedness of the millions of their fellow-men? No—no—they will patronise whatever and whomsoever they can hope to make subservient to their limited and mistaken views. Failing this object, no other aid can be expected of them, than the withholding of brute force as an answer to statements of facts and reasonings addressed to the interest of mankind. Prudence will compel them to this policy. As a class, conviction will never operate upon them; in proportion as knowledge is diffused through the mass of mankind, they will yield through prudence, not through conviction.

The system of labour by mutual co-operation appears to be attended with such paramount advantages, not to class or party, but to the whole of society, that it can well afford a competition with individual or isolated exertion in its best shape. If it cannot, it ought not to be preferred or followed. Nothing but experience of the two under their best forms, can or ought to convince mankind of the superiority of either. The same previous circumstances are requisite for the full development of both. Equal security once established, and the best form of individual exertion being exhibited, the real points of superiority of labour by co-operation will be apparent, and individual exertion will have no means of evading the proofs of its inferiority by appealing to restraints no longer existing. Equal security once established, a theatre boundless as human efforts will be open to every possible combination of

labour ; and that system of labour which shall be found to promote the most happiness, and the most wealth (as far as worth the labour necessary to create it), will ultimately supersede all other combinations, in as far as it can be usefully applied. Equal security once established, those who are now destitute, the poor, the ignorant, the vicious, the wretched productive labourers of society, will gradually acquire the small capitals necessary to enable them to form large unions of co-operative labour, without depending on the precarious aid of capitalists to put their productive powers in motion. Equal security once established, labour by co-operation will follow in its train as a necessary consequence, should the fatal disunion between capital and labour impede, while that disunion and the institutions on which it is founded remain, its previous establishment. Equal security once established, the co-operating communities, like the rest of society, may exert all their energies and multiply productions in peace, assured that the whole fruits of their industry will be at their own disposal.

What is the conclusion from the whole of our inquiry ?

Of all the causes which operate on the human character and human happiness, none is of so much importance as the distribution of wealth ; because on that depend almost all those circumstances, those relations, on which the development of character and happiness depends. But, on the principle of utility, every existing generation having alone the means of judging correctly, possesses the same right, or in other words, would promote its own greatest happiness by exerting the power, of so distributing all the means of happiness it possesses, wealth included, as to ensure that greatest happiness ; just as that same right was exercised by its predecessors.

No existing distribution ought to be upheld further than as it can be shown to promote preponderant good. If, therefore, it increased the mass of happiness of the whole community (all interests and consequences imme-

diate and remote considered), to re-distribute in any possible way the accumulated wealth, land, houses, machinery, food, clothes, and other materials of the whole society, and to re-regulate the future direction of labour, that re-distribution and re-regulation ought to take place: inconvenience to any party being as much as possible removed or mitigated in effecting the change.

The mass of real accumulated wealth, in point of magnitude and influence on human happiness, is so utterly insignificant when compared with the powers of production of the same society in whatever state of civilisation, or even compared with the actual consumption for even a few years of that society, that the great attention of legislators and political economists should be directed to "*productive powers*" and their future free development, and not, as hitherto, to the mere accumulated wealth that strikes the eye.

Of what is called *accumulated* wealth, by far the greater part is only nominal, consisting not of any real things, ships, houses, cottons, improvements on land, *but of mere demands on the future annual productive powers of society*, engendered and perpetuated by the expedients or institutions of insecurity.

Therefore, without injury to future production and happiness, all accumulations of physical things, or real wealth, may be left in the hands of those who now possess them, to enjoy them as they may; the use of such articles as a mere means of appropriating to their possessors the wealth to be created by the future productive powers of society, being that alone of which the natural laws of distribution would, without force, gradually deprive them, or, if aided by co-operative labour, would in a very few years deprive them.

If nine-tenths of any society were persuaded that it would tend to the happiness of all, by means of the system of co-operative labour, or any other modification of labour, under the shield of equal security, that all the existing

accumulations of real wealth should be equally divided, so as to make all capitalist-labourers ; it would not be the interest of all to use compulsion towards the minority of one-tenth, being the possessors of the real wealth, to force this distribution ; because,

If force, instead of persuasion, were used in the formation of the new arrangements of society, what guarantee could be given that force would not be used by every succeeding majority, leading to the annihilation of industry and production ?

The unconvinced possessors of the real wealth would suffer more than the majority would gain, the sense of injustice neutralising the pleasures of the majority, and increasing the pain of the privations of the oppressed.

The surplus produce of the productive powers of a few years of the majority of the whole society would repay this capital, if borrowed instead of being taken by force, to the satisfaction of all ; or would soon produce a greater amount, without the obligation of borrowing ; making their own houses, machinery, &c. themselves.

The small minority, possessors of the real capital, would be ultimately convinced to lend, or devote it, to such useful purposes—if proved to be useful ;—or whether convinced or not, they would, whether from sympathy or prudence, or both, conform to the clearly expressed wishes of those around them : where there is public opinion founded on knowledge, a minority can never long resist it : 'tis only where there is no knowledge, no public opinion, that a minority can rule by force.

The small minority, possessors of the real capital, whether convinced, sympathising, prudential, or not, would, under such circumstances, find no other use for their capital than making it instrumental to bring about the new order of things generally desired.

Equal security not affording them the means of using it as an engine for extorting the bulk of the future products of labour from the producers, it must remain unproductive, or be employed to bring about, however reluctantly, the end desired.

If a mere majority of any society were persuaded that all producers should be capitalists, all the evils of the use of force would be so much the greater. Equal security, and free discussion, one of its consequences, would speedily accomplish, without force, everything useful.

In a word, in order to produce the greatest happiness derivable from wealth, the greatest equality reconcileable with security, every producer, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or in any other way affording a satisfactory equivalent for wealth, or to possess the faculty of freely directing his labour, with *capital* sufficient to secure to himself the whole products of his labour, whether producing on his own account alone, or co-operating in company with others; and along with this, *knowledge* to show him how to use and retain these advantages.

The means to bring about this desirable distribution, are—

1. Simple *representative institutions*.
2. The *entire abolition*, under these, of *all the restraints of insecurity* (entail, primogeniture, combination local and general, wages-regulation direct or indirect, monopolies of knowledge of professions, of trades, bounties, game, privilege laws, public plunder, with all other expedients incompatible with equal security or the natural laws of distribution), with as little inconvenience as possible to any individual; leaving untouched all past real accumulations, but guarding all future products of labour equally from all attacks of force or fraud, direct or indirect, public or private.
3. *The progress and diffusion of knowledge*, and the gradual perception of their real interests by all

societies, would gradually effect the remainder; that is to say, everything useful as to wealth, as well as to every other means of producing happiness, in social arrangement.

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THE END.